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Abstract	
This	thesis	belongs	to	the	fields	of	creative	writing,	cultural	theory	and	Lacanian	theory.	It	comprises	two	components:	one	is	a	work	of	creative	writing	entitled	"Two	Negations".	The	"First	Negation"	 is	an	exploration	of	Part	A	of	German	philosopher	 G.	 W.	 F.	 Hegel's	 Phenomenology	 of	 Spirit	("Consciousness",	 from	 §90	 to	 §165)	 that	 chooses	 not	 to	rely	on	secondary	sources,	instead	remaining	as	close	to	the	text	as	it	can	while	establishing	surprising	or	controversial	links.	The	"Second	Negation"	consists	mostly	of	aphorisms,	with	a	handful	of	essays;	 its	content	side-tracks	from	what	is	initially	a	highly	metaphorical	and	personal	narrative	into	considerations	 upon	 the	 psychoanalytic	 understanding	 of	time	 and	 space,	 and	 more	 specifically	 the	 feminine	modalities	 of	 this	 experience.	 Creative	writing	 here	mixes	psychoanalytic	 concepts,	 Hegelian	 vocabulary	 and	 well-known	 works	 of	 modern	 and	 contemporary	 philosophy	with	 pop	 music	 and	 original	 fiction.	 This	 symptom	 writ	large	eventually	begs	the	question	of	what	it	 is	a	symptom	of,	raising	the	stakes	for	an	interpretation.	
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	 The	 second	 component	 is	 a	 reflective	 commentary	that	seeks	to	put	in	context	the	creative	writing	in	order	to	interpret	 it.	 Since	 Nietzsche's	 philosophy	 resembles	 Two	
Negations	 in	 both	 substance	 and	 style,	 it	 is	 the	 scholarly	material	best	fit	to	bring	contextual	light	to	it.	The	first	part	of	 the	 commentary	 therefore	 investigates	 the	 use	 and	function	of	aphorisms	in	Nietzsche's	books,	focusing	on	the	analogy	 with	 the	 French	 moralists.	 The	 second	 part	discusses	 Jacques	 Derrida's	 critique	 of	 Nietzsche	 in	 two	papers	 written	 in	 the	 1970s,	 in	 particular	 the	 ground-breaking	 emphasis	 on	 the	woman	 in	 Nietzsche's	writings,	an	analysis	that	bears	on	Two	Negations.	The	third	and	final	part	 introduces	 the	 question	 of	 melancholia	 in	 Two	
Negations	in	connection	with	Nietzschean	nihilism	and	the	psychoanalytic	 understanding	 of	 mourning,	 and	 closes	 on	the	 notions	 of	 Author	 and	 Style	 in	 Hegel	 and	 French	Romanticism.			 		 		
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General	Introduction	
	
Aims	and	objectives	Historically,	modern	philosophy	 involved	 the	mediation	of	content	 in	the	sole	movement	of	the	dialectic,	whereas	the	university	 imposed	 the	 reification	 of	 theological	 and	philosophical	 discourse	 under	 the	 academic	 pen.	 By	 using	creative	 writing	 to	 express	 philosophical	 ideas	 instead	 of	academic	writing,	 this	 thesis	 aims	 to	 recreate	 the	 historic	tension	 between	 the	 freedom	 of	 the	 philosopher	 and	 the	constraints	 of	 the	 university	 in	 order	 to	 say	 something	novel	about	 theory.	How?	The	two	negations	of	 the	 thesis'	title	allude	to	the	structure	of	its	creative	component,	which	divides	 into	 two	parts,	or	 "negations".	The	 first	part	 (First	Negation)	 abolishes	 the	 critical	 distance	 of	 the	 scholar	 to	over-identify	with	 the	Hegelian	 text	 through	 a	 paraphrase	that	fully	absorbs	the	content	of	part	A	("Consciousness")	of	Hegel's	 Phenomenology	 of	 Spirit	 regarding	 the	fragmentation	of	phenomenological	experience.	The	second	part	 (Second	 Negation)	 follows	 this	 up	 by	 writing	 a	metaphor	 of	 its	 own	 through	 a	mixture	 of	 fictional,	 poetic	and	 psychoanalytic	 language	 crafted	 in	 aphorisms.	 In	 the	creative	 writing,	 fragmentation	 thus	 passes	 from	 content	(the	subject	of	the	First	Negation)	to	form	(the	style	of	the	
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Second	Negation).	This	negation	 is	then	negated	at	 the	end	of	 the	 creative	writing	and	 in	 the	 reflective	 commentary	–	its	aphoristic	 form	 is	 cancelled	by	 the	 return	of	 secondary	sources	and	rigorous	academic	writing,	and	its	fictional	and	psychoanalytic	 content	 is	 taken	 apart	 by	 analysis.	 Put	simply,	this	thesis	lets	a	philosophical	subject	emerge	from	the	 creative	writing	 for	 the	 commentary	 to	 distinguish	 its	essential	 features	 in	 the	 otherwise	 disorienting	 wealth	 of	references	and	themes.	The	question	for	us	is	double:	what	does	 fiction	 tell	 us	 about	 theory,	 what	 is	 the	aforementioned	 fragmentation	 the	 sign	 of?	 And	 what	 can	the	experience	of	writing	creatively	about	philosophy	tell	us	about	 past	 like-minded	 philosophical	 endeavours	 such	 as	Nietzsche's?		
Primary	texts	In	 the	 creative	 component,	 the	 thesis'	 key	 primary	 text	 is	Hegel's	Phenomenology	of	Spirit.	This	is	because	Hegel	once	again	 appears	 today	 as	 the	 master	 and	 the	 endpoint	 of	philosophical	 enquiries,	 and	 therefore	 the	 dogmatic	 wall	against	 which	 the	 creative	 writing	 rebels.	 The	 creative	component	 mainly	 looks	 at	 part	 A	 and	 B	 of	 the	
Phenomenology	("Consciousness"	and	"Self-Consciousness")	as	 it	 reflects	 on	 the	 fragmentation	 (and	 alienation)	 of	consciousness	in	both	the	First	and	Second	Negation.		
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	 The	 creative	 component	 also	 features	 a	 number	 of	recurring	 literary	 references,	 including	 Keats'	 and	 Dylan	Thomas'	 poetry,	 Arthur	 Conan	 Doyle's	 Sherlock	 Holmes	stories,	 and	 Truman	 Capote's	 Breakfast	 at	 Tiffany's.	 Their	inclusion	reflects	the	architecture	of	hysteria	that	supports	the	 creative	 writing,	 as	 it	 suggests	 eccentric	 characters	(Sherlock	Holmes,	Holly	Golightly)	and	the	unrequited	love	of	the	poet	posited	against	the	anxiety	of	dying	(Keats'	"Ode	to	a	Nightingale",	N2§241;	Thomas'	"And	Death	Shall	Have	No	 Dominion",	 N2§149),	 themes	 that	 characterise	 the	Second	Negation.	As	to	the	selection	of	pop	songs	and	films,	it	 illustrates	 the	 conceptual	 shifts	 at	 work	 in	 the	 creative	writing	 –	 shifts	 that	 are	 analysed	 in	 detail	 in	 the	introduction	to	the	commentary.	For	example,	the	inclusion	of	 Christopher	 Nolan's	 films	 for	 discussion	 (N2§162,	N2§189n12)	 comes	 in	 connection	 to	 the	 clashing	temporalities	 that	 are	 evoked	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	Second	 Negation.	 Similarly,	 the	 discussions	 of	 Pop	 music	singers	(N2§166)	cement	the	shift	we	see	in	the	text	from	a	general	 discussion	 about	 the	 work	 of	 the	 signifier,	 to	 a	question	about	femininity.		 Because	 Nietzsche's	 aphoristic	 writing	 and	 his	sometimes	 fictional,	 often	 confrontational	 approach	 to	theory	 resemble	 in	 substance	 and	 style	 the	 experiment	 of	
Two	 Negations,	 the	 Nietzschean	 corpus	 is	 central	 to	 the	
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reflective	 component,	 and	 almost	 all	 of	 Nietzsche's	 works	are	 largely	 discussed	 in	 the	 three	 parts	 that	make	 up	 the	commentary.	In	the	first	part,	the	commentary	also	touches	upon	 many	 works	 by	 the	 French	 moralists,	 so	 that	 the	comparison	Nietzsche	and	Two	Negations	is	contextualised	in	 the	 larger	 tradition	 of	 fragmentary	 philosophical	 prose	Nietzsche	would	have	been	aware	of.	It	features	secondary	sources	 analysing	 the	 link	 between	 aphoristic	 writing,	Nietzsche	 and	 the	 French	 moralists,	 notably	 R.	 Pippin's	book	Nietzche,	Psychology,	and	First	Philosophy,	as	this	book	in	 particular	 bound	 all	 three	 together	 in	 its	 discursive	movement.	In	the	second	part,	the	commentary	turns	to	the	link	 between	 the	 aphoristic	 writings	 of	 Nietzsche	 and	 the	question	 of	 femininity	 that	 haunts	 it	 and	 Two	 Negations,	summoning	 the	 ground-breaking	 scholarship	 that	 has	preceded	 as	 well	 as	 accompanied	 Jacques	 Derrida's	interventions	 on	 this	 subject,	 namely	 the	 works	 of	 Sarah	Kofman,	 Bernard	 Pautrat	 and	 Philippe	 Lacoue-Labarthe.	And	 it	 of	 course	 includes	 Derrida's	 two	 interventions,	 i.e.	
Spurs	 and	 Otobiographies.	 When	 the	 commentary	 finally	analyses	 melancholia	 in	 the	 writings	 of	 Nietzsche	 and	beyond,	and	relates	it	to	the	French	Revolution,	the	primary	and	 secondary	 texts	 include	 Alenka	 Zupančič's	 work	 on	Nietzsche,	 Freud's	 and	 Lacanian	 analyst	 Russell	 Grigg's	works	 on	 melancholia,	 and	 Rebecca	 Comay	 and	 French	
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writer	Chateaubriand	on	the	link	between	melancholia	and	the	French	Revolution.		
Theoretical	framework	
Two	 Negations	 implies	 the	 specifically	 Hegelian	 nature	 of	two	negations,	namely	that	two	negations	are	not	unrelated	to	each	other	–	on	 the	contrary,	one	 is	 the	negation	of	 the	other.	 The	 negation	 of	 the	 negation	 of	 a	 content	 (or	substance)	does	not	take	us	back	to	the	original	content	by	simply	 cancelling	 the	 first	 negation,	 it	 ushers	 in	 a	 new	content	that	is	born	out	of	these	two	successive	negations:	in	 Hegelian	 terms,	 the	 subject.	 For	 example,	 academic	substance	is	cancelled	by	the	First	Negation	that	unleashes	poetic	 and	 fictional	 contents,	 until	 these	 too	 are	 reined	 in	and	eventually	negated	at	 the	end	of	 the	Second	Negation,	leaving	us	with	only	one	word,	"style",	which	is	then	at	the	heart	of	the	commentary's	argumentative	effort.		 Two	Negations	also	avails	 itself	of	 the	experience	of	psychoanalysis	to	bring	about	this	philosophical	moment	of	specular	rupture	and	symbolic	overcoming,	so	much	so	that	(Freudian	 and	 Lacanian)	 psychoanalysis	 is	 the	 other	obvious	element	in	the	theoretical	framework	of	the	thesis.	In	his	1925	paper	"Negation",	Freud	described	a	negation	as	the	 necessary	 first	 step	 on	 the	 path	 of	working	 through	 a	new	content,	as	it	is	the	only	way	for	the	subject	to	isolate	a	
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signifier	 or	 an	 object	 as	 such,	 and	 not	 re-include	 it	 in	 the	self-same	 phenomenological	 experience	 of	 the	 world.	Subjectivity	isolates	an	object	in	an	otherwise	blind	horizon	and	then	works	itself	out	against	that	object	to	come	out	on	its	 own.	 If	 the	 first	 negation	 is	 thus	 the	 negation	 of	 the	other,	 the	 second	 is	 the	 negation	 of	 self,	 so	 that	 the	seamless	 specular	 imaging	 that	 characterises	 social	 life	 is	disrupted.	 This	 applies	 to	 the	 creative	 component.	 The	agent	 first	negates	 the	other	along	 the	path	of	bad	 infinity	that	 leads	 to	 no	 redeeming	 feat	 –	 the	 larger	 questions	surrounding	Hegel	are	short-circuited	by	the	paraphrase	in	the	 First	 Negation,	 which	 turns	 them	 into	 a	 private	monologue	 instead	 of	 the	 academic,	 therefore	 public,	debate.	The	agent	then	negates	 itself	 in	existential	 fashion,	so	 that	 something	 new	 comes	 up	 –	 every	 attribute	 of	 the	author's	substance	is	symbolised	and	thereby	negated,	from	the	film	and	music	tastes	to	the	literature	preferences	to	the	personal	 experiences.	 This	 twofold	 structure	 not	 only	recalls	 the	 immense	sacrifices	made	by	 the	Hegelian	 "Self-Consciousness"	 transitioning	 to	 "Spirit"	 (at	 the	 end	 of	 the	section	 on	 "Unhappy	 Consciousness",	 see	 §229	 of	 the	
Phenomenology),	 but	 also	 the	 askesis	 that	 characterises	psychoanalysis	 according	 to	 Freud	 and	Lacan.	 So	 that	 this	thesis	 may	 borrow	 and	 then	 discard	 psychoanalytic	theoretical	 language	at	a	superficial	 level,	but	 it	constantly	
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and	consistently	reflects	this	askesis	at	a	more	fundamental	level.		
Methodology	In	 the	 creative	 component,	 I	 try	 to	 achieve	 a	 decentring	effect	 through	 creative	 writing.	 In	 the	 First	 Negation,	 this	creative	methodology	 is	more	paraphrastic	 in	nature	–	 the	writing	closely	follows	the	Hegelian	source	and	rehearses	in	its	own	words	the	movement	of	Hegel's	thought	in	Part	A	of	the	 Phenomenology.	 It	 does	 not	 reflect	 critically	 on	 the	terms	used	by	Hegel	or	his	overall	approach.	In	the	Second	Negation,	 the	 methodology	 could	 be	 qualified	 as	 anti-methodological	 insofar	as	 it	 evades	definition.	The	writing	is	first	purely	poetic,	then	it	is	fictional	in	the	guise	of	being	aphoristic,	 until	 it	 builds	 more	 logical	 and	 rigorous	arguments	and	case	studies	just	when	the	reader	is	getting	used	 to	 fictional	 aphorisms,	 and	 finally	 returns	 to	 more	esoteric	 and	 metaphorical	 prose	 at	 the	 end.	 No	 single	methodology	is	applied	throughout,	and	that	is	the	common	thread	that	links	up	otherwise	heterogeneous	fragments:	it	is	an	anti-methodology.			 In	the	commentary,	the	methodology	of	the	thesis	is	more	rigorous	and	academic:	a	question	is	introduced	(Part	A:	is	Nietzsche	a	French	moralist?	Part	B:	what	is	the	role	of	sex	 in	 Nietzsche	 and	 Hegel?	 Part	 C:	 what	 is	 the	 relation	
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between	 Nietzsche,	 melancholia	 and	 the	 French	Revolution?);	the	secondary	literature	is	reviewed	in	order	to	contextualise	the	initial	question	and	frame	it	in	current	scholarly	 debates;	 and	 the	 argument	 works	 through	 the	content	 to	 articulate	 an	 original	 answer	 to	 a	 specific	question	 so	 as	 to	 make	 a	 contribution	 to	 the	 scientific	literature.		
Structure	and	Form	The	thesis	 is	made	of	 two	main	components	 in	addition	of	this	 general	 introduction	 –	 creative	 writing	 (I)	 and	reflective	 commentary	 (II).	 The	 creative	 component	includes	 the	 "two	negations"	of	 the	 title,	 the	 first	being	an	exploration	 of	 Part	 A	 of	 Hegel's	 Phenomenology,	 and	 the	second	a	 series	of	 aphorisms	and	 longer	essays	divided	 in	seven	sections	of	varying	lengths.		 The	 reflective	 commentary	 features	 a	 partial	introduction	 that	 tries	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 conceptual	journey	 of	 the	 creative	 writing,	 laying	 the	 ground	 for	 an	interpretation	(in	 its	 full	 teleological	sense)	of	 the	creative	material.	This	interpretation	first	explores	fragmentation	as	a	 philosophical	 form	 through	 the	 analysis	 of	 its	 most	famous	exponent,	Nietzsche,	and	forerunners	in	the	guise	of	the	French	moralists	 (Part	1).	The	commentary	 then	turns	to	 the	 substance	 of	 Nietzsche's	 aphoristic	 writing	 as	
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deconstructed	 by	 Jacques	 Derrida	 in	 the	 1970s	 –	 this	deconstructive	 work	 passes	 through	 the	 main	 stations	 of	Nietzsche's	prose,	namely	poetry,	 femininity	and	 the	state,	and	 eventually	 summons	 Hegel	 (Part	 2).	 Finally,	 the	commentary	 establishes	 a	 link	 between	 the	 question	 of	Nietzsche	and	melancholia	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	French	Revolution	on	the	other	(Part	3).	
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	 1	
				I.	CREATIVE	WRITING
	 2	
	
	 3	
First	Negation	
Breaking	Through	
§1	 –	 In	 the	 Introduction	 to	 the	 Phenomenology	 of	 Spirit,	Hegel	 succinctly	 describes	 how	 natural	 consciousness	enters	the	'way	of	despair'	in	contact	with	a	negation.	What	negation?	 Negation	 first	 appears	 as	 an	 object	 that	 throws	every	 prejudices	 held	 up	 to	 now	 as	 knowledge	 (sense-knowledge	 from	 now	 on)	 into	 doubt.	 It	 is	 a	 pure,	 raw	 or	
undeveloped	negation	at	 first,	no	more	than	a	 flicker	–	one	that	will	awaken	consciousness	all	the	same.	This	negation	opens	up	the	dimension	of	truth,	or	at	least	the	quest	for	it	–	our	 consciousness	 trips	 on	 the	 contradiction	 between	sense-knowledge	 and	 the	 object	 that	 contradicts	 it.	Knowing	 is	 therefore	 only	 gnawing	 at	 first,	 but	 this	question-mark	 over	 the	world	 IS	 the	 birth	 of	 subjectivity:	Hegel's	'untrue	consciousness',	which	was	no	consciousness	at	 all,	 becomes	 torn	 apart	 between	 itself,	 the	 sensuous	immediacy	 which	 is	 for	 it	 sense-knowledge,	 and	 the	contradictory	object.	We	have	the	following:						
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Consciousness				Being-for-another										 	 	 Being-in-itself	(object)	 	 	 	 	 (truth)		Consciousness	 truly	 becomes	 Consciousness	 at	 this	 point	(capitalised	 from	 now	 on).	 The	 initial	 negation	 becomes	determinate	negation	 the	more	 the	object	proves	 false	my	prejudices.	 Determinate	 negation	 is	 the	 content	 of	 this	proving-false,	 what	 Hegel	 calls	 Knowing	 (capitalised	 from	now	 on).	 And	 this	 content	 points	 to	 a	 third	 dimension	beyond	untrue	consciousness	and	the	sensuous	appearance	of	 the	 object	 –	 truth,	 this	 in-itself	of	 things;	 but	 only	 the	experience	of	error	–	errancy?	–	can	gradually	delineate	this	dimension.	 With	 this	 first	 appears	 the	 notion	 qua	 the	apprehension	of	the	object	from	the	repeated	experience	of	error.	Consciousness	 is	no	 longer	at	one	with	 itself,	unlike	untrue	consciousness;	it	is	always	both	consciousness	of	the	object	and	of	its	own	relating	to	it.	The	object	is	for-another	insofar	 as	 it	 lies	 before	 the	 eyes	 of	 Consciousness;	 the	contradictory	object	is	at	first	only	for	it,	for	Consciousness.	But	 it	 is	 now	 a	 matter	 of	 whether	 Consciousness	 can	surrender	the	object	immediately	introjected	(in-another),	
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and	 surrender	 it	 to	 other	 consciousnesses	 (for-another).	Once	 this	 dialectical	 movement	 occurs,	 and	 the	 object	 is	surrendered,	it	will	have	left	the	object	for-itself.	We	come	to	grasp	this	essential	matrix	of	Hegelian	thought:	 in-itself,	for-another,	in-another,	for-itself.		§2	 –	We	 go	 through	 this	movement	 again.	 This	 operation	sense-knowledge/gnawing/Knowing	 reaches	 its	 end	when	Consciousness	 finds	 out	 that	 the	 in-itself	 is	 at	 least	 partly	in-another,	 and	 Consciousness	 grasp	 itself	 through	 this	other	 it	mirrors	 itself	with	(this	could	be	the	phenomenon	of	 transitivism	observed	 in	children);	and	 that	 the	 in-itself	as	 a	 dimension	 of	 the	 object	 only	 emerges	 against	 the	
background	 of	 the	 work	 of	 Consciousness,	 against	 the	background	 of	 Consciousness’	 previous	 beliefs	 being	proved	false	(determinate	negation).	Consciousness	reflects	on	 the	 movement	 of	 introjection	 that	 has	 taken	 place.	 It	grasps	 the	 determinateness	 of	 the	 negation	 –	 only	 when	Consciousness	 exhausts	 previously-held	 prejudices	 does	 it	get	 that	 this	 in-itself	 was	 only	 tenable	 against	 their	background.	 When	 this	 background	 vanishes,	Consciousness	does	not	fill	up	the	object	with	a	new	sense-knowledge;	 rather	 the	 object	 will	 have	 filled	 up	Consciousness	 with	 doubt,	 not	 as	 immediate	 anxiety	 as	 it	was	 at	 first	 (gnawing),	 but	 as	 a	 "mediated	 new	 mode	 of	
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existence	 for	 Consciousness,"	 to	 use	 Hegel's	 words	 (PoS,	Introduction).	Real	inquiries	only	start	now	–	it	is	precisely	when	doubt	deploys	 itself	 over	 the	whole	of	 the	 sensuous	world	that	Consciousness	takes	cognizance	of	the	fault	that	lies	 within	 itself.	 Consciousness	 also	 learns	 that	 its	fundamental	 operation	 is	not	one	of	 testing	 its	 knowledge	(that	is,	perhaps,	the	animal's	operation).	Rather,	since	this	knowledge	was	proved	 false	 in	 its	 entirety	by	 the	original	negation,	 the	 operation	 of	 Consciousness	 is	 one	 of	 testing	
the	criterion	of	what	Knowing	is	(PoS§84).	Last	but	not	least,	the	 object	 becomes	 for-itself	 –	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 not	reabsorbed	 in	 the	 self-same	 experience	 of	 the	 world	(insofar	 as	 it	 has	 survived	 introjection),	 it	 raises	 the	prospect	 of	 a	 presence	 absolutely	 other	 within	 itself.	 The	object	is	endued	with	a	life	all	 its	own,	something	that	will	become	 very	 clear	 in	 the	 traversing	 of	 the	 Thing	 (see	below).			§3	–	In	this	movement	Consciousness	has	glimpsed	a	world	outside	 its	window,	 and	 smoke	 hangs	 over	mirrors.	 Filled	with	 anxiety	 at	 the	 prospect	 of	 walking	 on	 air,	Consciousness	will	seek	to	land	on	common	ground.	In	this	attempt,	 it	 will	 gradually	 find	 itself	 more	 and	 more	groundless.		
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Breaking	Through	Sense	
§4	–	Consciousness	that	now	understands	the	object	is	for-itself,	 or	 is	 not	 reabsorbed	 in	 the	 self-same	 experience	 of	the	world,	will	 inquire	further:	what	is	the	world	made	of?	Consciousness	 will	 discover	 the	 Universal	 (capitalised	 to	distinguish	it	from	the	adjective)	–	what	the	author	believes	Saussure	 called	 the	 signifier	 –	 through	 the	 dialectics	 of	Sense-Certainty	 (capitalised	 when	 understood	 as	 a	movement).	To	follow	Hegel's	demonstration	closely:	when	we	say	This	Here	to	designate	this	day,	and	then	This	Here	to	designate	this	night,	only	the	universal	This	is	preserved	and	 the	 sensuality	 of	 the	 statement	 becomes	 the	unessential	part,	as	day	passes	over	into	night	in	the	second	This.	 The	 This	 therefore	 registers	 our	 meaning	 (the	intention	 of	 the	 statement)	 more	 than	 the	 sensuousness	that	was	initially	associated	to	it.	As	we	say	This	Here	And	Now	 a	 second	 time	 in	 the	 evening,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 sense-certainty	 is	 supported	by	 the	universals	Here	and	Now,	or	that	 sense-certainty	 is	 inseparable	 from	 its	 statement.	 To	put	 it	 differently,	 whether	 it	 is	 day	 or	 night	 is	 the	unessential	 part	 of	 the	 statement.	 Hegel	 also	 uses	 the	example	of	the	'I	see	a	tree'/'I	see	a	house'	to	show	that	in	the	 dialectic	 of	 the	 subject	 and	 predicate,	 the	 subject	becomes	 the	 universal	 or	 essential	 moment,	 and	 the	
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predicate,	 the	 sensuousness	 it	 contains,	 the	 unessential	moment.	 	 "We	must	 let	ourselves	point	to	it	 [the	Here	and	Now	 that	 are	 asserted]",	 says	 Hegel,	 "for	 the	 truth	 of	 this	immediate	 relation	 is	 the	 truth	 of	 this	 ‘I’	 which	 confines	itself	 to	 one	 ‘Now’	 and	 one	 ‘Here’."	 (PoS§105)	Consciousness	 is	suddenly	all	 intuition,	and	 its	own	empty	shadow	 is	 cast	 over	 the	 shining	 world.	 Indeed,	 the	immediate	relation	of	This	Tree	never	has	the	truth	of	Being	–	it	will	always	already	have	been.	The	world	flickers	on	the	wall:	it	is	like	pressing	the	remote	control	repeatedly	on	old	television	 screens,	 it	 leaves	 a	 fleeting	 blank	 space	(subjectivity)	 in	 between	 the	 channels.	 Consciousness	cannot	get	hold	of	the	Here	and	Now	outside	of	itself,	even	though	 it	 will	 try	 to	 deceive	 itself	 for	 as	 long	 as	 it	 can.	('Mindfulness'	is	today’s	term	for	such	a	sustained	practice	of	self-deception.)			 What	will	 be	 unravelled	 below	 are	 the	 conclusions	that	 should	be	drawn	 from	what	should	perhaps	be	called	language	acquisition;	but	the	greatest	mystery	remains	this	coalescing	 of	 the	 'I',	 the	 chasm	 between	 subject	 and	predicates,	 this	 opening	 of	 Being	 that	 is	 the	 possibility	 of	the	ejection	of	predicates	out	of	the	subject,	and	vice-versa.		§5	 –	 To	 conclude	 the	 dialectics	 of	 sense-certainty,	we	 can	rehearse	 Hegel's	 movement	 from	 1)	 the	 Now	 that	 is	
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asserted;	 2)	 which	 is	 superseded	 because	 it	 is	 not,	 it	 will	always	already	have	been;	3)	the	truth	of	this	 ‘has	been’	 is	also	superseded	precisely	because	it	is	not;	4)	we	return	to	the	 This	 Now	 through	 the	 negation	 of	 the	 negation.	 The	result,	 however,	 is	 that	 This	 Now	 is	 not	 simple	 sensuous	immediacy	 again,	 but	 a	 whole	 movement	 reflected	 into	itself,	from	which	emerges	a	plurality	of	Nows,	whose	only	encompassing	 term	 is	 the	 universal	 Now	 (PoS§107).	 The	same	 movement	 goes	 for	 the	 Here	 until	 Consciousness	painfully	 understands	 that	 the	 world	 it	 takes	 in	 is	 one	 at	least	partly	 fashioned	by	consciousness;	 that	 the	structure	of	the	statement	is	the	essential	part,	and	the	sensuous	the	unessential.	 In	 this	 process,	 Knowing	 thus	 becomes	essential,	and	the	sense-object	unessential.		§6	–	All	sadness	when	Consciousness	discovers	that	it	does	not	find	itself	where	it	took	itself	to	be!	It	will	therefore	try	its	 best	 to	 deny	 this	 movement	 of	 Sense-Certainty	 by	refusing	 to	 grant	 the	 Universal	 positive	 existence.	 Such	 a	manoeuver	 Hegel	 calls	 Scepticism,	 and	 we	 shall	 see	 now	how	it	deploys.	When	asked	by	his	neighbour	if	he	can	pass	the	 salt,	 the	 sceptic	won't	 acknowledge	 the	 universal,	 and	ultimately	 social,	 nature	 of	 language.	 He	 might	 thus	 snap	back	the	following:	'which	salt?	The	one	on	the	table,	or	the	one	in	the	sea?'	When	we	say	This	River,	the	sceptic	would	
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dispute	again	 that	 it	 is	 this	river,	not	 seeing	 that	when	we	say	This	River,	we	rely	on	the	conventionally-used	sense	of	This	River.	There	may	be	thousands	of	rivers	and	it	may	be	inadequate	 for	 us	 to	 call	 the	 river	 ten	 minutes	 down	 the	street	 This	 River,	 as	 this	may	 refer	 to	 these	 thousands	 of	rivers,	 but	 language	 is	 always	 the	 language	 shared	 by	 a	community,	 and	 a	 local	 community	 use	 a	 This	 River	 that	refers	to	the	one	around	the	corner,	not	one	half-way	across	the	 world.	 This	 conventional	 use	 of	 language,	 or	 the	intentionality	 of	 the	 statement	 (what	 Hegel	 designates	 as	the	 meaning	 of	 what	 we	 say,	 what	 precisely	 makes	 the	Universal	universal)	this	 is	what	the	sceptic	cannot	accept.	It	is	as	if	sense-certainty	is	too	precious	to	be	tainted	by	the	other’s	words.	 Insofar	 as	we	 have	 seen	 sense-certainty	 to	contain	 the	 Universal,	 the	 revolt	 of	 Hegel's	 sceptic	 is	paradoxically	a	defence	of	language	when	it	fancies	itself	to	be	 a	 defence	 of	 the	 sensuous	world	 –	 it	 is	 a	 defence	 of	 a	world.			 To	 use	 an	 extremely	 trivial	 example:	 a	 man	 the	author	 never	 met	 was	 very	 fond	 of	 gipsy	 jazz	 music,	 and	would	 fly	 into	 a	 fury	 at	 listening	 to	 his	 girlfriend	 sing	Shakira’s	 pop	 song	 “Gipsy”.	 Wasn't	 it	 the	 vulgarisation	 of	the	 notion	 'Gypsy'	 by	 a	 popular	 singer	 that	 truly	 was	intolerable?	As	 if	 the	song	betrayed	the	authenticity	of	 the	experience	of	gypsy	jazz	music,	in	Hegelian	terms	the	sense-
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object	 Gypsy.	 However,	 precisely	 when	 the	 sceptical	consciousness	 defends	 a	 sense-object	 against	 its	 notion,	arguing	that	the	universalising	Notion	betrays	the	sensuous	wealth	of	the	sense-object,	it	in	fact	cannot	see	that	what	it	is	 really	 defending	 is	 its	 very	 meaning	 of	 the	 sensuous	object,	what	 'Gypsy'	means	to	 this	 sceptical	 consciousness.	Such	 a	 defence	 is	 therefore	 truly	 a	 defence	 of	 sense-knowledge,	 not	 Knowing.	 This	 procedure	 is	 the	 pure	obverse	 of	 the	 more	 common	 manoeuver	 by	 which	 the	sceptic	 tries	 to	 deny	 that	 people	 mean	 different	 things.	While	 the	 sceptical	 consciousness	 refuses	 the	 universal	nature	of	language,	today's	sceptic	is	more	likely	to	defend	precisely	 this	 social	 nature	 of	 language	 all	 the	 more,	 in	order	to	obliterate	single	desires.	He	might	thus	argue	that	we	 all	 share	 this	 world,	 that	 we	 are	 one	 in	 it;	 or	 that	philosophy	 should	 immediately	 be	 understood	 by	 all	 and	talk	to	the	 'people'.	This	 is	all	yet	another	way	to	deny	the	Universal	 as	 such,	 the	 shattering	 positivity	 of	 language	outside	 single	 consciousnesses,	 what	 Ferdinand	 de	Saussure	called	la	langue,	the	coherent	set	at	the	synchronic	level	 (in	 contrast	 to	 le	 langage,	 the	 physical	muddling	 of	sounds).	 If	 Consciousness	 gets	 rid	 of	 the	 content	of	 sense-knowledge	when	it	enters	the	way	of	despair,	it	is	only	with	what	 comes	 next	 that	 Consciousness	 will	 also	 shed	 the	
form,	i.e.	this	Play-Doh	of	meaning	that	is	Sense-Certainty.		
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	§7	–	At	the	end	of	the	dialectics	of	Sense-Certainty	we	get	to	the	 conditioned	 Universal	 -	 the	 sense-object	 contains	 the	Universal	 but	 this	 Universal	 remains	 conditioned	 by	 the	sense-object.	 We	 shall	 now	 see	 how	 the	 unconditioned	Universal	unfolds.		 Breaking	Through	The	Thing	
§8	–	When	we	point	something	out	we	now	take	it	up	as	it	is	in	 truth	 –	 a	 Universal.	 This	 is	 what	 Hegel	 means	 by	perception,	 which	 in	 German	 translates	 as	 'to	 take	 the	truth',	literally	'to	take	truly'	[Wahrnehmen](PoS§110).	The	passage	 from	 Sense-Certainty	 to	 Perception	 is	 thus	 the	passage	of	 the	universal	This	 from	a	determinate	no-thing	in	addition	to	 the	sense-object...	 to	 the	proper	constitution	of	the	Thing.		§9	 –	 In	 Perception,	 the	 sense-element	 is	 at	 the	 same	 time	cancelled	 and	 preserved	 in	 the	 Universal,	 it	 becomes	 a	
property	 –	 this	 is	 sublation	 [Aufhebung].	 The	 lushness	 of	the	 tiger’s	 striped	 fur,	 the	 way	 it	 blends	 in	 with	 the	 tall	grass	 and	 vanishes	 into	 the	 jungle,	 up	 to	 the	 single	 thick	hairs	 that	 compose	 it;	 is	 present	 in	 the	 object	 Tiger	 as	 a	property	 that	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 other	 things	 –	 this	 is	
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sublation.	The	affect	of	a	single	tiger	here	is	negated	by	the	universal	 Tiger,	 what	 this	 single	 tiger	 is	 for	 us	 and	 yet	designates	all	other	such	animals	–	and	potentially	anything	and	anyone	else	–	just	as	much.	Recall	the	child	who	curses	and	 throws	at	 the	other	 all	 the	 vocabulary	 it	 has	 amassed	for	 lack	 of	 a	 proper	 insult	 –	 'You	 Tiger!	 You	 Horse!	 You	Bath!	 You	 Table!	 You	 Chair!'	 This	 is	 sublation.	 Once	 a	property,	 black	 stripes	 enter	 the	 matrix	 of	 oppositional	determination	 in	 structuralist	 terms,	 or	 differential	determination	in	Hegel's	lexicon.	The	fur	is	striped	and	it	is	a	tiger	only	insofar	as	it	is	not	spotted	and	it	is	not	a	leopard;	only	insofar	as	 it	 is	not	plain	and	it	 is	not	a	 lion,	etc.	Hegel	specifically	 says	 that	 Being	 is	 universal	 only	 in	 virtue	 of	having	 negation	 within	 itself,	 with	 as	 a	 result	 many	properties	 being	 established	 simultaneously	 –	 but	 again,	only	 thanks	 to	 the	negation	 that	 empties	 the	 object	 of	 the	sensuous.	To	quote	Hegel	at	length	before	we	go	on:		 “Supersession	 [sublation]	 exhibits	 its	 true	 twofold	meaning	which	we	have	seen	in	the	negative:	it	is	at	once	a	negating	and	a	preserving.	Our	Nothing,	as	the	Nothing	of	 the	 This,	 preserves	 its	 immediacy	 and	 is	 itself	sensuous,	 but	 it	 is	 a	 universal	 immediacy.	 Being,	however,	 is	 a	 universal	 in	 virtue	of	 having	mediation	or	the	 negative	 within	 it;	 when	 it	 expresses	 this	 in	 its	
	 14	
immediacy,	 it	 is	 a	 differentiated,	 determinate	 property."	(PoS§113)		By	splitting	the	visual	field	from	without,	negation	gives	it	a	determinateness	 all	 its	 own,	 where	 matters	 fall	 within	themselves,	 or	 are	 immediately	 recognisable	 from	 each	other	–	properties.			§10	 –	 We	 finally	 get	 to	 the	 Thing.	 One	 of	 the	 greatest	metaphysical	 mysteries	 is	 the	 following	 one	 –	 how	 do	properties	 both	 stand	 on	 their	 own,	 indifferent	 to	 one	another,	and	interpenetrate	each	other	in	the	bundle	that	is	the	object?	For	the	fact	that	a	tiger	possesses	four	legs	does	not	 prevent	 it	 from	 also	 having	 striped	 fur	 for	 example...	Here	again,	it	is	worth	following	Hegel	step	by	step	in	order	not	to	lose	the	subtleties	of	this	important	movement:		 "Since	 they	 are	 expressed	 in	 the	 simplicity	 of	 the	universal,	 these	 determinacies	 -	 which	 are	 properties	strictly	 speaking	 only	 through	 the	 addition	 of	 a	 further	determination	 -	 are	 related	 only	 to	 themselves	 (...)	 but	the	 simple,	 self-identical	 universality	 is	 itself	 in	 turn	distinct	 and	 free	 from	 these	 determinate	 properties	 it	has.	 It	 is	 pure	 relating	 of	 self	 to	 self,	 or	 the	medium	 in	which	 all	 these	 determinacies	 are,	 and	 in	 which	 as	 a	
simple	 unity	 they	 therefore	 interpenetrate,	 but	 without	
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coming	 into	contact	 with	 one	 another:	 for	 it	 is	 precisely	through	 participation	 in	 this	 universality	 that	 they	 exist	indifferently	on	their	own	account.	"	(PoS§113)		The	 Tiger-Thing	 is	 thus	 its	 many	 interpenetrating	properties	 and	 the	 Also	 of	 the	 universal	 medium	 Tiger	which	 keeps	 properties	 both	 together	 and	 one	 apart	 from	another.	This	 is	 crucial:	properties	 relate	 to	 themselves	as	properties	(striped,	not	plain)	and	to	this	Also,	the	universal	medium	which	allows	them	to	exist	together	–	striped	and	Also	 four	 legs	 Also	 with	 a	 tail	 Also	 etc.	 This	 has	 to	 be,	because,	as	Hegel	points	out,	properties	are	only	properties	"through	 the	 addition	 of	 a	 further	 determination"	 -	 striped	insofar	as	there	is	a	fur	to	be	so.	It	is	a	concatenation,	in	the	strict	Jakobsonian	sense	–	it	is	moulded	on	the	structure	of	the	sentence.	In	sense-certainty,	we	had	a	plurality	of	Nows	(sense-elements)	coming	together	in	the	universal	Now;	in	perception,	 we	 have	 a	 plurality	 of	 universals	 coming	together	 in	 the	 universal	 Also.	 How?	 Here	 comes	 the	
dénouement:	 the	 Also	which	 is	 the	 'thinghood'	 is	 a	One	as	
well,	 and	 this	 One	 is	 the	 moment	 of	 negation.	 Hegel's	'universal	immediacy'	(PoS§113)	is	isolated	in	the	Also	and	is	grasped	as	a	One;	but	this	One	immediately	turns	into	its	opposite,	 the	 negative,	 when	 we	 take	 into	 account	 the	
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existent	 properties	 that	 have	 been	 uncovered	 in	 the	 same	movement.	In	Hegel's	words:		 "Negation	is	inherent	in	a	property	as	a	determinateness	which	 is	 immediately	 one	with	 the	 immediacy	 of	 being,	an	immediacy	which,	through	this	unity	with	negation,	is	universality.	 As	 a	 One,	 however,	 the	 determinateness	 is	set	 free	 from	 this	 unity	 with	 its	 opposite,	 and	 exists	 in	and	for	itself."	(PoS§114)		This	 movement	 is	 a	 perfect	 illustration	 of	 Hegelian	dialectics	 insofar	 as	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 Thing	 is	 in	 fact	the	 sign	 of	 negation.	 One	 thing	 does	 not	 stand	 in	 tension	with	what	is	apparently	its	opposite,	but	with	itself,	its	true	opposite,	and	what	we	get	 is	 the	pure	turning	inside	out	of	something	into	Nothing,	i.e.	not	nothing	at	all,	but	a	Nothing	that	has	existence.	There	is	a	tiger	when	there	is	Tiger	and	the	Nothing	that	must	come	with	it,	One	and	the	place	of	its	emergence	 that	 is	 retroactively	posited.	 (Cf.	N2§209)	 (The	cut	is	not	vertical,	from	larger	to	smaller	ensembles	of	fixed	traits,	 but	 transversal	 –	 these	 traits	 (properties)	 relate	 to	their	 final	 forms	as	well	as	 the	absence	of	 form.	Properties	
exist	 only	 on	 the	 condition	 of	 being	 split	 from	 themselves.	Slavoj	Žižek	once	mentioned	the	particular	street	 layout	of	New	York	City	–	 it	 is	as	 if	 the	grid	plan	of	Manhattan	only	
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appears	thanks	to	the	shattering	transversality	of	Broadway	that	is	constitutive	of	it.)		§11	–	There	is	a	tiger	only	because	Tiger	can	be	a	One	that	excludes	and	not	merely	an	Also	that	links	up.	Tiger	is	One	to	 put	 an	 end	 to	 the	 potentially	 endless	work	 of	 the	 Also.	And	the	Thing	is	finally	constituted	when	it	is	characterised	by	 self-identity.	 In	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 Thing	 as	 such,	Consciousness	comes	across	the	invincibility	of	a	metaphor	–	Tiger	came	in	the	place	of	the	bundle	of	properties	that	it	
also	was.		§12	 –	 The	 outcome	 of	 Perception	 is	 its	 dissolution,	 or	 is	reflection	 out	 of	 this	 truth	 and	 into	 itself.	 To	 put	 it	 like	Hegel,	 it	 is	 all	 for	my	 eyes	 that	 the	Thing	 is	white,	 for	my	mouth	 that	 the	 thing	 is	 tart,	 and	 so	on.	 I	have	made	Tiger	out	of	this	concatenation	of	properties.	Consciousness	thus	returns	 into	 itself,	 for	 it	 has	 seen	 in	 the	 Thing	 that	which	points	 back	 to	 Consciousness.	 The	 Thing	 is	 once	 more	reflected	into	itself	when	it	presents	itself	to	Consciousness	through	the	never-ending	cycle	of	the	Properties-Also-One-etc.	And	the	object	for	the	Understanding	is	now	this	whole	movement	 that	was	shared	before	between	Consciousness	and	the	Thing.			
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§13	 –	 Consciousness	 will	 have	 to	 be	 faced	 with	 another	Thing	 before	 it	 is	 driven	 back	 into	 itself.	 One	 finds	 this	interplay	in	Hegel's	text	between	the	object	and	the	Thing;	both	 are	 used	 almost	 synonymously	 throughout,	 yet	 it	harbours	 a	 difference.	 The	 object	 remains	 an	 object	 for	consciousness	and	not	the	anxiety-producing	Thing	as	long	as	 Consciousness	 puts	 out	 the	 constant	 struggle	 to	 place	diversity	in	the	One	and	keep	it	away	from	the	abyssal	self-identical	Thing.	Or,	as	long	as	it	manages	to	understand	that	the	self-identity	of	the	Thing	relies	on	the	operation	of	the	One,	 and	 is	 not	 solely	 a	 property	 of	 the	 Thing	 outside	 of	Consciousness.	Insofar	as	the	Thing	appears	more	and	more	unbreakable	 in	 this	 perceptual	 movement,1	it	 is	 indeed	 a	daunting	 task	 for	 Consciousness	 to	 keep	 the	 Thing	 from	eating	out	its	own	diversity	as	well	as	Consciousness	itself.	Before	 the	 Thing	 is	 turned	 inside	 out	 and	 language	 is	registered	as	 such,	we	witness	 the	 return	of	 immediacy	 in	the	 Thing.	 At	 the	 height	 of	 this	 process	 –	 when	Consciousness	 is	 about	 to	 overtake	 the	 Thing	 as	 the	essential	element	 in	 this	dialectic	–	Consciousness	and	 the	Thing	 will	 be	 one	 and	 the	 same,	 and	 for	 just	 a	 moment	Consciousness	will	vanish	into	the	Thing.	Water	fills	up	the	bathtub	 all	 the	way	 to	 the	 top	 and	 threatens	 to	 spill	 over.	Only	 at	 this	 point	 can	 Consciousness	 understand	 that	 the																																																									1	Before	Consciousness	realises	it	is	the	I	that	is	unbreakable.	
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One	 of	 the	 Thing	 is	 actually	 the	 most	 potent	 sign	 of	 its	negation,	 that	 its	 indestructibility	 is	 not	 that	 of	 the	sensuous	 object	 but	 that	 of	 Consciousness	 itself.	 The	magical	unity	of	the	Thing	has	to	fall	within	Consciousness,	not	 the	 Thing.	 At	 first,	 Consciousness	 will	 mistake	 one	indestructibility	 for	 another	 and	 will	 be	 led	 astray	 and	enthused	by	the	Thing.			 *		So	how	exactly	does	Consciousness	break	out	of	the	Thing?	Universal	 immediacy	 is	 isolated	 as	 One	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	properties	that	fall	within	themselves	and	are	linked	up	by	the	 Also.	 This	 enabled	 the	 Thing	 to	 be	 constituted	 away	from	immediacy	–	it	is	an	object	for	Consciousness.	But	the	Thing	that	now	comes	together,	comes	together	as	One,	and	the	immediacy	that	was	left	on	one	side	passes	over	to	the	Thing.	Anxiety	rises	and	peaks	when	the	Thing	thus	eats	out	its	own	diversity.	It	is	at	this	moment	that	the	very	diversity	of	 the	object	 that	 is	being	destroyed	by	 the	overwhelming	Thing,	 passes	 over	 to	 Consciousness'	 side	 and	 links	 up	 to	become	the	Thing-in-waiting.	This	duplication	of	the	Thing	thus	 makes	 clear	 that	 the	 overbearing	 manifoldness	contained	in	the	Thing	was	the	unessential	aspect.	It	was	in	fact	'the	essential	property	of	the	Thing	that	is	its	undoing'	
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(PoS§125)	 –	 its	 being	 a	 One	 is	 undermined	 by	 what	 has	been	 negated	 through	 this	 operation,	 the	manifoldness	 of	the	content.	Once	again,	the	One	of	immediacy	turns	out	to	be	 the	 negative.	 The	 being-for-self	 of	 the	 Thing	 –	 its	overwhelming	 indestructibility	 –	 was	 in	 fact	 self-related	negativity,	 or	 language	 completely	 driven	 back	 into	 itself.	This	 is	 the	 tour	 de	 force	 of	 this	 passage.	 When	 this	movement	is	registered,	our	water	goes	down	the	drain.			*		To	conclude,	 the	self-related	negativity	 that	 is	 the	Thing	 is	also	suspension	of	the	Thing	itself	–	its	essence	is	contained	
in	 another	 being.	 The	 overwhelming,	 anxiety-producing	Thing	 has	 let	 the	 manifoldness	 that	 gave	 rise	 to	 it	 slip	through	 the	 door	 of	 the	 terrified	 Consciousness,	 and	Consciousness	 just	 has	 to	 turn	 around	 to	 find	 the	manifoldness	 of	 the	Thing	 actually	 contained	 in	 this	 other	being	 we	 called	 the	 Thing-in-waiting.	 The	 self-identical	unity	 of	 the	 Thing	 is	 suspension	 of	 itself	 insofar	 as	 the	inverse	form	of	this	magical	unity	is	pure	negation,	negation	
as	such.	Insofar	as	the	One	has	to	exclude	properties	to	keep	itself	together,	or	otherwise	falls	back	into	an	Also,	it	raises	the	prospect	of	another	Thing	waiting	to	be	cohered	by	the	Also	that	has	been	cast	out.	Now	secure	in	its	awareness	of	
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the	 other	 Thing-in-waiting,	 Consciousness	 finds	 a	differentially-determined	Tiger,	a	paper	tiger	–	a	tiger	that	is	for-another	just	when	it	is	for-itself,	that	leaps	and	roars	only	 when	 other	 combinations	 of	 properties	 agree	 to	 sit.	Therefore	 the	 being-for-self	 of	 the	 Thing,	 this	overwhelming	 presence	 that	 was	 witnessed,	 is	 just	 as	unessential	as	was	 the	sense-elements	previously;	and	 the	determinateness	 that	 was	 supposed	 to	 constitute	 its	essence	 and	 strength	 is	 overcome	 just	 as	 the	 sensuous	being	was	overcome.			 When	the	being-for-self	and	being-for-another	of	the	Thing	are	a	single	unity,	we	truly	enter	into	the	realm	of	the	
Understanding.	 But,	 at	 the	 risk	 of	 repeating	 myself,	Consciousness	will	 have	 to	 go	 through	 the	Thing	 to	 get	 to	this	point!	Once	this	 is	done,	Consciousness	will	be	 indeed	relieved	from	an	extraordinary	tension,	but	also	very	upset	to	lose	what	was	ironically	the	guarantee	of	its	existence	in	the	form	of	the	Thing,	as	well	as	the	Thing	itself;	and	for	a	time	 Consciousness	 will	 crumble	 like	 an	 old	 wood	 cabin	blown	up	by	the	winds.		§14	–	The	unconditioned	universality	finally	reached	at	the	end	 of	 the	 perceptual	 process	 leads	 Consciousness	 to	understand	 that	 the	 very	 excess	 –	 fullness	 –	 of	 the	world	that	 was	 experienced	 in	 the	 perceptual	 process,	 in	 fact	
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turns	out	to	be	the	excess	of	language	over	itself	–	foolness.	In	 Hegelian	 terms,	 the	 positivity	 of	 Being	 qua	 self-related	negativity.	A	detour	through	Kantian	logic	may	be	of	help	to	grasp	 this	 point.	 For	 Immanuel	 Kant,	 statements	 can	 be	broken	down	into	analytic	a	priori	judgements	according	to	quantity	 (universal,	 particular,	 singular),	 quality	(affirmative,	 negative,	 infinite),	 relation	 (categorical,	hypothetical,	 disjunctive)	 and	 modality	 (problematical,	assertorical,	 apodeictical).2	Such	 a	 transcendental	 logic	 is	immanent	to	language,	even	though	it	is	logic	beyond	what	Kant	calls	'general	logic'	(the	Aristotelian	subject-predicate	logic).	Let	us	take	judgements	of	quality:	statements	can	be	positive	 (A	 is	 alive),	 negative	 (A	 is	 not	 alive,	 i.e.	 dead)	 or	infinite	 (A	 is	 not	 not-alive,	 i.e.	 undead).	 Alive	 and	 dead	(positive	 and	 negative	 judgements)	 correspond	 to	 the	properties	as	they	stand	in	oppositional	determination;	but	there	 is	 also	 the	 vanishing	 medium	 that	 supports	 the	diversity	 as	well	 as	 independence	of	properties	 from	each	other.	This	medium	allows	for	the	third	option,	the	infinite	judgement:	something	neither	dead	nor	alive,	not	alive	and	not	 dead,	 thus	 not	 not-alive,	 undead.	 There	 are	 two	negations	at	work	–	the	first	negation	is	that	of	oppositional	determination	(alive	negated	is	dead);	the	second	negation																																																									2	I.	Kant,	Critique	of	Pure	Reason	(1999),	ed.	and	trans.	P.	Guyer	&	A.	W.	Wood,	Cambridge	University	Press	Cambridge.	See	Second	Part,	Division	One,	Book	One,	Section	2.	
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becomes	visible	after	 the	perceptual	process	and	 is	 that	of	
the	retrieval	of	the	One,	so	that	the	distinction	subject-object	is	 blurred	 and	 we	 get	 a	 groundless,	 metaphor-less	metonymy:	 both	 dead	 and	 alive	 and	 neither	 of	 them.	 But	metonymy	cannot	yet	be	isolated	as	such	(we	have	to	wait	for	the	dialectics	of	Force)	and	we	witness	the	return	in	the	real	of	the	foreclosed	signifier	that	makes	the	stuff	of	horror	movies.	The	Thing	is	at	its	most	potent	before	it	peters	out.	But	once	 the	Thing	has	been	 traversed	and	 the	untruth	of	the	 perceptual	 process	 found	 to	 fall	 within	 us,	 such	 an	infinite	judgement	in	fact	displays	self-related	negativity.	It	is	 the	 positivity	 of	 Being	 we	 have	 seen	 previously,	 the	excess	 that	 sustains	 the	 differential	 +/-	 matrix	(striped/plain).		§15	–	Such	an	insight	enables	Hegel	to	close	the	chapter	on	the	 perceptual	 process	 with	 a	 critique	 of	 the	 Aristotelian	logic	of	subject-predicate,	i.e.	the	stable	subject	to	which	are	attached	predicates.	The	subject	is	in	fact	for	the	predicates	and	 vice-versa.	 What	 Hegel	 calls	 Sound	 Common	 Sense	 –	the	 deception	 by	 which	 Consciousness	 tries	 to	 retain	 the	consistency	of	the	Thing	despite	the	reflection-into-itself	of	the	 whole	 perceptual	 movement	 –	 is	 consequently	"generally	 at	 its	 poorest	when	 it	 fancies	 itself	 to	 be	 at	 its	richest"	(PoS§131).	That	is	to	say,	it	is	at	its	poorest	when	it	
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multiplies	 and	 needlessly	 problematizes	 the	 predicates	 to	cover	up	the	impotency	of	the	subject.	It	is	perhaps	akin	to	Jacques	Lacan's	remark	that	the	multiplication	of	phalluses	in	 fact	 points	 to	 castration.	 The	 multi-disciplinarism	 of	today's	 academia	 is	 a	 good	 example;	 it	 fancies	 to	 be	 at	 its	richest	when	it	does	not	restrict	itself	to	one	discipline	but	peppers	 and	 sprays	 as	many	 disciplines	 as	 it	 can	 over	 its	subject	matter.			§16	 –	We	 could	 say	 that	 the	 traversing	 of	 the	 Thing	 also	corresponds	 to	 the	 Lacanian	 passage	 from	 phallus	 as	 the	lost	 signifier	 to	Phallus	as	 the	signifier	of	 loss	 itself.	When	one	 exhausts	 the	 imaginary	 dimension	 of	 one's	 existence,	Phallus	 will	 reveal	 itself	 to	 be	 the	 signifier	 of	 loss	 –	 the	w/hole	 language	created,	 that	no	sense-element	 is	capable	of	permanently	 filling	out.	This	absolute	presence	 that	has	been	sought	throughout	the	world,	turns	out	to	be	absence	
itself,	 the	Universal...	After	 the	crumbling	of	 the	Thing,	 this	glimpse	of	hope	is	welcome.	It	will	not	last.		§17	 –	 Consciousness	 has	 gone	 through	 the	Thing	 and	will	soon	 glimpse	 another	 world	 above	 this	 one,	 to	 which	 we	shall	now	turn	our	attention.		 Breaking	Through	The	Void	
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§18	 –	 Even	now	 that	 Consciousness	 has	 gone	 through	 the	Thing,	 it	 is	 still	 keen	 to	 grasp	 the	 now-unconditioned	universal	as	object	but	not	yet	as	Notion.	Just	as	previously	Consciousness	did	not	recognise	itself	in	the	sensuous	This	it	 intuited,	nor	after	 in	 the	Thing	 it	perceived,	 it	now	does	not	recognise	 itself	 in	the	Notion	that	 is	 left	by	the	tearing	apart	of	the	Thing.	What	is	at	first	posited	by	Consciousness	as	 the	 object	 for	 the	 Understanding	 is	 the	 transition	 that	occurs	in	the	place	of	the	Thing,	how	we	constantly	passed	–	that	was	the	deadlock	of	perception	–	from	the	properties	in	 the	 object	 that	 stand	 independently	 from	 each	 other,	through	 the	Also	 that	 allowed	 them	 to	 coexist,	 to	 the	One	that	excluded	and	gave	rise	to	the	Thing,	to	the	other	Thing-in-waiting	 that	 undermines	 all.	 In	 this	 process,	Consciousness	 gives	 up	 its	 one-sided	 notions	 (notion	 of	Things)	and	understands	that	the	being-for-self	of	the	Thing	is	at	 the	 same	 time	being-for-another	–	 this	 is	 the	Notion,	which	is	all	deployment.	Once	the	form	of	this	movement	is	gone	through	and	perception	dissolved,	it	is	in	fact	also	the	
content	 of	 the	 object	 that	 was	 this	 movement,	 for	 this	movement	 leaves	 nothing	 else	 but	 the	 unconditioned	universal	 (PoS§134)	 –	 no	 return	 to	 sensuous	 immediacy	here.	 And	 the	 moments	 uncovered	 in	 Perception	 are	 no	longer	 separated	 from	 one	 another	 –	 they	 could	 only	 be	sustained	 against	 the	 background	 of	 the	 Thing	 –	 but	 are	
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now	 all	 "self-superseded	 aspects	 of	 the	 Universal"	(PoS§135).	 To	 put	 it	 differently,	 what	 was	 for	Consciousness	the	way	to	grasp	the	self-identicalness	of	the	Thing,	was	in	fact	already	the	Thing	itself!	The	Universal	as	passive	medium	 (the	 Also)	 that	 linked	 up	matters	 was	 in	fact	 just	the	plurality	of	the	subsistent	porous	matters	that	previously	 came	 in	 contact	with	one	another	 in	 the	Thing.	And	 the	Universal	as	One	(being-for-self)	was	 the	medium	itself	that	let	the	matters	be	independent	properties	as	well	(PoS§136).	 All	was	 already	 self-sublated	 in	 the	 Thing:	 the	tiger	 was	 already	 stripes	 when	 we	 found	 it.	 With	 this	synecdoche	 we	 slowly	 approach	 the	 metonymical	 side	 of	Being.		§19	 –	 Hegel	 calls	 Force	 the	 unfolding	 of	 this	 movement	diversity-unity/unity-diversity.	 Whereas	 before	 we	experienced	 the	 deadlock	 and	 dissolution	 of	 Perception	when	 Force,	 the	 Thing	 qua	 deployment,	 became	 for-another,	 i.e.	 faced	 with	 another	 Thing;	 we	 now	 find	 that	Force	is	equally	in	itself	when	it	is	for-itself	and	for-another.	In	Hegel's	words:		 "But,	 in	 general,	 to	 be	 for	 itself	 and	 to	 be	 in	 relation	 to	another	 constitutes	 the	 nature	 and	 essence	 of	 the	content,	whose	truth	consists	in	its	being	unconditionally	
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universal;	 and	 the	 result	 is	 simply	and	solely	universal."	(PoS§134)		Hegel	 adds	 that	 "Force	 marks	 the	 unity,	 or	 rises	 as	 the	middle	 term,	between	 the	perceived	and	 the	percipient,	 in	this	 perpetual	 diremption	 of	 the	 perceptual	 process"	(PoS§136),	 and	 this	 middle	 term	 becomes	 the	 essential	moment.	This	 is	what	 is	 also	 called	 the	 signifier,	what	 can	only	 inscribe	 itself	 through	 self-division,	 the	 perpetual	vanishing	of	one	into	two	and	back	into	one,	and	so	on.		§20	–	Consciousness	first	grasps	Force	in	its	objective	sense,	this	whole	movement	as	something	that	really	 is;	before	 it	grasps	Force	 in	 its	actual	 sense,	whose	different	moments	are	only	vanishing	 (PoS§136).	What	 is	 it	 to	grasp	Force	 in	its	actual	sense,	as	pure	vanishing?	It	is	as	if	Consciousness	
imagines	 the	passage	 from	one	signifier	 to	another,	before	realising	 that	 precisely	 this	 very	 passage	 that	 is	 the	vanishing	of	one	into	another,	is	the	essence	and	true	being	of	 the	 signifier	 insofar	 as	 it	 does	 not	 exist	 outside	 the	differential	 matrix.	 It	 is	 as	 if	 Consciousness	 imagines	 the	breaking	 down	 of	 what	 constitutes	 Beautiful	 and	 turns	 it	into	Ugly,	before	realising	that	the	vanishing	of	one	into	its	opposite	is	the	very	condition	of	possibility	of	both	–	in	the	differential	matrix,	 there	cannot	be	Beautiful	without	Ugly.	
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Consciousness	 quickly	 learns	 not	 to	 be	 fooled	 again,	 and	sees	how	Beautiful	and	Ugly	really	were	in	fact	one	and	the	same	thing,	the	Universal.		§21	 –	 Another	 essence	 is	 posited	 as	 first	 in	 this	 notion	 of	Force	as	the	passage	that	mediates	one	and	the	other,	Ugly	and	Beautiful	–	 this	 is	Force	 that	 is	driven	back	 into	 itself.	But	 the	unfolded	matters	 that	 seem	 to	 subsist	 outside	 the	expression	 of	 Force	 as	 oneness,	 the	 residues	 left	 by	 the	operation	of	the	One	that	will	trigger	the	operation	on	and	on	 again;	 this	 appears	 as	 the	 other	 Force	 that	 solicits	 the	first	one;	and	we	now	have	the	duplication	of	Force,	just	as	we	 had	 the	 duplication	 of	 the	 Thing	 in	 the	 previous	movement.	 In	 other	words,	 there	will	 be	 another	 Force	 at	work	that	both	solicits	and	remains	outside	the	deployment	of	the	first	Force	into	the	Also	and	the	One	-	the	first	Force	as	 movement	 can	 only	 have	 its	 determinateness	 through	the	other	and	through	this	constant	repetition.	But	Force	is	also	 this	other.	 In	 fact,	 Force	 is	 the	 repelling	of	 itself	 from	itself.	 It	 is	 as	 if,	 in	 the	 movement	 of	 Force,	 Force	 has	 to	reject	 itself	 from	 itself	 to	 solicit	 itself	 to	 express	 itself	 as	One.	But	this	self-rejection	is	akin	to	another	Force.	And	the	unity	 of	 the	 first	 Force	 is	 undermined	 by	 the	 sundering	from	itself	of	the	other.	To	put	it	in	yet	another	way,	Force	is	
also	 one	 that	 stands	 out	 of	 its	 own	 movement	 to	 spur	 it,	
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thereby	duplicating	 itself.	 Something	always	 escapes...	 this	is	 Force	 grasped	 as	 Notion,	 or	 for-itself.	 And	 we	 come	across	 the	 indestructibility	 of	 a	 metonymy	 that	 is	 also	constitutive	of	Being.		§22	 –	 Force	 is	 therefore	 only	 the	 thought	 of	 it,	 and	 we	acquire	the	Notion	in	its	actual	sense	this	time.	Force	does	not	 exist	 outside	 this	 analytic	 moment;	 it	 is	 only	 for	 this	analytic	 moment,	 only	 for	 the	 Understanding.	 Force	 is	 all	the	work	of	the	Understanding.	This	is	a	wonderful	moment	for	 philosophy	 that	 should	 not	 be	 lost	 on	 us.	 As	 the	expression	 of	 Force	 through	 the	 duality	 of	 Forces	 always	collapses	 in	 unity	 –	 the	 synchronicity	 of	 language	 always	reasserts	its	rights,	at	one	point	in	time	each	thing	is	always	within	itself	in	relation	to	the	other	that	is	also	within	itself,	at	 one	 point	 in	 time	 Beautiful	 and	Ugly	 always	 fall	within	themselves	and	not	 in	the	passage	of	one	 into	the	other	 in	the	 differential	matrix,	 this	 passage	 being	 purely	 virtual	 –	its	 notion	 therefore	 appears	 as	 such,	 qua	 Notion;	 and	 the	loss	of	reality	is	total.	At	first	the	Universal	was	immediate	in	 the	sense-object	and	 the	Thing,	now	the	Universal	 is	an	object	 solely	of	 the	Understanding;	 it	 has	been	 completely	separated	from	the	sensuous,	which	has	absolutely	no	place	in	 it.	 And	 yet	 –	 dialectical	 deployment	 –	 we	 should	remember	all	 the	more	 that	 "philosophy	should	beware	of	
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the	 wish	 to	 be	 edifying"	 (PoS§9,	 Preface)	 and	 that	 "the	power	of	Spirit	is	only	as	great	as	its	expression,	its	depths	only	as	deep	as	 it	dares	 to	spread	out	and	 lose	 itself	 in	 its	exposition"	(PoS§10,	Preface).	The	Notion	just	found	is	only	vanishing	 moments	 for	 the	 Understanding.	 They	 remain	just	that	if	they	are	not	sublated	in	the	act	of	writing.		§23	–	Appearances	come	onstage	 through	the	stabilisation	of	 this	 movement	 (PoS§143),	 for	 Consciousness	understands	 that	 the	 sensuous	 world	 it	 dwelt	 in	 is	
appearances	from	the	standpoint	of	the	now-unconditioned	Universal.	 Mediation	 is	 now	 firmly	 taking	 place.	 Once	 we	have	gone	through	the	Thing,	the	world	of	sense-knowledge	cannot	but	appear	as	only	a	 show	 for	 the	 senses,	one	 that	does	 not	 raise	 itself	 to	 the	 consistency	 of	 Being,	 what	opened	 up	 through	 the	 scribbling	 of	 a	 letter	 on	 a	 surface.	Consciousness	 is	 no	 longer	 surprised	 to	 learn	 that	 a	 tiger	can	never	be	a	Tiger,	for	the	poor	cat	always	lags	behind	its	own	notion!	The	 contingent	 tiger	will	 always	be	 too	dirty,	not	 big	 enough,	 not	 polished	 enough,	 or	 not	 ferocious	enough	 to	 fit	 the	 Universal.	 Every	 Thing	 will	 always	 be	 a	disappointment	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 Being	 that	 is	beyond	 it.	 	 And	 at	 the	 same	 time	 –	 the	 dialectical	deployment	 seen	 previously	 –	 Consciousness	 understands	that	a	Tiger	qua	Notion	is	only	a	totality	of	the	moments	we	
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have	 seen	 before	 –	 the	 inner	 being	 of	 Things	 qua	 the	Universal	 is	 mediated	 by	 appearances,	 or	 is	 just	 this	unfolding	of	appearances;	so	that	Consciousness	will	be	at	a	loss	 to	 name	what	was	most	 painful	 to	 it,	 the	unveiling	 of	the	real	tiger,	or	the	deflation	of	its	one-sided	notion	of	the	Thing.		§24	 –	 This	 is	 important	 to	 keep	 in	mind	 for	 the	 following	development.	When	Force	 is	understood	 (Notion),	 and	not	just	apprehended	(object),	a	new	world	opens	up	above	the	sensuous	 world	 of	 appearances	 –	 what	 Hegel	 calls	 the	
Supersensible	 World,	 or	 the	 inner	world	 of	 Things.	 We	shall	 now	 see	 how	 Consciousness	 grasps	 the	 inner	 of	Things,	not	in	its	actual	sense,	but	only	in	its	objective	sense	at	first,	for	Consciousness	still	distinguishes	itself	from	this	inner	of	Things	beyond	what	has	been	revealed	to	be	only	appearances.			§25	 –	 The	 Supersensible	World	 emerges	 only	 against	 the	background	of	the	reflection-into-itself	of	the	play	of	Forces	that	was	at	work	in	the	Thing.	Once	Consciousness	sees	that	the	sensuous	is	for	itself	all	a	show,	it	will	long	for	another	place,	 the	 realm	 of	 the	 True	 against	 the	 Ukiyo-e	 of	appearances;	and	we	thus	have	the	following	syllogism:		
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Inner	 Being	 of	 Things	 <---->	 Appearances	 <---->	Understanding		To	 anticipate,	 if	 the	 horizon	 of	 the	 first	 negation	 is	 the	collapse	of	the	inner	being	of	Things	back	into	appearances,	what	 shall	 be	 unfolded	 in	 the	 following	 paragraphs,	 the	horizon	 of	 the	 second	 negation	will	 be	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	Understanding	onto	itself,	so	that	appearances	can	stand	on	their	own.				§26	–	The	inner	Being	of	Things	is	at	first	empty	says	Hegel,	a	"pure	beyond"	(PoS§146),	and	he	strikingly	qualifies	it	as	the	realm	of	the	'simple	or	unitary	universal',	which	cannot	but	 remind	us	of	Lacan's	 trait	unaire.3	Hegel	also	says	 it	 is	the	universal	in-itself,	still	unfilled,	a	void.	But	this	world	is	immediately	filled	up	with	reveries,	the	Idea	begets	siblings	–	 had	 the	 supersensible	world	been	 empty	 from	 the	 start,	we	would	have	immediately	perceive	appearances	as	true,	a	conclusion	 too	 sophisticated	 to	 impact	 the	 mind	 at	 this	stage.	 Appearances	 really	 are	 the	 content	 of	 this	supersensible	world	 however,	 but	 the	 form	 is	 understood	to	be	produced	by	Consciousness	(PoS§146).	Therefore	the	Supersensible	World	 is	 for	Hegel	 the	 realm	of	 appearance	
qua	appearance.	This	is	what	popular	opinion	understands																																																									3	We	evoke	the	net	of	tennis	further	down,	N2§111	
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as	 the	 fantasy	 world,	 a	 world	 dominated	 by	 the	 letter,	whose	 appearances	 is	 run	 by	 the	 logic	 of	 the	 signifier	 –	where	 a	 flowerbed	 really	 is	 a	 bed	 for	 flowers,	 "and	 if	 too	soft,	 the	 flowers	are	always	asleep"	(Lewis	Carroll,	Beyond	
the	Looking-Glass).	It	is	indeed	the	world	of	appearances	as	Consciousness	 would	 like	 to	 see	 them	 appear	 before	 its	eyes	 –	 appearances,	 but	 appearances	 by	 Consciousness.	Like	 a	 fragrance,	 'Flower	 by	 Kenzo'	 –	 appearances	 are	systematically	re-marked	by	the	buoyant	mediating	agency	that	has	become	conscious	of	itself.		§27	 –	 And	 yet,	 amid	 the	 confusion	 and	 the	 reveries,	Consciousness	 implicitly	 comes	 to	 understand	 the	 Law	 of	Force.	 First	 Force	 becomes	 the	 mediating	 agency,	 not	 as	something	 that	 is	 apprehended	 or	 comprehended,	 but	 as	something	that	merely	is.	Hegel	on	this	point:		 "The	play	of	Forces	has	merely	this	negative	significance	of	being	in	itself	nothing,	and	its	only	positive	significance	that	 of	 being	 the	 mediating	 agency,	 but	 outside	 of	 the	Understanding	 (...)	The	connection	of	 the	Understanding	with	the	inner	world	through	the	mediation	is,	however,	its	own	movement	through	which	the	inner	world	will	fill	itself	 out	 for	 the	 Understanding.	 What	 is	 immediate	 for	the	Understanding	 is	 the	play	of	Forces;	but	what	 is	 the	
True	for	it,	is	the	simple	inner	world."	(PoS§138)	
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	This	is	the	syllogism	we	have	seen	previously,	appearances	being	 the	 play	 of	 Forces.	 What	 is	 immediate	 for	 the	Understanding	 is	 this	 play	 of	 Forces	 as	 the	 unconditioned	universal	 that	has	 taken	the	place	of	 the	sensuous	and	the	
conditioned	universal.	But	insofar	as	the	Understanding	has	carried	 itself	 all	 the	 way	 to	 the	 supersensible	 world	 and	appearances	are	now	 just	a	show	for	 it,	 the	 inner	world	 is	what	is	true	for	it,	and	the	endless	play	of	appearances	loses	its	appeal.	This	is	the	dome	of	philosophy	and	the	doom	of	scholars.		§28	 –	 We	 first	 had	 Force	 as	 this	 movement	 between	 the	passive	 medium	 that	 links	 up	 matters	 in	 the	 field	 of	perception	and	allowed	us	to	perceive	something	in	the	blur	of	 colours	 and	 sounds	 that	 is	 the	world;	 and	 the	 negative	unity	 of	 the	 One	 in	 contrast	 to	 these	 interpenetrating	matters.	 Force	 duplicates	 itself	 into	 the	 Force	 that	expresses	 this	 unity,	 and	 the	 one	 that	 solicited	 it.	 But	 we	found	that	this	movement	was	for	another	–	that	once	one	expresses	and	the	other	is	done	soliciting,	they	immediately	change	position	because	the	thing	was	always	 for	another.	When	one	is	done	expressing	a	Tiger,	it	will	solicit	the	other	that	 solicited	 in	 the	 first	 place	 to	 also	 express	 itself.	 	 This	duplication	of	Force	is	again	duplicated	into	the	form	of	this	
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play	 of	 Forces,	 and	 its	 content.	 The	 form	 concerns	 the	question	 of	 which	 is	 doing	 the	 expressing	 and	 which	 is	doing	the	soliciting;	they	will	switch.	The	content	is	that	of	the	passive	medium	and	the	negative	unity;	again,	one	will	give	in	to	the	other.		§29	 –	 It	 therefore	 all	 boils	 down	 to	 the	 alternation	 of	 the	determinateness	 that	 is	 the	 content	 of	 the	 Universal,	 for	such	 duplications	 are	 superseded	 because	 Consciousness	understands	that	the	Notion	is	again	for-itself	when	it	is	for-another,	 that	 such	 moments	 and	 duplications	 are	 not	 in-themselves	but	only	for	the	Understanding	–	we	saw	before	that	 they	 were	 just	 vanishing	 thoughts	 –	 and	 that	 this	reflection	 out	 of	 the	 True	 and	 back	 into	 itself	 leaves	Consciousness	with	what	Hegel	calls	universal	difference,	or	pure	difference:		 "What	there	is	in	this	absolute	flux	is	only	difference	as	a	
universal	 difference,	 or	 as	 a	 difference	 into	 which	 the	many	antitheses	have	been	resolved.	This	difference,	as	a	
universal	difference,	is	consequently	the	simple	element	in	
the	play	of	Force	itself	and	what	is	true	in	it.	It	is	the	law	of	
Force."	(PoS§148)		
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What	is	the	now-emerging	 law	of	Force?	We	could	say	it	is	that	 which	 regulates	 actualisation	 and	 virtualisation,	 0.	Universal	difference	means	that	you	can	never	grasp	all	the	things	 that	 constitute	 a	 tiger	 without	 the	 negative	 unity	Tiger.	 A	 tiger	 without	 its	 name	 is	 just	 a	 blur.	 And	 at	 the	same	 time,	 you	 can	 never	 get	 the	 tiger	 in-itself	 because	 it	has	 its	 truth	 in	another,	or	what	has	been	 left	over	by	 the	operation	of	 the	One.	There	 can	be	no	 reconciliation	here,	there	 is	 only	 the	 crack	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 Understanding	that	 is	 pure	 difference	 –	 one	 that	 is	 never	 bridged	 and	therefore	 universal.	 Determinateness	 of	 the	 content	 will	always	 alternate	 following	 the	 play	 of	 the	 Forces.	Determinateness	 is	 in	 fact	 only	 the	 alternation	 of	 its	content.	Either	One	is	actual	and	another	is	missing,	or	One	is	
in	pieces.		§30	 –	 The	 incessant	 change	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 reality,	 or	absolute	 flux,	 is	 reduced	 –	 abstracted	 –	 to	 the	 simple	difference	 in	 the	 inner	 world,	 which	 is	 the	 object	 of	 the	Understanding.	 We	 now	 have	 the	 following	 partition:	
Universal	difference	is	grasped	as	selfsame	in	the	inner	world,	
with	 the	 absolute	 flux	 belonging	 to	 the	 Understanding	 and	
appearances	being	the	mediating	agency.			 That	 appearances	 can	 be	 reduced	 to	 simple	difference	 when	 mediated	 by	 the	 inner	 world	 and	 the	
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Understanding,	 this	 is	 nowhere	 clearer	 than	 in	 Cinema.	 It	often	 seems	 that	 appearances	 are	 an	 absolute	 flux	 that	cannot	 be	 pinned	 down,	 that	 our	 gaze	 is	 directed	 to	 an	appearance	 that	 immediately	 vanishes	 into	 just	 another...	That	we	cannot	focus	on	the	tiger	when	the	tiger	constantly	interacts	with	its	surroundings,	embedded	in	the	shivering	jungle,	 in	 relation	 to	deers	 crossing	 the	 stream	 in	a	hurry,	framed	by	 the	slow-moving	clouds	above,	 themselves	only	the	 sign	 of	 a	 coming	 monsoon...	 But	 this	 whole	 flux	 of	appearance	is	only	simple	difference	in	relation	to	the	inner	of	 Things,	 or	 supersensible	 world	 –	 with	 regards	 to	 the	True,	 appearances	 are	 just	 this	 movement	 from	 one	 to	 the	
other	and	nothing	else...	In	the	same	way	that	the	screen	is	run	by	the	shot/counter-shot	procedure	in	modern	cinema,	so	that	the	wealth	of	the	content	is	negated	by	what	drives	the	 passage	 from	 one	 shot	 to	 the	 next	 one,	 what	 is	embodied	by	the	famous	McGuffin...4			
																																																								4	Insofar	as	the	shot/counter-shot	procedure	breaks	the	spell	of	long	subjective	shots	by	introducing	a	reflected	distance	within	the	texture	of	the	film,	the	emotions	displayed	on	the	screen	are	always	in	tension,	not	with	the	spectator,	but	with	the	plot;	and	the	director	just	plays	the	audience	like	the	piano,	to	use	Hitchcock’s	expression.	I	rely	here	on	Jean-Pierre	Oudart’s	seminal	piece	“Cinema	and	Suture”	in	Screen	18	(winter	1978)[first	published	in	1969	in		Cahiers	du	Cinéma].	Translation:	Kari	Hanet.	Available	online	at:	http://www.lacan.com/symptom8_articles/oudart8.html		
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§31	–	The	inner	being	is	only	implicitly	universal	difference,	for	 the	 Supersensible	 World	 is	 filled	 with	 the	 reveries	 of	Consciousness;	yet	it	becomes	clearer	and	clearer	that	even	though	 in	 the	 Supersensible	 World	 the	 elephant	 is	 pink	when	it	is	grey	in	the	other,	the	flux	is	the	same;	it	does	not	have	 its	being	outside	 the	Understanding,	but	 in	 this	 truth	that	the	elephant	is	in	both	worlds	only	for	itself	when	it	is	for	 us,	 i.e.	 inserted	 in	 the	 flux	 which	 in	 fact	 is	 simple	difference.			§32	–	This	 structure	of	 the	 inner	world	 is	 slowly	reflected	back	 into	 appearances,	 so	 that	 the	 Universal	 as	 pure	difference	shines	 through	the	wealth	of	 the	content.	There	is	only	this	truth	that	negation	is	the	essential	moment	of	the	
Universal,	 that	 the	 object	 of	 the	 Understanding	 is	 in	 fact	negation	itself;	but	this	truth,	the	law	of	appearance,	is	only	grasped	 in-itself	 at	 first,	 as	 something	 	 “absolutely	 at	 rest	and	self-same”	(PoS§149).	To	quote	Hegel:		 "This	 difference	 is	 expressed	 in	 the	 law,	 which	 is	 the	
stable	 image	 of	 unstable	 appearance.	 Consequently,	 the	
supersensible	 world	 is	 an	 inert	 realm	 of	 laws	 which,	though	beyond	the	perceived	world	–	for	this	exhibits	law	only	 through	 incessant	 change	 –	 is	 equally	 present	 in	 it	and	is	its	direct	tranquil	image."	(PoS§149)	
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	This	passage	about	grasping	the	law	of	appearance	only	in-itself	 is	 strictly	 correlative	 to	 the	 exposition	 of	 Fort-Da	by	Freud.	The	incessant	change	in	the	world	of	appearances	is	reduced	 to	 the	 couple	 of	 presence/absence	 in	 this	 law	 of	Force	-	Fort-Da!	And	the	child	safely	retreats	into	the	inner	world.	 Once	 again,	 the	 Understanding	 registers	 the	appearance-ness	of	appearances.		§33	–	Consciousness	does	not	stop	there.	The	law	just	found	is	comprehended	at	first	as	object,	not	as	Notion...	The	law	does	 contain	 universal	 difference,	 but	 this	 law	 has	 been	found	in	the	reflection	from	one	world	into	another,	and	it	lacks	in	the	world	of	appearances	determinateness	–	it	begs	the	 question	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 law	 –	 it	 remains	indeterminate	 in	this	world	as	 long	as	 its	truth	qua	simple	difference	 is	 ferociously	 kept	 intact	 in	 the	 supersensible	world.	When	this	insight	is	reflected	back	into	the	world	of	appearances,	 Consciousness	 that	 looks	 for	 the	 law	 in	 the	content	simultaneously	finds	many	different	laws	there,	one	for	each	phenomenon,	 just	as	 there	were	many	properties	established	 simultaneously	 in	 the	 dialectics	 of	 Perception.	But	this	cannot	be,	for	Consciousness	has	found	in	the	inner	world	that	the	True	is	universal	unity	–	the	tension	within	the	 One	 –	 since	 what	 is	 for	 self	 is	 always	 already	 for	
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another.	Consciousness	will	thus	seek	to	'collapse'	(Hegel’s	word,	zusammenfallen,	PoS§150)	all	the	specific	laws	of	the	world	 of	 appearances	 –	 all	 the	 virtualities	 of	 the	inexhaustible	flux	–	into	one,	for	in	the	inner	world	there	is	only	this	unity	of	the	law.	Universal	attraction	seems	to	be	the	 perfect	 candidate	 for	 Consciousness	 says	 Hegel	(PoS§150),	and	it	is	interesting	that	he	mentions	it	when	we	have	in	mind	the	Freudian	Fort-Da.	But	such	laws	lose	their	specific	 characters	 when	 thus	 collapsed;	 and	 what	 is	grasped	 in	 the	world	 of	 appearances	 is	what	was	 grasped	previously	 in	 the	 other	 world,	 the	 Notion	 of	 law	 itself	 as	unifying	principle	of	the	play	of	forces.	But	only	the	Notion	of	the	unifying	principle	is	found,	not	the	unifying	principle	itself.	The	determinateness	of	the	law	is	still	lacking,	we	still	need	to	call	for	something	else	in	the	realm	of	appearances,	and	 the	 Understanding	 remains	 unable	 to	 enclose	 the	complexity	 of	 that	 realm;	 and	 while	 Consciousness	implicitly	 turns	 its	 dreamy	 eyes	 back	 to	 the	 world	 of	appearances,	 it	 is	 this	 notion	 of	 law	 that	 is	 in	 fact	 turned	against	the	original	law	itself,	as	that	which	always	divides	into	 two	determinate	differences	–	 two	 forces.	This	notion	threatens	 to	 erase	 its	 steps	 when	 it	 is	 found	 as	 being	 in	universal	attraction.		
	 41	
§34	 –	 And	 just	 when	 universal	 attraction	 threatens	 to	sediment	 as	 a	 one-sided	 notion	 –	 like	 the	 Thing	 in	 the	previous	movement	 –	 it	 so	 happens	 that	 other	 notions	 of	the	law	can	be	found,	such	as	the	law	of	motion.	In	motion,	simple	 difference	 is	 grasped	 immediately,	 not	 just	 as	 the	unfilled	 unitary	 universal	 first	 uncovered	 in	 the	supersensible	world.	 But	 such	 immediate,	 or	 determinate,	differences	must	return	into	the	inner	world	for	such	a	law	to	be	raised	to	 the	universal;	more	specifically,	 “they	must	return	 again	 to	 the	 inner	 world	 as	 a	 simple	 unity"	(PoS§151)	 –	 this	 is	 the	 inner	 necessity	 of	 the	 law.	 Simple	difference	that	 is	directly	embodied	outside,	cannot	return	to	 the	 inner	 world	 without	 bringing	 something	 that	 is	foreign	to	it	–	this	very	embodiment...	The	law	out	must	be	the	same	as	the	law	in,	or	neither	contains	necessity	within	them;	 for	 motion,	 or	 universal	 attraction	 for	 that	 matter,	has	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	 the	 workings	 of	 the	 mind	 so	 far	uncovered...	 This	 is	 the	 problem	 of	 necessity	 that	 now	arises	for	the	Understanding.		 One	 might	 be	 content	 to	 stop	 there,	 with	 the	contradiction	between	the	law	as	Notion	one	grasped	in	the	world	of	appearance,	and	the	simple	or	unitary	universal	in	the	 inner	world	that	 is	 left	untouched	by	determinateness.	What	 is	 not	 processed	 is	 the	 'inner	 necessity	 of	 the	 law'	(Hegel),	the	deadlock	that	is	the	lack	of	unifying	principle	in	
	 42	
the	 world	 of	 appearances,	 which	 must	 be	 reflected	 back	into	the	inner	world	of	Things.		
	§35	 –	 Our	 Consciousness	 is	 not	 one	 to	 retreat	 in	 such	 a	fashion,	perhaps	because	it	cannot	afford	it,	no	matter	how	much	it	loves	it;	and	Consciousness	will	seek	the	necessity	of	the	 law.	 The	 law	 that	 is	 grasped	 now	 is	 present	 as	 1)	 the	differences	it	harbours	as	different	moments	of	the	law,	we	can	 think	 again	 of	 Fort/Da,	 and	 2)	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	withdrawal	of	 the	 law	 into	 itself	as	 in	 the	Notion	of	Force,	“an	abstraction	which	absorbs	the	differences	themselves	of	what	 attracts	 and	 what	 is	 attracted.”	 (PoS§152)	 Hegel’s	example	is	electricity:	it	can	be	negative	or	positive	(1)	but	can	 also	 exist	 as	 such,	 as	 Notion,	 harbouring	 universal	difference	but	absorbing	 the	determinate	differences	 in	 its	deployment	 as	 Notion	 (2).	 The	Notion	 is	 indifferent	 to	 its	Being	–	to	be	positive	or	negative	 in	this	 instance	–	 just	as	the	 law	 is	 to	 Force.	 Necessity	 is	 still	 out	 of	 reach,	we	 still	cannot	see	why	such	a	law	is	necessary	–	there	is	a	missing	link	 between	 the	 deployment	 of	 the	 Notion	 into	 two	determinate	differences	and	its	being	as	One	in	the	law.	We	either	presuppose	electricity	in	the	description	of	positivity	and	negativity;	or	we	draw	in	other	 laws	to	make	sense	of	the	first	one,	thereby	reverting	back	to	the	plurality	of	laws	and	 negating	 the	 determinate	 differences	 dialectically	
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deployed	thus	far.	One	way	or	another,	however	it	looks	at	it,	Consciousness	is	mired.		§36	–	In	a	superb	example	of	what	Hegel	calls	‘bad	infinity’	–	 the	snake	of	symbolisation	 forever	eating	 its	 tail	–	Hegel	indicates	 that	 in	 the	 law	 of	 motion	 the	 Universal	 is	 torn	apart	between	 the	different	 factors	of	 time	and	 space	 that	have	no	origin	in	the	Force	of	this	law.	What	is	discovered	is	
magnitude,	which	 is	 not	 related	 to	 the	 law	 the	 same	 way	positive	 and	 negative	 are	 –	 the	 parts	 are	 not	 the	determinate	 differences	 of	 the	 law	 so	 far	worked	 out.	We	either	 have	 the	 necessity	 of	 the	 division	 but	 not	 the	necessity	of	the	parts,	or	the	necessity	of	the	parts	but	not	the	division.	If	we	cling	on	to	the	law	of	motion,	we	have	to	assume	that	such	Force	does	not	have	division	within	itself,	which	amounts	to	acting	out,	the	half-erasure	of	the	tension	that	drove	us	thus	far,	what	is	called	the	death	drive.	If	we	don't,	 the	 choice	 of	 Melancholia,	 we	 are	 forever	 trapped	inside	 the	 inner	 world.	 This	 is	 the	 blackmail	 of	symbolisation.		§37	–	The	Understanding	must	lose	itself	completely	in	this	conundrum.	 It	 cannot	 actualise	 in	 the	 Thing	 itself	 the	knowledge	it	has	of	the	law	that	is	an	inner	being	inwardly	differentiated,	 i.e.	 differentiated	 into	 the	 determinate	
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differences	 it	 harbours,	 and	 its	 pure	 difference	 as	movement,	Force.	The	Understanding	here	gets	the	Notion	of	universal	difference,	but	 since	 it	 cannot	put	 it	back	 into	the	Thing	itself,	or	the	world	of	appearances,	this	universal	difference	 that	 is	 the	 law	 is	 cancelled	 once	 again.	Consciousness	 will	 maintain	 that	 difference	 as	 such	 by	repeating	 again	 and	 again	 the	 moments	 we	 have	 so	 far	covered	 (this	 takes	 the	 form	 of	 an	 "explanation,"	 says	Hegel),	 but	 in	 the	 failure	 to	 actualise	 it	 in	 the	 world	 of	appearances,	 this	 pure	 difference	 remains	 vain,	 "and	 the	explanation	does	not	explain	anything,"	to	use	Hegel's	blunt	conclusion	(PoS§155).				§38	–	Yet,	 this	difference	that	 is	maintained	at	the	price	of	the	 impotence	 of	 the	 Understanding,	 this	 chasm	 between	the	 Understanding	 and	 the	 object	 it	 is	 applying	 itself	 to	 –	this	 whole	 movement	 that	 comes	 to	 dust	 –	 is	 in	 fact	 the	truth	 of	 the	 Universal.	 For,	 just	 as	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 the	previous	 movement,	 positive	 Being	 (of	 the	 law)	 is	 in	 fact	self-related	 negativity.	 Consciousness	 just	 needs	 to	 step	
aside	 to	realise	that	this	fruitless	explanation	is	akin	to	the	absolute	 flux	of	 appearances	we	have	encountered	before.	Precisely	 when	 Consciousness	 despaired	 of	 this	 fruitless	flux	of	the	Understanding,	it	implicitly	grasped	the	absolute	flux	of	appearances	as	Being.	That	is	to	say,	what	appears	as	
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such	 is	 just	 the	 flux	 of	 symbolisation;	 and	 the	 pure	difference	 that	 constantly	 rejects	 itself	 to	 spur	 itself,	 is	 in	fact	self-same.	In	the	same	way	that	Force	has	to	duplicate	itself	to	become	itself,	the	law	also	has	to	duplicate	itself	to	express	itself.	And	the	truth	is	just	this:	that	duplication,	or	self-repelling,	 is	 the	 essence	 of	 this	movement.	 And	when	this	 step	 is	 achieved,	 it	 will	 be	 clear	 as	 day	 that	 the	Universal	 is	 just	 this	 constant	 self-repelling	 and	 self-attracting	 movement	 we	 witnessed	 in	 the	 Fort-Da	 of	 the	child	(PoS§156).			§39	–	The	flux	of	 incessant	change	Consciousness	detected	at	 its	 heart	 and	 against	 which	 it	 tried	 in	 vain	 to	 impose	order	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 the	 tranquil	 supersensible	world,	 is	 now	 transferred	 to	 where	 it	 belongs,	 in	 the	supersensible	world	itself,	and	tranquillity	is	restored	back	to	the	Understanding.	The	world	was	too	slow,	not	too	fast!		§40	 –	 The	 staggering	 speed	 of	 the	 rainforest,	 the	way	 the	pouring	 rain	 melts	 the	 trees	 until	 they	 come	 apart;	 and	from	 their	 dissolution	 the	 way	 the	 lushness	 of	 the	undergrowth	 allows	 new	 trunks	 to	 rise	 from	 the	 decrepit	ones,	and	this	movement	back	again...	This	is	all	in	fact	the	expression	 of	 sameness.	 The	 trees	 falling	 are	 the	 trees	rising,	 and	what	 there	 is,	 is	 just	 this	 forest	 repelling	 itself	
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from	itself,	what	is	condensed	in	the	name	of	Negativity.	In	this	movement	of	Fort-Da	whereby	presence	and	absence,	or	universal	difference,	was	registered,	it	turns	out	a	second	law	must	be	posited	 in	which	absolute	difference	 is	 in	 fact	self-same.	The	child's	mother	had	always	been	away	–	she	would	 always	 be	 there.	 To	 take	 things	 to	 their	 essence:	what	 is	 there	 to	 symbolise	 is	 the	 destruction	 as	 well	 as	preservation	 of	 sense-knowledge.	Walter	 Kaufmann	 noted	that	 in	 German	 Aufhebung	means	 to	 pick	 something	 up,	literally;	 to	 stoop	 and	 extend	 one's	 hand,	 grab	 something,	get	back	up	again.	We	pick	 something	up	and	 take	 it	 onto	another,	 higher	 plane	 –	 abstraction.	 But	 this	 higher	 plane	was	only	 supposed	by	 the	enquiring	Consciousness	whose	movement	we	have	been	following	so	far;	and	when	this	is	found	out,	Consciousness	has	to	cancel	 itself,	to	ditch	itself	where	 the	 object	was	 picked	 up	 from;	 but	 this	movement	does	not	prevent	the	object	from	really	having	been	picked	up	and	carried	over	to	what	is	now	the	symbolic	plane.		§41	 –	 What	 is	 left	 in	 this	 extraordinary	 insight	 of	 the	Understanding	 is	 the	 "contradiction	 in	 the	 antithesis"	(PoS§160).	The	division	of	the	One	into	two	does	not	mean	that	 the	 two	 so	 distinguished	 are	 in	 themselves;	 on	 the	contrary,	precisely	because	they	are	for	another,	one	is	the	truth	of	the	other.	Or,	the	opposite	has	within	itself	its	own	
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opposite.	The	second	law	now	found	is	that	of	inversion.	To	quote	Hegel's	crystal-clear	deployment:		
"This	 second	 supersensible	 world	 is	 in	 this	 way	 the	
inverted	world	and,	moreover,	since	one	aspect	is	already	present	 in	the	first	supersensible	world,	 the	 inversion	of	the	 first.	 With	 this,	 the	 inner	 world	 is	 completed	 as	appearance.	 For	 the	 first	 supersensible	 world	 was	 only	the	 immediate	 raising	 of	 the	 perceived	 world	 into	 the	universal	element;	it	has	its	necessary	counterpart	in	this	perceived	world	which	still	retained	for	itself	the	principle	
of	change	and	alteration.	The	first	kingdom	of	laws	lacked	that	 principle,	 but	 obtains	 it	 as	 an	 inverted	 world."	(PoS§157)		If	 in	the	first	supersensible	world	universal	difference	was	grasped	 implicitly	and	we	had	an	 inner	realm	of	 laws	 that	kept	the	absolute	flux	out,	in	the	inverted	world,	difference	is	 grasped	 explicitly	 and	 everything	 is	 turned	 on	 its	 head.	Hegel	here	gives	a	long	list	of	examples	(PoS§158)	–	just	to	take	 one;	 the	 North	 Pole	 becomes	 the	 South	 Pole	 in	 the	inverted	world.			§42	–	At	this	point,	we	pass	from	substance	to	subject	and	grasp	 simple	 infinity	 as	 the	 absolute	 Notion.	 Before,	 we	distinguished	 between	 appearances	 and	 their	 complete	
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inversion	in	the	other	world	–	what	is	sweet	in	one	can	be	sour	 in	 the	 supersensible	 other;	 now	 Consciousness	understands	 that,	 in	 fact,	 what	 is	 sweet	 really	 is	 sour	(PoS§159),	and	one	refuses	to	eat.		§43	 –	 Everything	 must	 be	 gone	 through	 again	 to	 be	reflected	 into	 itself:	 the	 dissolution	 of	 Perception	 and	 the	arising	 of	 Force	 as	 the	moment	 of	 the	 Understanding,	 the	Also	and	the	One,	Force	that	duplicates	itself,	the	inwardly-differentiated	 law	 that	 is	 left	 in	 the	 duplication,	 and	 the	duplication	 of	 the	 law	 itself	 between	 the	 law	 of	 pure	difference	and	the	law	of	inversion;	what	is	unbridgeable	is	in	 fact	 self-same.	 There	 is	 only	 negativity	 –	 this	 is	 the	immanent	 necessity	 of	 the	 law.	 This	 is	 what	 must	 be	thought	–	 in	Hegel's	own	words,	 "the	antithesis	within	 the	antithesis	itself,	or	contradiction."	(PoS§160)		§44	–	When	this	is	gone	through,	the	world	of	appearances	completely	passes	into	the	inner	world,	and	the	inner	world	back	 into	 appearances.	 Consciousness	 had	 so	 far	 only	experienced	 itself,	 until	 it	 is	 at	 rest	 within	 itself,	 Self-Consciousness.	 Behind	 the	 veil	 of	 appearances,	which	was	for	 us	 the	 trigger	 of	 our	 elaborations,	 there	 is	 in	 fact	nothing,	just	what	Consciousness	ever	decides	to	put	there.		
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§45	 –	 Consciousness,	 now	 Self-Consciousness,	 went	through	a	storm;	but	this	storm	was	just	the	appearance	of	one,	in	the	sense	of	illusory	nature	and	coming-on-stage	–	it	was	only	the	reality	of	Consciousness	itself.	It	was	a	mirage.	But,	 just	as	before	when	the	Thing	rose	for-itself	–	became	self-identical	 –	 only	 to	 be	 broken	 down	 by	 another;	Consciousness	 that	 has	 become	 for-itself,	 Self-Consciousness,	 has	 little	 time	 to	 rest,	 for	 another	 storm	
gathers	in	the	dusk	that	settles	over	the	stables.	*	To	 conclude	 this	 first	 movement,	 presentation	 has	 been	thoroughly	 negated	 and	 is	 representation.	 It	 has	
encountered	 itself	 –	 it	 has	 proved	 itself	 –	 it	 is	 for-itself.	 In	psychoanalytic	 terms,	 this	movement	 is	 called	Phobia.	But	when	 a	 tiger	 is	 released	 into	 the	 wild	 where	 it	 belonged,	someone	has	to	fill	in	that	empty	cage.		
	 50	
	
	 51	
Second	Negation	
Main	Body	
§1	–	We	danced	all	night	 to	 the	rhythm	of	our	bodies,	and	the	 sky	 was	 hours.	 In	 the	 repeated	 choreography	 of	 our	vowels,	we	understand	the	coming-together	of	motion	and	form	in	the	signifier.	There	is	nothing	else.		§2	 –	 To	 say	 that,	 across	 the	 surface	 of	 the	 ocean,	 the	rainforest	 only	 repels	 itself	 from	 itself,	 is	 to	 say	 that	absolute	difference	is	in	fact	self-same,	or	that	one	is	other.		§3	 –	 Once	 you	 know	 the	 throne	 and	 the	 king	 are	 two	different	things,	the	throne	is	all	for	the	taking…		§4	–	In	the	silence	of	our	surroundings,	a	melody	came	out	and	we	sang	along.		§5	–	Once	stood	a	man	drumming	up	a	city	 for	years.	One	day,	another	cared	 to	 listen.	 "You	have	 the	empty	expanse	of	the	lake	beyond,"	the	man	said	with	enthusiasm,	"the	rest	of	 the	 country	 is	 flat	 and	 made	 up	 of	 farmland.	 A	 purely	functional	centre	stands	at	 its	concrete	core,	which	 is	only	playground	 for	 the	 wind,"	 he	 continued;	 "quiet,	 empty	suburbs	sprawl	around	it.	There	is	absolutely	nothing.	And	
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yet	 there	 is	 something	 quite	 heroic	 about	 the	 City:	 its	people	keep	on	doing	things	and	building	things."		§6	 –	 So	 it	 turns	 out	 the	 phallus	 is	 only	 one	 signifier	 for	desire!	Mountains	do	fall	flat!			§7	 –	 While	 our	 eyes	 searched	 the	 stars,	 the	 world	disappeared…	Wait	for	it	to	appear!	Those	who	came	before	us	all	started	with	the	paradox	of	disappearance	preceding	appearance.		§8	 –	 "Switch	 it	 off,	 pull	 the	 plug,	walk	 in	 the	 dark,	 plug	 it	again,	 switch	 it	 back	on,"	 said	 the	man,	 "then	you	will	 see	the	City."		§9	–	All	work	and	no	play	makes	Jack	a	mere	toy,	all	play	and	
no	work	makes	Jack	a	dull	boy	(popular	saying).			§10	–	"On	the	tip	of	my	tongue,	at	the	end	of	the	peer,	and	after	 looking	hard	and	fast	 into	the	abyss	beyond,	I	turned	back	and	the	City	awaited	me,"	said	the	man.		§11	–	On	 the	abyss	of	Otherness,	 a	witness	 tells	 it	 all:	 "on	either	sides	of	the	lake	there	is	nothing.	Few,	if	any,	are	the	monsters	that	have	been	reported	inhabiting	it;	what	is	left	
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is	the	impenetrable	density	or	depth	beneath	the	surface.	As	
if	 gravity	 was	 only	 the	 domesticated	 version	 that	 the	
nightmare	of	a	black	hole	 is.	 Syntax	 fails	 accordingly.	 Here	one	meets	one's	own	death."		§12	–	"The	trees	were	sparse,	and	I	could	see	the	lake,	and	I	swear	I	was	so	scared!"	said	the	witness,	visibly	shaken.			§13	–	"Down	the	vortex	that	the	signifier	opens	up,	there	is	nothing	 even	 remotely	 human..."	 "You	 don't	 understand!"	He	disappeared.		§14	–	Who	builds	an	ark	doesn't	know	how.	He	or	she	must	turn	it	into	know-how	(Noah).			§15	–	There	was	a	solipsist	in	our	dreamer:	"our	forefathers	built	 a	 City	 on	 the	 edge	 of	 the	 void.	 Their	 waves	 didn't	waver."		§16	–	After	the	Sword,	there	comes	a	Shield.			§17	–	The	witness	recalls:	"I	released	the	fishes	into	what	I	knew	was	not	 a	 sea.	 I	 kept	my	 feet	on	 the	ground	but	my	gaze	 was	 always	 on	 the	 horizon,	 where	 the	 void	 and	 the	
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stars	 meet.	 New	 species	 will	 emerge	 to	 replace	 the	 old	ones..."	And	he	ditched	all	his	collections.		§18	–	The	next	morning,	the	witness	was	absolutely	broken.	"Once	 the	 lights	had	gone	down,	 the	 lake	 turned	out	 to	be	nothing	but	my	own	tears,"	 the	person	sputtered.	"Beyond	the	reflection,	there	was	only	the	pavement.	I	fell	hard."		§19	 –	 "The	 blackout	 spooks	 me..."	 he	 continued.	 "I	 don't	know	where	 I	 am	 going.	 I	 have	 reached	 out	 all	 night	 but	found	no	thing	to	hold	on	to.	I	stumble	upon	the	inexistent	Real.	 I	 am	 in	 pain.	 Walking	 on	 air	 never	 seemed	 so	perilous..."	 One	 keeps	 one's	 wits	 about	 oneself	 precisely	when	one	is	out	of	them,	so	the	witness	retired	in	a	convent	to	think.			§20	 –	 Can	 we	 all	 colonise	 our	 own	 deaths?	 That	 is	 the	
political	question.		§21	–	The	dreamer	made	for	an	interesting	companion.	We	asked	him	to	remember	his	melancholy:	"all	I	know	is	that	the	 world	 faded	 into	 the	 distance	 as	 the	 fleet	 left	 the	harbour	without	me.	Not	long	after	came	the	first	flurries	of	snow."		
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§22	–	 "Winter	 came	and	 turned	everything	 into	 stone	and	ice,	 trapping	 us	 inside.	 Time	 was	 suspended,	 space	restricted.	The	wait	is	interminable."		§23	 –	 "No	monster	 survived	 the	 freezing	 temperatures	 of	Winter."		§24	 –	 "Outside	 my	 window,	 the	 world	 became	 strangely	derealised."		§25	–	Winter	was	like	a	ritornelle	in	his	speech,	so	we	asked	him	what	this	stood	for.	After	a	pause,	the	dreamer	gave	us	the	 following	 answer:	 "when	 he	 comes	 and	 ghosts,	 and	looks	at	me	like	I	am	a	most	impenetrable	Thing,	I	feel	the	pinch	of	 the	cold	again.	Evil	 is	 in	his	gaze	which	perceives	evil	all	around	himself."			§26	–	The	man	went	on:	"space	became	strangely	curved	as	the	 mirror	 curled	 around	 my	 neck	 like	 a	 most	 fluffy	 and	colourful	boa.	Only	a	vague	sensation	of	pinch	–	perhaps	the	frost	 –	 kept	me	 alert."	 Fortunate	 is	 the	 pinch	when,	much	like	a	punch,	lets	blood.		§27	 –	 Could	 this	 man	 be	 Snow	White?	 He	 continued:	 "to	freeze	 is	 to	be	dying	 from	 love.	 I	know	all	 too	well	no	one	
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will	 answer,	 yet	 I	 have	 to	 make	 the	 call."	 Interestingly,	 it	seemed	to	us	that	the	kiss	was	in	fact	the	apple	of	the	story.	The	snow	is	a	nice	blanket	to	sleep	through	Winter...	A	kiss	and	the	world	goes	up	in	flames.	"Can	there	be	life	in	such	an	inhospitable	place?"		§28	–	"Keep	their	eyes	off	the	ground,	keep	your	eyes	on	the	ball;	 let	 them	have	eyes	 for	what	 they	don't	 see!"	 the	man	tells	me,	"the	faintest	light	flickers	in	the	darkest	of	places."		§29	–	Sexual	difference	is	a	gaze.			§30	–	No	answers	were	given	–	there	were	none	–	but	the	question	 was	 returned.	 The	 rest	 could	 not	 be	 said	 with	words.		§31	–	"In	the	City	that	is	ours,	this	seat	can	be	yours.	I	keep	the	y,"	said	the	man,	transfixed.		§32	–	Between	the	mist	of	substance	below	and	the	void	of	the	subject	beyond,	I	stand.		§33	 –	 The	 dreamer	 told	 us	 the	 story	 of	 his	 extraordinary	journey:	 "the	 City	 contained	 me.	 I	 clothed	 myself	 with	whatever	there	was	to	survive	the	freeze,	mainly	the	lights	
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and	 the	 skyscrapers,	 but	 also	 the	 City's	 voices	 and	 its	signifiers.	When	it	was	time,	I	rolled	up	my	skin	and	built	a	bonfire	of	myself;	but	I	knew	the	City	could	take	it."		§34	–	He	said	he	wasn't	too	good	at	maths,	but	nonetheless	understood	its	founding	principle.	He	gave	us	an	example:				 (-Sky)(-Lake)	=	City			"Two	minus	do	equal	a	plus,"	he	concluded.		§35	 –	 "I	 learned	 to	 ignore	 the	 scuffle,	 I	 was	 on	 my	 own	plane.	But	I	needed	a	runway."		§36	–	"I	listened	to	the	voices	and	cat	got	my	tongue.	They	gave	me	the	City	in	exchange."		§37	–	He	couldn't	get	 the	stars	out	of	his	eyes,	he	said.	He	recalled	 another	 of	 his	 dreams:	 "we	watched	 the	 cars	 run	below.	 There	 was	 nothing	 on	 our	 minds	 and	 something	clasped	in	our	hands.	We	knew	the	City	ran	in	our	veins."		§38	 –	 There	 is	 something	 to	 conquer	 even	 for	 whom	vanished	 with	 the	 Lake.	 There	 is	 always	 a	 Tenochtitlan	under	a	Mexico	City.	Better:	always	a	Tenochtitlan	under	a	
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Madrid,	a	London	or	a	Paris.	Perhaps	there	was	something	about	that	in	Antonin	Artaud's	trip	to	Mexico.		§39	 –	 "Space	 is	 only	 conquered	 through	 time.	 Space	 only	appears	when	the	map	is	drawn.	Before,	there	is	no	space.	Leave	the	post	office	and	go	to	the	station,	but	don't	get	on	the	train.	Wait	there.	You	must	know	when	to	act	and	when	to	step	back.	You	can	only	dance	with	the	Real;	if	you	stick	a	knife	 into	 it,	 you	 bleed	 yourself	 to	 death.	 But	 if	 you	 don't	act,	 the	 Real	will	 stick	 a	 knife	 into	 you.	 The	 cut	 is	 always	that	 of	 the	 signifier;	 how	 you	 deal	 with	 it	 is	 a	 different	matter	entirely."		§40	–	Imitation	is	always	a	necessary	step.	You	have	to	take	yourself	out	of	yourself	 first,	before	you	can	come	back	 to	yourself	and	see	what	was	yours.		§41	–	When	the	Sky	became	unreadable,	the	dreamer	killed	himself.	What	he	 saw	 lived	on	 forever	 in	 our	 imagination;	we	decided	to	go	there	ourselves.		§42	–	In	the	City	one	does	not	shy	away	from	symbolisation	and	 actualisation.	 Symbolisation	 is	 the	 dialecticisation	 of	the	Real,	its	encircling	if	you	will;	actualisation	is	the	giving	
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flesh	to	the	symbols	that	are	born	from	symbolisation.	The	City	knows	its	future	depends	on	both.		§43	–	Your	shoulders	will	be	dusty,	the	streets	muddy	and	desert,	the	City	broken.	The	Real	will	wear	you	out	until	you	cannot	 recognise	yourself	 in	 the	mirror.	 If	 you're	 ready	 to	take	 it	 –	 to	 endure	 and	 not	 to	move	 –	 the	 Real	 will	 have	nothing	on	you.		§44	–	Patience	is	an	art.	Each	time	a	new	signifier	comes	up,	its	absence	too	must	be	registered.	What	may	seem	like	an	endless	process	–	the	impossibility	of	symbolic	closure,	the	long	 process	 of	 symbolisation,	 the	 unavoidable	 loop	 that	belongs	 to	 the	 symbolic	 order	 itself	 and	 must	 be	 gone	through	 again	 and	 again	 –	 in	 sum,	 what	 Hegel	 calls	 'bad	infinity'	–	all	of	this	will	eventually	turn	into	something	else,	though	not	what	you	expected	at	the	beginning.		§45	–	We	were	on	our	way	 to	 the	other	 side	of	 the	City	–	cold,	starved	and	exhausted.	Our	feet	hurt	so	badly	we	had	to	stop	at	every	street	corner	and	rest	 in	the	pouring	rain.	We	couldn't	walk,	 literally	 –	 in	 the	realisation	 that	we	had	gone	 through	 the	whole	of	 a	 symbolic	 chain	was	Absolute	Knowing.		
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§46	–	We	travelled	faster	than	light	when	we	came	to	a	rest.		§47	–	Out	of	some	Thing	came	nothing	–	we	symbolised	the	symbolic	 chain.	 Out	 of	 Nothing	 came	 something	 –	 we	symbolised	 our	 absence	 from	 it.	 This	 is	 the	 passage	 from	the	 first	 to	 the	 second	 negation.	 You	must	 go	 all	 the	way	down,	only	to	take	the	same	path	back	up;	then	you	will	be	out,	and	then	in	again.			§48	–	Some	of	us	will	be	trampled	by	the	Real.	May	the	City	listen	and	not	judge		§49	–	We	left	 the	station,	 the	only	train	to	come	was	ours.	We	crawled	back	along	 the	 river	and	out	of	 the	Loop,	 and	across	the	bridge	shone	the	City.		§50	 –	 In	 a	 small	 café	 steps	 away	 from	 the	 bridge,	 we	interviewed	the	City's	Mayer	about	its	lights.	She	put	it	very	clearly:	 "the	 City	 knows	 its	 lights	 are	 only	 borrowed	 and	shared	 by	 all.	 The	 City	 does	 not	 partake	 of	 the	 phallic	economy,	it	does	not	wish	to	shine	and	enlighten	and	glare.	It	only	wants	to	rise	and	become	other."		§51	–	We	kept	 in	mind	 the	dreamer's	 last	words:	 "when	 I	thought	I	would	go	up	in	flames	out	of	love,	I	knew	it	was	in	
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fact	 the	 cold	 wind	 blowing	 again.	 I	 learned	 to	 burn	 in	silence,	I	kept	warm	despite	myself."		§52	 –	 The	 Mayer	 added:	 "the	 City	 is	 not	 afraid	 of	eccentricity.	The	City	makes	the	moves	as	it	goes,	it	can	only	walk	in	its	own	footsteps."		§53	–	The	Mayer	went	on:	"the	City	is	out	for	consistency.	It	does	 not	 seek	 to	 permanently	 reinvent	 itself,	 but	 to	actualise	 itself	 over	 Time	 and	 Space,	 i.e.	 live	 on	 its	 own	Concept.	 It	 knows	 that	 to	 become	other	means	 to	 become	one."		§54	–	Look	out	for	sublime	compromises		§55	–	The	Mayer's	words	on	eccentricity	were	stuck	in	our	minds;	we	could	not	be	more	in	agreement.	The	City	has	to	run	on	eccentricity.	We	keep	stitching	ourselves	up,	and	as	best	as	we	can;	the	result	can	only	be	highly	idiosyncratic.		§56	 –	 The	 Mayer	 fondly	 recalled:	 "we	 got	 married	 in	 a	rundown	church	outside	the	City.	We	were	our	own	priest,	our	own	witnesses,	our	own	parents."		
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§57	–	WHO	DOES	NOT	KNOW	WHERE	ONE	COMES	FROM	CANNOT	KNOW	WHERE	ONE	IS	GOING.	This	could	be	read	on	the	frontispiece	of	every	hospital	in	the	City.		§58	–	"From	the	phallic	economy,	we	only	keep	the	waste	-	period!"	said	the	women.		§59	 –	 The	 dreamer	 also	 said	 this	 before	 dying:	 "when	 I	thought	it	was	over,	or	that	it	will	never	have	an	end,	or	that	it	never	had	a	start	to	start	with...	I	knew	that	it	was	the	cold	wind	blowing	again.	I	kept	my	cool."	The	man	really	was	a	lesson	in	enduring.		§60	–	 In	a	 court	of	 law	 inside	 the	City,	Daphne	 testifies	 to	the	passage	from	the	Imaginary	to	the	Symbolic:	"It	seemed	to	me	that	 I	was	never	going	to	break	out	of	what	had	me	trapped.	I	wrestled	but	it	was	all	in	vain.	The	more	I	fought	back,	 the	 more	 entangled	 I	 got.	 I	 couldn't	 breathe	 and	played	dead	for	a	while,	so	that	I	could	catch	my	breath;	yet	it	did	not	let	go.	The	fight	goes	on	to	this	very	day."		§61	–	 In	a	 court	of	 law	 inside	 the	City,	Daphne	 testifies	 to	the	 passage	 from	 the	 Symbolic	 to	 the	 Real:	 'For	 a	 while	there	is	the	chasing,	the	running	and	the	fighting;	but	when	the	Real	bites	your	head	off,	there	is	only	the	dying.'	
	 63	
	§62	 –	 "I	 live	 in	 a	 rather	 small	 place	 to	 speak	 the	 truth...	There	is	only	space	for	one...	Although	God	knows	the	many	I	 welcome."	 Much	 later,	 the	 author	 of	 these	 lines	 was	 to	learn	 that	God	radically	didn't	know.	Past	 the	sheer	horror	of	such	a	condition,	the	Actual	really	begins	its	ascent	with	this	insight.	God	–	what	Hegel	would	here	refer	to	as	social	
substance	 –	 must	 become	 conscious	 of	 our	 existence.	 Be	warned,	it	is	a	long	way	to	the	top.		§63	–	The	girl	in	red	was	the	prettiest	of	all.	One	day	she	put	on	pretty	red	shoes	and	danced	for	hours,	until	she	prayed	not	to	go	up	in	flames.	There	is	nothing	certain		§64	–	We	met	the	Mayer	to	discuss	Daphne's	extraordinary	testimony	 of	 the	 day	 before.	 She	 had	 been	 there	 too,	 she	said	 –	 "First	 you	 run	horizontally,	 then	 you	 run	 vertically,	finally	you	step	into	another	dimension.	Some	have	called	it	'the	desert	of	 the	Real'.	Whether	we	can	grow	flowers	and	skyscrapers	again	depends	on	you."		§65	–	We	received	a	message	from	the	Old	Town.	It	read	as	follows:	 "I	 couldn't	 grasp	 even	 the	 nearest,	 most	 obvious	object.	My	 fingers	 could	 only	 hit	 it	 and	 the	 object	 slipped	away	 every	 time.	 I	 couldn't	 explain	 the	 phenomenon	 to	
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anyone	either,	I	was	lost	for	words.	I	must	have	hurt	myself	repeatedly	 in	 this	 way,	 for	 my	 hands	 were	 all	 cuts	 and	burns.	 And	 I	 was	 dirty	 –	 sweaty,	 dusty,	 even	 grimy.	 I...	stank!	 I	 felt	dizzy.	 I	was	quite	 simply	exhausted	 from	how	slow	 time	was	on	 this	 side	of	 the	Gate.	Heaven	was	hell	 –	the	moment	I	was	in,	I	was	out."		§66	 –	 Absolute	 Knowing:	 not	 to	 know	 as	 the	 greatest	achievement	 one	 can	 aim	 for.	 Being,	 or	 Actuality,	 starts	there.		§67	–	Pretty	 is	 the	City	when	 the	 light	goes	down	and	 the	lights	go	up.	It	reminds	us	of	this	pure	vanishing	at	the	core	of	Hegel's	Phenomenology.	To	go	to	the	heart	of	Science,	one	must	 believe	 in	 the	 smallest	of	miracles.	When	you	 follow	your	heart,	you	can	only	believe.		§68	–	At	first	there	is	only	time,	plenty	of	it.	You	might	want	to	 call	 it	 eternity.	 It's	 never-ending;	 it	 is	 not-one.	 Space	comes	second,	it	has	to	be	invented.	In	time,	the	suffocating	Here	must	 give	 birth	 to	 another	 place,	 There.	We	 are	 not	anywhere	or	 in	Time	–	the	rhythm	and	horizon	opened	up	by	 its	 symbolisation	 –	 until	 we	 learn	 to	 divide	 ourselves	spatially.	 It	 is	 often	 said	 that	we	 do	 not	 possess	 ubiquity,	but	some	of	us	do,	thank	God.		
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	§69	 –	Time	 and	 Space	 can	become	 symbolisations,	 and	 so	can	 Motion	 and	 Form.	 There	 is	 nothing	 before	 that,	symbolisation	 creates	 what	 it	 symbolises.	 You	 must	differentiate	in	the	trial	of	Science	what	is	method	and	what	is	discourse.		§70	 –	Have	 no	 doubt	 –	 but	 do	make	mistakes!	 –	 even	 the	City	will	 eventually	die.	Until	 the	day	 comes	and	goes,	 the	City	will	go	about	 its	business	as	usual.	We	didn't	come	to	sell	 opium	 to	 the	 masses,	 making	 the	 ride	 home	 more	comfortable	 should	be	 enough.	There	 is	 no	Beyond.	There	IS,	but	it	was	a	pure	vanishing.		§71	–	This	was	the	Hegelian	reversal	of	Kant	–	how	we	pass	from	 'Think,	 but	 obey!'	 to	 'Have	 no	 doubt,	 but	 do	 make	mistakes!'	 This	 is	 also	 the	 passage	 from	 desire	 to	 drive.	Desire	 thrives	 on	 its	 metonymical	 run	 but	 leaves	 the	founding	metaphor	untouched.	The	drive	on	the	other	hand	gets	 off	 its	 beaten	 tracks,	 but	 we	 don't	 know	 where	 the	tracks	go.		§72	–	 In	a	 court	of	 law	 inside	 the	City,	Daphne	 testifies	 to	the	passage	from	the	Real	 to	the	Imaginary:	"There	can	be	desire	only	where	death	 is.	 I	 came	 to	desire	a	good	wreck	
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like	myself."	Ultimately,	the	remains	are	language	sublated.	These	 remains,	 crumbs	 of	 language,	 must	 be	 libidinally	invested.	"If	the	City	is	where	Negativity	rests	in	piece,	the	City	should	not	be	afraid	of	a	good	lightning."		§73	–	The	Mayer	was	really	excited	today	–	"The	City	is	safe	from	 nothing!"	 she	 exclaimed,	 "it	 is	 not	 afraid	 of	 its	 own	disappearance,	for	it	already	stands	in	ruins!"	We	ran	back	to	 the	 station	 right	 after	 the	meeting;	 there,	 the	 Real	 had	acquired	a	density	all	its	own...	The	City	was	a	signifier!		§74	–	You	can	never	be	a	real	girl;	you	can	only	be	a	mean	girl.	 We	 rank	 the	 movie	 of	 the	 same	 name	 among	 the	treasures	of	our	era.		§75	–	The	Mayer	said:	"years	from	now,	perhaps	people	will	flock	 to	 admire	 the	 strange	 beauty	 of	 the	 fallen	 City.	 And	that	 which	 lived	 and	 died	 will	 live	 again	 beyond	 death…	Who	 fails	 to	 part	 parties	 in	 his	 or	 her	 own	 grave,	 you	know."	We	thought	about	it	for	a	while.	After	all,	wasn't	the	city	of	Detroit	currently	colonising	 its	own	signifier?	From	Detroit	 to	 actually	 destroyed?	 Is	 this	 perhaps	 what	psychoanalysis	 calls	 the	 death	 drive?	 The	 destruction	 we	wilfully	bring	upon	ourselves	everyday?		
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§76	–	Death	became	for	us	a	signifier.	It	ceased	to	haunt	us	as	we	started	haunting	 it.	That	which	comes	to	undermine	the	phallic	economy	sooner	or	later	–	the	Real	–	was	sublet	to	the	gaze	that	came	to	sublate	it.		§77	–	On	our	way	out	of	the	City	and	back	to	the	Old	Town	where	we	were	summoned,	we	met	the	girl	we	always	had	a	liking	for;	she	went	by	the	name	of	Holly.	With	her	usual	go-lightly	demeanour,	she	told	us	that	even	though	she	had	seen	 the	 most	 majestic	 cathedrals	 and	 castles	 the	 world	over,	there	was	not	much	she	liked	apart	from	ruins...	How	strange.	And	she	liked	nothing	more	than	a	hole	in	the	wall,	she	said!		§78	–	When	asked	by	 the	one	who	 led	her	 so	 far,	 she	said	she	 didn't	 know	 the	 answer.	 She	was	 almost	 surprised	 to	learn	 it	 eventually.	 She	 gave	 us	 the	 long	 sought-after	answer	–	if	there	is	a	residue	to	the	passage	of	the	signifier,	a	minimal,	 silliest,	 absolutely	 vital	 repetition	 was	 that	residue.	 It	was	useless,	 it	 didn't	make	 any	 sense,	 she	 said.	This	repetition	is	the	drive	all	the	same.		"Keep	it	on	the	low,"	she	whispered,	"but	I	never	felt	more	alive	than	when	I	died."		
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§79	 –	 She	 discoursed	 at	 length	 about	 how	 easy	 it	 was	 to	conquer	 the	 stars	 –	 to	 look	 at	 them	 "from	 the	 top	 of	 the	Empire	 State	 building"	 and	 "to	 burn	 bright	 in	 our	 own	soulless	 skies,"	 to	quote	her	memorable	words	–	 and	how	apparently	much	harder	it	was	to	conquer	the	hole	that	will	inevitably	 swallow	 them.	 "Apparently"	 she	 said,	 was	"paradoxical,"	 precisely	 because	 it	 is	 at	 the	 level	 of	appearances	that	we	can	seize	the	hole.		§80	 –	Never	had	 the	 void	been	 given	 such	 a	density.	 That	which	 was	 a	 hole	 in	 our	 horizon	 became	 the	 ball	 we	 ran	after.	There	was	a	strange	presence	in	the	most	desolate	of	places.	We	were	depressed	but	also	curious.		§81	–	We	could	not	even	 say	with	 the	melancholic	 Justine	that	 life	 on	 Earth	 was	 evil;	 it	 would	 have	 said	 too	 much.	Ultimately,	there	is	only	the	dialectics	at	the	heart	of	Being.	Will	you	dare	to	follow	the	thread	amid	the	debris?		§82	 –	 "One	must	 always	 stand	with	Melanie	 Klein	 against	Gilles	 Deleuze	 on	 symbolisation.	 Psychoanalytic	constructions	are	always	false,	yet	absolutely	necessary.	We	would	 not	 otherwise	 have	 unravelled	 the	 truth	 of	 our	desire.	The	paradox,	of	course,	is	that	you	have	to	go	mad	to	go	sane..."	Wait	for	the	negation.	
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	§83	 –	 She	 who	 stands	 in	 tears	 amid	 the	 alien	 corn,	 must	stand	undefeated	amid	her	own	ruins.	The	signifier	 is	 first	apprehended	 as	 object,	 nightingale;	 and	 then	 as	 Notion,	night-in-gale.		§84	–	As	to	the	mystery	of	our	origins,	no	one	can	provide	a	clue	 but	 a	 metaphor	 can	 be	 invented.	 When	 the	 winding	City	 was	 one,	 our	 storm	 became	 inhabited.	 Inhibited	 too	perhaps...		§85	–	Back	in	the	Old	Town,	we	worked	hard.	We	went	out	and	mingled	with	our	contemporaries;	we	went	home.	We	fell	asleep	and	woke	up.	We	got	on	buses	and	off,	and	so	on.	Yet	we	 couldn't	 help	 but	 secretly	 search	 the	 ruins	 for	 the	object	of	desire	that	eluded	us.		§86	 –	 Holly	 moved	 next	 door.	 During	 one	 of	 our	 many	evening	 conversations,	 she	 confessed	 that	 she	 was	originally	 looking	 for	 a	 mirror	 that	 did	 not	 stare	 in	 her	lesbian	 lover.	 This	 was	 perhaps	 her	 mistake.	 In	 her	predicament	there	could	only	be	death,	she	said.	"Love	has	to	cancel	itself,	however	hard	this	is."		
	 70	
§87	–	You	must	build	something	up	before	you	can	raze	it	to	the	ground	and	start	from	scratch.	This	is	what	is	meant	by	construction	 in	 the	 psychoanalytic	 sense.	 Suddenly,	Deconstruction	 sounded	 like	 the	 most	 radical	 attempt	 at	
shrouding	 the	 inexistence	of	 the	Other.	To	deconstruct	 the	hermeneutics	of	'presence'	at	the	heart	of	metaphysics	is	to	suppose	 that	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 'presence'	 there	 was	nonetheless	 such	 a	 thing	 as	 hermeneutics...	 We	 smiled.	While	there	is	nothing	to	deconstruct,	for	us	there	certainly	was	Nothing	to	build	up.	We	will	come	back	to	that.		§88	 –	When	 Love	 is	 gone	 through,	 there	 are	 only	 desires.	Not	even	bodies	can	trap	them.	We	must	take	responsibility	for	our	own	disembowelment.		§89	 –	 There	 was	 nothing	 above	 our	 heads	 (the	 sky	 fell	down),	nothing	under	our	feet	(we	walked	over	that	which	fell)	 and	 different	 kinds	 of	 deserts	 on	 the	 horizon	 (the	Desert	 we	 crossed	 ceased	 to	 be	 totality).	 We	 decided	 to	settle,	 there	was	work	 to	 do.	We	were	 pioneers	 again,	we	were	to	wrestle	with	the	Real		§90	–	 "We	can	never	get	 clean.	The	stain	 is	always	 that	of	language	 and	 it	 was	 not	 going	 to	 go	 away..."	Wait	 for	 the	negation.	
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	§91	–	There	is	no	happy	ending.	A	happy	ending	is	one	that	precisely	does	not	want	to	end;	or	is	frozen	out	of	Time.	We	were	to	move	beyond	such	endings.	Actuality	does	not	care	much	 for	 Eternity.	 It	 is	 only	 interested	 in	 how	 its	 present	refashions	both	past	and	future.	If	the	loss	had	been	painful,	the	 loss	 of	 the	 loss	was	 to	be	unendurable;	 and	now	Time	
appeared	on	our	horizon	 through	 the	 completeness	of	 our	death.	This	is	crucial	–	the	symbolisation	of	Time	was	in	fact	that	 horizon,	 i.e.	 the	 becoming-conscious	 of	 the	 signifier.	What	the	signifier	comes	to	announce	is	that	both	the	gaze	and	 that	 which	 is	 looked	 at	 will	 cease	 to	 live	 when	 Time	does	its	work	of	undoing.	Glad	tidings	take	one's	eyes	off	the	
sea	from	time	to	Time.			§92	–	The	necessity	of	war	 is	nothing	other	 than	 society's	attempt	 at	 symbolising	 Time,	 its	 own	maker,	 through	 the	repetition	 of	 its	 undoing	 and	 coming-back-together.	 The	march	of	civilisation	is	always	in	search	of	its	own	signifier,	the	reflection	of	its	groundless	deployment	in	Time.			§93	 –	 It	 did	 not	 matter	 anymore	 whether	 we	 had	 fully	escaped	our	pasts.	To	escape	one's	past	is	to	be	completely	enslaved	to	it.	Those	who	have	escaped	it	are	condemned	to	
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repeat	it	unconsciously;	but	those	who	haven't	must	invent	one,	for	symbolisation	always	brings	about	something	else.		§94	–	Winter	was	one	of	the	Names-of-the-Father.	Precisely	what	kills	on	our	streets	when	deep	the	temperatures.		§95	 –	 For	 us,	 Winter	 was	 barely	 more	 than	 a	 stray	 dog.	When	 he	 let	 go	 of	 our	 feet,	 when	 his	 hands	 were	 not	wrapped	 around	 our	 throat,	 Winter	 needed	 help	 like	everyone	else…	Perhaps	we	couldn't	let	go	either.		§96	–	A	skyscraper	was	our	attempt	to	fathom	what	was	not	passed	on.	Remove	the	skyscraper	and	the	City	 falls	on	 its	head,	we	learned	that	much.		§97	–	Around	noon	we	met	with	an	exceptional	archer.	He	had	 just	 launched	 the	 arrow	 of	 Fate	 and	 was	 recovering	from	 the	 sheer	 exhaustion	 of	 the	 Act.	 He	 explained	 –	 "To	reach	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 matter,	 you	 must	 aim	 off-centre.	Those	who	do	not	 take	 the	wind	and	their	own	exposition	into	 account	 will	 aim	 straight	 and	miss!	 There	 is	 nothing	more	 deceptive	 than	 an	 obvious	 Thing,	 to	 twist	 a	 friend's	words.	You	have	 learned	your	way	through	the	Real	when	you	can	see	in	the	image	what	is	beyond	it.	When	you	know	
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the	 difference	 you	 can	 point	 your	 bow	 to	 the	 corner	 and	aim	at	the	back.	You	must	train	in	curving	trajectories."	After	a	pause	he	added	rather	mysteriously:	"Only	shots	in	the	dark	can	bring	the	sun	down."		§98	–	We	knew	all	along	Winter	was	a	distraction.	The	true	horror	 begins	 when	 you	 are	 kept	 inside	 and	 there	 is	 no	outside	 to	 dream	 of.	 At	 this	 point,	 things	 are	 about	 to	 go	very	wrong	and	then	very	strange.	There	is	no	such	thing	as	success	or	failure;	when	standards	come	apart,	there	is	only	the	trying.		§99	 –	We	 saw	 the	 Archer	 again	 the	 next	 day.	 He	was	 not	ready	 to	 be	 overwhelmed	 with	 our	 endless	 hysterical	questions,	and	simply	dropped	the	following	line:	"you	just	know	something	has	gone	in	and	out	when	nothing	happens	and	 you	 feel	 too	 depressed	 to	 inquire	 anyway."	 He	 went	back	to	bed.		§100	–	First	you	want	to	date	yourself,	and	then	you	want	to	 date	 your	 corpse.	When	 you	do,	 you	 leave	 eternity	 and	enter	mortality.		§101	 –	 Things	 do	 not	 necessarily	 turn	 out	 for	 the	 better.	One	must	 be	 careful	 when	 forcing	 one's	 way	 through	 the	
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Real,	 especially	 when	 one	 does	 not	 have	 a	 choice.	 If	alienation	 kept	 you	 down	 most	 of	 the	 day,	 responsibility	will	keep	you	up	at	night.			§102	 –	We	 lived	 in	 the	wild.	 Everyday,	 all	 sorts	 of	 beasts	crossed	our	path.	Danger	loomed	at	every	street	corner.	We	constantly	worried	about	each	other,	we	were	horrified	at	the	 prospect	 of	 the	 other's	 death.	 Gradually	 we	 came	 to	trust	the	City,	but	it	was	always	work	in	progress!		§103	–	"I	became	my	own	Medea.	I	desired	my	own	murder	in	place	of	my	murderer.	I	elevated	the	revolting	act	to	the	Absolute."		§104	–	There	 is	always	a	morning	 fairy	at	 the	heart	of	 the	storm.	Wait	for	the	reversal.		§105	–	We	didn't	know	where	to	look	anymore.	We	couldn't	see	our	reflection,	so	crystal	clear	was	the	void.		§106	–	What	was	it	that	kept	people	going	we	just	didn't	get	it.	We	came	to	a	resting	place,	we	built	a	scholar's	garden.	There,	 we	 let	 Negativity	 roam	 the	 grounds	 freely.	 She	barked	all	day	like	a	dog,	only	to	come	home	at	night	like	a	cat	–	a	black	cat,	it	goes	without	saying.	
	 75	
	§107	 –	 There	 is	 something	 evil	 inside	 of	 us.	 It	 is	 the	 dark	core	of	humanity,	 the	 land	of	 anonymous	drives	 that	have	been	 cut	 off	 from	 the	 surface.	 The	drives	 don't	 care	much	for	what	language	spills	out;	language	doesn't	care	much	for	what	the	drives	work	upon.	A	deal	must	be	struck.			§108	 –	 We	 didn't	 know	 anymore.	 It	 didn't	 matter.	 We	passed	 from	 the	 death	 of	 our	 desire	 to	 the	 desire	 for	 our	death,	 i.e.	 the	 story	of	 our	disappearance	 that	we	 come	 to	enjoy.		§109	 –	 Months	 later,	 we	 glimpsed	 our	 Irene	 Adler	 in	 the	distance.	She	kept	her	eyes	on	the	edge	of	 the	void	and	us	on	 the	 edge	 of	 our	 seat.	 Or	 perhaps	 it	was	 the	 other	way	around...	She	had	pierced	her	body	but	she	didn't	care	much	for	 inscriptions,	 save	 for	 an	 obscure	 pendent	 that	 hung	around	 her	 neck.	 She	 knew	 her	 own	 secrets	were	 secrets	she	didn't	know	herself,	but	she	was	only	interested	in	what	goes	on	at	the	Frontier,	where	the	void	and	the	stars	meet	–	she	 secretly	 expected	 her	 redemption	 there.	 Death	 never	looked	so	good.		§110	–	We	only	liked	to	take	a	walk	in	the	sublated	woods	of	 our	 early	 years,	 amid	 the	 skyscrapers	 of	 the	 populated	
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City.	 For	 the	 rest,	we	 kept	 to	 our	 room.	 The	 Frontier	was	There.		§111	 –	 One	 must	 not	 be	 afraid	 of	 symbolisation	 and	actualisation.	To	borrow	one	or	 the	other's	words,	 behind	the	 so-called	 curtain	 of	 appearance	 there	 is	 nothing,	 just	what	we	put	there.	So	that	the	Universal	only	finds	its	net	in	
the	deployment	of	singularity.	That	is,	the	endless	dialectical	reversals	 that	 are	 the	 stuff	 of	 our	 lives,	 painfully	 pinpoint	both	the	Real	and	that	which	keeps	it	in	check.	One	must	lie	on	the	table	and	be	that	net,	before	the	other	can	serve	and	play	the	game.			§112	–	There	was	a	question	that	needed	to	be	upheld	 for	us	to	start	living	again.	One	is	allowed	to	ask	one's	question	for	a	few	others.	Our	question	was	the	greatest	of	all	–	what	
is	it	 to	be?	But	at	 the	end	of	our	 journey	up	and	down	 the	signifying	chain,	we	were	like	Kierkegaard's	knight	of	faith	–	 we	 wanted	 nothing	 more	 than	 the	 repetition	 of	 a	 good	meal	and	good	company.		§113	–	Holly	was	very	expansive	today:	"I	never	knew	what	a	woman	was	in	contrast	to	those	I	rarely	saw,"	she	agreed,	"but	 I	 never	 knew	 what	 those	 were	 to	 begin	 with!	 I	gathered	something	came	 in	 the	place	of	 an	exchange,	but	
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there	was	no	ditching	the	question	altogether.	So	I	became	my	 own	 kind	 of	 woman	 in	 my	 everyday	 dealings	 with	others,	and	the	rest	was	shapes."		§114	–	She	went	on:	 "I'm	out	 for	 revenge	perhaps,	 I	don't	mind	 admitting	 it.	 My	 wrath	 has	 no	 object	however,	 it	 is	purely	 metaphysical.	 The	 world	 disappears	 but	 the	 anger	remains."		§115	 –	 She	 couldn't	 stop...	 "I	 don't	 get	 peacocks,"	 she	continued,	 "neither	 the	 imaginary	ones	on	display,	nor	 the	symbolic	 ones	 hidden	 from	 view.	 I	 only	 like	 the	 sublated	ones.	Who	 likes	 birds	 that	 barely	 fly	 anyway?"	 She	 had	 a	point.		§116	–	There	is	me,	there	is	the	other,	and	there	is	Time,	the	belated	third	of	our	lives.	Neurotics	get	the	empty	structure	of	 the	 signifier	 (the	 +/-	 matrix)	 but	 not	 its	 fillings	(hysterics)	or	its	feelings	(obsessionals).	Others	will	not	go	through	 the	mirror	 and	we	 don't	 blame	 them.	We	 on	 the	other	 hand,	 know	 so	 much	 about	 negations	 because	 we	fight	for	hours...		§117	–	Do	you	know	the	story	of	the	boy	who	was	all	ears?	He	listened	to	his	surroundings	for	years	and	years	–	mostly	
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to	the	voices,	but	also	to	the	wind	as	well	as	his	own	silence.	One	 day	 he	 opened	 the	 door	 and	 spoke	 his	 first	 and	 last	words:	 "You	 are	 welcome	 to	 join,"	 he	 said,	 "but	 please	knock	 on	 the	 door	 first.	 Don't	 be	 offended	 if	 I	 ask	 you	 to	leave	at	some	point."		§118	 –	 A	 professor	 said:	 "If	 everyone	 came	 on	 time,	 I	wouldn't	need	to	deliver	a	lecture."		§119	–	We	kindly	added:	"If	the	professor	finished	on	time,	there	would	be	no	need	for	students."		§120	–	When	you	are	subject	to	the	law	for	no	reason,	you	have	to	invent	a	world	in	which	this	subjection	is	justified.		§121	–	First	you	desire	repetition	as	an	object,	and	then	its	Notion.	 We	 repeat	 our	 most	 infantile	 scenes	 in	 order	 to	
understand	that	the	scene	stands	for	repetition	itself.	What	is	desired	is	the	signifier,	beyond	the	endless	unveilings	that	represent	 for	 us	 its	 binary	 structure.	Only	 this	 insight	 can	be	 time-bending	 –	 and,	 with	 time,	 time-binding.	 Time-building	 is	 thus	 characteristic	 of	 the	 intervention	 of	 the	third,	which	can	enshrine	with	a	metaphor	the	work	phobia	started,	 thereby	 grounding	 the	 signifier	 that	 was	 in	 the	
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wind.	This	metaphor	comes	for	death,	the	other	side	of	the	gaze	when	both	are	mediated	by	the	signifier.			§122	 –	 The	 harder	 it	 becomes,	 the	 speedier	 time	 gets.	Eternity	gone	through	can	be	broken		§123	 –	When	 the	 other	 was	 not	 symbolised,	 the	 work	 of	symbolisation	will	have	to	be	displaced	onto	time	itself.	One	must	 invent	a	metaphor	 for	Death,	 the	signifier	 that	never	came	 through.	 Time	 must	 become	 the	 vector	 one	 forever	looked	 for.	 If	 the	 Real	 does	 not	 break	 the	 continuum	 of	eternity	 and	 introduce	 death,	 you	 can	 only	 desire	 that	which	 you	 lack:	 death	 qua	 the	 lack	 itself.	 Feminine	
depression	 is	 nothing	 other	 than	 the	 desire	 for	 one's	 own	
oblivion	 in	 the	 passage	 of	 Time.	 To	 break	 out	 of	 this	predicament,	 one	 must	 actualise	 Time	 –	 give	 it	 rhythm,	 if	
not	blues...		§124	 –	 Sex	 is	 nothing	 other	 than	 the	 enjoyment	 of	 Time.	The	 signifier	 finds	 its	 pleasurable	 actualisation	 in	 the	elementary	 matrix	 of	 the	 coitus'	 or	 sodomy's	 back	 and	forth;	 when	 Phallus	 passes	 from	 the	 lost	 signifier	 to	 the	signifier	of	loss,	this	is	what	is	meant	by	phallic	jouissance.			
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§125	 –	And	 in	 the	whirling	caresses	of	our	whimsical	 lover,	
Time	comes	undone	on	the	cross	that	does	not	come...	This	is	one	 formula	 for	 the	 feminine	 jouissance	 that	 keeps	 our	contemporaries	riveted.	May	they	instead	become	absorbed	in	the	dazzling	beauty	of	this	sentence.		§126	 –	 True	 Love,	 i.e.	 love	 deprived	 of	 meaning	 and	actualised,	 is	the	taking	responsibility	for	the	contingency	of	
an	encounter.	 In	 the	author's	native	 tongue:	 in	a	rencontre	(encounter)	 we	 pass	 from	 rendre	 compte	 (to	 settle	accounts;	 the	 pound	 of	 flesh	 that	 language	 demands	 and	Love	pretends	 to	waive)	to	rendre	contre	 (to	give...	against;	to	 give	up	 something	 in	order	 to	 retain	 something	else,	 to	go	against	 that	which	always	demands	more).	This	 cannot	but	call	to	mind	El	Cid	from	Pierre	Corneille's	play:	once	the	debt	 is	 paid,	 one	 should	 not	 be	 afraid	 to	 claim	 back	 that	which	initiated	the	transfer	and	has	been	actualised	by	it.		§127	–	This	 is	 also	 the	 story	of	Christ	who	wanted	 to	pay	the	 debt	 once	 and	 for	 all	 with	 his	 life.	 Christ	 effectively	broke	 the	continuum	of	 time	by	metaphorising	 it.	 In	Time,	there	was	a	beginning	in	the	birth	of	Christ,	and	we	knew	an	end	 in	 the	 Apocalypse.	 True	 love	 is	 always	 an	 ontological	adventure.			
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§128	–	In	the	psychoanalytic	setting,	money	comes	in	place	of	the	death	of	Christ.	One	shouldn't	dwell	long	on	this,	for	without	 money	 there	 would	 only	 be	 dead	 analysts.	 What	good	 is	a	dead	analyst?	You	also	need	 to	know	that	Christ	survived	his	own	death	and	got	to	enjoy	himself	in	the	end...		§129	 –	 If	 the	 signifier	 is	 the	 coming	 apart	 of	 the	 phallus,	time	 is	 the	 coming	 apart	 of	 the	 signifier.	 Take	 the	 phallus	away	from	the	depressive	mother	and	the	signifier	goes	too.	We	learned	that	much.			§130	–	When	we	were	left	for	dead	and	the	wolves	dragged	our	decaying	body	into	the	night,	we	could	only	desire	our	own	signifier.		§131	 –	We	who	had	 survived	 our	 own	death,	wanted	 this	death	to	survive	Time.	Death	became	a	signifier	again,	one	which	represented	the	subject	 for	another	signifier.	For	us	there	 can	 only	 be	 phallic	 jouissance	 in	 the	 form	 of	 its	inversion.		§132	 –	 The	 slaves	 had	 acquired	 a	 chain	 of	 their	 own,	 this	was	 the	outcome	of	 the	dialectic	 of	 lordship	 and	bondage.	What	 kept	 them	 apart	 before,	 now	 tied	 them	 together.	When	 they	 become	 conscious	 of	 this	 (and	 that	 chain	
	 82	
unconscious),	they	will	rise	as	One.	A	new	order	will	come	into	being;	one	that	 is	not	grounded	on	the	enigmatic	gaze	of	 the	 Other,	 but	 ground	 for	 the	 squared	 and	 twisted	skyscrapers	that	flash	from	the	void	to	the	stars.		§133	 –	 Because	 we	 forsook	 Nothing,	 we	 had	 to	 forsake	everything.	 For	 our	 own	 sake,	 we	 knew	what	 it	meant	 to	turn	 madness	 inside	 out.	 Past	 the	 intoxication,	 we	 also	knew	the	sad	serenity	of	absolute	beginnings.			§134	–	 "I	hurt	my	 foot	against	 the	 table	on	my	way	out	of	the	 room.	 I	 turned	 around	 and	 pointed	 my	 finger	 at	 it	menacingly,	 shouting:	 'nasty,	nasty	 table!'	Perhaps	 I	 got	 to	know	my	 underlying	 position	 vis-à-vis	 language	 that	 day.	But	the	Other's	words	did	not	matter	anymore,	and	neither	past	nor	future.	I	experienced	mindfulness,	irony	included."		§135	–	Holly	had	 just	moved	out	of	our	building	when	we	met	outside	the	theatre.	She	looked	helpless	for	once.	When	we	asked	what	 the	 trouble	was,	 she	gave	us	 the	 following	answer:	"I	am	afraid	he	is	getting	tired	of	me.	I	know	he	has	something	else	to	do,	and	a	life	of	his	own.	I	have	solved	for	him	 the	 mystery	 that	 kept	 him	 on,	 but	 he	 turned	 off	 the	lights	 before	 I	 could	 tell	 him."	The	 gates	were	 closing,	 the	Other	was	show,	and	about	 to	start...	On	the	threshold,	we	
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turned	 around	 to	 wave	 her	 goodbye.	 She	 smiled,	 waved	back	 and	vanished	 into	 the	 crowd	 that	makes	up	 the	City.	We	 never	 saw	 her	 again.	 This	 was	 without	 a	 doubt	 the	heaviest	price	we	had	to	pay	for	a	show	in	the	Old	Town.		§136	–	When	madness	was	gone	through,	we	 felt	absolute	responsibility	 for	 our	words.	We	became	 careful	 –	 though	not	inactive	–	in	our	everyday	dealings	with	others,	for	we	learned	 that	 there	was	always	a	storm	waiting	 to	break	 in	every	morning	fairy.	We	were	out	to	defend	that	which	we	became	 possessor,	 but	 left	 the	 rest	 to	 the	 meanders	 of	language	that	saw	our	passage.	When	finally	ashore,	Leander	
cut	off	the	hand	that	got	him	up	from	the	bottom	of	the	sea,	
for	 it	 was	 Hero's;	 and	 vanished	 into	 a	 gentle	 breeze	 that	
swept	through	the	coast	of	dead	loves.		§137	 –	 This	 also	 brings	 us	 to	 singer	 Ciara,	 who	 put	 into	words	our	last	trap	in	the	following	line:	"you	can	entertain	Him	all	day	long,	but	I	am	what	He	wants	for	dinner."	In	this	gesture	 of	 self-sacrifice	 in	 the	 strict	 sense,	 Christ	 perhaps	found	his	sexuality,	at	last.	However,	when	the	mill	is	done	and	so	is	the	meal,	one	must	fly	like	an	arrow	at	the	closest	of	all	ranges.		
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§138	 –	 Someone	 said	 psychoanalysis	 was	 not	 philosophy.	This	didn't	make	any	sense	to	us,	for	these	were	words,	not	things...	 There	 are	 no	 such	 things	 as	 signifiers!	This	 is	 the	real,	where	 some	of	us	have	 to	 invent	 something	 that	will	keep	all	dimensions	separate.		§139	–	Aufhebung:	what	 is	 absolutely	 appropriated	 is	 also	absolutely	overcome.	What	is	owned	must	also	be	given	up.	And	when	you	are	every	thing,	you	have	become	something	else.		§140	–	 I	 choose	 to	believe	 there	 can	be	 a	place	where	we	will	 gather	 each	 of	 us	 one	 of	 its	 own	 kind,	 and	 yet	 live	together	 and	 aim	 higher	 than	 before.	 Imaginary	competition	is	not	the	final	horizon	of	those	we	call	humans	for	lack	of	a	more	original	term.			§141	–	You	can	start	at	 the	beginning	and	work	your	way	up;	 or	 you	 can	 start	 at	 the	 end,	 go	down	 to	 the	beginning	and	back	up	again.	Either	way	you	will	be	going	in	circles		§142	–	If	the	first	negation	is	the	mediation	of	content,	the	second	negation	 is	 the	mediation	 of	 form.	 For	 philosophy,	Nothing	was	the	same.		
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§143	–	History	thus	becomes	the	 final	horizon	of	 thinking.	History	 is	 an	 outpost	 on	 the	 Frontier,	where	 the	 void	 and	the	 stars	 meet,	 and	 where	 new	 forms	 appear	 and	 twist	Time.	History	 is	 the	 study	 of	 how	 shapes	 come	 into	 being	
out	of	the	signifier.	When	the	set	is	not	totalised	and	only	ex-sists	 in	 its	 own	 coming	 apart,	 there	 cannot	 be	 any	hermeneutics	of	traditions	left.	The	only	permanence	is	the	struggle	to	become.	For	there	to	be	a	mutation,	there	must	be	some	 thing	 that	can	mutate	 to	start	with.	We	could	not	even	state	such	a	thing	any	longer.			§144	 –	 Philosophy	 should	 be	 afraid	 of	 neither	 phony	 nor	polyphony.	 It	 remains	 faithful	 to	 its	 material	 when	 it	strangles	its	own	voice;	if	the	content	can	die,	the	form	must	
two.	 Here	 the	Hegelian	 reversal	must	 be	 felt	 –	 philosophy	that	keeps	itself	from	the	eroticism	of	language	will	take	its	subject	matter	as	an	object	but	not	 in	 its	Notion,	 i.e.	not	 in	its	 notional	 deployment.	 If	 there	 is	 a	 void	 at	 the	 heart	 of	things	and	the	One	is	always	in	the	struggle	to	become,	that	which	 articulates	 such	 a	 thought	must	 take	 responsibility	for	just	such	a	gesture	-	an	enjoyment	–	of	imposing	a	One	onto	a	chaotic	whether.	In	the	void	there	is	no	such	thing	as	neutrality.	 Just	 as	 the	 analyst	 must	 never	 give	 ground	relative	 to	 his	 or	 her	 desire,	 the	 philosopher	must	 always	recognise	 and	 locate	his	or	her	own	 libidinal	 investments;	
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or	 will	 otherwise	 create	 more	 alienation.	 There	 is	 no	Beyond	and	no	happy	ending;	and	when	 the	event	 is	gone	through,	 there	 is	no	 such	 thing	as	Love	either,	 only	a	new	order	that	craves	actualisation.	To	walk	in	Hegel's	footsteps	is	 to	 understand	 that	 philosophy	 can	 only	 love	 itself.	 It	 is	the	only	Actual.1			§145	 –	One	must	 become	 a	 signifier	 in	 order	 to	 bequeath	flesh	to	the	other.			§146	–	One	must	forget	one's	self	and	others,	and	speak	up	one's	desire	in	its	minimal	and	most	complete	form.	There	is	Universality.		§147	 –	 We	 have	 thus	 exhausted	 both	 content	 (Absolute	Knowing)	and	form	(Repetition),	and	have	taken	ourselves	all	the	way	to	one	end	of	the	dialectical	arc.	It	is	at	this	point	in	 the	 dialectical	 process	 that	 the	 One	 just	 born	immediately	 vanishes,	 and	 the	 work	 of	 repetition	 starts	anew	at	the	other	end	of	this	ark.	Good	infinity	starts	there,	which	is	neither	the	suffocating	Eternity	nor	the	bad	infinity	of	symbolisation;	but	the	radically	New,	i.e.	the	sublation	of																																																									1	See	above,	N1§18;		"what	was	for	Consciousness	the	way	to	grasp	the	self-identicalness	of	the	Thing,	was	in	fact	already	the	
Thing	itself!"	Although,	strictly-speaking,	'philosophy	that	loves	itself'	is	precisely	something	foreign	to	Hegel.	More	below.	(author’s	note,	2016)	
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Time	itself	qua	the	invention	of	a	new	mode	of	Being	in	the	midst	 of	 the	 signifier.	 If	 there	 ever	 was	 freedom	 on	 our	horizon...	
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Epilogue	
§148	–	Days	later,	we	received	a	letter	from	the	Archer:			'To	whom	I	met	in	my	fall,			 I	 am	sorry	 to	 come	back	 to	you	 in	 this	 form	and	not	 in	person.	 I	am	writing	to	you	from	the	City	where	I	have	 relocated.	 I	 very	 much	 doubt	 we	 will	 meet	 again;	frankly,	 it	 is	perhaps	better	for	both	of	us	this	way.	I	did	not	belong	in	the	Old	Town,	and	I	hope	you	know	by	now	that	you	do	not	belong	here	in	the	City.		 I	 recall	 you	 had	 many	 questions,	 and	 perhaps	 I	have	left	you	frustrated	with	my	laconic	answers.	To	tell	you	the	truth,	I	was	not	sure	of	what	to	tell	you.	There	was	so	much	 I	 did	 not	 know	myself!	 If	 I	 am	 coming	 back	 to	you	now,	 it	 is	because	 I	have	something	 to	say	 that	may	be	of	help	on	the	long,	winding	path	that	awaits	you.			 After	 I	 launched	 the	 arrow	 of	 Fate,	 you	 recall,	 I	spent	 many	 days	 in	 bed,	 mostly	 sleeping;	 and	 for	 each	day	I	spent	in	bed,	there	was	a	night	I	was	up	figuring	out	what	happened.	Amid	the	confusion	I	did	not	notice	that	my	body	was	rapidly	weakening	–	it	turned	out	there	was	a	hole	in	me!	Here	is	what	I	subsequently	gathered:	when	I	 finally	 aimed	 for	 the	 sun	 and	 took	 that	 shot,	 I	 stepped	into	 the	 light.	 By	 doing	 so,	 I	 exposed	myself	 to	 the	 shot	finding	its	way	back	to	me.	When	one	takes	the	sun	down,	
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one	cancels	oneself	entirely;	for	one	does	not	exist	if	it	is	not	for	the	sun	that	sheds	its	light	on	us.	Time	contracted	in	 the	 strangest	 of	 ways	 when	 I	 put	 a	 knee	 down	 and	looked	in	horror	at	my	chest	ripped	open.	I	vomited	a	lot	of	 blood	 and	 the	 pain	 was	 unendurable,	 as	 you	 can	imagine.	 But	 there	 was	 to	 be	 an	 additional	 turn	 of	 the	screw	 to	 my	 agony	 –	 not	 only	 did	 I	 have	 blood	 on	 my	hands,	but	the	blood	was	not	mine.	When	you	hit	the	Real	directly,	 you	 only	 bleed	 yourself	 to	 death,	 this	 much	 is	true;	but	when	you	really	hit	 the	Real,	 that	 is,	 indirectly,	you	also	bleed	someone	else	to	death.	Suddenly,	I	had	to	take	responsibility	for	a	murder.		 I	gathered	my	last	strengths	and	pulled	the	arrow	out,	and	my	heart	went	with	it.	I	collapsed	–	prolapsed,	to	be	 precise.	 In	my	 dying	moments	 a	miracle	 occurred:	 a	small	 child	 came	 and	 sat	 down	 next	 to	 me,	 resting	 my	head	 on	 its	 legs	 and	 gently	 stroking	 my	 hair.	 Self-
Consciousness	faded	into	the	child's	smile.			 The	next	thing	I	knew,	I	was	being	treated	in	the	City's	 Central	 Hospital.	 Naturally,	 I	 had	 to	 have	 an	artificial	 heart	 grafted	 to	my	 body.	 You	will	 not	 believe	what	 they	use	 for	heart	 transplantations	here	 –	 a	music	box!	God	is	a	DJ,	they	tell	me.	Well,	it	works	just	fine;	in	no	time	 I	 was	 able	 to	 take	 a	 walk	 under	 the	 cherished	skyscrapers	 of	 the	 City.	 Weapons	 are	 no	 more	 allowed	here	than	in	the	Old	Town,	so	I	gave	up	my	bow	to	take	it.	
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I	 have	 since	 become	 an	 architect	 –	 heartchitect,	 I	 dare	say!		 I	am	not	sure	this	answers	any	of	your	questions,	but	I	felt	I	needed	to	tell	you	what	happened	to	me	–	I	felt	you	needed	to	hear	 from	me.	Stories	do	come	to	an	end,	however	much	we	dislike	it.	Remember:	to	the	voices	you	must	add	yours.		 I	wish	you	the	best	of	luck,	look	out	for	that	child!			 Forever	yours,	 -	The	Archer'		§149	–	"Lovers	may	reunite,	but	their	souls	are	forever	lost.	So	 was	 overturned	 the	 poet's	 vanity	 in	 words	 of	 lovers	being	lost	and	love	that	shall	not.	Who	has	been	all	the	way	down	 the	path	of	 love,	does	not	belong	 to	him–	or	herself	anymore.	 Lovers	 belong	 to	 the	 Idea	 that	 saw	 them	 dance	with	 the	 Real,	 but	 that	 Idea	 never	 belongs	 to	 them.	 One	must	 accept	 such	 a	 radical	 subjective	 destitution.	 No	 one	emerges	 unscathed	 in	 the	 end	 –	 blood	 is	 on	 everyone's	hands.	 Nor	 can	 anyone	 claim	 the	 moral	 high	 ground	 –	everything	has	been	levelled.	And	the	Idea	itself	disappears	upon	 actualisation	 –	 it	 had	 never	 been	 there.	 This	 is	 the	definition	of	a	revolution	 in	every	sense	of	 the	word.	With	this	the	second	negation	comes	to	a	close."		§150	–	A	telegram	was	received:		
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		 Left	 the	convent	 -	Could	not	hide	any	 longer	 -	Became	a	
withness	-	A		 witchness?	-	Definitely	a	wishness	-	Was	not	sick	of	life	anymore	-		 Actively	seeking	sublime	compromises		§151	–	They	met	again	 in	an	empty	restaurant.	One	or	the	other	said:			 "I	 have	nothing	 to	 offer;	 there	 is	 nothing	particular	about	me,	 just	 a	 hole	 in	 place	 of	 substance."	 They	 looked	each	other	in	the	eye,	but	it	was	impenetrable.	They	did	not	know	 what	 to	 say,	 and	 the	 silence	 was	 awkward.	 Their	hands	hardly	 touched.	To	part	or	depart,	 but	 the	question	was	all	theirs.		§152	–	The	true	event	is	always	that	of	writing.	Without	the	Bible,	there	would	be	no	Christ.		§153	–	On	a	 cold	Monday	morning	God	was	enjoying	 fruit	toasts	with	a	cup	of	strong	coffee	when	He	opened	a	fateful	letter	–		 	 [Not	addressed]		 There	 is	 nothing	 you	 can	 teach	 me,	 and	 God!	 I	crave	it.	Should	you	burn	my	house	down,	the	ground	will	be	 pulled	 off	 your	 feet.	 Should	 you	 throw	 stones	 at	me,	
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your	 little	mountains	will	 crumble	 upon	 you.	 Do	 stick	 a	knife	 and	 I	will	watch	 you	 die	 in	my	 own	 agony	 –	 for	 I	only	exist	in	the	shadows	of	your	postures!	You	can	only	play	 Russian	 roulette	with	me!	 I	 curse	 every	 single	 day	that	you	make	me	have	to	spin	that	cylinder	again.			 So	tie	your	whore	to	the	bed	and	fuck	her	so	dame	hard.	Talk	dirty,	swear	and	make	threats	while	you	push	yourself	inside	me;	foul	me	but	you're	not	fooling	anyone.	Skewer	me	with	your	cock,	grill	me	and	bite	my	head	off	the	way	you	like	 it,	while	you	eye	these	bitches	with	the	rest	 of	 your	dogs;	 you	will	 never	 string	me	 to	 the	 other	end	of	the	world.	Blow	me	up,	but	I	am	not	blowing	you.	Go	 ahead,	 punish	 me	 –	 I	 thoroughly	 deserve	 it.	 Slit	 my	wrists	 but	 leave	 the	 knots	 on;	 slash	 my	 throat	 and	leisurely	bathe	in	the	pool	of	my	blood	so	constituted;	or	skin	me	alive	 if	 you	dare!	Please!	You	have	no	 idea	 how	much	I	enjoy	all	of	this.	God!	I	laugh	at	you.	And	when	you	have	 taken	 my	 limbs	 apart	 and	 wrecked	 my	 bowels	through	 and	 through,	 I	 will	 come	 when	 and	 where	 my	body	 snaps	 in	 two...	 I	 will	 shake	 so	 hard	 your	 whole	kingdom	 will	 be	 swallowed	 in	 the	 terrible	 and	 long-denied	 spasm	 of	 enjoyment.	 The	more	 you	 postpone	 it,	the	more	 I	 explode	 inside.	Do	 you	know	who	 I	 am?	Can	you	guest?'		God	cried	 'Terrorism	in	heaven!'	but	no	one	heard	a	thing.	
One	is	utterly	alone	in	the	reflection	that	brought	the	other	to	
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existence.	 This	 is	 the	 formula	 for	 Obsessional	 Neurosis,	more	 appropriately	 called	 Modernity.	 Modernity	 is	 the	symbolisation	 –	 read	 creation	 –	 of	 the	 Other,	 from	 the	jungles	of	America	to	the	bay	of	Yokohama,	from	the	Hôtel-Dieu	 to	 the	 Salpêtrière.	 Through	 what	 can	 only	 be	 called	Terror,	one	is	certain	of	itself	and	the	other.			§154	 –	 Symbolisation	 comes	 to	 a	 rest	 –	 to	 arrest	 –	 when	
jouissance	becomes	impossible.	Then,	the	Real	of	jouissance	–	 that	 which	 is	 always	 better	 expressed	 in	 a	 foreign	language,	 both	 to	 convey	 its	 absolute	 heterogeneity	 with	regards	 to	 a	 symbolic	 chain,	 and	at	 the	 same	 time	 remind	you	that	this	Real	is	only	a	bug	in	language;	Beyond	is	only	another	 language,	 another	 arrangement	 of	 places,	 another	mythology	 –	 this	 has	 all	 been	 symbolised.	 Symbolisation	became	a	place	that	could	never	be	reached,	where	its	own	time	is	compressed	to	lay	you	out.	We	are	out	in	Space	when	time	has	been	reduced	to	a	subspecies	of	itself	–	of	Time!	–	and	 leaves	 the	 space	 of	 its	 unravelling	 to	 its	 own	
actualisation.	 We	 have	 said	 it	 before:	 Space	 is	 the	actualisation	of	the	signifier	brought	to	its	end.	There,	a	new	life	can	begin.	For	when	Space	 is	symbolised,	other	spaces	can	 be	 invented	 –	 and	 the	 exploration	 of	 space	 can	 begin.	Symbolisation	is	the	first	step	to	its	undoing	or	overcoming.	While	 overcoming	 is	 the	 horizon	 of	 those	who	 have	 been	
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buried	alive,	undoing	is	for	those	who	pay	heavy	tribute	to	a	
semblance	of	negativity,	but	not	the	real	Thing!		§155	 –	 Architecture,	 not	 Poetry,	 seemed	 to	 be	 the	 end	 of	Art.	They	were	in	fact	the	same	thing.		§156	–	Once	on	the	other	side	of	 the	Frontier	–	 in	Space	–	we	sighed,	and	tears	rolled	down	our	cheeks	at	long	last.	It	was	neither	the	uncontrollable	fit	of	crying	we	experienced	in	our	youth,	nor	the	torturing	sobs	that	never	come	out	we	had	 to	 endure	 for	 years,	 only	 the	 quiet	 and	 solemn	 tears	that	 gently	 glide	 down	 the	 lips,	 the	 salt	 of	 life.	 We	 had	untied	a	knot	and	tied	a	new	one.	Our	loss	was	incalculable.			 We	set	up	camp	by	a	river	on	the	most	desolate	of	all	stars,	 and	 proceeded	 to	 build	 a	 church.	 We	 prayed	 every	morning	 for	 the	 safe	 return	 of	 our	 loved	 ones	 in	 the	evening.		§157	 –	 Some	have	 answers	 but	 they	 don't	 like	 them,	 they	also	have	questions.	Some	are	the	answer.	Sometimes	they	may	 not	 like	 it	 either.	 Unfortunately,	 some	 have	 neither	answers	nor	questions,	the	text	is	lacking.	And	some	are	the	question.	May	they	live	up	to	their	own!			 First	you	lose	everything,	and	then	the	loss	itself	will	also	be	taken	away	from	you.	Everything	will	be	given	back	
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but	 it	will	 never	 be	 the	 same.	 And	 you	will	 truly	 stand	 in	tears	amid	the	alien	corn.	Go	catch	a	movie.		§158	 –	When	 the	 text	was	 restored,	 it	 could	 be	 set	 alight.	One	 didn't	 go	 up	 in	 flames.	 This	 is	 what	 is	 contained	 in	Titian's	 early	 masterpiece,	 Bacchus	 and	 Ariadne.	 Caught	
between	the	riveting	gaze	of	the	other	and	the	disorder	of	the	
stars	above,	 she	was	petrified.	There	was	more	 than	meets	the	eye	in	the	Renaissance!			 One	can	only	admire	 the	young	Erwin	Panofsky	 for	his	work	on	perspective	–	and	for	how	he	reminded	us	that	the	 painters	 committed	 to	 the	 mathematized	 perspectival	view	 came	 under	 fire	 from	philosophers	 for	 emptying	 the	World	 out	 of	 space,	 and	 from	 artists	 starting	 in	 the	nineteenth	 century,	 for	 returning	 phenomena	 to	 a	 purely	psychological/idealistic	 point	 of	 view	 or	 confining	 it	 to	rationality.2	They	must	have	been	up	 to	some	Thing,	 those	Renaissance	painters!		§159	–	You	must	lose	so	consistently	you	go	numb.	If	noon	is	a	figure	of	the	dialectical	process,	the	point	at	which	the	symbolic	chain	runs	out	of	signifiers	and	falls	into	an	empty	
whale,	midnight	 is	 another	 –	 the	 point	 at	which	 the	 chain	
																																																								2	E.	Panofsky,	Perspective	as	Symbolic	Form	(2009),	trans.	C.	S.	Wood,	New	York:	Zone	Books.	See	p.	71	
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unravels	 again,	 but	 this	 time	 for	 a	 subject	whose	 eyes	 are	set	 on	 something	 else.	 Spinoza	 located	 freedom	 in	 the	stone's	 becoming	 conscious	 of	 its	 rolling	 down;	 if	 the	impulse	that	set	it	in	motion	belonged	to	an	external	cause,	its	 desire	 to	 continue	 to	 roll	 and	 not	 to	 hamper	 its	 own	movement	 could	 be	 the	 stone's	 freedom. 3 	If	 Spinoza's	horizon	 was	 the	 signifier,	 he	 could	 only	 desire	 the	completion	of	the	tracks	that	would	allow	its	circulation	in	the	speech	of	one.	Once	this	movement	is	gone	through,	one	must	 also	 learn	 to	 act	 towards	 the	 point	 beyond	 –	 the	constitution	 of	 the	Thing	 –	 and	 leave	 the	 chain	 to	 its	 own	workings.	 To	 act	 is	 to	 suspend	 for	 a	moment	 the	 and-less	game	 of	 Fort-Da.	 If	 Spinoza	 built	 the	 tracks,	 it	 was	 up	 to	Hegel	 to	blow	up	 the	 station.	Before,	 tracks	only	 took	you	up	and	down	the	same	line;	now,	where	we	are	headed	no	one	 has	 been.	 This	 is	 something	 the	 neuroscientist	 will	never	 understand:	 ears	 on	 the	 rails,	 they	 cannot	 see	 that	there	is	enjoyment	in	the	train	not	coming.	You	can	only	get	to	 the	City	 on	 the	back	of	 a	 nightmare.	Only	 then	 can	 you	take	a	train	to	the	launch	site	and	into	space!	More	below.		§160	–	The	object	creates	what	the	signifier	seeks	to	destroy	–	 it	 is	 the	 embodiment	 of	 one's	 struggle	with	 a	 signifying	
																																																								3	See	Spinoza's	correspondence,	Letter	LXII.	addressed	to	G.	H.	Schaller,	available	online	
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chain,	 the	 ultimate	 case	 of	 sublation	 whereby	 in	 the	imaginary	 is	 inscribed	 that	which	negated	 it.	The	object	 is	not	a	 fetish.	The	fetish	directly	stands	for	the	desire	of	 the	other,	and	the	pervert	is	one	who	makes	a	tribute	for	it;	or	acts	 as	 the	Third	 for	 the	 Second.	We	have	 said	 it	 before	 –	take	 the	 Third	 away	 from	 the	 Second,	 and	 the	 One	collapses,	along	with	the	Second	and	the	Third.	On	the	other	
hand,	the	object	directly	stands	for	the	desire	of	the	subject,	or	 is	 its	 own	 objectification;	 the	 reflection	 of	 its	
disappearance	in	the	passage	of	a	signifier.	The	object	is	the	result	 of	 the	 subject's	 inscription	 in	 a	 symbolic	 chain,	 or	
lack	 thereof,	 which	 is	 the	 same	 thing.	 Prior	 to	 the	emergence	of	either	the	object	or	the	fetish,	there	is	no	such	thing	 as	 the	 real;	 it	 all	 collapses	 in	 the	 voice,	 as	 psychosis	reminds	us.	To	come	up	with	a	formula	for	perversion	–	it	is	the	 partaking	of	 the	mother's	 knot	 through	 its	 tightening.	For	the	pervert,	it	all	collapses	in	the	signifier.	
	 The	 object	 creates	 the	 signifier	 it	 seeks	 to	 destroy	 –	what	cannot	but	appear	as	a	 transgression	 is	 the	hallmark	of	 the	 law.	A	transgression	 is	one	 in	relation	to	a	standard	that	has	been	set,	and	knows	it;	enjoyment	comes	with	guilt.	And	 transgressions	 are	 the	 rhythm	 of	 the	 law.	Paradoxically,	to	be	subject	to	the	law	is	to	understand	just	this,	namely	that	the	law	would	be	nothing	if	it	were	not	for	the	 transgression	 that	 sustains	 it.	 Far	 from	preventing	 the	
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incestuous	 link,	 the	 law	 is	 only	 its	 regulation,	 the	 equal	access	of	all	to	the	gaze	and	bosom	of	the	sublated	mother.	Time	and	the	law	-	the	desire	for	the	death	of	the	father	and	the	 outcome	 of	 its	 realisation	 -	 are	 the	 most	 infantile	 of	topics.	 Our	 horizon	 is	 the	 death	 of	 the	 Mother;	 not	 the	actual	 murder	 of	 the	 mother,	 but	 the	 symbolisation	 of	 the	
desire	 for	 the	 one	 deprived	 of	 in	 the	 phallic	 signifier.	 The	
degradation	 of	 ourselves	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	 Science	 is	 the	interesting	 path;	 we	 will	 come	 back	 to	 that.	 Science	 does	not	start	with	something	but	with	Nothing,	 the	possession	of	the	other.	But	it	does	not	end	there!		 	 	 	 	 	 *	For	every	stare	there	is	a	question,	and	for	every	question	a	desire	that	looks	for	itself.	There	is	nothing	worse	than	the	psychotic	 certainty	 that	 Normality	 runs	 our	 cities.	 It	certainly	does	not	run	the	City.	Yes,	there	will	be	scuffles	–	
what	else?		§161	 –	Beware	 if	 you	 think	you	are	what	 the	master	wants	
for	dinner,	 for	 the	slaves	will	 set	 the	 table	 in	 the	blink	of	an	
eye!	 You	 do	 not	 own	 your	 own	madness.	 This	 is	 Hysteria	gone	through	and	actualised.	Katniss	Everdeen	is	one	name	for	 such	 a	 deployment.	 Perhaps	 Lewis	 Kerfane	 will	 be	another.		
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§162	–	When	we	pass	 from	 the	big	Other	 (of	 language)	 to	the	small	other	(of	our	desire),	the	wait	is	still	interminable	
but	 can	 be	 sustained.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 Christopher	 Nolan's	masterpiece	 Interstellar	 (2014),	 Amelia	 Brand	 may	 have	her	teary	eyes	searching	the	darkness,	but	her	encampment	is	all	 lit	up.	What	is	of	interest	is	not	the	symptom,	but	the	structure.	One	will	change	but	not	the	other.			§163	–	The	darkest	hour	is	nothing	but	the	promise	of	dawn	
on	the	horizon.	It	turns	out	the	night	is	still	young.		§164	–	Love	is	a	zero-sum	game.	Your	gain	was	my	loss,	but	my	gain	is	your	loss.	At	the	end	of	the	day,	there	are	much	
better	games	to	play.			§165	–	We	didn't	take	'no'	for	an	answer.	We	went	as	far	as	to	 think	 that	 we	 regretted	 it,	 which	 was	 yet	 again	 the	smokescreen	 of	 Time.	 To	 follow	 Mallarmé,	 nothing	 will	have	 taken	 place	 but	 the	 place...	 except	 perhaps	 a	constellation,	precisely	the	Lacanian	sinthome.	It	may	seem	that	 it	 has	 all	 been	 in	 vain	 but	 the	 rings	 have	 been	 ex-changed.	The	question	is	never	about	the	drag	of	everyday	life,	but	about	the	other	scene	of	the	Unconscious.	What	sort	of	 makeshift	 for	 the	 other	 side	 does	 the	 analytic	 process	
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leave?	What	 link	 there,	 if	 any,	 enables	 one	 to	 drag	 on,	 to	catch	as	well	as	spout	fire?		§166	 –	 In	 the	 treatment	 of	 phobics,	 you	 will	 analyse	 one	and	the	other.	What	you	must	organise	is	precisely	not	their	separation	 but	 their	 coming-together.	 This	 is	 the	 ultimate	twist	 in	 the	story	of	Oedipus	as	retold	by	Freud.	You	must	orchestrate	 the	 triggering	 of	 psychosis	 in	 an	 orderly	
fashion.			 We	cannot	help	but	return	to	our	greatest	example,	Ciara's	 song	 "Wants	 for	 Dinner"	 from	 the	 record	 Basic	
Instinct	 (2010).	 During	 the	 choruses,	 the	 synthesizers	closely	match	 the	 bass	 line	 at	 the	 fastest	 of	 paces,	 against	the	background	of	 the	slow,	syncopated	beat	accompanied	by	 the	 piano,	 which	 is	 the	 trademark	 of	 R&B	music.	 This	already	creates	a	space	within	 the	 texture	of	 the	song	and	gives	 an	 unmistakable	 impression	 of	 speed,	 which	 would	have	been	absent	altogether	without	the	slow	beat.	At	some	point	towards	the	end	of	the	song,	in	the	frantic	but	ordered	repetition	 of	 this	movement,	 the	 bass	 line	 suddenly	 drops	and	 leaves	 the	synthesizers	 to	 their	own	workings,	at	 first	following	 the	 now-absent	 bass	 line	 at	 the	 same	 frenetic	pace	as	before,	until	they	finally	come	undone	and	unwind	in	 higher	 and	 lower	 notes,	 like	 a	 pierced	 helium	 balloon	would	 suddenly	 shoot	upwards	 in	all	directions.	We	could	
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say	 that	 the	 time	 that	 separates	 the	 bass	 line's	 drop	 from	the	 unwinding	 of	 the	 synthesizers	 stands	 for	 the	completeness	 of	 Phallus,	 a	 signifier,	 until	 the	 synthesizers	
realise	 in	 a	 few	 seconds	 that	 they	were	 in	 fact	walking	on	air.	 In	 this	 short	 interval	 of	 time,	 the	 out-of-breath	 Ciara	busies	herself	spelling	her	name	before	whispering	'one'.	At	the	 point	 of	 such	 a	 realisation,	 in	 the	 space	 of	 sexual	difference,	 language	comes	apart	–	and	the	knot	that	traps	the	 Real	 is	 loosened.	 This	 is	 feminine	 jouissance	 at	 its	purest,	 a	 precipitate	 of	 it.	 Why?	 Because	 the	 feminine	orgasm	is	 the	experience	of	symbolisation	(+/-,	0-1)	in	the	
space	 of	 its	 undoing,	 where	 phallic	 jouissance	 is	 done	 and	undone	by	the	very	phallus	that	negated	the	other.	Such	an	orgasm	is	the	Challenger	of	symbolisation,	or	the	collapse	in	the	midst	of	 its	climb,	when	the	 inquiring	 little	girl	 figures	out	she	is	on	the	wrong	side	of	the	divide.	Why	else	should	the	 NASA	 recording	 of	 the	 disaster	 open	 a	 Beyoncé	 song	about	 having	 one's	 lights	 turned	 out?	 ("XO",	 off	 the	eponymous	 Beyoncé,	 2013)	 The	 symbolic	 circulation	 of	Phallus	 in	 the	 coitus	 cannot	 account	 for	 the	 fact	 that	language	 and	 jouissance	 can	only	 come	 together	 thanks	 to	the	negation	of	the	little	girl's	imaginary	phallus,	something	that	does	not	happen	for	the	boy,	whose	specular	 image	is	
backed	by	the	signifier	for	as	long	as	he	remains	worthy	of	it.	 No	 wonder	 he	 will	 feel	 stuffed...	 To	 go	 through	 the	
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movement	of	femininity	is	to	understand	the	alienation	that	gives	 rise	 to	 the	show	one	puts	on.	The	other	 really	exists	only	for	one,	the	other's	raison	d'être	hangs	upon	the	desire	
of	one.			 To	 put	 it	 differently,	 feminine	 jouissance	 thrives	 on	the	failure	of	the	signifier	to	account	for	both	the	universal	and	 the	 particular.	 It	 will	 produce	 in	 the	 orgasm	 the	unmistakable	feeling	of	being	torn	apart.	It	is	the	enjoyment	of	 an	 unbridgeable	 alienation.	 For	when	 Phallus	 stabilises	Woman,	 the	 social	 link,	 it	 has	 to	 be	 oblivious	 of	 the	particular	woman,	the	imaginary	phallus	that	could	only	be	inscribed	as	commodity	and	not	as	agent	 in	the	process	of	symbolic	exchange.4	Only	when	this	entire	sequence	is	gone	through	 again	 and	 thoroughly	 negated,	 can	 the	 now-emerging	 singular	 directly	 stand	 for	 the	 universal,	 in	 the	most	stripped-down	of	syntheses.			 To	 further	 pin	 this	 point	 down,	we	 feel	 there	 is	 no	better	 exposition	 of	 the	 feminine	 structure	 than	 Michael	Bay's	Armageddon	(1997).	To	prevent	a	large	asteroid	from	colliding	with	Earth,	NASA	hires	a	team	of	oil	drillers	to	set	up	and	detonate	nuclear	bombs	inside	the	asteroid	so	that	the	 large	 body	 will	 split	 into	 two	 parts	 that	 fly	 past	 the	planet.	To	 lead	 them	 is	Harry	Stamper	 (Bruce	Willis),	best	
																																																								4	We	refer	here	to	the	work	of	Claude	Lévi-Strauss,	The	
Elementary	Structures	of	Kinship	(1949)	in	particular	
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deep-sea	oil	 driller	 in	 the	world,	whose	 incestuous	 link	 to	his	 daughter	 Grace	 (Liv	 Tyler)	 is	 threatened	 by	 her	relations	 with	 A.	 J.	 (Ben	 Affleck),	 one	 of	 Harry's	 drillers.	Both	men	agree	to	put	their	quarrel	regarding	Grace	aside,	and	 the	 mission	 divides	 between	 two	 space	 shuttles,	
Freedom	 and	 Independence,	 one	 carrying	 Harry	 and	 the	other	 carrying	 A.	 J.,	 while	 Grace	 stays	 on	 Earth	 to	 watch	unfold	the	destiny	of	the	two	men	she	loves.	The	first	thing	to	note	is	how	the	film	repeatedly	stages	the	division	of	one	into	 two.	 In	 the	most	 significant	 of	 these	 occurrences,	 we	can	 say	 that	 the	 two	 signifiers	 "Freedom"	 and	"Independence"	–	shuttles	to	usher	in	a	new	era	–	stand	for	the	 pure	 difference	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 Universal	 we	encountered	 in	 the	 first	 negation;	 it	 is	 the	 crack	 that	 is	Being,	the	signifier;	both	words	have	the	same	signification,	
but	 for	 signification	 to	 be	 self-same,	 it	must	 divide	 into	 two	
words.	Once	we	have	broken	through	sense	and	the	Thing,	the	 reader	 recalls	 that	 the	 signifier	 finds	 itself	 groundless	and	 is	 caught	 in	 the	 endless	 back	 and	 forth	movement	 of	Forces,	 until	 what	 is	 symbolised	 is	 just	 that,	 namely	 that	pure	 difference	 is	 self-same.	 First,	 the	 specular	 image	 is	curved	and	broken	into	two	by	the	signifier	that	runs	in	the	speech	 of	 the	 other,	 until	 both	 parts	 are	 shipped	 into	 the	phallus	that	anchors	the	signifier	and	mediates	One	and	the	other.	 While	 the	 masculine	 structure	 is	 born	 out	 of	 the	
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impossible	 a	 posteriori	 cover-up	 of	 this	 division	 in	 the	phallic	 signifier,	 the	 feminine	 structure	 is	 the	 outcome	 of	the	 loss	 of	 one	 of	 these	 determinate	 differences	 along	 the	way,	 the	truth	of	the	division	the	signifier	 imposes	shining	through	the	porous	phallus.	 In	 this	sense,	Woman	really	 is	the	 symptom	 of	 Man;	 more	 precisely,	 it	 is	 one	 of	 its	subspecies.	 This	 has	 to	 be	 because,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 the	phallic	 signifier	 is	 unable	 to	 account	 for	 the	 missing	imaginary	phallus	 of	 the	other	 sex.	One	 face	of	 the	phallic	signifier	will	 have	 to	 be	 invested	more	 than	 the	 other	 for	the	structure	to	coalesce,	either	the	One,	the	Universal	that	comes	together	in	the	phallic	Thing;	or	the	other,	the	Thing-in-waiting.	If	it	is	the	One,	the	subject	will	be	all	a	show	and	it	 is	 the	 symbolic	 axis	 that	 is	 at	 risk	 whenever	 the	 other	
woman	comes	up	and	negates	the	show	the	subject	puts	on.	If	it	is	the	other,	it	is	the	imaginary	axis	that	is	under	siege	when	 the	 death	 of	 desire	 results	 in	 the	 longing	 for	 the	passage	 of	 another	 signifier,	 Love.	 Taylor	 Swift	 and	 Lana	Del	 Rey	 can	 stand	 for	 these	 two	 poles	 of	 the	 feminine	position.	 If	 it	 is	 found	 that	 the	 incestuous	 link	 with	 the	father	 has	 no	 validity	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	 big	 Other,	 the	deployment	of	this	negation	will	bring	about	the	loss	of	the	phallic	signifier	and	the	collapse	of	a	world	based	upon	this	metonymy.	When	 asked	 about	what	 she	missed	 the	most,	Lana	del	Rey	gave	this	wonderful	answer	we	never	get	tired	
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of	quoting:	"I	miss	everything."5	A	new	metaphor	will	have	to	come	into	being	to	spur	the	movement	of	desire	back	to	life,	 one	 that	 will	 not	 be	 based	 on	 the	 Other	 but	 on	 the	subject.	 Nymphomania,	 the	 encyclopaedic	 search	 for	 the	signifier	in	the	actual	phallus,	is	more	likely	on	this	side,	and	must	 lead	 to	 the	 realisation	 that	 there	 is	 no	 such	 thing	 as	Phallus.	At	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum,	if	the	incestuous	link	to	the	father	is	shielded	or	sanctioned	by	the	big	Other,	it	 can	 be	 abstracted	 back	 to	 the	 simple	 difference	 of	 the	phallus	one	did	not	get	and	the	hysteric	can	make	a	home	in	the	world	of	the	Other,	among	supermodels	and	cats.	This	is	the	 Taylor	 Swift	 pole.	 The	 contradiction	 is	 acknowledged	but	 no	 way	 out	 is	 found.	 A	 show	 will	 be	 put	 on	 for	 the	master,	and	the	phallus	might	be	welcome;	but	the	real	fun	goes	on	away	from	the	public	eye,	in	the	transgression	with	the	double	for	which	there	 is	no	signifier.	Taylor	Swift	can	ride	 a	 wave	 of	 unmatched	 success	 for	 as	 long	 as	 the	homosexual	current	 in	her	 life	 is	not	displayed,	 for	as	 long	as	you	really	believe	 that	she	still	 longs	 for	something	she	does	 not	 have.	 The	 extraordinary	 creativity	 of	 the	 two	singers	 testify	 to	 the	 authenticity	 of	 both	 poles,	 and	 both	
Ultraviolence	and	1989	(2014)	are	masterpieces	that	tell	the	
																																																								5	See	the	interview	published	by	The	Fader,	number	92,	June-July	issue,	available	online:	http://www.thefader.com/2014/06/04/cover-story-lana-del-rey-is-anyone-she-wants-to-be		
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story	of	a	dead	desire,	one	 that	 is	either	kept	apart	by	 the	ruling	 phallic	 economy	 (Lana	 del	 Rey)	 or	 smothered	 by	 it	(Taylor	Swift).6	If	Taylor	Swift	represents	the	last	sparks	of	a	 metonymy	 that	 has	 gone	 full	 circle,	 its	 becoming-metaphor;	Lana	del	Rey	represents	the	first	radiations	of	a	new	metaphor	 that	 comes	 to	 be,	 its	 becoming-metonymy.	We	 thus	 come	down	 to	 the	 irreducible	 structure	 of	Being,	metaphor	 and	 metonymy.	 To	 be	 a	 philosopher	 and	 a	scientist	is	to	explore	the	becoming-Lana	del	Rey	of	Taylor-Swift,	 and	 the	 becoming-Taylor	 Swift	 of	 Lana	 del	 Rey;	 the	lamella	of	Force	that	repels	itself	from	itself	(Cf.	N1§20).	In	the	desperate	bolstering	of	a	metonymy	that	wants	to	keep	on	going	despite	the	void,	lies	the	splendours	of	a	World-in-waiting	 in	 the	missed	metaphor.	 In	 the	 painful	 work	 of	 a	metaphor	 that	 systematically	 erases	 what	 belongs	 to	 a	bygone	 era,	 lies	 the	 actualisation	 of	 a	 metonymy	 that	 did	not	make	 it.	What	now	appears	 in	 the	 chasm	of	 a	point	 is	the	pure	vanishing	that	is	Being.		 		 	 	 	 	 *																																																									6	On	1989,	we	especially	love	the	ambiguity	contained	in	these	lines	of		the	song	"Style",	already	a	pun	on	the	name	of	Swift's	last	boyfriend:	"You	got	that	James	Dean	daydream	look	in	your	eye/And	I	got	that	red	lip	classic	thing	that	you	like/And	when	we	go	crashing	down,	we	come	back	every	time/'Cause	we	never	
go	out	of	style"...	Eternity	is	the	nightmare	of	the	repetition	of	the	phallic	game.		On	Ultraviolence,	we	love	the	explosion	of	sexual	difference	in	the	midst	of	Death,	in	"Money,	Power,	Glory"	for	example:	"You	talk	lots	about	God/Freedom	comes	from	the	call/But	that's	not	what	this	bitch	wants/Not	what	I	want	at	all/I	want	money	and	all	your	power,	all	your	glory."		
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Retracing	our	steps,	we	can	say	that	Armageddon	 is	typical	of	Hollywood	when	it	comes	to	the	desire	of	the	other,	as	it	stages	a	middle-ground	"happy"	solution	–	the	father	is	lost	and	mediation	unfolds,	but	the	lover	turns	out	to	be	a	copy	of	 the	 father.	The	potentially	destructive	metonymy	of	 the	other's	 desire	 is	 interrupted	 as	 the	 paternal	 metaphor	 is	sedimented	 by	 the	 removal	 of	 the	 incestuous	 link.	 The	Oedipal	 manipulation	 is	 double-edged,	 as	 the	 true	incestuous	link	that	the	film	works	through	is	in	fact	not	the	one	between	Harry	and	daughter	Grace,	but	between	Harry	and	A.	 J.	While	Grace's	 feminine	 structure	 easily	 settles	 in	the	 symbolisation	 of	 the	 father's	 phallus	 through	 the	repetition	that	is	A.	J.,	the	real	trial	is	for	the	boyish	A.	J.	to	leave	the	imago	of	the	father	behind	–	of	the	father's	behind	–	and	embrace	his	death.	The	unresolved	tension	the	movie	hides	away	is	just	this	one,	for	A.	J.'s	love-object	is	obviously	not	 Grace,	 but	 Harry.	 Many	 details	 point	 to	 A.	 J.'s	 lack	 of	sexual	interest	in	Grace	–	take	A.	J.	and	Grace's	surprisingly	child-like	parting	before	the	shuttles	go	–	as	well	as	Harry's	libidinal	 investment	 of	 A.	 J.	 Does	 not	 the	 film	 constantly	stage	 the	 enjoyment	 of	 a	 perverse	 ritual	 between	 the	 two	men,	 from	 that	 early	 scene	 when	 Harry	 tries	 to	 shoot	 a	barely	dressed	A.	J.	upon	discovering	that	his	daughter	slept	in	 his	 bed,	 to	 the	 phallic	 show	 A.	 J.	 puts	 on	 when	 Harry	comes	for	his	help.	They	always	"have	five	or	six	words"	for	
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each	 other,	 this	 exchange	 comes	 twice	 –	 perhaps	 three	would	 have	 sufficed!	 The	 movie	 thus	 nicely	 sums	 up	 the	scandal	of	the	psychoanalytic	experience,	namely	that	girls	just	 want	 to	 have	 fun	 (preferably	 with	 other	 girls	 and	 a	phallic	 stand-in)	 and	 boys	 secretly	 want	 their	 daddies	 to	make	love	to	them	(preferably	through	the	anal	penetration	they	will	 be	 keen	 to	 repeat	with	 their	 sexual	 partners).	 Is	not	 the	 true	 Armageddon	 the	 disappearance	 of	 both	 the	phallus	and	one's	double?		 Back	 to	 feminine	 logic	 –	 while	 the	 hysteric	 busies	herself	 asking	 if	 she	 is	 a	 woman	 or	 a	 man,	 the	 phobic	wonders	whether	such	a	question	is	possible	at	all...	In	her	paper	 "Phobia	 and	 Perversion",	 Danuza	Machado	 remarks	that	the	phobic	is	the	hysteric's	dream;	it	is	as	if	the	hysteric	knew	 there	was	a	 layer	of	protest	 she	couldn't	 reach	back	there,	the	protest	against	the	signifier	itself	–	the	division	of	one	into	two	–	beyond	the	contingency	of	its	phallic	stand-in.	 We	 feel	 there	 is	 no	 better	 example	 than	 rapper	 Nicki	Minaj's	 thing	 for	 the	 most	 phobic	 of	 all	 the	 Hip-Hop	hysterics,	 the	 shoe-collecting	 model	 and	 singer	 Cassie	Ventura.7	On	 "Paradise"	 from	 her	 mixtape	 Rocka	 By	 Baby	(2013),	 Cassie	 refers	 to	 the	 pleasure	 she	 receives	 –	paradise,	 note	 the	 ensuing	homophony	–	 as	 "I'll	 be	 rolling	
																																																								7	See	the	references	Minaj	drops	on	"Fuck	U	Silly"	and	"Little	Freak",	as	well	as	their	single	together	"The	Boys"	
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like	a	pair	of	dice"	or	"body	rolling	like	a	pair	of	dice"...	Need	we	say	more?	Yes	 it	 turns	out,	 simply	 to	say	 that	Cassie	 is	perhaps	 the	 blind	 spot	 of	Mallarmé	 –	why	 not?	 –	 that	 the	roll	 of	dice	was	not	meant	 to	 abolish	 chance	after	 all,	 that	perhaps	Mallarmé	 remained	 stuck	 to	 the	 very	 horizon	 he	tried	 so	 sublimely	 to	 escape.	 As	 a	 delicious	 piece	 of	anecdote,	it	has	been	said	that	Cassie,	who	is	known	for	her	insurmountable	 stage	 fright,	 always	 wears	 a	 watch	 set	 to	the	wrong	time...	If	phobia	is	the	dream	of	hysteria,	hysteria	is	 equally	 the	dream	of	 phobia,	 the	revengeful	stabilisation	
of	 the	signifier	 in	 the	alienation	of	 the	phallus.	 And	 back	 to	feminine	 jouissance:	 precisely	 because	 it	 is	 the	 experience	of	the	phallus'	inadequacy,	the	revelation	of	the	void	at	the	heart	of	the	signifier,	it	is	also	the	point	at	which	psychosis	lurks	 around	 like	 a	 great	 white	 shark.	 You	 might	 go	 sky	high,	but	the	landing	will	prove	very	tricky...	For	those	with	a	 crumbling	 psychic	 structure,	 the	 work	 of	 analysis	 must	seek	to	delineate	this	point,	to	give	it	consistency.		 	 	 	 	 *		 What	is	interesting	in	the	case	of	Ciara,	the	greatest	R&B	 singer	 since	 the	 late	 Aaliyah,	 is	 the	 shift	 from	 her	fourth	 album	 Basic	 Instinct,	 to	 her	 fifth,	 Ciara	 (2013),	another	 eponymous	 album.	While	Basic	Instinct	 is	 steeped	in	 syncopated	 rhythms	 throughout,	with	the	exception	of	a	dance-pop	 song	 towards	 the	 end;	 Ciara	 is	 a	 most	
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idiosyncratic	mixture	of	electro-pop,	rap,	rock	and	soul;	one	which	 leaves	 these	 genres	 barely	 recognisable.	 This	 very	strange	object	that	is	Ciara's	fifth	album,	is	nothing	short	of	the	formation	of	a	sinthome.	The	cover	of	Ciara	is	a	tell-tale	–	 it	 is	a	mirror-flipped	image	of	Ciara;	we	could	say	that	 it	represents	the	curving	of	space	mentioned	earlier	(see	also	N2§26	 above),	 which	 indicates	 the	 symbolisation	 of	 the	imaginary	phallus	by	the	taking	into	account	of	the	other's	gaze	 in	 the	 space	of	 representation.	On	 "Gimme	Dat"	 from	
Basic	 Instinct,	 the	 record	 we	 reflect	 so	 much	 of	 our	knowledge	in,	she	sings	repeatedly	"give	me	that	bass"	over	a	heavy	bass	 line;	we	cannot	help	but	think	of	the	Nothing	of	 the	 signifier	 that	 is	 so	 precariously	 set	 up	 there.	 If	
anything,	 it	 is	 the	bass	of	negativity	 that	 is	propped	up	on	record,	like	an	additional	ring	to	a	fragile	knot.	Does	not	the	presence	of	a	protruding	bass	line,	almost	like	the	sprout	of	a	 germinating	 potato,	 characterise	 the	 masterpieces	 of	Aaliyah's	last	years,	from	"If	Your	Girl	Only	Knew"	and	"Are	You	 That	 Somebody"	 to	 the	 final	 experimentations	 of	
Aaliyah	 (2001)	 and	her	defining	hit,	 "Try	Again"?	And	 can	the	 same	 not	 be	 said	 about	 John	 Keats'	 "Ode	 to	 a	Nightingale"?	 Is	 not	 the	 nightingale's	 song	 the	 "ecstasy	 of	Death",	the	signifier	itself?	And	the	poet	is	precisely	the	one	who	struggles	to	escape	Eternity,	the	wait	for	the	passage	of	a	signifier;	who	has	"ears	in	vain/To	thy	requiem	become	a	
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sod"	 (sixth	stanza).	Back	 to	Ciara:	on	 that	 fifth	record,	 she	finally	 put	 Time	 together,	 the	 desire	 for	 the	 phallus.	Interestingly,	 she	 gave	 birth	 to	 her	 first	 child,	 a	 son,	 less	than	a	year	after	the	release	of	the	record.	If	in	the	video	for	the	single	"Like	A	Boy"	(2007),	she	was	obviously	one	and	the	other,	at	the	end	of	Ciara	she	could	be	one	to	give	a	look	as	well	as	one	who	is	looked	at...	and	at	two	different	times.	On	the	twenty-seventh	of	December	2014,	she	tweeted	that	"some	things	are	not	meant	to	be	understood"	and	that	she	is	 "cool	 with	 that."	 You	 know	 something	 has	 been	symbolised	when	things	acquire	an	impenetrable	depth	and	you	grow	tired	of	Fort-Da,	the	dangerous	game	of	reeling	in	the	real.		 To	a	certain	extent,	the	same	can	also	be	said	about	the	 aesthetic	 of	 Britney	 Spears'	 seventh	 album,	 the	 aptly-titled	 Femme	 Fatale	 (2011),	 what	 we	 have	 always	recognised	 as	 her	 post-madness	 record.	 Femme	 fatale	comes	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 success	 of	 "3",	 one	 of	 her	 best	singles,	 once	 again	 pointing	 to	 the	 symbolisation	 of	 the	phallus.	Only	when	language	and	the	exception	it	relies	on	–	the	 child's	 imaginary	 phallus,	 and	 it	 is	 especially	 obvious	today	 that	 the	 phallic	 economy	 is	 paedophilic	 by	 nature	 –	was	 symbolised,	 could	 she	 proceed	 to	 stabilise	 her	signifying	 universe	 along	 the	 traditional	 lines	 of	 feminine	alienation,	following	the	blackout	–	the	title	of	arguably	her	
	 113	
best	 record	 –	 of	madness	 in	 2007.	 The	 title	 of	 her	 eighth	album,	Britney	Jean	(2013)	unsurprisingly	follows	the	same	logic	 as	 Ciara's	 eponymous	 album.	 Britney	 Jean	 was	released	to	critical	failure	and	dismal	sales	figures.	There	is	no	 better	 example	 for	 the	 passage	 from	 Woman	 to	 one	among	other	women.	This	is	actualisation.		§167	 –	We	 needed	 to	match	 our	words	 as	well	 as	 let	 the	words	match	us,	so	that	a	mirror	could	be	fixed	to	the	wall.	Not	so	much	to	look	at	the	broken	glass,	but	to	go	beyond	it	–	and	to	come	back.		§168	 –	 There	 is	 enjoyment	 in	 the	 renunciation	 that	 leads	one	to	the	convent.	To	live	in	a	convent	is	to	devote	oneself	to	the	Other	–	it	turns	out	there	is	no	such	thing.	When	this	enjoyment	 is	also	 taken	away,	one	will	 find	oneself	 in	 that	exact	 same	position	one	 fled	 from	 to	 start	with.	One	must	accept	 one's	 fate	 and	 go	 through	 it	 once	 more	 without	feelings	this	time.	There	will	be	little	room	for	hope,	not	at	all	 for	passion,	even	 less	 for	dreams.	The	 flat	will	be	small	and	 crowded,	 the	 street	 noisy	 and	 dirty.	 In	 the	 drag	 of	
everyday	lies	the	other	of	sideways	glances.			§169	–	To	truly	wake	up	from	the	slumber	of	Reason	 is	 to	be	able	to	go	back	to	sleep.	This	becomes	possible	after	the	
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negations	of	the	hunting	tigress	and	the	haunting	doll.	To	go	full	circle	 is	 to	grieve	Francine	Descartes.	We	boarded	that	mythical	 ship	 from	which	her	 replica	was	 thrown	 into	 the	inexistent	waters	of	Otherness.			§170	 –	 After	 two	 devastating	 negations,	 one	 thoroughly	destroyed	 itself	 –	 this	 is	what	was	 at	 stake	 all	 along.	 One	really	 was	 not.	 Did	 you	 notice?	 We	 are	 back	 at	 the	beginning...		§171	 –	 A	 tremor	 was	 felt.	 The	 fleet	 had	 jumped	 into	hyperspace.	 While	 our	 ship	 covered	 distances	unimaginable,	 we	 retired	 to	 our	 cabin;	 we	 had	 fallen	 ill.	When	 the	 hysteric	 meets	 death,	 only	 the	 body	 can	symbolise	 it	 –	 a	 hidden-in-site	 that	 went	 missing	 and	returned	so	conspicuously	in	the	neurological	exposition	of	a	 former	master	whose	 exhaustion	was	 not	 complete.	We	keep	in	mind	the	words	of	Madeleine	Albright	–	"there	is	a	special	 place	 in	 hell	 for	 women	 who	 don't	 help	 other	women."			§172	 –	 To	 conquer	 a	 traumatic	 signifier,	 one	 upon	which	hangs	a	world	(and	we	could	say	that	it	is	something	in	the	Other	 that	 leads	 to	 its	 self-destruction)	 is	 to	dialecticise	 it,	i.e.	to	go	through	the	context	of	its	utterance,	the	signifiers	
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that	have	been	obliterated	in	what	is	said	or	not	said;	and,	most	importantly,	to	actualise	this	dialecticisation,	i.e.	to	re-
vectorialise	 the	 impact	of	 such	a	 signifier	 towards	 another	horizon.	Lucky	is	one	who	can	trigger	the	bomb	but	exit	the	room	 before	 it	 all	 comes	 to	 dust.	 One	must	 use	 the	 boom	that	 is	 produced,	 not	 only	 to	 set	 direction	 or	 contain	 the	debris,	 but	 also	 to	 propel	what	 is	 left	 of	 the	 signifier	 onto	another	 universe	 entirely.	 When	 the	 smoke	 cleared,	 one	was	so	high	it	was	about	to	escape	the	gravitational	pull	of	its	origins.		§173	–	There	 is	nothing	to	go	 for	back	 in	Time	-	Time	was	
the	mirage	of	a	signifier.	Nothing	more.	Not	the	superseded	wealth	 of	 a	 world,	 only	 the	 deployment	 of	 nothingness.	Look	around	the	museum;	can	you	see	the	emptiness?	Can	you	see	the	skyscrapers	of	the	City	outside	its	windows?		 Space	 thus	becomes	our	ultimate	 frontier.	We	 shall	go	there	ourselves.	What	is	there	to	discover	is	our	absolute	contingency	–	and	necessity.			§174	–	We	now	have	to	rehearse	in	what	follows	the	proofs	of	what	has	been	exposed	in	a	dash	–	one	swallow	does	not	make	 a	winter!	 The	 signifier	must	 survive	 the	 intoxication	that	led	to	its	birth.	The	void	we	found	ourselves	in	must	be	
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systematised;	 one	 must	 have	 no	 doubt	 as	 to	 the	 air	 one	walks	on,	if	one	is	to	reach	for	the	stars.		§175	–	At	the	end	of	the	funnel	that	was	hyperspace,	it	was	asked	whether	Time	and	Space	were	not	abstract	categories	that	miss	 the	 point.	 For	 us	 there	 certainly	was	 a	 point	 to	
miss!			 For	the	rest,	we	could	only	offer	a	Pascalian	answer	–	 pray	 first,	 belief	 comes	 after.	 To	 go	 through	 the	inexistence	 of	 the	 Big	Other	 and	 not	 to	 take	 ourselves	 for	God,	precisely	means	to	go	there	ourselves	and	witness	the	mess	first-hand.	One	will	discover	that	He	didn't	know	what	He	was	doing,	 even	 less	where	 the	 fruit	 toasts	 came	 from.	The	point	is	never	to	kill	God...	What	a	lack	of	imagination!	The	point	is	to	analyse	Him,	to	systematise	His	knowledge	–	knowledge	of	the	Real	–	so	that	it	becomes	our	knowledge.	How	much	should	one	charge	God?	That	is	the	question.		§176	 –	 Being	 one	 and	 the	 other	 was	 exhausting.	 Perhaps	God	was	just	afraid	of	being	alone	–	and	our	world	was	the	
litter	of	a	loneliness.		§177	 –	When	 the	 signifier	 has	 tortured	 you	 for	 years	 but	was	 unable	 to	 finish	 the	 job,	 you	 can	 only	 delight	 in	
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returning	 the	 favour.	 We	 swore	 to	 break	 language	 to	 the	degree	we	were	broken	by	it.		
	 Can	 you	 hear	 my	 voice	 in	 the	 alliterations,	 in	 the	
consonances,	in	the	play	on	words,	in	the	internal	rhymes,	in	
the	 wealth	 of	 references	 and	 the	 double	 entendres	 that	
pervade	 the	 text?	 Can	 you	 discern	 the	 fluttering	 from	 the	
screaming	and	the	purring?	Can	you	hear	it	go	up	and	down	
in	the	melisma	of	dialectics?	Can	you	hear	the	complaint,	the	
impossible	demand,	the	cries	of	joy	and	laughter,	the	low	ends	
and	 high	 pitches,	 the	 undertones	 and	 overtures?	 Can	 you	
picture	its	complexion,	do	you	wish	you	could	bring	it	to	your	
lips,	will	you	dream	of	touching	it?	Can	you	see	 it	dressed	in	
satin	 and	 perched	 on	 high	 heels,	 with	 its	 shoulder	 strap	
already	 hanging	 out?	 Will	 you	 fantasise	 about	 its	 red	 lips	
drenching	your	neck,	 the	 long	hair	now	caressing	your	 face,	
its	naked	breast	undulating	in	the	desert	of	your	life?	Do	you	
desire	me	now?	Scream	my	name!		 	 	 	 	 	 *	"She	 came	back	 that	night,	 all	 dressed	up	 in	her	 satin	 and	high	heels.	She	emerged	from	the	smoke	without	a	smudge	on	her.	The	slaves	had	gone	 to	sleep;	only	 the	master	was	awake,	pondering	the	moves	and	counter-moves	that	make	his	day.	She	threw	the	chessboard	off	the	table	and	herself	
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upon	 him;	 in	 a	matter	 of	 seconds,	 she	 had	 slit	 his	 throat.	Time	was	all	over	the	wall,	writings."8			§178	 –	 We	 exited	 hyperspace	 and	 went	 into	geosynchronous	 orbit	 of	 a	 planet	 unknown.	 Hyperspace	was	 the	 turning	 inside	out	of	 duration.	 Not	 the	 going	 back	and	forth	in	time,	which	belonged	to	Time;	but	the	unveiling	of	 Time,	what	 had	 so	 far	 been	 the	 cover-up	 for	 the	 One's	impossible	 coming	 to	 terms	 with	 itself.	 In	 the	 beginning	there	 was	 not	 even	 nothing,	 in	 the	 end	 the	 same.	 In	 the	
interstice	of	Time's	explosion,	what	 is	elsewhere	called	the	Big	 Bang,	 we	 have	 reached	 Space.	 In	 the	 physical	exploration	of	the	stars	close	and	far,	space	must	become	a	subspecies	 of	 itself,	 Space.	 What	 unfolded	 on	 Earth	 from	Christopher	 Columbus	 to	 Claude	 Lévi-Strauss	 –	 this	movement	we	 call	Modernity	 –	must	be	 repeated	 in	outer	space,	this	is	the	horizon	of	Spirit	today.	The	glorious	days	of	anthropology	have	yet	 to	come,	which	 is	 to	say	 that	 the	essence	of	History	always	lies	ahead.		§179	 –	 It	 goes	 without	 saying	 that	 Death	 is	 the	 ultimate	fake.	Incidentally,	it	was	reported	to	us	that	Death	had	been	arrested	on	a	crowded	street	of	the	City	days	ago,	where	it	
																																																								8	The	second	sentence	from	the	last	paragraph	("She	emerged	from	the	smoke...")	is	borrowed	from	Iggy	Azalea	(2014).	
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attempted	to	hijack	an	elevated	train	on	its	way	out	of	 the	Loop.	 It	 has	 since	 been	 sent	 to	 the	 Metropolitan	Correctional	 Center,	 a	 skyscraper	 we	 wished	 we	 had	designed	ourselves.		As	for	our	murderer,	we	have	said	it	again	and	again	before:	when	you	hit	the	Real	directly,	you	bleed	yourself	to	death.	She	went	on	to	become	the	master	instead.	To	be	a	master	is	to	welcome	the	arrival	of	a	challenger!		§180	–	When	Death	becomes	the	most	abstract	and	untrue	of	notions,	the	mirage	of	the	signifier,	one	is	faced	with	the	unsymbolisable	death,	the	Real	of	human	finitude.	Only	the	paradoxical	 repetition	 of	 a	 small	 death	 can	 successfully	ward	 off	 the	 obsession	 of	 the	 big	 one.	 The	 solution	 is	dialectical,	 as	 always.	 The	 likely	 occurrence	 of	 death	 is	 a	pure	virtual;	to	escape	Time	altogether	is	to	actualise	death	in	 the	 space	 of	 a	 foreign	 body	 that	 craves	 exploration.	 If	there	 is	 such	a	 thing	as	ethics,	 it	 lies	 in	 finding	 the	elusive	coordinates	 for	 one's	 small	 death.	 French	 men	 speak	 of	
étoile	de	mer	(starfish)	to	describe	a	woman	who	passively	receives	penetration	and	fails	to	give	her	partner	signals	of	her	enjoyment.	Such	an	étoile	de	mère	('mother's	star')	must	become	an	étoile	de	 la	mort	(death	 star),	 i.e.	 subjectify	 the	alienation	that	the	signifier	so	perilously	constituted	there;	for	such	alienation	can	be	turned	inside	out,	something	we	
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believe	we	have	shown	here.	The	ultimate	Hegelian	reversal	is	 the	 passage	 from	 the	 impossible	 jouissance	 to	 small	everyday	 enjoyments.	 There	 is	 nothing	 apart	 from	actualisation.		As	 for	Desire	–	 the	 life	of	 Spirit	 –	 it	will	 easily	 survive	 the	disappearance	 of	 our	 contingent	 bodies,	 as	 well	 as	 its	
disappearance	from	them.	Metaphor,	not	metonymy,	 is	our	horizon.		§181	 –	 Actualisation	 means	 that	 one	 becomes	 a	 cliché	 of	oneself.	Can	you	stomach	the	 immortal	green	of	 jouissance	that	is	stuck	on	my	face	like	a	disgusting	wart?	Can	I?		§182	–	Si	la	jouissance	n'existait	pas,	il	faudrait	l'inventer.	In	an	interstice	of	Time,	one	discovered	the	other.		 As	for	the	signifier,	there	is	nothing	to	do	but	throw	it	away.	 I	did	 just	 that.	To	ask	about	 the	meaning	of	 life	 is	very	 dated;	 to	 laugh	 at	 it	 is	 even	more	 so.	 As	 far	 as	 I	 am	concerned,	 a	 song	 came	 out	 and	 we	 sang	 along.	 After	listening	to	many	thousands,	a	record	was	compiled.		§183	–	Some	are	spaces	until	they	are	caught	in	Time.	Some	are	 all	 in	 Time,	 save	 for	 that	 piece	 of	 space.	 After	 the	melting	 away	 of	 the	 phallus,	 what	 I	 call	 the	 end	 of	 Time,	there	is	nothing	to	wait	for	and	nothing	to	defend	–	nothing	
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that	 is	worth	 your	 time	 and	 nothing	 that	will	 outlast	 it.	 A	new	distribution	shall	be	brought	forth,	one	that	cuts	across	sexes	 as	 well	 as	 races	 and	 religions,	 and	 revolves	 around	the	 symbolisation	 of	 a	 dead	 desire,	 Science.	 Life	 does	 not	turn	into	death	–	death	comes	to	life.		§184	–	In	the	stardust	that	settles	upon	the	abyss,	 there	 is	only	my	voice.	Space!	
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Post	Scriptum	
§185	–	Either	you	get	a	subset	without	its	set,	Y;	or	the	set	founded	 on	 a	 repressed	 subset,	 X;	 or	 the	 self-indulging	neither-X-nor-Y,	 which	 is	 in	 fact	 the	 form	 of	 a	 blackmail,	either-X-or-Y,	 at	 bottom	 the	 reaffirmation	 of	 X,	 the	 set	founded	on	 the	 repressed	subset.	How	about	Z,	 the	empty	set	with	no	subset	at	the	end	of	language?		 What	 is	 of	 philosophical	 interest,	 beyond	 the	contingent	form	of	a	repetition,	is	the	asymmetry	of	X	and	Y.	To	break	out	of	the	deadlock	of	X	and	Y	is	to	see	that	Y	only	emerges	against	the	background	of	X,	or	is	only	the	leftover	of	 symbolisation,	 the	 coalescing	 of	 X.	 To	 go	 through	 a	repetition	is	to	understand	not	only	that	X	is	untenable,	but	also	that	no	set	can	be	derived	from	Y,	which	in	fact	really	is	X.	One	 is	 then	 left	with	Philosophy,	 the	beautiful	name	 for	what	outmanoeuvres	All…		 In	his	first	reaction	to	the	Charlie	Hebdo	shooting	in	Paris,9	Slavoj	 Žižek	 deployed	 two	 negations.	 In	 the	 first	movement,	he	unambiguously	condemned	the	shooting	and	what	he	rightly	sees	as	the	academic	Left's	resorting	to	the	third	 option	 when	 confronted	 with	 terrorism:	 neither-X-nor-Y,	 neither	 the	 blind	 violence	 of	 terrorism,	 nor	 the																																																									9	See	the	New	Statesman,	published	online	10/01/2015,	available	online:	http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2015/01/slavoj-i-ek-charlie-hebdo-massacre-are-worst-really-full-passionate-intensity	
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underlying	 imperialist	 constellation	 that	 apparently	produces	 the	 former.	 To	 undo	 such	 a	 position,	 the	 first	negation	that	is	deployed	is	over-identification	with	X.	The	shooting	 is	 an	 intolerable	 attack	 on	 our	 civilisation,	something	 we	 should	 unambiguously	 defend,	 so	 the	 line	goes.	 Such	 a	 position	 is	 in	 fact	 not	 the	 master's	 but	 the	analyst's.	 For	 over-identification	 with	 X	 actually	 yields	 Y,	the	missing	subset	upon	which	X	 is	 founded.	X	overshoots	itself	and	produces	Y	until	it	can	match	itself	once	again	and	erase	 its	 steps. 10 	In	 the	 reassertion	 of	 Y	 appears	 the	distance	 that	 keeps	 the	 One	 from	 reaching	 itself,	 from	eating	 its	 tail	–	 the	difference	X-Y	 is	maintained.	When	the	violent	 passage	 à	 l'acte	 looms	 large,	 the	 aim	 of	 analytic	intervention	is	to	slow	down	time	to	preserve	its	symbolic	dimension	 –	 if	 the	 signifier	 goes	 down	 and	 drags	 along	one's	 double,	 all	 is	 lost...	 What	 is	 it	 that	 caused	 time	 to	brutally	 accelerate	 for	Nietzsche	 in	 the	 late	1880s?	Was	 it	perhaps	 the	 growing	 interest	 in	 his	work,	which	 began	 to	render	 impossible	 the	 imaginary	 discordance	 upon	which	his	 precarious	 stability	 rested?	 I	 leave	 this	 line	 of	 thought	open.		 The	 second	 negation	 deployed	 is	 for	 us	 more	interesting.	 Žižek	 first	 remarks	 that	 liberalism	 generates																																																									10	See	Dornbusch's	ever	so	elegant	'overshooting'	model:	Rudiger	Dornbusch	(1976).	"Expectations	and	Exchange	Rate	Dynamics".	Journal	of	Political	Economy	84	(6):	1161–1176	
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fundamentalism,	 that	 one	 is	 the	 by-product	 of	 the	 other's	incompleteness,	 which	 all	 amounts	 to	 saying	 what	 we	described	earlier,	not	only	that	X	is	untenable,	but	also	that	Y	really	is	X.	What	he	proposes	next	is	nothing	short	of	the	sundering	 of	 X	 from	 itself	 –	 if	 liberalism	 is	 to	 survive	beyond	 its	 constitutive	 impossibility,	 its	generating	of	Y,	 it	must	 seek	 the	 "brotherly	 help"	 of	 the	 radical	 Left.	 This	sundering	of	X	from	itself	seems	to	perfectly	fit	the	Hegelian	matrix:	 it	 is	 the	 reintegration	 of	 Y	 into	 X,	 the	 forcing	 of	 a	blank	space	of	subjectivity	through	the	opening	of	a	second	front	 of	 the	 other	 side	 of	 X	 (X!).	 This	 is	 a	 very	 thin	 line:	neither	 the	 destruction	 of	 X	 in	 a	 passage	 à	 l'acte,	 nor	 the	conservative	 acceptance	 of	 X's	 existence	 as	 well	 as	 its	shortcomings	 (Y),	 but	 the	 attempt	 at	 taking	 the	contradiction	onto	another	horizon	–	the	redeployment	of	X	and	Y	on	a	different	plane.	The	subject	of	 the	unconscious	
lies	 in	 this	duplication	of	 the	plane	X-Y,	 i.e.	 appears	 in	 the	mediation	that	happens	in	such	a	duplication.	We	could	also	say	that	in	the	formation	of	X!,	Time	is	given	density	when	this	 very	mediation	–	 from	X	 to	X!	–	quietly	 sinks	 into	 the	unconscious.	 We	 might	 add	 that	 the	 very	 signifier	 that	curved	and	broke	up	the	specular	image	is	itself	submitted	to	this	curving	and	breaking	through	its	being	raised	to	the	power	of	2.	Its	much	greater	number	gives	rise	to	the	many	shapes	we	come	 to	stroll	by	 in	 the	museum,	 the	church	of	
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our	 times.	 What	 is	 gone	 through	 in	 the	 formation	 of	superego	 in	 the	 analytic	 setting	 is	 the	 distance	within	 the	signifier;	 to	 anticipate	 a	 little,	 the	 formation	 of	 superego	follows	 from	 the	 clarification	 of	 the	 signifier's	 relation	 to	the	phallus	–	when	it	is	understood	that	the	latter	does	not	entirely	overlap	with	the	former.			 However,	 is	 this	 the	way	out	 for	us?	We	 could	 also	say	that	such	negations	mark	the	completion	of	a	distinctly	masculine	 option	 –	 in	 purely	 Lacanian	 terms,	 the	 non-coincidence	 of	 phallic	 and	 Other	 jouissance	 in	 the	maintaining	of	both	X	and	Y.	One	is	here	interested	in	what	the	other	says	in	the	One;	only	on	condition	that	the	One	is	maintained	 through	 the	 exception	 that	 grounds	 it.	 This	 is	the	horizon	of	Time.	In	psychoanalytic	terms,	this	is	what	I	am	 tempted	 to	 call	 the	 neurotic	 plane	 opened	 up	 by	 this	properly	neurotic	question:	what	to	do	with	the	phallus?	It	all	 comes	 down	 to	 the	 quakes	 of	 Time:	 its	 breaking	 into	various	shapes,	its	speeding	up	in	the	blink	of	a	passion,	or	its	dissolution	in	the	glow	of	Bernini's	Saint	Theresa.		 Against	this	background,	Z	cannot	but	appear	as	the	most	anti-dialectical	position	ever:	is	it	not	the	assertion	of	
something	 else	 beyond	 the	 dialectics	 of	 X	 and	 Y?	 To	 be	faithful	to	the	speech	of	the	other	is	to	take	into	account	not	only	 the	 neurotic's	 knowledge,	 that	 the	 phallus	 is	contingent;	but	also	the	pervert's,	that	the	signifier	is	to	be	
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midwifed;	 and	 the	 psychotic's,	 that	 the	 signifier	 too	 is	contingent.	 To	 be	 interested	 in	what	 the	 other	 says	 in	 the	
One	 –	 the	masculine	 position	 –	 is	 to	 understand	 that	 one	breaks	 into	 two.	 Its	 feminine	 counterpart	 –	what	does	 the	One	 say	 in	 the	 other	 –	 is	 the	 suspicion	mentioned	 above,	that	Y	really	is	X,	or	that	two	must	flow	back	into	One.	But	what	does	it	mean	for	us	to	be	interested	in	what	the	other	says	in	the	other?	Is	it	not	to	know	that	two	breaks	into	One?	That	the	continuum	of	voices	heard,	that	sweet	song	of	the	nightingale,	 breaks	 into	 the	 univocal	 delirium	of	 triggered	psychosis,	 night-in-gale?	 Is	 not	 the	 ultimate	 scandal	 the	truth	 that	 the	 structure	 of	 Being	 –	 one	 divides	 into	 two,	metaphor	 and	 metonymy,	 the	 articulation	 of	 the	 void	 –	randomly	 collapses	 at	 points?	 That	 when	 the	 dialectical	process	reaches	the	end	of	its	arc,	it	vanishes	and	reappears	at	 the	other	 end	of	 this	 same-yet-different	 ark?	So	 that,	 in	fact,	metaphor	really	is	metonymy?	All	of	a	sudden	we	were	not	 interested	 in	 the	 puerile	 rollercoaster	 of	 language	anymore,	but	in	the	vanishing	out	of	which	it	emerged	and	to	which	it	will	return.	A	train	is	always	fastened	to	its	tracks	
even	as	it	passes	through	a	railroad	switch,	until	it	turns	out	
it	branched	off.	
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	 Not	 something	 then,	 neither	 the	 Nothing	 of	 the	signifier;	 but	 the	 assertion	 of	 nothing	 else	 apart	 from	 the	dialectics	of	X	and	Y.11	Some	Thing	comes	after!	
	§186	–	Do	you	know	my	secret?	I	don't	have	one.		§187	–	Someone:	"she	loved	me	as	much	as	I	loved	her;	the	
question	was	not	there!	Do	you	know	what	 I'm	saying?	We	loved	each	other	very	much;	there	was	no	doubt	about	that!	That	 is	precisely	what	had	 to	be	worked	 through	–	doubt!	At	the	end	of	the	day,	I	just	crashed	into	the	Night.	To	put	it	differently,	I	could	also	say	that	I	loved	her	unconditionally	–	when	the	ground	was	swept	off	my	feet,	it	all	turned	into	a	nightmare."		§188	–	The	film	Mysterious	Skin	(Gregg	Araki,	2004)	stages	the	 story	 of	 two	 boys	who	were	 sexually	 abused	 by	 their	baseball	 coach	at	 age	8	 and	grew	up	 separately	 after	 that,	one	 to	 compulsively	 repeat	 the	 act	 in	 the	 form	 of	prostitution	 (Neil),	 the	 other	 who	 cannot	 help	 but	 be	haunted	 by	 a	 scene	 forgotten	 (Brian).	 This	 is	 crucial:	 for	Brian	 the	 trauma	 is	 a	 hole	 that	 is	 encircled	 by	 fantasies	about	aliens,	while	for	Neil	the	scene	is	very	real,	perfectly	
																																																								11	Hegel:	"We	must	eliminate	the	sensuous	idea	of	fixing	the	differences	in	a	different	sustaining	element"	(PoS§160)	
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remembered	 and	 repeated.	 When	 previously	 repressed	materials	come	to	consciousness,	Brian	decides	to	 look	for	the	other	boy	of	the	scene,	Neil,	in	order	to	symbolise	what	is	missing.	 The	 film	 ends	where	 Freud	 did	 not:	 the	 happy	ending	 of	 symbolisation,	 when	 the	 now-recollecting	 Brian	falls	into	the	arms	of	Neil.	As	for	us,	there	was	little	doubt;	Neil	 is	 in	 for	 a	 straight	dive	 into	psychosis.	One	makes	up	stories	about	aliens;	the	other	will	turn	out	to	be	one.	There	has	been	no	ground	for	symbolisation	in	Neil's	life,	there	is	no	 alienation	 in	 language,	 the	 trauma	 has	 not	 been	processed	 through	 the	 lenses	 of	 the	 signifier,	 it	 remains	very	real;	Neil	takes	on	the	coach	as	imaginary	anchor	of	his	desire.	 What	 must	 appear	 in	 Brian's	 questions	 is	 the	symbolic	 status	 of	 the	 scene,	 the	 abyss	 of	 subjectivity,	 the	fact	 that	 what	 is	 assumed	 to	 be	 univocal	 for	 one	 raises	questions	for	the	other	–	and	what	is	revealed	to	Neil	is	just	this	 abyss	 he	 is	 absolutely	 unprepared-for	 and	 that	 will	swallow	him	mercilessly.			 The	question	of	structure,	the	configuration	of	one's	relation	 to	 the	 signifier,	 is	 the	 truth	 psychoanalysis	 is	faithful	 to,	and	 the	neurosciences	 ignore.	Yet	 this	 is	where	psychoanalysis	meets	Science.	Science	is	the	knowledge	and	exposition	 of	 the	 different	 deployments	 of	 Being	 (or	 lack	thereof!).	If	this	relation	to	the	signifier	is	not	configured	at	all,	 and	 this	 is	 the	 case	 for	Neil	 in	 the	 film,	 any	 encounter	
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with	the	signifier	will	trigger	the	end	of	the	world.	So	sweet	was	the	voice	that	is	now	unforgiving...				§189	 –	 There	 are	 other	 structures,	 other	 ways	 one's	relation	 to	 the	 signifier	 is	 configured.	 Sometimes	 the	signifier	 is	 framed	 in	 the	 gaze	 of	 the	 other.	 Lucky	 if	 it	 is	inscribed	 in	 the	 letter.	 In	 some	 cases,	 something	 else	will	have	 to	 come	 besides	 the	 letter	 and	 beyond	 the	 gaze.	We	have	 seen	 before	 how,	 in	 Neurosis,	 the	 specular	 image	breaks	 into	 two	 parts	 that	 are	 shipped	 into	 the	 phallus,	which	 in	 turn	 anchors	 the	 signifier	 and	mediates	One	 and	the	other.	Neurosis	 is	 the	attempt	 to	clarify	 the	relation	of	the	 signifier	 to	 the	phallus	 that	anchors	 it	 –	 the	difference	between	X	and	Y	must	be	formally	acknowledged.	In	Phobia	and	Perversion,	the	signifier	is	not	anchored	in	the	phallus	–	in	 Phobia,	 an	 object	must	appear	 to	 embody	 just	 this	 and	mediate	the	One	and	the	other.	In	Perversion,	the	specular	image	has	not	been	broken,	which	sets	it	apart	from	Phobia	and	 the	 field	 of	 Neurosis.	 Instead,	 the	 One	 mediates	 the	signifier	 and	 the	 other.	 One	 directly	 is	 the	 phallus;	 unlike	Neurosis,	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 signifier	 and	 the	phallus	 –	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 signifier	 has	 to	 divide	 itself	 or	invent	a	phallus	to	anchor	itself,	that	the	two	don't	overlap	–	 is	 not	 acknowledged	 at	 all.	 While	 the	 complete	 lack	 of	inscription	 in	 Psychosis,	 if	 only	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	
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symbolisation	of	the	signifier	(Phobia)	or	the	omnipotence	of	 the	 other	 (Perversion),	 leaves	 one	 and	 the	 other	 in	 a	crumbling	room	that	cannot	be	exited.	One	does	not	make	it	through	the	signifier;	more	precisely,	the	signifier	does	not	emerge	out	 of	 the	other.	And	when	 it	 finally	does,	 it	 tears	through	 the	 One	 and	 only	 leaves	 pieces.	 Peace	 is	 perhaps	the	stabilisation	of	 the	very	path	the	belated	signifier	 took	in	 the	 thorough	 destruction	 of	 the	 One.	 If	 you	 will	 not	separate	the	one	and	the	other,	you	can	at	least	prevent	the	falling	 debris	 from	 adding	 more	 harm.12	No	 structure	 can	coalesce	here,	but	fluxes	of	discourses	can	settle	–	the	field	
of	 the	 other	 can	 be	 irrigated	 through	 the	 invention	 of	
																																																								12	This	 is	 the	 aesthetic	 of	 Christopher	Nolan's	 Inception	(2010),	which	 is	 to	 be	 redeemed	 from	what	 is	 said	 and	 not	 said...	 The	same	 goes	 for	 the	 Dark	 Knight	 trilogy	 –	 there	 is	 more	 in	 the	gorgeous	aerial	shots	opening	The	Dark	Knight	Rises	(2012)	than	in	the	rest	of	the	movie.	In	a	plane	boarded	by	another	plane	and	dismantled	in	flight,	we	see	a	signifier	taking	over	a	content,	only	to	 extract	 a	 kernel	 of	 enjoyment	 and	 discard	 the	 shell...	 This	 is	where	 the	 greatness	 of	 Nolan	 resides,	 beyond	 the	 cumbersome	political	 discussions	 that	 always	 follow	 from	 his	 movies.	 Who	else	 shoots	 Anne	 Hathaway	 the	 way	 he	 does	 in	 the	 Bruce	 and	Selina	ball	 scene?	When	 the	 camera	moves	 counterclockwise	 to	the	revolving	dancers,	until	 the	shot	voluptuously	 freezes	at	 the	height	–	the	heist!	–	of	Selina's	sublime	hysterical	parade...	There	is	 only	 the	 framing.	 And	 when	 one	 is	 left	 frustrated	 with	 the	normalisation	of	this	excess	in	the	closing	Florence	scene	–	when	the	viewer	 is	assured	 that	Batman	has	escaped	his	death	and	 is	enjoying	a	subtraction	from	the	Other	with	Selina	–	it	is	only	then	that	this	excess	takes	on	its	sublime!	The	fact	that	the	movie	ends	in	Florence	must	not	be	dismissed	as	mere	coincidence,	but	must	be	linked	to	what	has	been	said	here	on	perspective	–	there	is	a	Thing	only	when	there	is	a	frame...			 A	 passing	 note	 on	 words:	 I	 prefer	 the	 more	 dialectical	'counterclockwise',	 as	 in	 'counter-reformation'	 or	 'counter-movement',	to	the	rigid	falsely-Hegelian	'anticlockwise'.	
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canals.13	To	 treat	 Psychosis	 is	 to	 expel	 again	 the	 signifier	that	 appeared	 and	 threatened	 to	 absorb	 in	 its	 black	 hole	one	and	the	other.			 Science,	on	the	other	hand,	the	signifier	throws	away	–	but	its	non-coincidence	with	itself	it	keeps.		§190	 –	When	 Time	 is	 not	 properly	 set	 up,	 you	 can	 either	undo	it	or	be	undone	by	it.	(Cf.	N2§129)		§191	–	When	all	was	gone	through,	 the	universe	appeared	in	 the	wake	 of	 the	Universal;	and	 in	 the	darkness	of	 space	we	wrote	again	and	again	the	beautiful	name	of	Science.		§192	 –	 One	 said	 to	 the	 other:	 "Can	 you	 lend	 me	 some	money?"	 The	 other	 replied:	 "I'm	 very	 sorry,	 I	 can't	 do	more..."	"Can	you	do	less?"			§193	–	First	 you	 listen;	 then	you	 speak;	 and	 then	you	act;	finally,	you	shut	up	and	let	the	other	catch	up.	Repeat.			§194	 –	 You	 step	 into	 the	 unknown	 every	 time,	 until	 it	 all	goes	according	to	plan.																																																											13	Does	not	the	history	of	humanity	just	boil	down	to	a	question	of	canals,	of	 irrigation,	 from	the	Euphrates	and	 the	Tigris	 to	 the	Nile?		
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§195	 –	 What	 a	 miracle!	 A	 metaphor	 has	 died	 but	 a	metonymy	keeps	on	going!	And	tragedy	turns	into	comedy	–	 precisely	 when	 you	 have	 said	 everything,	 you	 might	 as	well	 say	 something	 else.	We	 come	 to	 S2,	 the	 long-awaited	discourse	of	Science.	Who	longs	for	the	passage	of	another	signifier	must	learn	to	deploy	one.	If,	for	Hegel,	Philosophy	had	 to	 give	 up	 its	 love	 of	 wisdom,	 for	 us	 the	 picture	was	more	contrasted	–	something	certainly	had	to	be	given	up,	but	it	was	also	the	nature	of	an	affection	that	needed	to	be	clarified.	 To	 reach	 Science	 is	 to	 swing	 Philosophy	 on	 the	side	 of	Eros	 and	 Storge,	 and	 away	 from	Agape	and	Philia,	which	 paradoxically	 fits	 psychoanalysis	 –	 the	 friendly	practice	 of	 dissension	 in	 the	 analytic	 chiasmus	 –	 in	 a	stunning	completion	of	the	reversal	started	above,	N2§138.	This	is	the	negation	of	the	negation,	the	appropriation	of	a	residue	 left	 by	 the	 subtraction	 of	 substance	 from	 the	subject.	 We	 are	 unsure	 whether	 psychoanalysis	 was	 not	Philosophy	or	 Science,	 but	 the	One	 that	mediates	 them	all	was	certainly	not	itself!			§196	–	One	was	told:	'It's	grating	the	slip	between	analysis	and	 legitimation.'	 In	 the	 passage	 of	 the	 adjective	 to	substantiation	lies	Science.	What	for	us	was	truly	grating	is	the	sleep	between	anal-is-his	and	legitimate	nation...			
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§197	–	To	say	'I	love	you'	is	to	remain	stuck	in	Time,	for	one	supposes	the	circulation	of	the	letter	beyond	the	addressee.	When	the	big	Other	turns	out	to	be	Big	Brother,	the	obscene	regulator	of	 an	 incestuous	 link,	 love	 is	 stripped	down	 to	a	making,	 the	 acknowledging	 of	 sexual	 difference	 in	 the	discovery	 of	 our	 diverging	 bodies.	 Shape	 therefore	 –	 the	shapes	of	that	difference	–	is	our	ultimate	horizon.		 Not	 to	 look	 for	 commonalities,	 but	 to	 see	singularities,	to	seek	them,	is	the	essential	feature	of	Space.		§198	 –	 I	 am	 stuck	 in	 the	most	 elementary	 repetition,	 the	extent	to	which	this	repetition	is	revealed	being	groundless.		§199	 –	 In	 pure	 Hegelian	 fashion,	 fear	 of	 failure	 is	 fear	 of	success.	No	excuses	this	time.		§200	–	In	the	absence	of	the	phallus,	a	piece	of	the	real	must	be	elevated	to	the	Thing	to	mediate	the	One	and	the	other.	Don't	be	fooled	though,	this	is	all	the	work	of	a	signifier!			§201	–	 I	breathed	heavily	–	 this	 is	how	 it	 started.	 I	was	 in	the	kitchen	when	my	body	was	gently	 lifted	onto	 the	edge	of	 the	 sink.	 My	 hips	 began	 moving	 back	 and	 forth	 to	 the	presence	of	an	absence.	I	got	off	the	sill	and	leaned	forward	my	hands	against	it,	arching	my	back	catlike,	spreading	my	
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legs	 open,	 expectant.	 Instead,	 it	 dragged	me	down	 against	the	 cupboard	 and	 enveloped	 me	 –	 I	 couldn't	 repress	 it,	 I	sighed,	I	murmured,	I...			 I	 got	 up	 and	 went	 to	 my	 room	 for	 fear	 someone	might	 see	me;	 but	 it	 didn't	 stop	 there.	 I	was	 taken	 on	 the	chest,	and	then	on	the	floor,	my	legs	twitching	and	twisting	uncontrollably,	my	hands	and	arms	flitting	about	untangled,	my	hips	rising	again	to	meet	it.	In	the	awakening	forest	that	my	body	was	 becoming,	 leaves	 trembled,	 birds	 took	 flight	and	 stems	 branched	 out	 to	 the	 all-rustling	 sun.	 Drawers	were	 flung	open,	objects	dropped,	hands	splashed	all	over	the	walls.	 I	was	 thrown	up	and	down	between	ceiling	and	ground,	hurled	forcefully	against	the	bars	of	my	cage...	And	when	it	finally	stopped,	I	was	left	absolutely	spent,	my	lids	heavy,	my	body	murdered,	and	all	bright	the	absent	centre	of	my	subjectivity.	I	could	only	exclaim	–	'Again!'		*	Time	winked	out	as	the	space	of	the	body	came	in	the	wake	of	a	mediation.	There	was	no	question	of	breaking	language	anymore	 (cf.	 N2§177)	 –	 what	 tore	 us	 apart	 also	made	 us	one.	 What	 must	 be	 broken	 is	 the	 grammarian	 dichotomy	between	 subject	 and	 predicate;	 there	 is	nothing	 else	 in	 a	sentence.		
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§202	–	There	is	such	a	thing	as	a	visitation.	It	cannot	be	said	because	 it	 is	 a	 by-product	 of	 the	 One's	 thoroughly	impossible	 enjoyment	 of	 itself,	 its	 long-awaited	 Big	 Bang.	However,	it	can	be	written...	What	happens	when	you	raise	the	by-product	to	the	real	Thing?	The	best	of	Science	is	just	such	an	exposition	of	what	 is	called	disaptation.	The	more	contingent	something	appears,	the	more	necessary	it	really	is.		 *	First	 there	 is	 only	 the	 circus	 running	 through	 one's	mind,	until	one	can	say:	'You	are	the	circus	that	runs	through	my	mind!'	 That	 is,	 until	 one	 can	 shift	 it	 all	 onto	 the	 now	 ex-isting	 Other.	 After	 a	 life	 spent	mediating	 the	 signifier	 and	the	other,	it	felt	good	to	be	God's	bitch.		§203	–		 	 	 	 	 FINAL	ACT,	LAST	
SCENE	 ONE	Do	you	still	love	me?	THE	OTHER	No,	I	don't	love	you	anymore...	I	really	don't.	
Pause.	 I	just	don't	love	anybody	else	either.	
Pause.	Aside.	
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	 And	I	feel	so	lonely	and	unloved...	*	
Jamais	de	sang	Troie	
	§204	 –	 There	 is	 something	 that	 can't	 be	 said	 but	 can	 be	written.	And	there	is	something	that	can	be	said	but	can't	be	written.	Let's	call	this	Femininity		§205	–	He	will	never	 let	you	 in,	but	 it's	up	 to	him	 to	meet	you	out.		§206	 –	 The	 crucifixion	 is	 bad	 enough.	 The	 worst	 is	 the	
resuscitation.	
	§207	–	And	 the	princess	 said	–	 'Killing	 is	your	only	 talent,	that	is	your	curse!'		§208	 –	 You	 can	 defy	 one	 but	 you	 can't	 defile	 both.	 And	when	you	have	killed	One,	you	die	at	the	hands	of	the	Other.	Broken!	Her	words.		§209	 –	 Ontological	 axiom	 –	 Poetry	 is	 the	 multiplicative	inverse	 of	 Science.	 Each	 opening	 of	 the	 void	 calls	 for	 a	symbolic	closure.	What	 follows	 from	the	alternation	of	 the	void	of	 the	drives	and	 the	voice	 that	opens	 it,	 is	Time;	 the	
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time	 of	 the	 symbolisation	 of	 jouissance	 in	 the	 voice	 that	comes	and	goes.	When	this	very	process	is	also	symbolised,	Time	turns	out	to	be	only	the	retroactive	presupposition	of	One	 in	 (the	 discourses	 of)	 the	 other.	 Our	 interest	 in	what	the	 other	 says	 in	 the	 other	 was	 in	 fact	 never	 warranted:	there	 was	 only	 jouissance	 in	 that	 voice!	 The	 king	 merely	turns	outside	in;	for	Science	to	turn	inside	out,	the	lack	that	
is	 uncovered	 in	 the	 subtraction	 of	 One	 from	 zero	 -	 the	expulsion	 of	 jouissance	 from	 the	 system	 -	 must	 be	 blank	
space	 for	 the	 inscription	 of	 the	Thing,	 what	 there	 really	 is.	Science	 is	 therefore	 dependent	 on	 the	 intervention	 of	 the	master,	 the	 disappearance	 of	 which	 always	 results	 in	 its	decline.	 Are	 not	 the	Middle	 Ages	 such	 a	 ptolemaisation	 of	Science,	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 symbolic	 plane	 onto	 the	imaginary	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 Roman	 eclipse?	 The	 true	miracle	is	therefore	not	the	opening	of	the	void	–	that	really	comes	second	–	but	the	appearance	of	One,	upon	which	the	real	 is	 predicated.	 Is	 this	 not	 what	 is	 at	 stakes	 in	Heisenberg's	so-called	uncertainty	principle?	That	the	Real	off	 symbolisation	 really	 is	 the	 real	 of	 symbolisation?	 That	the	Real	is	for	the	voice	that	articulates	one	and	the	symbol	that	pins	 it	down?	So	that	we	can	say,	negating	a	negation	(cf.	N1§39),	that	the	world	really	was	too	fast,	not	too	slow;	that	the	content	is	so	fragile	it	collapses	at	points;	and	that	Science	 only	 arises	 from	 the	 way	 to	 Calvary	 that	 is	 the	
	 139	
passage	 from	 the	 gaze	 that	 supposes	 One,	 to	 the	acknowledgement	of	the	zero	that	the	symbol	cannot	fail	to	introduce,	 to	 the	 voice	 that	 states	 One,	 to	 the	 other	 that	doubts	it.	One	can	see	why	Science	is	on	the	side	of	hysteria;	it	is	for	obsessional	neurosis	to	doubt	the	other.	But	Science	that	now	becomes	One	 threatens	 to	 freak	out,	 and	 it	 is	 for	the	master	 to	 reassure	her	once	again	 that	 she	 really	 is	 in	and	should	keep	looking	for	an	exit	that	may	never	come.	If	there	is	one	who	needs	another	in	her	life,	it's	Science!		 Science	may	 be	 fooled	 but	 is	 not	 foolish;	 it	 follows	from	what	 has	 been	 said	 that	 the	 void	 really	 is	 the	 voice	that	mediates	the	One	of	the	letter	and	the	other,	the	body	of	 jouissance...	 Otherwise,	 drives	 but	 no	 void!	 "What	 is	 a	Father?"	Science	desperately	asks...	Why	dig	up	 fossils	and	search	 the	 stars,	 if	 not	 to	 look	 for	 the	 traces	 of	 His	passage?14			 But	 the	 unity	 of	 the	 voice	 is	 only	 the	 retroactive	presupposition	of	Being	amid	 the	chaos	of	drives	 that	was	uncovered	 in	 the	 becoming-conscious	 of	 a	 signifier,	 the	fiction	needed	to	give	birth	to	truth.	And	One	and	the	Other	
																																																								14	To	avoid	any	misunderstanding:	for	Science	the	true	miracle	is	not	the	Derridean	trace	the	signifier	leaves	in	its	wake,	this	inexistent	Otherness	in	the	flicker	of	more	lies,	but	the	signifier	itself!	If	there	ever	was	such	a	thing	as	masculine	fetishisation,	it	is	Deconstruction	(for	feminine	fetishisation,	see	N1§34).	While	for	Science	the	trace	functions	as	object-cause	of	desire,	what	reminds	Science	of	the	Thing	that	emerges	in	the	disappearance	of	Time,	i.e.	Space,	the	lack	of	which	is	Science	itself...		
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really	 belong	 to	 the	 smoke;	 will	 only	 have	 taken	 place	 a	smudge	of	desire.			§210	 –	 We	 learned	 the	 additive	 inverse	 as	 soon	 as	 we	counted	 to	 three!	 But	 the	 mediation	 that	 has	 now	 taken	place	 unfolds	 the	 disappearance	 of	 the	 body	 of	 jouissance	through	 the	 negation	 of	 the	 libidinal	 investments	 of	 the	mother.	This	is	the	ultimate	turn	of	the	screwed	–	when	all	was	 negated	 in	 the	most	 sublime	 of	 fashions,	 it	 turns	 out	there	was	nothing	to	negate	to	start	with,	there	is	only	the	glitch	that	is	the	drive!		 This	 is	 the	 Hegelian	 move:	 the	 solution	 to	 the	contradiction	is	clothed	in	the	contradiction	itself.		§211	–	Science	is	no	mystic;	she	knows	that	One	is	only	the	vast	 movement	 of	 its	 retroactive	 presupposition;	 One	 is	thus	her	object	of	study.	Science	that	becomes	fully	blind	to	the	 phallic	 economy	 does	 not	 doubt	 anymore,	 but	 only	takes	the	contradiction	onto	the	stage	of	the	symbol.	What	is	left	is	not	the	mystery	of	Science's	desire	–	for	the	space	that	 was	 so	 thoroughly	 refused	 –	 but	 the	 mystery	 of	 her	enjoyment...	Is	it	not	the	properly	masochistic	pleasure	she	must	 derive	 from	 her	 own	 bludgeoning,	 qua	 the	 twisted	sublation	 of	 the	 desire	 for	 her	 oblivion	 in	 the	 passage	 of	Time?	(Cf.	N2§123)		
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	§212	 –	What	was	 only	 a	 continuum	 of	 times,	was	 bent	 to	form	a	self-enclosed	loop	by	the	pull	of	a	black	hole.	In	the	totality	 that	 ensued,	 Time,	 was	 posited	 a	 limit	 beyond	which	laid	Space.	But	when	one	is	vomited,	so	is	the	other,	and	 what	 remains	 beyond	 the	 stars	 that	 have	 been	swallowed	 and	 billowed	 out	 is	 the	 system,	 the	 barren	
torsion	 of	 these	 occurrings,	what	was	 called	Z	 earlier.	 The	system	 that	 has	 emptied	 itself	 out	 of	 Science,	 is	 now	 very	hungry	 and	 shall	 eat	 before	 continuing.	While	 the	 system	can	wait,	the	girl	in	red	can	knot		 END	
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Postface	
§213	–	Language	introduces	a	real	lack	of	a	symbolic	object,	what	 is	 artificially	 covered	 up	 in	 the	 symbolised	 phallus	that	 arises	 from	 the	 exchange.	 The	 depressive	 mother	desires	 something	 beyond	 the	 imaginary	 phallus	 that	 the	child	 is,	 perhaps	 something	 like	 the	 real	 presence	 of	 the	already-fragile	symbolic	phallus	she	was	deprived	of	in	the	inevitable	 passing	 away	 of	 the	 real	 father.	 In	 the	 best	 of	cases,	the	father	or	any	other	Third,	whose	name	the	child	may	bear,	intervenes	to	separate	the	child	and	the	mother.	What	 is	gone	through	 is	 the	symbolic	 lack	of	an	 imaginary	object,	the	phallus.	You	can	show	One	to	the	mother	as	long	as	 you	want,	 but	does	 it	 run	 in	 the	 symbolic	 circuit	 of	 the	Other?	This	is	the	problem	of	Neurosis.	One	shall	make	sure	the	phallus	will	be	transmitted	in	the	exchange	that	should	take	 place,	 while	 the	 other	 looks	 forward	 to	 dressing	 up	that	symbolic	lack.			 In	 the	absence	of	 the	real	 intervention	that	anchors	the	symbolic	 lack	of	 the	 imaginary	object,	 the	child	cannot	but	 draw	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 mother	 is	 herself	 not	lacking,	 the	 lack	only	being	 in	the	real,	and	waiting	for	the	child	to	fill	in.	The	child	thus	ends	up	being	nothing	short	of	the	mother's	appendix.	
	 144	
	 What	happens	when	there	is	an	imaginary	lack	of	an	imaginary	 object	 instead	 of	 a	 symbolic	 lack?	 This	 is	Eternity,	 the	 lack	 of	 the	 symbolic	 lack,	 the	 nightmare	 that	was	 traversed	and	broken	 in	 these	 few	pages.	Symbolic	or	else,	there	was	a	lack	all	the	same.		§214	 –	 Sexual	 difference	 is	 predicated	on	 a	 symbolic	 lack.	Only	from	the	standpoint	of	the	Other,	is	there	such	a	thing	as	sexual	difference	–	in	the	eyes	of	the	depressive	mother,	there	is	only	the	phallus	and	the	real	lack.	Sexual	difference	is	gone	through	in	the	exchange	that	occurs	with	the	father,	no	matter	the	many	misunderstandings	that	arise	from	this	exchange	 and	 later	 beg	 for	 clarifications.	 And	 Eternity	 is	sublated	 in	 Time,	 the	 distribution	 of	 jouissance	at	 regular	but	 fixed	 intervals.	 In	 the	case	mentioned	above	–	only	an	imaginary	lack	–	the	imaginary	object	for	the	mother	can	be	maintained	by	being	One	and	 the	other,	the	phallus	and	its	
absence	 qua	 the	 place	 where	 it	 stands.	 This	 is	 what	 is	unravelled	 in	Alicia	Keys'	 classic	song	"Diary"	 (off	Diary	of	
Alicia	 Keys,	 2003).	 One	 is	 also	 the	 place	 of	 its	 own	inscription	–	just	think	of	me	as	the	pages	of	your	diary...	This	is	perhaps	what	we	should	call	feminine	perversion,	not	the	active	 role	 the	 pervert	 usually	 takes	 in	 the	 inscription	 of	what	 is	 mistaken	 for	 the	 will	 of	 the	 other,	 but	 the	 more	
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passive	 pleasure	 derived	 from	being	 both	 the	 phallic	 gaze	
and	the	body	written	over.			 Painful	 is	 the	 gesture	 that	 rubs	 out	 the	writings	 of	the	 other!	 (Cf.	 N2§177)	 And	 uncompromising	 the	 rabbit's	ear	that	morphs	into	the	hawk's	eye.			§215	 –	 The	 lack	 of	 the	 symbolic	 lack	 is	 an	 ever-present	ghost	in	one's	life	–	it	is	not	the	same	as	the	psychotic	lack	of	 the	 lack.	 While	 for	 the	 neurotic	 the	 lack	 has	 a	 clear	symbolic	 status,	and	 for	 the	pervert	 the	 lack	 is	 in	 the	real,	for	 the	psychotic	 there	 is	no	 lack	at	all;	one	could	say	 that	what	is	lacking	is	the	psychotic	himself	or	herself.			 The	 lack	 of	 the	 symbolic	 lack	 appears	 when	 the	phobic	approaches	 sexual	difference	 in	a	 relationship.	The	more	 the	 partner	 fixes	One	 and	 the	 other	 in	 the	myths	 of	Man	 and	Woman,	 the	 more	 acutely	 the	 kryptonite	 is	 felt.	The	barrage	of	sexual	difference	is	here	at	its	most	potent	–	the	 more	 one	 introduces	 something	 else	 apart	 from	 the	phallic	signifier	to	mediate	the	One	and	the	other,	the	more	difficult	becomes	for	the	other	the	assumption	of	his	or	her	own	symbolic	lack,	the	fact	that	one	is	not	whole.	It	is	very	important	 to	 see	 that	 sexual	 difference	 cuts	 through	 the	sexes,	 or	 is	 transversal	 like	 the	 knowledge	deployed	here;	and	can	never	be	reduced	to	the	couple	of	man	and	woman.	There	is	no	more	sublime	irony	for	us	than	the	fact	that	two	
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may	 actually	 share	 a	 similar	 psychic	 structure,	 what	perhaps	brought	them	together	in	the	first	place,	and	yet	hit	the	 wall	 much	 faster	 than	 an	 obsessional	 and	 an	 hysteric	together	 in	bed	–	 these	 two	 love	 their	walls	 so	much	 they	make	sure	they	never	see	the	other	in	the	nakedness	of	his	or	her	fragile	singularity!	"You're	an	asshole!"	she	exclaims,	as	 if	 he	didn't	 know	 it	 yet...	One	kicks	out,	 the	other	kicks	back;	 what	 they	 really	 had	 was	 a	 good	 time.	 This	 is	 not	sexual	 difference	 but	 only	 its	 accommodation,	 the	 parade	that	masks	a	deeper	antagonism	at	the	heart	of	the	signifier.		§216	–	In	the	inevitable	absence	of	a	symbolic	lack	and	the	inescapable	presence	of	an	imaginary	lack,	what	one	can	do	is	 to	 empty	 the	 imaginary	 out	 of	 the	 lack	 to	 pinpoint	 its	place.	 What	 is	 thereby	 symbolised	 is	 1)	 the	 place	 of	 the	symbolic	 lack;	 and	 2)	 the	 imaginary	 phallus;	 this	 finally	paves	the	way	for	the	symbolisation	of	the	symbolic	lack	as	such.		 First	is	symbolised	the	place	of	the	symbolic	lack	by	submitting	the	imaginary	phallus	to	all	the	permutations	of	language	–	one	will	go	everywhere	and	say	everything.	When	this	is	done,	one	stands	out	and	embodies	the	place	as	such.	One	directly	is	sexual	difference	(cf.	N2§29),	the	crack	that	runs	 in	 the	 symbolic	 order,	 the	 missing	 link	 between	 the	drives	and	the	symbol.	But	this	crack	is	at	once	mistaken	for	
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another	presence	–	for	us	it	was	called	the	City.	The	sublime	of	 this	moment	 is	 the	actualisation	of	 an	asymptote	 in	 the	form	of	 two	competing	signifiers,	Phallus	and	 the	City,	 the	repetition	of	Man	and	Woman	in	the	Garden	of	Eden	–	this	is	 the	 opening-up	 of	 the	 symbolic	 plane,	 the	 immediate	raising	of	the	imaginary	onto	the	symbol.	At	such	a	moment,	the	 genus	 and	 the	 species	 appear	 together	 –	 that	 one	divides	into	two	is	here	only	grasped	as	object	and	not	yet	in	 its	 notional	 deployment,	 i.e.	 the	 contradiction	 that	subsequently	 arises	 in	 the	 belonging	 of	 distinct	 species	 to	the	same	genus.	When	the	contradiction	 is	understood	(we	pass	 once	 again	 from	 object	 to	 notion),	 this	 asymptote	morphs	 into	 the	binary	 structure	of	 the	 signifier,	what	we	have	 come	 to	 recognise	 as	 the	 inseparable	 metaphor	 and	metonymy,	one	always	spurring	the	other.	When	two	come	together,	 something	 else	 escapes;	 but	 the	 division	 of	 One	renders	urgent	its	reassembling.	This	is	by	now	familiar.		 But	 there	 really	 is	 trouble	 in	 paradise,	 what	 only	appears	 as	 terrorism	 at	 first	 (cf.	 N2§153);	 and	 one	 of	 the	two	 signifiers	 –	 our	 Challenger	 –	 is	 unable	 to	 endure	 this	race	to	infinity	and	crashes.	Why?	Because	there	is	only	one	substance,	 not	 two!	 Language	 is	 always	 sustained	 by	enjoyment,	 the	 partition	 of	 which	 gives	 rise	 to	 the	 void.	There	cannot	be	another	signifier,	for	the	signifier	is	always	only	 the	 product	 of	 the	 exchange	 that	 establishes	 and	
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perpetuates	 social	 groups;	 it	 must	 be	 understood	 not	 as	content,	but	as	form.	Our	little	girl	pictures	herself	to	be	The	Woman,	until	 she	 realises	 she	 is	only	 the	sundering	of	 the	phallus	 from	 itself,	 which	 was	 symbolised	 as	 One	 in	 the	exchange	of	women	that	mediated	one	and	the	other,	what	paved	the	way	for	the	emergence	–	emergency	–	of	society.	There	is	One	and	the	Other,	Metaphor	and	Metonymy,	more	
of	 the	 same;	 and	 the	 vanishing	 to	which	was	 confined	 the	imaginary	phallus	of	 the	other	 sex	 that	must	have	opened	up	 the	 symbolic	 plane.	 For	 women,	 there	 is	 always	 too	much	 to	 say	 –	 they	 do	 try	 their	 best	 to	 say	 it!	 And	 this	excess	cannot	be	written	–	the	letter	belongs	to	the	phallic	One	 established	 in	 the	 infamous	 contract,	 what	 political	philosophers,	with	the	help	of	Sacher-Masoch,	raised	to	the	Thing...	Is	Jacques	Lacan's	impossible	style,	this	torturing	of	language	 in	 the	 Écrits,	 the	 most	 potent	 sign	 of	 his	femininity?	 Or	 is	 it	 not	 the	 opposite,	 his	 own	 struggle	 to	fully	 actualise	 his	 feminine	 structure	 in	 the	 perverse	enjoyment	of	breaking	language	to	stand	out?	(Cf.	N2§177)	Minus-One	 –	 the	 subtraction	 of	 One	 from	 zero	 –	might	 as	well	be	 crystal-clear,	 especially	when	 it	knows	 it	has	been	thoroughly	 negated	 anyway!	 And	 yet,	 is	 not	 such	 a	compromise	the	drive	itself,	in	the	form	of	sticking	the	knife	only	halfway	through?	(Cf.	N1§36)	
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	 What	 is	 therefore	 symbolised	 is	 phallic	 jouissance,	the	 indestructible	 enjoyment	 that	 sustains	 the	 One	 of	language	and	drives	all	the	others	out.	You	can	symbolise	it	but	you	cannot	remove	it.	And	in	the	final	blazing	of	the	City	(cf.	 N2§33,	 N2§70),	 the	 signifier	 that	 truly	 matched	 the	imaginary	 phallus,	 was	 acknowledged	 at	 last	 the	 phallic	signifier	 channelling	 jouissance.	 So	 was	 actualised	 the	negation	 of	 the	 imaginary	 phallus	 that	 had	 come	 to	 go	through	 all	 the	 places	 of	 the	 symbolic	 order	 all	 the	 same.	Everything	came	down	 to	nothing.	On	 the	song	"Shades	of	Cool",	one	of	the	highlights	of	Ultraviolence	(2014),	Lana	del	Rey	 sings:	 "I	 can't	 fix	 it/can't	 make	 it	 better/can't	 do	nothing	 about	 his	 strange	 weather/you	 are	 invincible/I	can't	 break	 through	 your	 world/you	 live	 in	 shades	 of	cool/your	 heart	 is	 unbreakable."	 The	 feminine	 knowledge	in	 the	 real	 is	 nothing	 but	 this	 symbolisation	 of	 sexual	difference,	 the	 symbolisation	 of	 phallic	 jouissance	 in	 the	flicker	of	the	Other's	lies.15	Does	not	the	skidding	guitar	solo	at	the	end	of	the	song	directly	stand	for	the	terrible	rage	of	feminine	subjectivity	that	cannot	be	said?	There	is	however	a	 surplus	 left	 behind	 the	 symbolisation	 of	 phallic	enjoyment,	what	is	sometimes	called	Other	jouissance,	what	I	 prefer	 to	 call	 feminine	 jouissance,	 which	 is	 the	 very																																																									15	One	is	tempted	to	add	that	Masculinity	that	has	gone	through	its	own	movement	also	learns	to	detect	enjoyment	in	the	feminine	parade,	however	true	and	sublime.	(author's	note,	2016)	
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intensity	of	this	guitar	solo,	the	upside	down	enjoyment	of	the	crash	that	is	femininity.			 There	 is	 thus	 something	 in	 the	 other	 that	 has	 not	been	 taken	 over	 to	 the	 One	 spoken.	 So	 there	 is	 the	nightmare	of	having	 to	speak	a	 tongue	while	knowing	you	are	not	included	in	the	set	of	language.	Such	a	contradiction	cannot	fail	to	explode	in	the	verbal	fury	of	hysteria	–	 'Why	should	 I	 calm	 down?'	 'You	 are	 being	 emotional...'	 'Yes,	 I	have	nowhere	to	retreat	apart	from	this	excess!'	When	this	truth	 is	 also	 gone	 through,	 one	 can	 drop	 the	 excess	 and	embrace	the	parade	as	such.	This	is	what	is	really	at	stakes	in	 the	 example	 used	 before,	 Taylor	 Swift's	 song	 "Style"	(from	1989,	2014).	One	first	despairs	of	the	eternity	of	the	phallic	game	that	 is	reasserted	for	the	other	 in	the	oedipal	phase,	until	one	comes	to	invest	not	so	much	the	mirroring	gazes,	 but	 the	 putting-on-a-show	 itself,	 the	 clothing	 of	 the	contradiction	 of	 the	 symbolic	 order	 in	 the	 complexity	 of	patterns	and	textures	that	adorns	a	dress,	 the	 interior	of	a	home,	the	sophisticated	arrangements	of	Ikebana	that	laces	the	 imaginary	 order,	 etc.	 Is	 not	 the	 structure	 of	 "Style"	similar	 to	 Ciara's	 "Wants	 For	 Dinner",	 the	 articulation	 of	feminine	 enjoyment	 in	 the	 break	 that	 occurs	 between	 the	verses	 and	 the	 chorus?	When	 a	 piano	 note	 interrupts	 the	bass	line	and	the	beat,	the	guitar	that	has	vanished	for	just	an	instant	slowly	returns	from	the	sonic	depths	to	climax	in	
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a	 spark	 that	 ushers	 in	 the	 chorus...	 A	 purely	 virtual	 spark	immediately	 cancelled	 by	 the	 return	 of	 the	 bass	 line,	 the	beat	and	the	voice;	yet	 the	spark	of	 feminine	 jouissance	all	the	 same!	 The	 long	 breath	 taken	 in	 the	 exposition	 of	 the	crack	at	the	heart	of	the	phallic	signifier...		§217	–	Psychosis	is	the	brutal	acceleration	of	time	towards	its	 breaking	 point;	 the	 becoming	 transparent,	 see-through,	of	the	world...	As	if	gravity	ceased	to	matter	and	there	were	only	singularities	floating	in	the	bottomless	void...	As	if	the	distance	within	reality	was	abolished	and	the	object	really	is	in	your	eye	and	you	really	are	in	the	object...	As	if	words	were	 to	 take	 off	 from	 the	 storefront	 signs	 and	 take	 on	 an	extraordinary	 intensity...	 As	 long	 as	 they	 don't	 start	
speaking.		§218	 –	 When	 the	 Real	 strikes	 where	 your	 libidinal	investments	 were,	 you	 can	 only	 ship	 them	 back	 into	 the	real,	 sadly.	 This	 is	 trauma.	 We	 have	 said	 it	 before,	 these	must	be	retrieved	from	the	underworld	and	re-inscribed	in	the	sublated	Thing.			§219	 –	 Desire	 is	 negated	 and	 a	 feminine	 structure	 is	 its	quake;	Desire	is	impossible	and	a	masculine	structure	is	its	
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wake.	 But	 Desire	 only	 emerges	 in	 such	 retroactive	actualisations...			§220	 –	 If	 you	 are	 to	 inherit	 the	 symbolic	 phallus	 –	 the	masculine	structure	–	you	must	inevitably	wonder	whether	you	 really	 are	 dead	 or	well	 alive	 in	 Eternity.	One	 really	 is	dead	when	the	question	is	pressing;	and	finally	comes	alive	again	when	it	was	made	clear	the	signifier	does	not	overlap	with	the	phallus	that	was	transmitted,	however	imperfectly,	through	 the	 mediation	 of	 language	 in	 the	 analytic	 cure.	There	is	nothing	to	be	guilty	of,	it	is	not	about	you!		§221	 –	A	 good	 girl	 gone	 bad,	 that	 is	 so	 common...	A	mean	girl	gone	quiet,	that	is	so	fetch!		§222	 –	 But	 it	 really	 is	 all	 for	 you!	 Beyond	 the	 sublime	 of	Christ,	there	is	only	the	enjoyment	of	the	model	staging	her	appearance	 and	 disappearance	 on	 the	 catwalk	 of	 your	dreams,	the	place	of	symbolisation	that	rejects	the	other	to	become	One.	You	kept	your	eyes	on	me,	did	you	notice	the	master	 sitting	 across	 the	 room?	 The	 couturier	 behind	 the	
scenes...	Or	perhaps	he	was	himself	all	just	a	show!	But	this	doubt	was	precisely	just	what	needed	to	come	through.		
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§223	–	First	you	keep	the	best	and	leave	the	rest	–	this	is	the	symbolic	 intervention	 that	 cuts	 through	 the	 content.	Then	
you	 keep	 the	 dress	 and	 leave	 the	 best	 –	 the	 Thing	 is	constituted	when	it	is	understood	the	drive	is	only	its	glitch	(cf.	N1§18).	Finally,	you	 leave	 the	dress	and	keep	the	rest	 –	this	is	the	sublation	of	the	real	in	the	long-postponed	sexual	act.	 Best,	 Dress,	 Rest:	 our	 version	 of	 the	 three	 orders	 of	Being,	Symbolic,	Imaginary	and	Real.		 We	can	also	say	that	every	opening	of	the	void	(real)	calls	for	a	symbolic	closure	(Real).	Such	a	symbolic	closure	can	 only	 happen	 if	 the	 subject	 disappears	 from	 the	 body	and	 re-inscribes	 itself	 in	 the	 content.	 And	 this	 movement	must	 actualise	 itself	 by	 sublating	 the	 void	 of	 the	 drives	 in	the	 imaginary	 of	 the	 sexual	 act,	 what	 is	 also	 called	 the	fundamental	 fantasy,	 through	 the	 formation	 of	 phallic	enjoyment,	 however	 apparently	 inverted.	 So	 is	 the	 void	
resorbed.	 This	 movement	 is	 what	 must	 be	 upheld	 against	every	superegoic	blackmail.	There	is	nothing	else.		§224	–	Precisely	when	we	thought	we	didn't	have	a	secret	(cf.	N2§186),	it	turned	out	there	was	one	that	could	not	be	laid	on	the	page!	Not	that	we	knew	what	it	was	either.			
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§225	 –	 There	 is	 such	 a	 thing	 as	 symbolic	 closure	 in	 the	creation	of	the	Oedipal	couple.	There	is	nothing	wrong	with	that.			 And	yet,	something	else	ghosts	around,	perhaps	the	Derridean	 trace	 we	 do	 not	 mind	 rehabilitating	 here	 –	definitely	 no	 Otherness,	 just	 the	 ridiculous	 monster	 of	negativity	that	wreaks	havoc	at	random	in	the	post-credits	shots	of	Thor:	The	Dark	World	 (Alan	Taylor,	2013)	–	easily	the	greatest	of	all	the	superhero	movies...	This	is	the	drive,	"acting	out,	the	half-erasure	of	the	tension	that	drove	us	so	far"	(cf.	N1§36),	the	re-appropriation	of	the	lamella	of	Force	that	rejects	itself	to	spur	itself	again.	(See	also	N2§106)		§226	 –	 Phobia	 is	 the	 compromise	 between	 Neurosis	 and	Perversion.	 There	 is	 the	 certainty	 of	 the	 libidinal	investments	 of	 the	 mother,	 and	 the	 question	 that	 is	 the	symbolic	order.	When	all	 the	places	of	 the	 symbolic	order	are	 gone	 through,	 the	 question	 vanishes	 in	 the	 show	 of	calligraphy	 that	 is	 sustained	 by	 the	 phobic	 object	 upon	which	 is	 concentrated	 anxiety;	 and	 the	 certainty	 of	 what	can	 become	 one's	 own	 libidinal	 investments	 through	 the	mediation	 that	 has	 taken	 place.	 One	 can	 think	 again	 of	Melville's	Moby	Dick,	the	phobic	object	and	the	fireworks	of	literary	forms.	
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	 However,	if	the	question	accidentally	extends	to	the	certainty	 of	 the	 mother's	 libidinal	 investments,16	what	 is	uncovered	is	the	void	of	the	subject	as	such,	and	Psychosis	threatens	 when	 the	 phobic	 object	 becomes	 ineffective.	 In	such	a	situation,	what	must	be	gone	through	is	not	only	the	places	of	the	symbolic	order,	but	also	Perversion	itself,	the	attempt	 at	 being	 One	 again	 to	 fill	 up	 the	 real	 lack	 of	 the	depressive	mother.	What	 is	 unfolded	 in	 this	movement	 is	the	 negation	 of	 Perversion,	 this	 collage	 of	 the	 imaginary	phallus	and	the	signifier.	Something	remains	in	the	absolute	destruction	that	results	from	these	two	negations	(signifier,	imaginary	phallus),	which	is	Minus-One,	the	actualisation	of	a	 feminine	 structure	 in	 this	 alienation,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 by-product	of	feminine	jouissance	it	leaves	in	its	quake.	This	is	crucial	to	understand	–	in	the	absence	of	the	phobic	object,	any	form	of	perverse	enjoyment	is	impossible;	there	is	only	psychosis	waiting	 in	 and	 hysteria	 out.	 If	 the	 contradiction	that	 is	 the	 void	 of	 the	 subject	 remains	 in,	 the	 room	crumbles;	one	and	 the	other	are	 trapped	under	 the	debris	and	deathened	by	the	Voice	(cf.	N2§172).	The	contradiction																																																									16	It	is	sometimes	said	that	psychoanalysis	cannot	account	for	the	contingency	of	the	accident...	But	for	psychoanalysis	there	is	only	the	contingency	of	one's	encounter	with	the	signifier!	An	accident	really	does	resonate	within	an	already-formed	psychic	structure,	but	 the	 sublation	 of	 this	 accident	 in	 the	 analytic	 cure	 –	 the	opening	of	the	void	calling	for	symbolic	closure,	this	making	the	accident	 reason-hate	 –	 will	 necessarily	 bring	 about	 something	else.	To	 turn	 things	around	 is	 to	show	that	 the	singularity	of	an	accident	only	emerges	 in	 its	 sublation.	Have	we	not	 said	before	that	Being	itself	was	an	accident?	
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must	 be	 turned	 completely	 inside	 out	 in	 order	 to	 leave	space	 for	 the	 subject	 that	 must	 take	 place.	 This	 becomes	
style,	 the	 zero-level	 of	 feminine	 subjectivity,	 indeed	subjectivity	as	such.	And	one	is	both	in	and	out.		 But	the	signifier	was	only	actualised	outside;	writing	becomes	necessary	to	put	it	back	together	inside.		§227	–	What	remains	 is	1)	 the	desire	to	be	 loved	for	what	one	 is	 not	 -	 the	 girl	 in	 red,	 precisely	 the	 lost	 imaginary	phallus	that	only	emerged	through	its	negation;	2)	the	now-sublated	 imaginary	phallus	 reconstituted	 in	 the	Thing	at	 a	safe	 distance	 from	 the	 symbolic	 phallus	 that	 has	 been	acknowledged;	and	3)	the	sublation	of	the	killing	drive	that	was	turned	inwards,	in	the	formalisation	of	the	system	that	calls	 one	 to	 one's	 desk	 again	 and	 again.	 You	need	 to	 posit	
One	in	order	to	systematise	the	barren	torsion	out	of	which	it	
appeared,	 this	 is	 the	 paradox	 of	 Science	 that	 shall	 be	explored	 in	 what	 follows.	 Now	 that	 the	 titanic	 work	 of	symbolisation	 sinks	 in,	 desire	 that	 has	 been	 negated	 only	wishes	for	the	quiet	work	of	systematisation	to	begin.	Let	it	be	known:	desire	does	not	forgive,	nor	does	it	forget.		
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Afterward	
§228	–	The	author	is	also	an	offer.	The	content	is	for	you	to	articulate.		§229	 –	 Sexual	 difference	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 to	 man	 and	woman.	 It	 has	 in	 fact	 little	 to	 do	 with	 these	 two.	 Neither	does	 it	 boil	 down	 to	 what	 is	 vaguely	 called	 socio-cultural	concepts,	 nor	 even	 the	 more	 rigorous	 psychoanalytic	compass	of	psychic	structures.	Frankly,	it	is	quite	a	mystery.	Sexual	 difference	 can	 be	 acknowledged	 in	 same-sex	relations	 and	 ignored	 in	 what	 are	 all	 too	 hastily	 called	heterosexual	 relations;	 there	 may	 even	 be	 so-called	heterosexual	 relations	 that	 externalise	 the	 phallus.	 But	 its	most	 stunning	 truth	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 two	separate	 sexes,	 themselves	 not	 always	 spared	 from	biological	 hazards,	 only	 emerges	 in	 the	mind	 through	 the	most	 complex	 of	 dialectical	 movements,	 whereby	 the	subject	picks	in	the	content	something	that	can	mediate	the	terrible	crack	at	the	heart	of	Being,	which	is	the	fact	that	a	self-same	 genus	divides	 into	 two	distinct	 species.	 The	 fact	that	we	are	all	humans,	but	not	of	the	same	kind…			 Sexual	difference	is	therefore	what	you	can	make	of	it.	This	is	what	is	usually	called	the	fundamental	fantasy,	i.e.	the	scenario	each	of	us	has	to	elaborate	to	frame	the	sexual	
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encounter.	 There	 might	 be	 sex	 for	 animals,	 but	 not	 a	difference,	 only	 imaginary	 parades.	 This	 very	 difference,	begetting	as	it	does	so	many	insoluble	problems,	is	also	our	most	precious,	our	only	possession	–	what	drives	us	out	of	Eden	 and	 forces	 us	 to	 create	 something	 new.	We	 humans	need	to	cancel	ourselves	and	redeploy	ourselves	onto	social	stages	just	to	articulate	that	difference…		§230	–	On	my	other	side,	there	is	only	myself.	But	my	self-division	is	the	acknowledging	of	sexual	difference,	the	mark	a	mystery	leaves	on	the	mind;	and	the	truth	of	my	desire	is	not	 for	 myself	 but	 for	 that	 difference	 in	 the	 shape	 of	another,	 different	 body.	 The	 secret	 X	 on	 the	 map	 of	 our	
treasures	 lost…	 Is	 not	 desire	 always	 desire	 of	 a	 mystery?	More	precisely,	is	not	desire	always	desire	to	desire?		
FIFTY	 SHADES	 OF	 GREY,	 one	 black	 hole,	 one	 blank	
space	§231	 –	 Is	 Fifty	 Shades	 of	 Grey	 the	 last-ditch	 attempt	 at	concealing	 sexual	difference?	The	 fact	 that	men's	desire	 is	not	for	you	and	your	beautiful	self,	but	is	split	between	the	longing	for	the	lost	object	in	the	shape	of	their	mothers,	and	The	 Other	Woman,	 that	mythical	 whore	who	 gives	 a	 fuck	that	does	not	take	place	at	home,	and	does	not	give	a	fuck?	Is	 thus	 the	 reinvention	of	 S&M	sex	 just	 a	 smokescreen	 for	
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this	most	disturbing	fact	that	man	and	woman	are	no	match	for	each	other?	That	one	craves	for	the	attention	the	other	is	 quite	 reluctant,	 if	 not	 plainly	 unfazed,	 to	 give?	 And	 the	more	you	want	to	be	the	Only	Girl	In	The	World,	the	more	your	 partner	 sleeps	 around,	 quite	 rightly	 bored	 by	 this	semblance	of	femininity…			 Beyoncé's	superb	re-visitation	of	her	signature	song	"Crazy	 In	 Love"	 (for	 the	movie's	 soundtrack)	 goes	 in	 this	direction.	 While	 the	 first	 version	 exudes	 enthusiasm,	 the	promise	of	 being	One	 again	 through	 the	 love	of	 the	 other,	the	 new	 Fifty	 Shades	 version	 cannot	 fail	 to	 give	 the	impression	of	a	descent	into	madness.	Note	the	slow,	eerie,	nightmarish	 even,	 first	 part	 of	 the	 song,	 worth	 a	 horror	movie;	then	the	intense	build-up	of	the	second	part,	with	its	blazing	guitars	and	screaming	voices;	 finally	the	repetition	of	 the	 opening	 in	 the	 ending,	 which	 signals	 the	 drive	 has	been	actualised	in	the	trauma	of	the	other's	desire,	what	the	film	works	through.		 First	 you	 understand	 you	 are	 not	 whole,	 there	 is	always	 the	 malevolent	 other	 woman	 lurking	 around	 your	man;	then,	when	he	does	betray	you,	you	realise	you	really	are	nothing,	The	Other	Woman	being	the	evil	of	negativity	that	does	not	care	much	for	mirrors;	and	what	is	left	is	only	the	 shattering	 enjoyment	 of	 the	 negation	 that	 has	 taken	place…		
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Fifty	Shades	of	Grey,	ONE	BLACK	HOLE,	one	blank	space	§232	 –	What	 does	 Christian	 Grey	want?	 This	 seems	 to	 be	the	 question	 raised	 by	 Fifty	 Shades	 of	 Grey,	 the	 cinematic	adaptation	of	the	novel	by	E.	L.	James	starring	Jamie	Dornan	(Christian	Grey)	and	Dakota	Johnson	(Anastasia	Steele).	We	all	know	the	story	by	now:	a	young	college	graduate	falls	in	love	 with	 an	 equally	 young	 billionaire	 entrepreneur	 she	interviews	for	the	school	newspaper;	 the	young	billionaire	entrepreneur	 equally	 falls	 in	 love	 with	 her;	 there	 is	 one	hiccup	 to	 this	 great	 story	 however,	which	 is	 his	 penchant	for	belts	and	whips	rather	than	belles	and	wit.			 We	 proceed	 to	 establish	 a	 diagnosis.	 Is	 Christian	Grey	 a	 clear-cut	 case	 of	 perversion,	 more	 particularly	sadism	qua	the	enjoyment	of	creating	anxiety	in	the	other?	The	 hotchpotch	 that	 is	 Christian's	 sexuality	 points	 to	 a	different	answer.	While	he	seems	to	enjoy	inflicting	pain	on	the	other	(which	is	typical	of	sadism)	he	also	deploys	all	the	knacks	characteristic	of	masochism,	the	establishment	of	a	contract	 between	 punisher	 and	 victim	 being	 foremost	among	 them.	We	 know	 from	 philosopher	 Gilles	 Deleuze's	classic	 study	 of	 Sacher-Masoch	 (1967)	 that	 sadism	 and	masochism	actually	don't	go	together.	Sadism	secretly	over-identify	 with	 the	 Law	 by	 crushing	 desires;	 while	 if	masochism	elevates	 the	Woman	 to	 the	all-powerful	 figure,	
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it	 is	 only	 to	 reveal	 her	 lack	 in	 the	 enjoyment	 of	 the	 rules	beyond	her	gaze.	For	the	sadist	the	rules	are	overlooked	in	their	ruthless	application,	what	remains	is	only	the	anxious	gaze	 of	 the	 other.	 And	 for	 the	 masochist,	 the	 rules	 take	precedence	 over	 the	 Other,	 whatever	 the	 cost!	 To	 put	 it	differently,	the	desire	of	the	sadist	is	for	the	breaking	of	the	rules	that	are	one	with	the	skin	of	 the	 imaginary	phallus	–	this	 is	 the	 collapse	 of	 Three	 down	 to	 Two.	 Whereas	 the	desire	 of	 the	 masochist	 is	 for	 the	 spectacle	 of	 their	disentangling	–	the	emergence	of	Three	from	Two.	We	can	see	 here	 how	 Perversion,	 like	 Neurosis,	 is	 not	 a	 univocal	category	 but	 encompasses	 different	 configurations.	 In	 all	cases	the	law	that	was	glimpsed	yet	not	set	up	remains	the	ultimate	 horizon	 of	 the	 subject's	 libidinal	 life,	 but	 sadism	and	 masochism	 nonetheless	 deploy	 two	 different,	incompatible	 logics.	 And	 while	 the	 sadist	 enjoys	 the	violation	of	 the	 law,	 really	 its	 actualisation,	Christian	Grey	will	 always	 stop	 the	 moment	 'a	 yellow	 or	 red	 word'	 is	uttered,	thereby	revealing	what	is	for	him	the	trauma	of	the	other's	 desire	 –	 'What	 does	 she	 want?'	 This	 is	 also	 the	reason	why	 the	 contract	 is	not	enough	 for	him	 (he	breaks	his	own	rules	all	 the	 time).	Both	sadist	and	masochist	and	neither	 of	 them,	 Christian	 Grey's	 subjective	 split	 is	 at	 the	heart	of	the	film,	more	so	than	in	the	novel.	
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	 Anastasia	 is	by	contrast	 the	 interpellated	subject	of	Ideology.	Her	 eyes	brim	with	excitation	at	 the	 sight	of	 the	big	city;	they	overflow	in	the	office	of	the	dashing	Grey,	who	concentrates	 on	 himself	 all	 the	 attributes	 of	 the	 phallic	signifier	 –	 youth,	 strength,	 power,	 wealth,	 etc.	 Is	 not	 grey	the	cover-up	for	the	signifier's	two	determinate	differences	after	all,	black	and	white?	The	absence	of	subjective	split	is	nowhere	more	visible	than	when	she	 loses	her	virginity	to	Grey.	Hysteria	always	involves	a	conflicted	approach	to	the	actual	phallus,	either	in	the	form	of	the	disgust	provoked	by	the	penis,	or	the	disgust	linked	to	one's	own	body	(or	both	if	you're	lucky).	I	remember	from	my	own	high	school	years	a	girl	losing	her	virginity	at	a	party:	when	she	and	her	lover	came	back	to	the	garden	where	the	party	was	taking	place,	she	 immediately	 retreated	 into	 the	 house	 with	 her	girlfriends.	What	presumably	needed	to	be	drowned	in	the	clatter	 of	 her	 friends,	 was	 the	 very	mixed	 feelings	 such	 a	moment	 harbours:	 did	 not	 the	 most	 important	 time	 of	femininity,	the	giving	away	of	one's	agalma,	come	down	to	a	half-pleasurable	 bodily	 exchange	 and	 a	 train	 of	 blood	 and	sperm?	 And	 does	 not	 phallic	 enjoyment	 really	 come	 with	the	 talk	 that	 follows,	when	 the	 signifier	Woman	 is	 thrown	around	to	replace	the	imaginary	phallus	that	was	just	lost?	But	Anastasia	is	thoroughly	untroubled	by	such	things:	she	wakes	up	 in	 the	middle	of	 the	night	with	only	 the	drive	to	
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have	the	phallus	inside	her	again.	There	is	something	that	is	not	worked	through	at	all,	namely	her	symbolic	lack,	which	is	the	fact	that	at	such	a	moment	a	woman	enters	the	wider	coordinates	 of	men's	 desire	 and	 becomes	 a	 commodity.	 If	there	is	one	hanging	on	the	side	of	perversion,	is	it	not	the	unbreakable	 phallus	 that	 is	 Anastasia	 Steele?	Wait	 for	 the	second	negation.		
Fifty	Shades	of	Grey,	one	black	hole,	ONE	BLANK	SPACE	§233	 –	 The	 first	 novel's	 two	 sequels,	 Fifty	 Shades	 Darker	and	Fifty	Shades	Freed,	plainly	describe	the	obvious	path	to	the	 formation	 of	 the	Oedipal	 couple	 through	 the	 symbolic	castration	 that	 comes	 in	 the	 form	 of	 minding	 one's	 own	business.	 First	 was	 the	 hystericisation	 of	 Anastasia	 by	introducing	 something	 else	 beyond	 her	 gaze,	 then	 the	acknowledgement	 of	 the	 symbolic	 phallus	 in	 the	 form	 of	marriage,	 finally	 the	 negation	 of	 the	 imaginary	 phallus	through	 the	 giving	 birth	 to	 children.	 On	 Christian's	 side	comes	 the	 severing	 of	 the	 incestuous	 link	 to	 the	 mother-substitute	 that	 was	 Elena	 Lincoln,	 the	 older	 woman	 who	introduced	 him	 to	 S&M	 when	 he	 was	 fifteen;	 then	 the	acknowledging	of	sexual	difference	by	finding	oneself	in	the	position	of	having	 to	 give	 the	 symbolic	phallus;	 finally	 the	
mediation	 of	 the	 imaginary	 phallus	 in	 the	 children	 that	come	 to	 life.	 Something	 is	 actualised	 in	 this	 movement,	
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which	 belongs	 to	 neither	 Anastasia	 nor	 Christian:	 the	(symbolic)	 Phallus.	 The	 story	 is	 thus	 nothing	 but	 the	actualisation	of	E.	L.	James'	feminine	structure,	in	the	form	of	 the	 desire	 for	 the	 phallus	 of	 the	 father.	 The	worldwide	success	 of	 both	 movie	 and	 novels	 reflect	 just	 this	contemporary	 craving	 for	 the	 symbolic	 phallus	 that	 was	mediated	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century	 and	 went	 into	 hiding	since,	only	to	blow	up	in	the	terrorist's	demand	for	love.			 In	a	world	that	sees	the	emergence	of	powerhouses	in	 the	 East,	 why	 does	 London	 find	 itself	 at	 the	 centre	 of	global	exchanges	again?	Why	do	we	not	pass	straight	from	New	 York	 to	 Shanghai?	 For	 the	 same	 reason	 we	 did	 not	pass	 from	 New	 York	 to	 Tokyo,	 namely	 that	 the	 One	 that	mediates	 them	 all	 is	 the	 colonial	 One	 that	 only	 emerged	through	 the	 negation	 of	 the	 other.	 Barack	 Obama's	 initial	intuition	 was	 the	 right	 one:	 there	 is	 no	 more	 disturbing	position	 than	 laissez-faire...	 'Go	 ahead,	 the	 world	 is	 yours,	what	are	you	going	to	do	with	it?'	In	psychoanalytic	terms,	this	 is	 the	 discovery	 that	 the	 Other	 is	 lacking,	 that	 the	emperor	has	no	clothes	on.	We	stress	again	and	again	that	what	 is	 truly	traumatic	 is	not	so	much	the	omnipotence	of	the	Other,	only	 the	 first	of	 two	dialectical	movements;	but	our	neighbour's	 fragile	desire,	 that	flash	of	singularity	that	rests	on	no	ground	and	foreshadows	unrest.	Is	not	Obama's	ultimate	 failure	 the	 sign	 that	 capitalism	 cannot	
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accommodate	 difference?	 That	 the	 phallic	 economy	
systematically	 precludes	 subjectivity	 by	 constantly	bombarding	us	with	superego	demands?	That	 if	 it	was	not	for	Christian	Grey's	very	common	penchants	–	who	does	not	enjoy	 a	 bit	 of	 sadism	 during	 the	 day?	 –	 the	 world	 would	literally	 stop?	 Those	 who	 do	 not	 want	 to	 talk	 about	capitalism	should	also	keep	quiet	about	Fifty	Shades	of	Grey;	whoever	is	without	sin,	let	him	or	her	cast	the	first	stone	at	E.	L.	James...			 	 	 	 	 *	We	 have	 established	 that	 every	 political	 antagonism	 is	
always	 the	 displacement	 of	 sexual	 difference;	 in	 our	 over-sexualised	era,	the	reverse	is	also	true.	Fifty	Shades	of	Grey	is	 thus	 only	 the	 displacement	 of	 social	 antagonisms	 and	power	 relations	 into	 the	 drab	 sexual	 life	 of	 the	 phallic	couple.	 And	 their	 twisted	 story	 is	 Ideology's	 greatest	weapon	 to	 conceal	 the	 fact	 that	 desire	 is	 only	 possible	against	 the	 background	 of	 their	 unrestricted	 access	 to	capital.	 We	 ask	 this	 question:	 is	 not	 the	 enigma	 of	 the	other's	 desire,	 the	 bedrock	 of	 the	 phallic	 economy,	 only	possible	thanks	to	girls	and	boys	who	throw	themselves	out	of	 the	 window	making	 iPads	 in	 Shenzhen?17	'It's	 just	 fifty	shades	 of	 fucked	 up,'	 says	 Jamie	Dornan	while	 his	 back	 is																																																									17	http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/05/woman-nearly-died-making-ipad	
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shot	 against	 the	window	of	Christian's	 Seattle	penthouse...	Love	 can	 therefore	only	 end	 in	 the	 suicides	of	Romeo	and	Juliet,	with	 the	dying	 flame	of	 their	 desire	 casting	 a	 crude	light	on	the	stupidity	of	the	phallic	carnivore,	the	carnival	of	names	 from	 Capulet	 to	 Montague	 that	 dominates	 our	everyday	 lives.	 When	 I	 grab	 a	 Starbucks	 drink	 while	checking	my	 Facebook	 on	my	Apple	 device	 before	 getting	some	 takeaway	 lunch	 at	 Pret	 on	 my	 way	 to	 a	 re-nouned	university,	 what	 do	 I	 actually	 live	 for,	 if	 not	 the	 symbolic	phallus,	the	(absent)	name	for	all	names?				 A	good	death	is	its	own	reward!	This	should	be	read	as	nothing	but	the	reassertion	of	 the	 fantasy	 -	 the	singular	ways	the	passage	of	the	signifier	comes	to	be	registered	in	each	 of	 us	 -	 against	 the	 imploring	 gaze	 that	 is	 more	comfortable	sitting	on	a	nail	than	standing	up	for	itself.	For	truly	sexy	reading,	the	author	cannot	but	recommend	Anaïs	Nin,	 the	queen	of	writing	feminine	 jouissance.	And	for	true	love	stories,	one	is	struck	by	the	feelings	of	elation	left	by	a	Jane	Austen	novel,	 the	revelation	 of	 the	 ludicrousness	of	 it	all!	 Which,	 again,	 is	 nothing	 but	 the	 distance	 within	 the	
porous	Phallus,	something	sadly	absent	from	Fifty	Shades	of	
Grey.			§234	 –	 The	 nightmare	 of	 subjectivity:	 the	 other	 is	indispensable	 to	 you,	 but	 you're	 not	 indispensable	 to	 the	
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other.	 So	 much	 for	 the	 self,	 the	 illusory	 receptacle	 of	 a	content	that	is	not	yours.		
Identity	of	opposites:	the	monk	and	the	hysteric	§235	–	The	man	stumbled	out	of	breath	upon	reaching	the	top	 of	 the	 stairs.	 Straightening	 up,	 he	 immediately	 knelt	down	 to	 vomit	 ad	 vitam	 aeternam.	 The	 splash	 of	 ejected	matter	painfully	 alternated	with	his	 gasping	 for	 air.	 There	were	 holes	 at	 hands	 and	 feet;	 the	wounds	 had	 not	 healed	properly	and	were	bleeding	profusely,	adding	some	red	 to	the	 ash	 grey	 spectacle	 of	 his	 sorry	 appearance.	 The	vomiting	stopped	and	the	exhausted	creature	tumbled	into	unconsciousness	 in	 one	 final	 gasp.	 And	 when	 the	 lights	went	 on	 and	 the	 curtains	 were	 drawn,	 this	 is	 how	 the	master	 came	 on	 stage.	A	 smudge	 of	 blood	 on	 the	 face	 of	 it	
all...		 		 'What	 does	 not	 kill	 you	 makes	 you...'	 'Wait,	 did	 I	check	 for	 internal	bleeding?'	There	 is	 for	us	nothing	more	indecent	 indeed	 than	 the	 self-indulgent	 ritornello	 of	 the	what-does-not-kill-me-makes-me-stronger	 quote	 from	
Twilight	of	the	Idols	–	what	didn't	kill	Nietzsche	froze	him	to	bed	 for	 the	 last	 decade	 of	 his	 wretched	 life...	 Not	 a	particularly	 striking	 example	 of	 survival.	 What	 will	 be	stronger	is	that	which	missed	and	only	waits	to	come	at	you	again	in	a	turn	of	phrase.	We	love	the	condensation	in	this	
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line	 of	 Taylor	 Swift:	 'I'm	 a	 nightmare	 dressed	 like	 a	daydream'	 ("Blank	 Space"	 from	 1989).	 This	 is	 hysteria,	equally	the	beautiful	soul	position,	namely	the	enjoyment	of	being	 the	 object	 of	 an	 exchange.	 Such	 a	 deployment	involves	the	refusal	of	the	signifier	in	the	delicious	coming-together	 of	 the	 two	 determinate	 differences	 in	 the	 re-invested	imaginary	phallus.	What	is	asserted	is	the	distance	between	the	signifier	and	the	imaginary	phallus,	against	the	collage	of	perversion;	but	what	 is	nonetheless	sacrificed	 is	the	distance	within	the	signifier	itself,	the	porous	symbolic	Phallus	–	the	two	determinate	differences	are	gone	through,	but	 not	 their	 asymmetry.	 And	 when	 this	 very	 distance	resurfaces,	 either	 melancholia	 qua	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	imaginary	 axis,	 or	 physical	 symptoms	 qua	 the	 collapse	 of	the	symbolic	axis,	threatens.	One	that	is	suddenly	not	itself	disappears	to	send	the	subject’s	desire	in	the	real.	And	what	was	uncut	perversion	becomes	clear-cut	psychosis.	Or,	One	that	is	suddenly	not	itself	is	maintained	in	the	metonymy	of	the	master,	but	at	the	price	of	leaving	the	body	work	out	the	lost	 metaphor.	 And	 what	 harboured	 the	 splendours	 of	 a	world-in-waiting	 becomes	 the	 stupid	 psychosomatic	repetition	 of	 hysteria.	 Should	 you	 decide	 to	 negate	 the	nightmare	 altogether,	 be	 ready	 to	 forsake	 the	daydream	–	space	comes	at	this	price,	the	painful	sublation	of	the	virtual	
trace	 the	 Phallus	 leaves	 in	 its	 trek,	where	 the	 slaves	 took	
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solace.	But	the	truth	is	that	one	never	gets	rid	of	enjoyment;	so	that	one	will	 find	a	nightmare	dressed	like	a	nightmare,	which	 is	 in	 fact	 a	 daydream	dressed	 like	 a	 daydream,	 this	really	being	your	worst	nightmare.	And	the	daydream	that	is	dressed	 like	a	nightmare	at	 first,	really	was	a	nightmare	dressed	like	a	daydream.			 Beware,	when	 it	 seems	 too	 complicated,	 it	 really	 is	too	simple;	but	the	reverse	is	not	true.		§236	–	So	far	the	truth	spoke	and	lies	were	written.	I,	Truth,	write:	someone	please	listen.		§237	–	Hysteria	only	returns	what	was	yours	all	along.	You	can	 try	 to	 keep	 it	 as	 far	 from	you	 as	 you	 can	 –	 I	 can	 only	wish	 you	 good	 luck	 –	 but	 you	 may	 also	 give	 it	 a	 place	beyond	 your	 symbolic	 constellations	 and	 within	 yourself.	Guest	what?	A	distance	that	is	knot,	not	at	a	distance.	This	is	subjectivity,	which	is	 the	assumption	of	a	radical	 lack	with	regards	to	Being.		§238	–	Can	I	change	my	mind?	Please	do	keep	your	eyes	on	me...	(Cf.	N2§222)		
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	 	 	 Conclusion	
Absolute	Knowing	(-,	+)	§239	 –	 At	 the	 end	 of	 his	 Phenomenology	 of	 Spirit,	philosopher	G.	W.	F.	Hegel	suggested	there	was	such	a	thing	as	 Absolute	 Knowing.	 Das	 absolute	 Wissen,	 to	 know	absolutely,	best	rendered	in	English	by	the	gerund	knowing:	it	is	not	the	vacuous	knowledge	(Wissenschaft	in	German)	of	Monsieur	 Homais,	 which	 is	 pure,	 Chomskyan	 language	 –	only	sustained	on	its	flipside	by	a	phallus	just	as	turgescent;	but	an	 inhabiting	 form	of	knowledge,	a	knowing	 in-itself	–	that	does	not	keep	itself	apart	from	the	subject	at	hand;	and	for-itself	–	that	is	first	and	foremost	asserted	intentionality.	So	 what	 does	 Absolute	 Knowing	 know	 then?	 Only	 that	when	knowledge	is	exhausted,	i.e.	was	proven	wrong	in	its	entirety,	 one	 knows	 just	 this:	 that	 appearances	 stand	 on	their	 own	 and	 can	never	 be	 reduced	 to	 something	 beyond	themselves	by	the	operation	of	language.	Absolute	Knowing	knows	that	there	is	nothing	to	know,	and	the	tension	is	not	resolved.	 Precisely	 when	 it	 symbolised	 everything,	 it	realised	it	only	symbolised	Nothing	so	far,	the	signifier.	The	subsequent	negation	of	this	antiquated	cognition	paves	the	way	for	Science,	the	formalisation	of	Being	that	rids	itself	of	meaning.	 This	 is	 called	 the	 system.	 When	 the	 gap	 at	 the	heart	 of	 language	 is	 gone	 through,	 cognition	 becomes	
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metaphoric	 in	 nature,	 it	 does	 not	 add	 anything	 to	 the	content	but	merely	packs	and	unpacks	substance	in	and	out	of	smaller	and	larger	boxes.	And	Science	can	never	end	–	it	has	become	as	a	result	pure	metonymy.	Science	may	speak	but	 does	 not	 make	 sense.	 It	 needs	 the	 phallus	 to	 be	reinstated	 at	 a	distance	 from	 itself	 for	 the	 gap	of	Being	 to	remain	open.	This	 is	where	politics	enters;	politics	 tries	 to	ground	 meaning	 but	 fails,	 and	 this	 distance	 that	 is	established	 again	 and	 again	 –	 the	morning	 of	 the	 signifier	that	does	not	want	 to	be	mourning	already	–	 leaves	 space	for	Science	to	succeed	in	propping	up	Being	amid	the	chaos	of	the	universe.	You	political	animals	will	try,	but	you	must	fail,	for	the	true	battle	is	fought	where	your	eyes	are	all	ears	but	won’t	 see.	 Politics	 is	 for	 sceptics	 –	 they	will	 treat	 you	like	 shit,	 yet	 this	 gift	 is	 all	 for	 you.	 Politics	 is	 the	minimal	and	 most	 complete	 form	 of	 the	 phallus.	 They	 go	 head	 to	head	but	the	phallus	is	in	the	fight	that	cloaks	it	and	clocks	it.	 It	 is	dialectical:	something	really	 is	one	when	it	appears	divided.	 In	 contrast	 to	 Athenian	 democracy,	 so-called	oriental	autocracy	is	strictly-speaking	not	phallic	–	it	needs	to	display	the	phallus	to	conceal	the	fact	that	it	really	is	the	other	 who	 has	 it.	 The	 illusion	 is	 double:	 that	 the	 phallus	cannot	be	actualised,	and	that	it	cannot	be	negated.			 Whereas	 Science	 is	 for	 dreamers	 –	 kind	 lovers	 but	their	eyes	are	set	on	something	else.	Science,	truly	the	work	
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of	God,	 is	so	dry	it	 leaves	 little	to	desire	–	art	provides	the	necessary	 sublimation	 of	 the	 Thing	 that	 otherwise	 lies	dissected	on	 the	 table	of	Science.	Science	cuts,	art	sutures.	Love,	 perhaps	 the	 highest	 human	 endeavour,	 surely	 the	most	 devouring,	 is	 the	 deployment	 of	 passivity	 amid	 such	frantic	activities.	Love,	 the	negation	of	 the	phallus	and	 the	negation	of	the	negation,	all	a	work	of	patience,	establishes	Time,	which	cuts	and	kick-starts	the	drive	out	of	the	Garden	of	Eden.	While	chaos	goes	straight	to	shatters,	we	lovers	go	askew,	anew.		 Absolute	 Knowing	 encompasses	 them	 all.	 In	 itself,	Absolute	 Knowing	 is	 both	 pure	 enthusiasm	 and	 pure	anxiety.	It	knows	that	whatever	it	will	find	on	its	way	from	star	to	star	has	not	been	encountered	before.	While	Science	relishes	 its	 orbit,	 politics	 sabotages	 the	 landing	 and	 art	makes	 up	 an	 imaginary	 take-off,	 Absolute	Knowing	 enjoys	only	 the	 spacewalk.	 And	 whenever	 the	 walk	 takes	 it	 to	 a	new	arc/k,	 Spirit	 sheds	 its	old	 shape	and	embraces	a	new	one.	 There	 is	 no	metalanguage	 –	when	 this	 is	 achieved,	 it	will	be	all	that	there	is,	was	and	will	ever	be.	Necessity	is	as	unforgiving	 as	 it	 is	 contingent.	 It	 does	 not	 suppress	virtuality,	what	there	could	have	been,	for	it	is	virtuality	in-itself	 and	 for-itself	 –	 it	 has	become	actuality.	 Something	 is	only	 actualised	 when	 thoroughly	 negated	 and	 thereby	
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turned	 inside	 out.	 Now	 self-same,	 it	 is	 absolute	 difference	with	regards	to	itself	and	to	Being.			 Absolute	Knowing	is	nothing	but	the	impossibility	of	coming	 to	 terms	with	 death;	 it	 is	 substance	 that	murders	itself,	it	is	subject.	On	one	side	as	well	as	the	other,	Absolute	Knowing	 is	 the	 unspeakable	 stitch	 of	 a	 tearing	 apart...	
Crimson	 Beauty	 that	 turns	 pale	 for	 all	 the	 blood	 it	 spills,	
whether	it	removes	the	thorns	or	stalks.	
	
Out	of	the	woods	(-)	§240	–	The	master	will	have	his	slave	when	the	slave	rests	assured	there	is	such	a	thing	as	a	master.	Supreme	irony	for	us	 who	 must	 be	 both	 slave	 and	 master	 to	 a	 slave	 of	 a	master!	The	master	thus	wants	nothing	more	than	to	send	the	whole	party	to	Space,	where	the	phallus	vanishes	in	the	impenetrable	 darkness	 of	 our	 origins.	 One	 only	 wants	 to	meet	He	who	has	no	business	on	Earth,	only	its	hearth;	but	the	other	knows	the	signifier	is	incarnated,	not	incinerated;	incarcerated	 even,	 though	 not	 incorporated.	 The	 slaves	always	want	 to	 let	 it	 shine	 in	 their	 soulless	 skies,	 but	 the	master	knows	that	when	you	let	the	signifier	out	of	its	cage,	you	lose	both	your	home	and	your	house.	Take	the	signifier	away	and	the	flesh	goes	too!	While	the	master	slaves	away	in	 hell,	 it	 remains	 to	 be	 seen	 whether	 the	 slaves	 can	extirpate	 themselves	out	of	 the	purgatory	of	 this	dialectic.	
	 175	
"Are	we	out	 of	 the	woods	 yet?"	 the	most	 sublime	of	 them	asked,	 to	 which	we	 replied:	 "yes,	 just	 when	 the	monsters	turn	 out	 to	 be	 just	 trees,	 but	 fire	 rages	where	 you	 hit	 the	brakes	 too	 soon	 and	 crashed."	 Desire	 never	 stopped	haunting	me,	even	as	I	stopped	haunting	it.		
Back	in	(+)	§241	–	Dialectical	deployment.	Precisely	when	 the	phallus	disappears	 in	 the	 impenetrable	 darkness	 of	 our	 origins,	 it	reappears	 for	 just	what	 it	was	all	 along:	an	empty	husk	at	the	 base	 of	 tall	 trees.	 The	 king	 merely	 turned	 outside	 in!	The	signifier	is	haunted,	not	haunting;	 it	only	unfurls	what	it	 represses.	 It	 is	 void,	 not	 full	 –	what	haunts	 it	 is	 its	 own	absence	 at	 the	 place	 of	 its	 inscription.	When	 we	 pictured	the	woods	to	set	their	wolves	upon	us,	the	trees	were	in	fact	too	 wide	 apart	 to	 allow	 any	 communication,	 and	 the	monsters	 quietly	 slept	 in.	 Only	 a	 murmur	 inhabits	 the	sombre	 hush	 of	 the	 forest.	 What	 rises	 and	 domes	 in	 the	empire	of	virtuality	loses	it	all	in	actuality,	and	the	content	is	 only	 what	 we	 make	 of	 it.	 The	 bulging	 phallus	 is	 the	contingent	signifier	of	loss.	It	signals	negativity.		 The	nut	cracked.	When	we	found	its	kernel	gone,	we	took	refuge	in	the	ruins.	Picture	a	broken	palace	that	 is	all	the	more	 labyrinthic	 for	being	absolutely	desert.	The	most	sublime	expected	to	find	a	Minotaur	in	every	room,	but	only	
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minor	doors	dotted	this	holy	ground.	To	think	that	one	can	only	dot	one's	I	with	just	this	worthless	dot!	"I	know	places!	Out	 of	 the	 woods!"	 she	 screamed,	 and	 I	 too	 saw	 the	meadows	–	pure	Space	unspoiled	by	Time,	the	other	of	the	other.	But	 I	 stepped	out:	on	 the	other	 side	of	 the	window,	there	 was	 only	 my	 self,	 glass	 pain.	 "Tonight	 I'm	 going	 to	dance	 for	 all	 that	we've	been	 through,	 but	 I	 don't	want	 to	dance	 if	 I'm	 not	 dancing	 with	 you,"	 her	 voice	 echoed	through	the	dusty	chambers...	There,	at	the	window,	in	the	rolling	 meadows	 of	 our	 losses,	 she	 became	 a	 widow.	 She	was	well	 aware	 that	 she	had	dressed	her	nightmare	 like	a	daydream,	but	she	could	not	 leave	the	meadows	that	were	in	fact	alien	corn.	She	stood	in	tears.		 We	 parted.	 I	 turned	 around	 and	 retreated	 into	 the	empty	 woods.	 I	 found	 an	 old	 timber	 library	 to	 finish	 my	book,	but	fire	was	already	tearing	through	the	pages	of	the	Word.	 Love	 is	 only	 its	 failure,	 symbolisation	 only	 its	 loss.	Final	world?	There	is	––		For	fire	raged	in	the	midst	of	a	whirl.	They	who	were	looking	to	reap	what	they	sow,	Met	with	flying	embers,	and	blew	roses;	And	the	cost	of	dead	loves	to	heave	and	waive.		For	the	coast	of	dead	loves	to	heave	and	wave,	They	who	trade	in	amber,	for	blue	roses,	Met	with	the	stray	one	ripping	what	He	saw;	And	fire	raged	in	the	mist	of	a	world.
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	 	 	Bonus	
Unrequited	love	§242	 –	 If	 hysteria	 is	 a	 form	 of	 madness	 that	 recurs	throughout	 history,	 psychoanalysis	 likes	 to	 divide	 this	condition	into	two	subspecies:	Conversion	Hysteria,	where	the	 symptom	mainly	 takes	 place	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 body;	somehow	 what	 cannot	 be	 said	 is	 bodily	 expressed.	 And	Anxiety	Hysteria,	for	whom	the	Real	is	located	outside	at	a	precise	point	in	the	imaginary	world	of	the	subject,	a	point	that	allows	Anxiety	Hysteria	to	keep	at	bay	what	threatens	to	 overflow	 the	 entire	 field	 of	 representation.	 Conversion	Hysteria	will	want	to	shake	it	out	so	that	a	remainder	finally	falls	 off,	 the	 object	 of	 desire.	 While	 if	 Anxiety	 Hysteria	claims	 to	 shake	 it	 off,	 it	 is	 only	 to	 better	 keep	 the	 devil	inside,	 this	 devil	 being	 none	 other	 than	 the	 child	 it	 once	was.	 Conversion	 Hysteria	 does	 not	 wish	 for	 a	 baby	 to	embody	 outside	 what	 it	 already	 expects	 from	 the	 father	inside,	but	it	really	needs	it	because	a	loss	was	sustained	all	the	 same	 and	 Conversion	 Hysteria	 needs	 to	 write	 a	metaphor	if	it	is	to	break	out	of	its	deadlock,	and	perhaps	a	baby	 can	 help	 support	 this	 attempt,	 precisely	 because	 in	itself	 this	 baby	 will	 not	 be	 enough.	 Conversion	 Hysteria	needs	to	be	set	in	motion.	Whereas	Anxiety	Hysteria	wishes	it	had	a	baby	that	materialised	the	link	with	the	Other	that	did	not	take	place,	but	for	this	very	reason	it	does	not	really	
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want	it.	What	Anxiety	Hysteria	needs	is	only	a	brotherly	or	sisterly	 presence	 to	 play	with.	 It	 needs	 another	 to	 restart	the	metonymical	run	of	the	signifier	that	once	took	place	in	the	mouth	of	its	inner	child,	only	to	be	brutally	interrupted	before	 it	could	reach	a	conclusion.	There,	a	baby	may	very	well	 be	 enough,	 but	 the	 question	 is	 whether	 this	 will	 be	enough	 for	 the	baby	 itself.	The	risk	 is	 for	 the	signifier	and	the	 lack	 to	 overlap	 in	 this	 baby	 –	 this	 is	 subjectivity	 that	stops	short	of	deploying	itself.	For	this	baby	might	be	born	but	the	Subject,	that	which	goes	through	a	doubt,	is	aborted.	Results	 the	 always-imperfect	 fetishisation	 of	 the	 symbolic	order	 along	 with	 its	 train	 of	 phobias	 that	 form	 the	mysterious	in-itself	of	Femininity.	Instead,	Anxiety	Hysteria	may	come	to	the	conclusion	that	it	would	rather	remain	in	tears	 amid	 the	 alien	 corn	 than	 have	 this	 baby	 that	 in	 fact	does	not	mean	anything.	But	because	things	are	not	so	easy	and	clear-cut	in	the	phallic	realm	as	they	are	in	the	mind	of	the	 thinker,	 conversion	 and	 anxiety	 merge	 in	 the	 larger	movement	 you	 analysts	 call	 Hysteria,	 a	 movement	 that	revolves	around	a	lack,	produces	a	dead	loss	and	leads	the	now-emerging	 Subject	 to	 voice	 a	 curse.	What	 follows	 is	 a	question	that	neither	needs	nor	demands	any	answer,	being	at	the	ridge	of	the	signifier	as	well	as	its	bridge	–	where	the	quest	 morphs	 into	 a	 crest	 –	 but	 a	 question	 that	 simply	wishes	to	go	on	asking	forever,	if	not	to	die	right	there	and	
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then	 –	 preferably	 in	 the	 fields	 of	 the	Other	 –	 perhaps	 like	Ruth	in	Keats'	poem.		 Philosophy	 comes	 to	 a	 different	 conclusion.	 Beauty	that	ran	away	from	the	symbol	has	self-reflected.	It	learned	that	the	pain	it	endured	did	not	stem	from	the	great	castle	of	 the	 Law	 it	 defied,	where	 The	 Philosopher	 unknowingly	defiles	 the	 maternal	 presence	 he	 feared	 losing,	 but	 only	from	 the	 ravaging	 monster	 of	 Reason,	 whose	 tree	 of	knowledge	 bears	 for	 Beauty	 the	 name	 of	 Treason,	 a	monster	 that	 affects	 both	 sexes	 in	 equal	 measure	 yet	 in	different	 ways.	 Self-reflected	 Beauty	 that	 cleaned	 itself	 of	the	 Understanding	 becomes	 as	 a	 result	 the	 beauty	 of	 the	Understanding	itself.	Thus	comes	the	end	of	this	movement	of	 negativity:	 if	 Taylor	 Swift	 had	 that	 red	 lip	 classic	 thing	that	 you	 liked,	 this	 was	 only	 because	 we	 never	 go	 out	 of	style.	 	
	 180	
	 181	
SELECT	BIBLIOGRAPHY	Badiou	A.	(1988)	L’être	et	l’événement.	Paris:	Seuil.	–	 (1998)	Petit	manuel	d’inesthétique.	Paris:	Seuil.	Chiesa	 L.	 (2007)	 Subjectivity	 and	 Otherness.	 London	 &		 Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press.	Comay	 R.	 (2010)	Mourning	 Sickness:	Hegel	 and	 the	French	
	 Revolution.	Sanford:	Stanford	University	Press.		Copjec	 J.	 (2015)	 Read	 My	 Desire.	 London	 and	 New	 York:		 Verso.	De	Saussure	F.	(1916)	Cours	de	linguistique	générale.	Paris:		 Payot.	Deleuze	G.	(1967)	Présentation	de	Sacher-Masoch.	Paris:	Les		 Editions	de	Minuit.	Deleuze	G.	&	Guattari	F.	(1972)	Capitalisme	et	schizophrénie	
	 1	:	l’Anti-Œdipe.	Paris:	Les	Editions	de	Minuit.	Derrida	 J.	 (1967)	"Cogito	et	histoire	de	 la	 folie"	 in	Ecriture	
	 et	différence.		 Paris:		 Seuil.	–	 (1967)	La	voix	et	le	phénomène.	Paris:	Seuil.	–	 (1974)	Glas.	Paris:	Galilée.	–	 (1980)	 La	 carte	 postale.	 De	 Socrate	 à	 Freud	 et	 au-
	 delà.	Paris:	Flammarion.		Dolar	M.	(2006)	A	Voice	and	Nothing	More.	Cambridge,	MA:		 MIT	Press.	
	 182	
Eliot	 T.	 S.	 (1997)	 "Tradition	 and	 the	 Individual	 Talent"	 in		 The	 Sacred	 Wood.	 Essays	 on	 Poetry	 and	 Criticism.		 London:	Faber	and	Faber.	–	 (2002)	Collected	Poems	1909	–	1962.	London:	Faber		 and	Faber.	Fink	B.	(1996)	The	Lacanian	Subject.	Between	Language	and	
	 Jouissance.	Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press.	Freud	S.	(1900)	The	Interpretation	of	Dreams.	SE	4-5.		–	 (1919)	 ‘A	 Child	 is	 Being	 Beaten’:	 A	 Contribution	 to		 the	Study	of		 the	 Origin	 of	 Sexual	 Perversions.	 SE		 17,	p.	179-204.	–		 (1919)	The	‘Uncanny’.	SE	17,	p.	217-252.	–	 (1920)	 The	 Psychogenesis	 of	 a	 Case	 of		 Homosexuality	in	a		 Woman.	SE	18,	p.145-173.	–	 (1923)	The	Ego	and	the	Id.	SE	20.	–	 (1925)	Negation.	SE	19,	p.	235-241.	–	 (1937)	Constructions	in	Analysis.	SE	23,	p.	153-169.	Foucault	 M.	 (1972)	 Histoire	 de	 la	 folie	 à	 l’âge	 classique.		 Paris:	Gallimard.	Hegel	G.	W.	F.	 (1977)	Phenomenology	of	Spirit.	Translation		 by	A.V.	Miller.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.	Jakobson	 R.	 (1963)	 Essais	 de	 linguistique	 générale	 :	 I.	 Les	
	 fondations	du		langage.	 Translation	 by	 Nicolas		 Ruwet.	Paris:	Editions	de	Minuit.		
	 183	
Kant	 I.	 (1998)	Critique	of	Pure	Reason.	 Translated	 by	 Paul		 Guyer.		Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.	Keats	 J.	 (2008)	 Selected	 Poetry.	 Oxford:	 Oxford	 University		 Press.	Klein	 M.	 (1975)	 Love,	 Guilt	 and	 Reparation.	 London:		 Vintage.	Khun	 T.	 (1962)	 The	 Structure	 of	 Scientific	 Revolutions.		 Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press.	Lacan	J.	(1966)	Écrits.	Paris:	Seuil.	–	 (1975)	Le	Séminaire,	livre	XX,	Encore.	Paris:	Seuil.	–	 (1981)	 Le	 Séminaire,	 livre	 III,	 Les	 psychoses.	 Paris:		 Seuil.	–	 (1994)	 Le	 Séminaire,	 livre	 IV,	 La	 relation	 d’objet.		 Paris:	Seuil.		–	 (1998)	 Le	 Séminaire,	 livre	 V:	 Les	 formations	 de	
	 l'inconscient.		Paris:		 Seuil.	Laplanche	 J.	 &	 Pontalis	 J.-B.	 (1967)	 Vocabulaire	 de	 la	
	 psychanalyse.		Paris:	 Presses	 Universitaires	 de		 France.	Leader	 D.	 (1997)	Why	 do	 women	 write	 more	 letters	 than	
	 they	post?	London:	Faber	and	Faber.	–	 (2012)	What	Is	Madness?	London:	Penguin.	Leader	 D.	 &	 Corfield	 D.	 (2008)	 Why	 Do	 People	 Get	 Ill?		 London:	Penguin.	Le	Gaufey	G.	(1997)	Le	pastout	de	Lacan.	Paris:	EPEL.	
	 184	
–	 (2009)	C'est	à	quel	sujet?	Paris:	EPEL.	Žižek	 	S.	(1988)	Tout	ce	que	vous	avez	toujours	voulu	savoir	
	 sur	Lacan	sans	 jamais	oser	 le	demander	à	Hitchcock.		 Paris:	Navarin.	–	 (1989)	 The	 Sublime	 Object	 of	 Ideology.	 London	 &		 New	York:		 Verso.	–	 (1994)	The	Metastases	of	Enjoyment.	London:	Verso.	–	 (2000)	The	Fragile	Absolute:	Or,	Why	is	the	Christian	
	 Legacy	Worth	Fighting	For?		London:	Verso.	–	 (2003)	The	Puppet	and	the	Dwarf:	The	Perverse	Core	
	 of	Christianity.	Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press.	–	 (2006)	How	to	Read	Lacan.	London:	Granta	Books.	–	 (2009)	 First	 As	 Tragedy,	 Then	 As	 Farce.	 London:		 Verso.	–	 (2012)	Less	Than	Nothing.	London:	Verso.	Zupančič	 A.	 (2000)	 Ethics	 of	 the	 Real.	 Kant	 and	 Lacan.		 London:	Verso.			 	 	 SELECT	DISCOGRAPHY	Grant	 E.	 W.	 [Lana	 Del	 Rey]	 (2014)	 Ultraviolence.	 Digital.		 Santa	Monica,	CA:	UMG	Recordings.	Kelly	 A.	 A.	 [Iggy	 Azalea]	 (2014)	 The	 New	 Classic:	
	 Reclassified.	Digital.		 London:	Virgin	EMI	Records.	Swift	 T.	 (2012)	 Red.	 Digital.	 Nashville,	 TN:	 Big	 Machine		 Records.	
	 185	
–	 (2014)	 1989.	 Digital.	 Nashville,	 TN:	 Big	 Machine		 Records.	Various	artists	 (2015)	Fifty	Shades	of	Grey:	Original	Motion	
	 Picture	Soundtrack.	Digital.	New	York	City:	Republic		 Records.	Wilson	C.	P.	[Ciara]	(2011)	Basic	Instinct.	Digital.	New	York		 City,	NY	and	Atlanta,	GA:	LaFace	Records	&	Jive		 Records.	
	 186	
	 187	
				II.	REFLECTIVE	COMMENTARY
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INTRODUCTION.	Fragmentation,	from	
Practice	to	Theory	
		Modern	 philosophy	 has	 always	 produced	 a	 more	fragmented	 prose	 in	 reaction,	 starting	 with	 the	 compact,	systematic	 prose	 of	 Bacon	 and	 Descartes	 cutting	 through	medieval	dogmas,	and	the	subsequent	fragmentary	style	of	Pascal's	 Pensées.	 And	 while	 Malebranche	 and	 Spinoza	worked	 in	 the	vein	of	Descartes,	a	number	of	writers	such	as	La	Rochefoucauld	and	La	Bruyère	chose	a	more	 literary	style	 and	 the	 aphoristic	 form	 to	 address	 moral	 and	psychological	 matters.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 seventeenth	century	 and	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 the	masterpieces	 of	 English	 thought	 (whether	 it	 is	 Locke's	
Essay	 Concerning	 Human	 Understanding,	 or	 Berkeley's	 A	
Treatise	 Concerning	 the	 Principles	 of	 Human	 Knowledge)	were	 also	 accompanied	 by	 more	 fragmented	 and	 stylish	prose	 that	 still	 fully	 belongs	 to	 the	 history	 of	 philosophy:	these	are	Shaftesbury's	works	or	Mandeville's	Fable	of	the	
Bees.	 After	 Hegel,	 and	 perhaps	 in	 reaction,	 philosophers	have	 again	 felt	 the	 need	 to	 write	 in	 a	 more	 fragmentary	way.	 Schelling	 chose	 a	more	 elusive	 style	 in	 his	 later	 life;	after	The	World	 as	Will	 and	Representation,	 Schopenhauer	
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wrote	 shorter	 essays	 on	 topics	 outside	 traditional	philosophy	 (collected	 in	 Parerga	 and	 Paralipomena);	Nietzsche	 followed	 suit	 and	picked	up	 the	 tradition	 of	 the	French	 moralists	 to	 embrace	 a	 more	 confrontational	aphoristic	style,	starting	with	Human,	All	Too	Human.	After	the	 world	 wars,	 the	 legacy	 of	 modern	 philosophy	 was	thoroughly	 questioned	 by	 Adorno	 and	Horkheimer	 in	The	
Dialectic	of	the	Enlightenment,	and	Adorno	himself	went	on	to	write	his	Minima	Moralia	in	a	fragmented	way	not	unlike	Nietzsche's	 prose.	 In	 the	 following	 decades,	 it	 is	 the	 very	concept	 of	 fragmentation	 that	 took	 hold	 in	 the	 social	sciences:	 Henri	 Wallon	 and	 Jacques	 Lacan	 elaborated	 the	mirror-stage	that	established	the	priority	of	 fragmentation	in	human	development;	Gilles	Deleuze	insisted	in	a	number	of	works	 on	 the	 "rhizomatic",	 displacing	 nature	 of	 human	desire	 against	 the	 supposed	 teleology	 of	 modern	metaphysics;	 finally,	 Jacques	 Derrida	 argued	 in	 favour	 of	deconstruction	 to	 foil	 every	 attempt	 at	 metaphysical	closure,	 the	process	by	which	truth	 is	held	under	 lock	and	key.	This	commitment	endures	in	our	own	times:	if	Rebecca	Comay	 recently	 re-actualised	Hegel,	 the	 thinker	 of	 totality	
par	excellence,	it	was	not	by	extolling	thought's	potentiality	in	the	context	of	"Absolute	Spirit",	but	through	a	careful	re-contextualisation	of	Hegel's	system	via	Germany's	historical	lateness	compared	to	the	French	Revolution.	In	her	reading,	
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Hegel's	 reputedly	 impregnable	 fortress	 of	 theory	 becomes	yet	 another	 symptom	 of	 the	 disorienting	 dissolution	 of	identity	in	the	wake	of	the	French	Revolution.		 The	practice	of	creative	writing	in	Two	Negations	not	only	walks	in	these	steps,	it	helps	cast	an	original	light	on	a	fundamental	 theoretical	 problem.	 Indeed,	 the	 First	Negation	 sidestepped	 mystifying	 accounts	 of	 Absolute	Spirit	 (some	 form	 of	 all-encompassing	 Reason	 that	 still	pervades	the	secondary	literature	to	an	extent)	to	return	to	the	letter	of	Hegel's	Phenomenology	of	Spirit;	and	this	letter,	in	its	opening	chapters,	is	all	about	the	fragmentation	of	the	phenomenological	 experience	 of	 the	world:	 the	 crumbling	of	sense	certainty,	 the	dissolution	of	 the	Thing,	 the	play	of	forces,	etc.	It	is	the	very	process	of	fragmentation	that	is	in	fact	 rehearsed	 and	 acquainted	with	 in	 this	 First	Negation,	beyond	 the	 epistemological	 questions	 that	 are	 usually	extrapolated	 from	 those	 early	 sections	 of	 the	
Phenomenology.			 Moreover,	only	when	we	travel	with	Nietzsche	along	the	creative	 road	can	we	have	something	 to	 say	about	 the	value	 of	 fiction	 and	 poetry	 for	 theory	 –	 and	 about	 the	metaphysics	 of	 Nietzsche.	 Before	 I	 analyse	 the	 essential	features	 that	 emerged	 from	a	 creative	 practice	 brought	 to	its	logical	conclusion	–	fiction	–,	it	is	important	to	stress	the	formal	 difference	 that	 there	 is	 between	 the	 maxims	
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spanning	 a	 period	 from	 the	 sixteenth	 to	 the	 eighteenth	century,	 and	 the	 aphoristic	 prose	 typical	 of	Nietzsche	 and	Adorno.	 The	 aphoristic	 writing	 of	 the	 Second	 Negation	belongs	 to	 the	 tradition	 of	 the	 latter	 (late	 modern	 or	postmodern	 aphorisms),	 one	 that	 seeks	 fragmentation	 for	fragmentation's	sake,	unlike	earlier	prose	 from	Castiglione	to	Gracián	and	La	Rochefoucauld,	 for	which	 fragmentation	always	works	out	a	totality.		
Creative	writing	and	the	woman	We	 proceed	 to	 analyse	 step-by-step	 the	 substance	 of	 this	Second	Negation.	Poetic	writing	comes	as	a	life	ring	for	who	drowns	 in	an	abyssal	 "lake",	 the	near-homograph	 for	 lack,	i.e.	 the	 hole	 that	 threatens	 to	 engulf	 subjectivity	 at	 the	beginning	 of	 the	 Second	 Negation,	 and	 which	 creative	writing	 seeks	 to	 ward	 off.	 Proof	 is	 the	 unmistakably	melancholic	 constellation	 that	 arises	 from	 the	 first	 pages:	the	 "world	 that	disappeared",	 the	 "abyss	of	Otherness",	 or	the	 "vortex"	and	 the	 "blackout"	 from	which	 the	 "dreamer"	(the	 first	 character	 creative	 writing	 makes	 up)	 never	recovers	 (N2§1-20).	 One	 may	 also	 ponder	 about	 the	signifier	 "freeze",	 another	 running	 metaphor	 (N2§21-27,	§33)	 in	 the	 opening	 pages,	 which	 we	 could	 say	 has	 been	exchanged	for	"frieze".	It	is	not	so	much	the	case	of	a	story	set	 in	 stone,	 but	 one	 that	 has	 simply	 grown	 cold,	 with	
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melancholia	choking	the	life	out	of	substance.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	melancholia	is	indirectly	evoked	in	the	early	reference	to	 Lars	 von	 Trier's	 film	 of	 the	 same	 name	 in	 N2§81,	 and	then	more	directly	 and	 frequently	 as	 the	 text	 comes	 to	 an	end,	 making	 this	 theme	 consciously	 explicit.	 These	descriptions	of	a	sinkhole	that	suddenly	opens	up	under	the	narrator's	feet,	and	the	symbolic	devastation	wreaked	by	it	in	the	guise	of	a	"freeze",	all	find	their	source	in	"Winter",	an	essential	 if	 elusive	 character	 in	 the	 Second	 Negation,	 one	that	 "comes	 and	 ghosts"	 (N2§25)	 and	 is	 incapable	 of	returning	love.	To	thwart	the	onset	of	melancholia,	creative	writing	 triggers	 the	 remembrance	 of	 symbolic	 work	 over	the	 next	 few	 pages:	 "Patience	 is	 an	 art.	 Each	 time	 a	 new	signifier	 comes	 up,	 its	 absence	 too	 must	 be	 registered..."	(N2§44,	see	also	N2§42,	§45,	§47).		 Femininity	 comes	 up	 at	 this	 point	 as	 both	 problem	and	solution	 to	 this	 initial	 situation	of	melancholia:	 "could	this	man	[the	dreamer]	be	Snow	White?"	(N2§27);	 "sexual	difference	 is	 a	 gaze"	 (N2§29).	 This	 link	 is	 essential	 to	 the	conceptual	 journey	 of	 Two	 Negations	 and	 must	 be	 as	explicitly	articulated	as	can	be.	Femininity	raises	a	problem	insofar	as	it	returns	a	"gaze"	–	the	gaze	of	the	sexed	other,	therefore	a	small	other	–	and	 this	gaze	 leads	straight	back	to	the	trauma	of	Winter	previously	encountered:	"he	looks	at	me	like	I'm	a	most	impenetrable	thing;	evil	is	in	his	gaze	
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that	 perceives	 evil	 all	 around	 itself"	 (N2§25).	 And	 it	 is	 a	solution	 inasmuch	 as	 it	 suggests	 material	 for	transformation.	 From	 "Winter"	 back	 to	 "Snow	 White",	creative	writing	from	beginning	to	end	makes	up	not	only	a	woman,	 but	 a	 running	 story	 –	 it	 becomes	 the	 letter	 that	comes	back	alive	from	the	forced	slumber	of	melancholia.			 First,	 this	 woman	 must	 be	 qualified.	 The	remembrance	 of	 symbolic	work	produces	 as	 the	 return	of	the	 repressed	 a	 phallic	 character	 that	 embodies	 the	fragmented	 appearance	 (the	 "City")	 creative	 writing	subsequently	 unravels,	 and	 this	 phallic	 character	 is	 a	woman	 (the	 "Mayer",	 pun	 on	 'mayor').	 This	 means	 that	creative	writing	has	put	 back	 into	play	 the	psychoanalytic	phallus	 ("presence"	 in	 philosophical	 parlance)	 that	 it	 took	away	from	itself	at	the	start	(see	N2§6:	"so	it	turns	out	the	phallus	 is	 only	 one	 signifier	 for	 desire!	 Mountains	 do	 fall	flat!";	 see	also	N2§3,	§8)	and	only	returns	 to	 the	author	at	the	end	 (N2§241-2).	A	number	of	 "girls"	proliferate	 in	 the	shadow	 of	 the	 phallic	 character	 often	 indicated	 by	 an	epithet	 (here	 the	 Mayer,	 later	 the	 Archer).	 These	 are	Daphne,	the	first	of	the	properly	feminine	characters	of	the	text	 as	 she	 is	 referred	 to	by	name,	not	 epithet	 (N2§60-61,	§64,	§72);	the	"mean	girls"	of	N2§74;	Irene	Adler	(N2§109,	a	 reference	 to	 Sherlock	 Holmes);	 and,	 of	 course,	 starting	
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with	N2§77,	 Holly	 (inspired	 by	 the	 character	 of	 Holly	 Go-Lightly	in	Truman	Capote's	Breakfast	at	Tiffany's).			 The	 occurring	 fragmentation	 (in	 comparison	 to	 the	unified	 voice	 of	 the	 First	 Negation)	 means	 that	 every	character	 embodies	 one	 facet	 of	 the	 author	 who	 tries	 to	articulate	 truth	by	turning	to	 these	characters	 for	answers	in	 turn.	 This	 makes	 for	 a	 dialectical	 mediation	 of	 the	content	 that	does	not	arch	back	to	an	overruling	narrative	(say,	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 Hegelian	 source,	 as	 in	 the	 First	Negation).	 Nonetheless,	 the	 first-person	 plural	 (“we”)	functions	 throughout	 the	 text	 exactly	 like	 the	work	 of	 the	Also	 in	 the	 Phenomenology	 that	 is	 discussed	 in	 the	 First	Negation	(N1§10	and	 following).	This	engendering	 in	both	senses	of	the	word	is	a	remarkable	feature	that	justifies	the	question	 of	 sexual	 difference	 in	 the	 aphoristic	 writings	 of	Nietzsche,	 well-known	 for	 its	 recurrent	 and	 often	derogatory	comments	on	women,	 in	Part	2.	And	it	 justifies	the	discussion	of	melancholia	in	the	Freudian	corpus	in	Part	3,	 insofar	as	Lacanians	believe	melancholia	to	be	a	form	of	psychosis,	and	psychosis	is	characterised	by	the	invasion	of	a	 feminine	 Other	 in	 the	 psychic	 life	 of	 the	 patient	 (as	 we	know	 from	 Freud's	 Schreber	 case	 and	 Lacan's	corresponding	seminar	III).		
Creative	writing	and	the	anxiety	of	incarnation	
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The	woman	 is	not	 the	only	 concern	of	 the	 first	half	 of	 the	Second	Negation,	which	also	raises	the	question	of	the	body	in	connection	 to	 language	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	N2§90:	"We	can	never	get	clean.	The	stain	is	always	that	of	language	and	it	 was	 not	 going	 to	 go	 away".	 Interestingly,	 Winter	 –	 the	name	 of	 the	 melancholic	 trapping	 pit	 evoked	 above	 –,	comes	back	just	when	this	problem	of	incarnation	is	raised	(N2§94,	 §95,	 §98).	 In	 order	 to	 circumnavigate	Winter	 the	text	makes	 up	 a	 new	 (male)	 character	 in	 the	 guise	 of	 the	Archer,	 whose	 flying	 arrow	 comes	 in	 the	 place	 of	 the	missing	 link	 between	 the	 symbolic	 work	 that	 has	 taken	place	 in	 the	First	Negation,	 and	 the	 issue	of	 the	body	 that	this	 work	 has	 made	 relevant	 (N2§97-99).	 Indeed,	 the	awareness	 of	 the	 physicality	 of	 human	 existence	 (beyond	mere	 signifiers)	 seems	 to	 involve	 greater	 and	 greater	anxiety	as	the	text	goes	(see	N2§102;	and	N2§107,	"there	is	something	evil	inside	of	us,	it	is	the	dark	core	of	humanity,	the	 land	of	 anonymous	drives	 that	have	been	 cut	 off	 from	the	surface").	This	tension	–	between	the	awareness	of	the	on-going	 work	 of	 the	 signifier	 and	 the	 dangerous	fragmentation	 that	 it	 potentially	 imposes	 upon	 the	 body,	fragmentation	 that	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 aphoristic	 form	 –	 is	remarked	 in	 the	 question	 about	 this	 process	 (N2§112).	 In	retrospect	 this	 question	 should	 be	 called	 the	 phobic	question,	 insofar	 as	 the	 hysteric's	 and	 obsessional's	
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questions	 relate	 more	 directly	 to	 the	 real	 father,	 not	 the	imaginary	 father	 (Mayer)	 or	 symbolic	 father	 that	 cleaves	the	 real	 (the	Archer)	we	 have	 so	 far	 encountered.	We	 are	now	in	a	position	to	qualify	the	enigmatic	presence	of	death	in	 the	 creative	 writing:	 in	 melancholia	 the	 passage	 from	symbolic	 work	 to	 incarnation	 is	 always	 experienced	 as	death.	This	 is	what	we	can	read	 into	the	gory	metaphor	of	the	wolves	at	work	in	N2§130,	beyond	the	veiled	reference	to	the	Freudian	corpus.	Creative	writing	instead	allows	the	author	 to	 question	 and	 defer	 this	 conclusion	 (i.e.	 to	 be	embodied	 is	 to	 be	 dead	 already)	 through	 a	 number	 of	counter-moving	 remarks	 –	 about	 the	 depressive	 mother	(N2§129,	 §213-214,	 §226),	 about	 sexuality	 (N2§124-125),	and	above	all	about	history	(N2§142-144),	as	history	recalls	the	mediation	of	form	through	its	many	self-differentiating	shapes.	 It	 also	 produces	 a	 symptom	 in	 the	 shape	 of	 pop	music	 –	 regularly	 mentioned	 from	 this	 point	 on	 –	 which	perfectly	manifests	 the	difficulty	 to	pass	 from	the	oral	and	the	auditory	(starting	N2§137)	to	the	written	(N2§152).	To	put	 it	 simply,	 this	 difficulty	 stems	 from	 the	 melancholic	impasse	 that	 blocks	 the	 passage	 from	 the	 auditory	 to	 the	written,	or	from	the	dangers	of	organic	life	to	the	protection	that	 symbolic	 life	 affords.	Wholeness	 or	 phallic	 unity	 that	cannot	be	written	in	ink	or	set	in	stone	is	therefore	prey	to	
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partition	 again,	 and	 this	 prospect	 of	 explosion	 generates	intolerable	anxiety	for	the	subject.			 In	the	face	of	this	difficulty	and	the	resulting	textual	fragmentation,	 creative	 writing	 works	 out	 a	 solution	 that	consists	in	shifting	the	danger	of	dismemberment	onto	God,	starting	 the	 movement	 of	 castration	 in	 its	 precise	psychoanalytic	 sense.	 Rather	 than	 the	 anxiety	 –	 and	enjoyment	 –	 of	 dismemberment	 remaining	 whole	 and	suffocating	 for	 the	 subject,	 it	 is	 shifted	 upon	 another	 that	suffers	 for	us,	and	 is	 in	 this	way	mediated.	This	process	 is	made	 explicit	 in	 N2§185:	 "the	 attempt	 at	 taking	 the	contradiction	onto	another	horizon	–	the	redeployment	of	X	and	Y	on	a	different	plane".	No	wonder	the	entry	where	this	shift	 takes	 place	 (N2§153)	 is	 preceded	 by	 numerous	references	to	Christ	–	the	man	who	died	to	redeem	our	lives	according	 to	 the	 Gospel	 –,	 in	 the	 "Main	 Body"	 (N2§127,	§128,	§137,	§152),	as	well	as	questions	about	love	(N2§149,	§151).	Concurrently	with	 the	coalescing	of	 the	 'I'	 from	the	'we'	 (N2§134),	 and	 the	 disappearance	 of	 Holly	 (N2§135),	the	 last	of	 the	 female	 imagoes	 in	 the	Second	Negation,	 the	topology	is	reversed	for	good	as	a	consequence.	The	action	no	 longer	 takes	 place	 in	 the	 "City"	 (i.e.	 the	 "supersensible	world"	 analysed	 in	 the	 First	 Negation,	 N1§24)	 but	 in	 the	"Old	 Town",	 the	 actual	 world	 (N2§148).	 This	 spatial	
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inversion	 leads	 us	 to	 the	 question	 of	 space	 proper	 as	 the	melancholic	impasse	is	being	overcome.		
From	the	discussion	of		"time"	to	that	of	"space"	If	time	features	heavily	in	the	"Main	Body"	(see	for	example	N2§68-69),	 space	 is	 the	 key	 signifier	 of	 the	 second	half	 of	the	 creative	 component.	Why?	 If	 time	 fully	 belongs	 to	 the	work	 of	 the	 signifier,	 in	 particular	 the	 instantiation	 of	 the	master-signifier,	 which	 has	 to	 go	 through	 all	 the	 other	signifiers	 to	 receive	 its	 status	 and	 function,	 a	 move	 that	takes	time,	space	is	the	outcome	of	this	instantiation.	As	the	creative	 component	 rushes	 towards	 an	 ending	 (N2§239-242),	 space	 becomes	 more	 and	 more	 conscious	 –	 the	Second	 Negation's	 first	 two	 caesuras	 fall	 on	 the	 words	"horizon"	 (N2§147)	 and	 "space"	 (N2§184),	 with	 the	metaphor	 of	 space,	 spaceships,	 planets	 and	 planetary	systems	 abounding	 (N2§171,	 §172,	 §175,	 §178).	 The	excursion	on	the	history	of	Renaissance	painting	(N2§158)	also	 illustrates	 this	 shift	 towards	 space,	 as	 it	 marks	 the	irruption	 of	 space	 in	 art,	 from	 Alberti's	 theorisation	 of	perspective	in	De	Pictura	 to	its	application	in	the	paintings	of	 Paolo	 Uccello	 and	 Piero	 della	 Francesca	 among	 others.	The	 work	 of	 the	 signifier	 reaches	 its	 completion	 when	moments	 of	 stillness,	 chunks	 of	 time	 we	 could	 say,	 are	singled	 out,	 such	 as	 in	 entry	 N2§159.	 A	 number	 of	
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consequences	follow	from	the	setting	up	of	time	and	space	as	a	priori	conditions	of	discourse,	including	the	emergence	of	1)	 the	object	 (extensively	discussed	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	N2§160)	 2)	 the	 proper	 name	 (N2§161),	 and	 3)	 the	
sinthome,	or	 the	articulation	of	enjoyment	in	 language	that	is	 also	 evoked	 for	 the	 first	 time	 (N2§165).	 The	fragmentation	experienced	in	the	First	Negation	kept	these	
a	priori	 conditions	 from	coming	 to	 light.	Perhaps	 the	most	radical	 idea	 to	 draw	 from	 Hegel	 and	 psychoanalysis	 is	therefore	not	that	the	world	is	structured	by	language,	but	that	 this	very	 fact	can	remain	unconscious	and	fall	prey	to	forgetfulness.		 	
Creative	writing	as	reflection	of	psychoanalytic	work	In	 N2§166,	 the	 very	 philosophical	 language	 of	phenomenology	 that	 characterised	 the	 First	 Negation	 not	only	 forcefully	 returns,	 but	 is	 immediately	 applied	 to	 a	discussion	of	female	singers.	What	to	make	of	it?	Clearly,	in	this	 passage	 the	 question	 about	 Being	 transforms	 into	 a	question	 about	 femininity.	 It	 is	 this	 question	 in	 particular	that	is	acknowledged	in	the	"Conclusion"	as	the	productive	limit	of	the	entire	piece	–	limit	in	the	sense	that	the	creative	piece	 does	 not	 go	 beyond	 it,	 and	 productive	 in	 the	 sense	that	 this	 question	 allows	 a	 number	 of	 conclusions	 to	 be	reached	with	regards	to	Being	(N2§239).	I	will	turn	to	these	
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conclusions	 further	down.	For	now,	 let	us	 take	note	of	 the	several	 moves	 that	 we	 see	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 text:	 with	regards	 to	 God	 –	 the	 Law	 –	 we	 pass	 from	 an	 attitude	 of	defiance	 (N2§153)	 to	 one	 of	 caution	 and	 curiosity	(N2§175).	We	 also	 pass	 from	 imaginary	 identifications	 to	women	(we	recall	the	multiple	female	imagoes	of	the	"Main	Body")	 to	 a	 symbolic	 identification	 one	 could	 qualify	 as	feminine,	 that	 is	 to	 say	 identification	 to	 a	 certain	 position	within	 the	 symbolic	 order	 (N2§177).	 Lacan's	 descriptions	of	a	totality	that	never	fully	comes	together	and	always	goes	beyond,	 in	 contrast	 to	 one	 that	 is	 founded	 upon	 an	exception	and	always	 sticks	 to	 it,	 here	 come	back	 to	mind	(1975).	 But	 the	 contrast	 between	masculine	 and	 feminine	
jouissance	 the	 text	 keeps	 coming	 back	 to,	 especially	 in	N2§166,	 is	 perhaps	 best	 understood	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	mystical	 enjoyment	 later	 evoked	–	when	 the	 lack	of	Being	that	 drives	 the	 Second	 Negation	 eventually	 returns	 a	surplus	 enjoyment	 in	 the	 shape	 described	 in	 N2§201,	whereas	masculine	jouissance	is	characterised	by	a	form	of	certainty	that	would	have	prevented	enjoyment	from	taking	this	road.	I	address	this	feature	in	Part	2	of	the	commentary	via	 Derrida,	 who	 explicitly	 raised	 the	 question	 of	 the	femininity	of	Nietzsche's	style.		 Furthermore,	death	is	no	longer	this	lurking	abstract	negativity	of	 the	beginning,	 it	 is	 instead	 re-included	 in	 the	
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"individual	myth	of	 the	neurotic"	(Lacan),	 in	connection	to	the	paternal	stand-in	that	Winter	in	fact	was	(see	N2§179-180).	 These	 are	 but	 examples	 of	 how	 the	master-signifier	that	 arises	 from	 psychoanalytic	 work	 refashions	 old	material	and	re-qualifies	the	impasses	the	subject	was	once	trapped	 in,	 and	 how	 the	 creative	 writing	 reflects	 these	shifts.	 These	 impasses	 –	 fetishism,	 nihilism,	melancholia	 –	are	 clearly	 diagnosed	 and	 analysed	 in	 the	 reflective	commentary,	along	with	the	role	of	creative	writing,	in	Part	2	&	3.			 Moving	on,	the	metaphor	of	the	record	(in	the	sense	of	copy	and	archive	as	well	as	disc)	that	pops	up	regularly	throughout	the	Second	Negation	(see	N2§182	for	example:	"As	 far	 as	 I	 am	 concerned,	 a	 song	 came	 out	 and	we	 sang	along;	 after	 listening	 to	 many	 thousands,	 a	 record	 was	compiled")	 is	 an	 arresting	 one	 in	 the	 context	 of	psychoanalysis:	 subjectivity	 duplicates	 signifying	occurrences	 to	 mediate	 them.	 It	 is	 no	 wonder	 that	 the	question	 of	 the	 drive	 comes	 up	 at	 this	 point	 in	 the	 text.	Interestingly	 enough,	 the	 signifier	 'science'	 takes	 over	'space'	 as	 the	 predominant	 term	 in	 the	 next	 twenty	 or	 so	entries.	 If	 Science	 refashions	 the	 real	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	question	 (see	 N2§239,	 Science	 "does	 not	 add	 anything	 to	the	content	but	merely	packs	and	unpacks	substance	in	and	out	of	smaller	and	larger	boxes"),	 it	 is	bound	to	receive	an	
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answer	 from	 the	 real	 (see	 the	 evocation	 of	 Heisenberg's	uncertainty	 principle	 in	 N2§209,	 or	 observer	 effect	 –	 the	idea	that	study	has	effects	on	the	object	under	study).	Along	with	'science'	and	the	signifier	'fantasy',	logically	appearing	as	 the	 suture	 of	 subjectivity	 (N2§229,	 §233),	 one	 of	 the	notable	 novelties	 of	 the	 final	 entries	 is	 the	 passage	 from	singularity	to	particularity	that	is	manifest	in	the	case	study	of	 the	author's	 illness	 in	the	"Postface"	(N2§213-227).	The	psychoanalytic	 transference	 that	 made	 possible	 this	 case	study	 is	 also	 apparent	 in	 the	 final	 pages	 (see	 for	 example	N2§222:	 "You	 kept	 your	 eyes	 on	 me,	 did	 you	 notice	 the	master	 sitting	 across	 the	 room?	 The	 couturier	 behind	 the	scenes...	 Or	 perhaps	 he	 was	 himself	 all	 just	 a	 show!";	 see	also	 N2§236,	 §238).	 If	 the	 conclusions	 of	 psychoanalytic	work	 also	 transpires	 in	 the	 reflective	 commentary,	transference	 as	 such	 is	 not	 explored,	 and	 for	 a	 reason.	 If,	according	to	Lacan,	transference	is	established	on	the	basis	of	the	deferment	of	traditional	knowledge	(embodied	in	the	discourse	of	the	university)	in	and	by	the	subject-supposed-to-know	(the	analyst),	then	the	discussion	of	transference	is	logically	 out	 of	 place	 in	 the	 academic	 setting	 (and	 this	thesis)	 –	 it	 belongs	 to	 a	 clinical	discussion.	 This	 limit,	 and	the	 problems	 that	 surround	 it,	 are	 nonetheless	acknowledged	in	the	final	part	of	the	reflective	commentary	(on	pages	313-5).	
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Unpacking	the	"Conclusion"	The	 "Conclusion"	 (and	 "Bonus",	 N2§239-242)	 deserves	special	 attention.	 It	 turns	 around	 four	 terms	 inspired	 by	Alain	 Badiou's	 work:	 Science,	 Politics,	 Art	 and	 Love,	 or	Absolute	Knowing.	Each	of	these	terms	calls	for	another	in	a	chain	that	needs	all	four.	Science	can	do	its	work	of	analysis	for	as	 long	as	Politics	creates	contention	 in	the	field	of	 the	Other,	this	contention	calling	for	a	suture	called	Art.	Love	is	the	passive	 inverse	of	 these	active	elements,	 in	a	way	 love	registers	 them.	 As	 to	 Absolute	 Knowing,	 it	 is	 the	 Also	evoked	 in	 the	 First	 Negation	 that	 does	 the	 work	 of	registration	 just	mentioned.	 The	 "Conclusion"	 then	moves	over	to	the	master-slave	relationship	that	is	constitutive	of	language	 (N2§240).	 This	 is	 another	 Hegelian	 trait,	 insofar	as	Hegel	was	the	first	(and	arguably	the	last,	if	one	excludes	Freud)	 to	 inscribe	 the	 lordship	 and	 bondage	 relationship	right	at	the	heart	of	modern	metaphysics.	Before	Hegel,	this	relationship	was	 obfuscated	 in	 the	 articulation	 of	 a	 sticky	mediating	 third,	 whether	 it	 is	 in	 the	 shape	 of	 God	(Descartes,	 Malebranche),	 positive	 law	 (Locke),	 or	 the	antinomies	of	pure	reason	that	produces	a	Thing-in-itself	as	limit	 to	what	can	be	known	(Kant),	 the	 last	stage	of	denial	for	Hegel	 (again,	 "we	must	 eliminate	 the	 sensuous	 idea	 of	fixing	the	differences	in	a	different	sustaining	element",	see	
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the	Phenomenology,	§160).	We	could	therefore	say	that	Two	
Negations	 is	 a	 repetition	 of	 Hegel's	 gist	 if	 formally	 in	 the	shape	 of	 Nietzschean	 fragments,	 insofar	 as	 the	 woman	appears	 as	 a	 vanishing	mediator	of	 the	 Idea	 (emphasis	on	
vanishing),	 and	 not	 the	 reassertion	 of	 just	 this	 sticky	mediating	 third	 or	 "different	 sustaining	 element"	 that	plagues	 most	 philosophical	 constructions	 after	 Hegel	 –	especially	 Nietzsche's	 philosophy,	 or	 so	 I	 argue	 in	 the	commentary.	 Instead,	 the	 alienation	 constitutive	 of	language	 has	 been	 returned	 to	 the	 original	 situation	 of	modern	 philosophy	 that	 is	 alienated	 in,	 and	 seeks	 to	 free	itself	from,	the	discourse	of	university.	It	is	this	antagonism	that	unites	in	a	single	thread	the	figure	of	the	analyst	laying	aside	 traditional	knowledge,	 the	French	moralists'	 stylistic	freedom,	 and	 the	 Hegelian	 Sittlichkeit,	 which	 is	 a	 purely	
formal	 model	 of	 ethics	 made	 up	 of	 rights,	 unlike	 the	substantial	Moralität	 full	of	questions	and	duties	that	Kant	develops	 in	 the	 second	Critique.	This	point	 is	not	only	 the	conceptual	bone	of	the	creative	piece,	 it	 is	also	the	tension	that	 the	 commentary	 seeks	 to	 lay	 bare.	 How?	 By	 treating	the	 fragmentation	 of	 self-reflection	 that	 forcefully	 returns	unresolved	 in	 N2§241	 ("glass	 pain")	 and	 §242	(psychoanalytical	concepts	are	brushed	away	to	give	space	to	 "self-reflection"	 in	 the	 second	 paragraph)	 as	 a	productive,	 not	 negative,	 force.	 Being	 faithful	 to	 that	
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dualism	 that	 splits	 one	 into	 two	without	 progressing	 to	 a	synthesis	 not	 only	means	 not	 going	 for	 the	 easy	 symbolic	solution	 that	 erases	 it,	 but	 unravelling	 this	 very	fundamental	contradiction	in	the	symbolic	order	that	is	the	specifically	Lacanian	Real	to	its	logical	end.	I	try	to	do	so	as	I	explore	 first	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 the	 philosophical	 form	from	 the	 French	moralists	 to	 Nietzsche	 (Part	 1);	 then	 the	examination	of	the	course	this	fragmentation	takes	(poetry,	femininity,	 the	 state)	 in	 Nietzsche	 and	 Hegel	 according	 to	Derrida	 (Part	 2);	 and	 finally	 fragmentation	 as	 the	impossibility	of	 firm	 imaginary	 identifications	 in	 the	wake	of	the	French	Revolution	(Part	3).			
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PART	 1.	 The	 Traps	 of	 Analogy:	 Pippin,	
Nietzsche	and	the	French	Moralists	
		 For	 let	 a	man	 look	 carefully	 into	all	 that	variety	of	books	with	which	the	arts	and	sciences	abound,	he	will	 find	 everywhere	 endless	 repetitions	 of	 the	same	thing,	varying	in	the	method	of	treatment,	but	not	 new	 in	 substance,	 insomuch	 that	 the	 whole	stock,	numerous	as	 it	 appears	at	 first	view,	proves	on	 examination	 to	 be	 but	 scanty.	And	 for	 its	 value	and	 utility	 it	 must	 be	 plainly	 avowed	 that	 that	wisdom	which	we	have	derived	principally	from	the	Greeks	 is	 but	 like	 the	 boyhood	 of	 knowledge,	 and	has	 the	 characteristic	property	of	boys:	 it	 can	 talk,	but	 it	 cannot	 generate;	 for	 it	 is	 fruitful	 of	controversies	but	barren	of	works.	So	that	the	state	of	learning	as	it	now	is	appears	to	be	represented	to	the	life	 in	the	old	fable	of	Scylla,	who	had	the	head	and	face	of	a	virgin,	but	her	womb	was	hung	round	with	 barking	 monsters,	 from	 which	 she	 could	 not	be	delivered.	 –Francis	Bacon,	Instauration	Magna		IN	 October	 and	 November	 2004,	 well-known	 American	Hegel	scholar	Robert	Pippin	delivered	a	series	of	lectures	at	
	 208	
the	 prestigious	 Collège	 de	 France	 on	 the	 subject	 of	Nietzsche	and	the	French	moralists.	The	text	extracted	from	these	lectures	gave	birth	to	a	book	first	published	in	French	under	the	title	Nietzsche,	moraliste	français	 (2006)	with	an	introduction	by	Marc	Fumaroli	of	 the	Académie	Française,	another	 French	 institution	 all	 by	 himself.	 The	 book	 was	eventually	 translated	 into	 English	 four	 years	 later	 and	published	by	the	University	of	Chicago	Press	(2010)	with	a	brand	new	title:	Nietzsche,	Psychology,	and	First	Philosophy.	Almost	 simultaneously	 yet	 another	 distinguished	 Hegel	scholar,	 Robert	 Solomon,	 published	 Living	with	 Nietzsche:	
What	 the	 Great	 "Immoralist"	 Has	 to	 Teach	 Us	 (2006),	collecting	 in	 a	 single	 book	 all	 the	 interventions	 he	 made	about	the	German	philosopher	throughout	his	career.	It	was	a	 typical	 synthesis	 of	 the	 current	 debates,	 painting	Nietzsche	as	half	a	serious	philosopher,	 the	man	of	"moral	perspectivism"	 and	 the	 genealogical	 method;	 and	 half	 the	joker	 and	 Provençal	 troubadour,	 dealing	 "affirmative	ethics"	 in	 highly	 stylised	 prose	 and	 a	 few	 poems.	 Pippin	crystallised	 this	 view	 into	 a	 simple	 equation	 of	 terms:	Nietzsche	 equals	 French	moralists	 equals	 psychologist.	 To	make	 his	 case,	 the	 author	 of	 Nietzsche,	 moraliste	 français	reminds	us	 that	 the	German	philosopher	 first	 paid	 tribute	to	 the	 "French	masters	 of	 psychology"	 (HTH,	 §36),	 before	supplanting	them	ten	years	later:	"before	me,	there	was	no	
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psychology	 at	 all"	 (EH,	 IV,	 §6).	Between	 these	 two	quotes,	Pippin	etches	out	a	trajectory	that	starts	with	"the	cynicism	of	La	Rochefoucauld	and	the	despair	of	Pascal"	(2006,	110),	and	 ends	with	 life	 understood	 as	Will	 to	Power	 (Wille	zur	
Macht)	 against	 the	 reactive	 nature	 of	 (Christian)	morality.	Pippin	 eventually	 uncovers	 a	 Montanian	 Nietzsche,	 the	Nietzsche	 of	 The	 Gay	 Science,	 whose	 concern	 is	 "to	acclimatise	oneself	on	Earth"	(UM,	III,	2);	except	that,	unlike	Montaigne,	 says	Pippin,	Nietzsche	was	not	 able	 to	 find	his	footing	on	Earth	in	the	end	(2006,	IV).	Insofar	as	the	French	moralists	 –	 Pippin	 explicitly	 mentions	 without	 further	discussion,	 Montaigne,	 Pascal,	 La	 Rochefoucauld,	Vauvenargue,	Chamfort,	Fontenelle	and	the	late-nineteenth	century	 psychologist	 Bourget	 –	 embodied	 for	 Nietzsche	psychological	 insight	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 metaphysical	idealism	 he	 railed	 against	 (see	 for	 example	 Nietzsche's	attacks	on	Descartes,	GS,	§357;	BGE,	§16-7),	Pippin	does	not	believe	 it	necessary	 to	question	 further	 the	second	part	of	his	equation	(French	moralists	equals	psychologist).		 Pippin's	 discursive	 method	 is	 clearly	 analogical:	 in	order	 to	 explain	what	makes	 the	 originality	 of	Nietzsche's	writings	at	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century	–	a	time	when,	this	 is	 no	 coincidence,	 the	 Humboldtian	 reform	 of	 higher	education	 was	 in	 full	 swing	 –,	 he	 seeks	 to	 establish	comparisons	 between	 Nietzsche	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 a	
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number	 of	 mainly	 French	 nonfiction	 authors	 of	 the	sixteenth	 and	 seventeenth	 centuries	 on	 the	 other,	 the	 so-called	 French	 moralists.	 I	 argue	 in	 this	 essay	 that	 this	analogical	 method	 is	 risky	 and	 produces	 several	 serious	misinterpretations	 as	 a	 result.	 To	make	my	 case,	 I	 aim	 to	take	 the	 long	hard	 road	 into	 the	 content,	 first	 through	 the	shift	in	Nietzschean	studies	that	led	to	the	Pippin	equation,	and	the	basis	for	it	in	Nietzsche's	own	writings.	Against	the	restored	 background	 of	 both	 Nietzsche's	 corpus	 and	Pippin's	 book,	 I	 then	 proceed	 to	 show	 how	 damaging	 the	analogical	method	can	be	 for	both	1)	 the	understanding	 of	historical	 eras	 as	 different	 as	 the	 French	 classical	 age	 (for	the	purpose	of	this	introduction,	more	or	less	the	reigns	of	Kings	Louis	XIII	and	Louis	XIV)	and	Bismarckian	Germany,	as	well	as	for	2)	the	object	of	study	at	the	centre	of	Pippin's	French	moralist	analogy,	Friedrich	Nietzsche.		 	
The	new	Nietzsche	The	exceptional	setting	of	Pippin's	analogical	interpretation	cannot	 but	 appear	 as	 the	 triumph	 of	 a	 long	 evolution	 in	Nietzschean	studies,	one	that	ultimately	began	in	France	in	the	 1960s.	 Until	 then,	 Heidegger's	 monumental	 study	devoted	 to	 Nietzsche	 (the	 longest	 of	 the	 studies	 he	 has	devoted	 to	 philosophers)	 defined	 Nietzsche	 as	 the	metaphysical	 thinker	 of	 the	 eternal	 return	 (Lacoue-
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Labarthe	 1979).	 In	 the	 summer	 of	 1972,	 a	 conference	entitled	"Nietzsche	Today"	took	place	at	the	Château	Cérisy,	then	 and	 now	 a	well-known	 cultural	 centre	 in	Normandy,	and	gathered	the	best	of	the	French	intellectual	scene	at	the	time:	 Deleuze	 and	 Derrida	 were	 attending,	 and	 so	 were	Klossowski,	 Lyotard,	 Lacoue-Labarthe,	 Nancy,	 and	Nietzsche	 scholars	 Kofman	 and	 Pautrat.	 The	 Cérisy	Conference	 is	 a	 watershed	 moment	 in	 the	 history	 of	Nietzschean	studies	–	to	the	extent	that	it	was	the	focus	of	a	recent	 study	 published	 in	 Germany	 –,	 because	 the	participants	 fell	 into	 two	enduring	 camps,	 on	 the	one	 side	Heideggerians	interested	in	the	ontological	consequences	of	Nietzsche,	 the	 first	 among	 them	 being	 Gilles	 Deleuze.	 We	recall	 the	 Deleuzian	 project	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 situating	 the	argument:	 "the	 project	 of	 Nietzsche	 broadly	 consists	 in	introducing	 the	 concepts	 of	 meaning	 (sens)	 and	 value	 in	philosophy"	 (2010).	 Deleuze	 then	 examined	 the	 role	 of	reaction	in	Nietzsche's	analyses,	linking	it	to	the	question	of	the	 will	 to	 power.	 And	 to	 these	 Heideggerian	 tropes,	Deleuze	added	the	analysis	of	forces	that	came	up	again	in	his	 work	 on	 Michel	 Foucault	 (2004).	 This	 reading,	originating	 in	 another	 important	 Nietzsche	 conference	 in	France	 (the	 Royaumont	 conference	 in	 1964)	 proved	decisive	 in	 the	 years	 to	 come	 for	 the	 reactivation	 of	 the	
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genealogical	 method	 in	 the	 social	 sciences,	 if	 only	 in	 the	shape	of	the	Foucaultian	project	(see	Foucault	1977).		 On	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 divide	 stood	 a	 number	 of	young	Nietzsche	scholars	–	Sarah	Kofman,	Bernard	Pautrat,	Philippe	 Lacoue-Labarthe,	 Jean-Michel	 Rey	 –	 gathered	around	Jacques	Derrida.	They	all	shared	the	belief	that	one	had	 to	 return	 to	 the	 initial	 gist	 of	 Nietzschean	 thought,	namely	 the	 fundamental	 distrust	 of	 language	 and	 its	operations	 that	 was	 front	 and	 centre	 of	 Nietzsche's	 early	efforts,	 e.g.	 the	 argument	 for	 the	 Presocratics	 against	 the	dialectic	in	The	Birth	of	Tragedy	published	in	1872,	and	the	explicit	remarks	on	language	and	meaning	in	essays	such	as	"Truth	 and	 Lie	 in	 an	 Extra-moral	 Sense"	 written	 a	 year	later.	From	this	new	generation	of	scholars	emerged	a	more	aerial	 Nietzsche,	 one	 that	 sharply	 contrasted	 with,	 and	eventually	outmoded,	the	Heideggerian	bent	in	Nietzschean	studies.	 In	 the	 following	 years,	 a	 number	 of	 interventions	and	books	served	as	relay	in	the	American	academia	of	the	new	 French	 interpretation	 –	we	 could	 cite	 David	 Allison's	collection	of	translated	essays	from	the	Cérisy	participants	in	The	New	Nietzsche:	Contemporary	Styles	of	Interpretation	as	one	of	the	earliest	(1985).			
Nietzsche	and	the	aphorism	
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If	this	essay	is	not	the	place	to	explore	and	assess	what	we	could	 call	 the	 Derridean	 Nietzsche	 (I	 follow	 this	 lead	 up	with	a	second	essay	devoted	to	this	subject),	our	excursion	into	 the	history	of	Nietzschean	studies	 is	no	excursus	as	 it	helps	 trace	 the	 interest	 in	 Nietzsche's	 widespread	 use	 of	aphorisms	 back	 to	 the	 disjunction	 around	 the	 time	 of	 the	Cérisy	 conference.	 We	 start	 out	 by	 examining	 the	contemporary	 secondary	 literature	 on	 the	 subject	 of	aphorisms,	which	is	like	the	negative	of	the	Pippin	equation,	before	circling	back	to	our	main	object.		 In	the	wake	of	Pippin's	book,	we	have	seen	a	number	of	 works	 devoted	 to	 Nietzsche's	 aphoristic	 writings,	 not	always	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 French	 moralists	 –	 we	 can	 cite	among	others,	Kremer-Marietti	 (2007),	Westerdale	 (2013)	and	 Canstancio	 and	 Branco	 (2011,	 2012).	 These	 authors	have	been	keen	 to	 stress	 that	 the	aphorism,	 in	 contrast	 to	the	more	traditional	treatise	or	essay,	is	a	short	text	with	a	high	 density	 of	 meanings.	 Nietzsche	 says	 it	 best	 apropos	Horatian	ode	 in	Twilight	of	the	Idols:	 "this	minimum	in	 the	extent	and	number	of	the	signs,	and	the	maximum	thereby	attained	in	the	energy	of	the	signs"	(TI,	"What	I	Owe	to	the	Ancients",	 §1).	 The	 significance	 of	 the	 aphoristic	 form	 in	Nietzsche's	discursive	strategy	is	on	show	in	the	preface	to	
Beyond	 Good	 &	 Evil:	 "it	 is	 not	 enough	 for	 style	 to	 craft	aphorisms,	the	form	also	begs	an	interpretative	art	[on	the	
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part	 of	 the	 reader]"(§8).	 Simply	 put,	 Nietzsche	 seeks	 to	challenge	his	readership	by	complicating	the	picture	rather	than	working	out	 a	 common	 framework.	 Such	a	definition	agrees	with	 the	 immediate	 impression	 the	modern	 reader	gets	 from	 reading	 Nietzsche,	 namely	 that	 there	 is	 a	 fair	amount	 of	 provocation	 in	 his	 writings.	 Which	 makes	 the	project	 of	Angèle	Kremer-Marietti	 very	 strange,	 to	 say	 the	least.	 In	 her	 Nietzsche	 et	 la	 rhétorique	 (2007),	 Kremer-Marietti	 is	 intent	 on	 establishing	 a	 strict	 analogy	 between	Nietzsche	 and	 the	 classical	 rhetoric.	 Invoking	 Aristotle's	rhetoric,	 Kremer-Marietti	 describes	 a	 relation	 between	three	terms:	the	one	who	speaks	(proving	one's	ethos),	the	one	 to	whom	one	 speaks	 (testing	 the	 other's	pathos),	 and	the	discourse	understood	as	the	mediation	of	the	desire	of	the	 orator	 (the	 progress	 of	 logos).	 Situating	 him	 in	 this	triangle,	 she	 sees	 Nietzsche	 bent	 on	 denouncing	 the	artificiality	 of	 discourse	 by	 revealing	 the	 arbitrary	metaphoric	 process	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 truth.	 The	 problem	 is,	Kremer-Marietti	means	to	have	it	both	ways:	Nietzsche	the	young	philologist	 teaches	us	about	the	classical	rhetoric	of	the	Greeks	when	his	writings	 take	 the	shape	of	aphorisms	designed	 to	 stir;	 and	 Nietzsche	 the	 mature	 philosopher	reduces	 the	 metaphysical	 discourse	 to	 a	 rhetorical	 effort	unaware	of	 itself:	he	 thus	appears	as	a	 forerunner	of	 such	philosophers	as	Wittgenstein,	Bolzano,	Brentano	and,	more	
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generally	 speaking,	 the	 linguistic	 turn	 in	 philosophy.	 Alas,	this	 argument	only	holds	water	against	 the	background	of	the	young	Nietzsche,	the	Hellenistic	scholar	and	admirer	of	Schopenhauer	 and	Wagner.	 It	 goes	 against	 everything	one	can	read	in	Nietzsche's	works	from	Human,	All	Too	Human	onwards,	 from	 the	 rejection	 of	 his	 early	 writings	 to	 his	interest	 in	 French	 civilisation,	 to	 the	 theme	 of	 reaction	 in	late	modernity,	to	the	concern	with	passions	and	drives,	the	genealogical	method,	etc.	In	The	Gay	Science,	we	read:		
Esprit	 Un-Grecian.	 The	 Greeks	 were	exceedingly	 logical	 and	 plain	 in	 all	 their	thinking;	 they	 did	 not	 get	 tired	 of	 it,	 at	 least	during	 their	 long	 flourishing	 period,	 as	 is	 so	often	 the	 case	 with	 the	 French;	 who	 too	willingly	 made	 a	 little	 excursion	 into	 the	opposite,	 and	 in	 fact	 endure	 the	 spirit	of	 logic	only	when	 it	 betrays	 its	 sociable	 courtesy,	 its	sociable	 self-renunciation,	 by	 a	 multitude	 of	such	 little	 excursions	 into	 its	 opposite.	 Logic	appears	 to	 them	 as	 necessary	 as	 bread	 and	water,	 but	 also	 like	 these	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 prison-fare,	 as	 soon	 as	 it	 is	 to	 be	 taken	 pure	 and	 by	itself.	 In	good	society	one	must	never	want	 to	be	in	the	right	absolutely	and	solely,	as	all	pure	logic	 requires;	 hence	 the	 little	 dose	 of	
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irrationality	 in	 all	 French	 esprit.	 The	 social	sense	 of	 the	 Greeks	 was	 far	 less	 developed	than	that	of	 the	French	 in	 the	present	and	the	past;	 hence,	 so	 little	 esprit	 in	 their	 cleverest	men,	 hence,	 so	 little	 wit,	 even	 in	 their	 wags,	hence	-	alas!	But	people	will	not	readily	believe	these	tenets	of	mine,	and	how	much	of	the	kind	I	 have	 still	 on	my	 soul!	 -	Est	res	magna	tacere	says	 Martial,	 like	 all	 garrulous	 people.	 (GS,	§82)		Passages	such	as	this	one	come	in	spades	in	the	middle	and	late	 Nietzsche,	 and	 make	 it	 very	 difficult	 to	 argue	 that	Nietzsche	writes	serious	works	of	philology.	Yes,	Nietzsche	praises	a	Latin	poet	such	as	Horace	as	late	in	his	career	as	in	
Twilight	 of	 the	 Idols,	 but	 it	 is	 to	 write	 about	 the	poetical/stylistic	process,	not	the	philological/rhetorical.		 By	 contrast,	 the	 title	 of	 Westerdale's	 book,	
Nietzsche's	 Aphoristic	 Challenge	 (2013),	 strikes	 closer	 to	home.	The	originality	of	Westerdale's	 thesis	 in	 the	 rapidly	crowding	field	of	Nietzschean	aphoristic	studies	consists	in	distinguishing	 the	 German	 aphorism	 from	 its	 French	counterpart,	 and	 anchoring	 Nietzsche	 solidly	 in	 the	tradition	 of	 the	 former.	Westerdale	 first	 remarks	 that	 the	aphorism	as	a	concept	covers	a	wealth	of	forms	that	needs	to	 be	 unpacked.	 He	 builds	 on	 Nietzsche	 himself,	 who	
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opposes	the	Sentenz	–	 i.e.	 the	French	sentences	or	maximes	best	 exemplified	 by	 La	 Rochefoucauld's	 famously	 short	aphorisms	 –	 to	 the	 (German)	 Aphorismus	 (WS,	 §109).	Westerdale	 asserts	 that	 "whereas	 the	 French	 aphorism,	with	its	closed	and	considered	form,	presents	its	knowledge	as	 a	 definitive	 certainty,	 the	 German	 aphorism	 offers	 a	provocation	 to	 further	 discussion	 and	 dispute"	 (2013).	According	 to	 him,	 the	 German	 aphorism	 originates	 in	 the	hard	 sciences	 and	 finds	 its	 greatest	 expression	 in	eighteenth	 century	 scientist	 Lichtenberg's	 posthumous	
Sudelbücher	 (The	 Wastebook,	 2000).	 A	 taste	 of	Lichtenberg's	prose	is	in	order:		 We	often	have	need	of	 a	profound	philosophy	to	restore	to	our	feelings	their	original	state	of	innocence,	to	find	our	way	out	of	the	rubble	of	things	alien	to	us,	to	begin	to	feel	for	ourselves	and	to	speak	for	ourselves,	and	I	might	almost	say	 to	 exist	 ourselves.	 Even	 if	 my	 philosophy	does	not	extend	to	discovering	anything	new,	it	does	 nevertheless	 possess	 the	 courage	 to	regard	 as	 questionable	 what	 has	 long	 been	thought	true.	(2000)		Lichtenberg's	 style	 is	 here	 uncannily	 close	 to	 Nietzsche's	and	 well	 illustrates	 the	 more	 conversational	 nature	 that	
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Westerdale	 believes	 is	 characteristic	 of	 the	 German	aphorism.	 By	 contrast,	 the	 best	 aphorisms	 of	 the	 Grand	
Siècle	 (seventeenth	 century	 in	 France)	 seem	 either	 more	definitive,	 or	 more	 poetic	 in	 nature	 insofar	 as	 they	 more	readily	rely	on	stylistic	devices.	Let	me	suggest	this	one	by	La	Rochefoucauld:		 Silence	 is	 the	 safest	 course	 for	 any	 man	 to	adopt	 who	 does	 not	 place	 trust	 in	 himself.	(1976,	my	translation)			Or	this	one	by	La	Bruyère:		 The	 court	 is	 like	 a	 palace	 built	 of	 marble;	 I	mean	that	 it	 is	made	up	of	very	hard	but	very	polished	people.	(1975,	my	translation)		 	The	problem	with	this	neat	argument	is	that	only	a	cursory	look	 at	 Lichtenberg's	 very	 varied	 production	 is	 enough	 to	show	 that	 such	 a	 distinction	 between	 French	 and	German	can	easily	be	blurred	again.	Consider	this	aphorism:		 The	 journalists	 have	 constructed	 for	themselves	a	 little	wooden	chapel,	which	 they	also	call	the	Temple	of	Fame,	in	which	they	put	up	 and	 take	 down	 portraits	 all	 day	 long	 and	
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make	 such	 a	 hammering	 you	 can't	 hear	yourself	speak.	(Lichtenberg	2000)		This	aphorism	is	a	conceit	as	snappy	and	mean	as	anything	written	 by	 La	 Bruyère.	 And	 Westerdale	 struggles	 to	mention,	 let	 alone	 quote,	 other	 German	 authors	 of	aphorisms	 apart	 from	 Lichtenberg.	 It	 is	 a	 shame,	 for	Goethe's	 aphorisms,	 which	 range	 from	 highly	 metaphoric	one-liners	to	the	kind	of	gratuitous	statements	that	abound	in	Nietzsche's	aphoristic	books,	would	have	greatly	 fuelled	his	argument.	Here	are	two	examples:		 The	world	is	a	bell	with	a	crack	in	it;	it	rattles,	but	does	not	ring.	(Goethe	2010,	§158)		Of	 all	 peoples,	 the	 Greeks	 have	 dreamt	 the	dream	of	life	the	best.	(Goethe	2010,	§189)		If	Westerdale	 fails	 to	mention	 further	examples	of	authors	in	the	"German	aphoristic	tradition,"	Donnellan	does	cite,	in	his	Nietzsche	and	the	French	(1982),	two	early	seventeenth	century	 German	 mystical	 poets,	 Friedrich	 von	 Logau	 and	Angelus	 Silesius.	 Both	 men	 wrote	 mystical	 poems	 –	 true,	
short	 poems,	 often	 epigrams	 –	 more	 in	 the	 vein	 of	 the	Metaphysical	 Poets	 of	 the	 Jacobean	 era	 than	 anything	 by	
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Goethe	 and	 Lichtenberg.	 Consider	 the	 following	 stanza	 by	Silesius:		 Christian,	dost	thou	demand	to	know			Where	God	hath	set	His	Throne?	Even	there	within	thyself,	where	He			Gives	birth	to	thee,	His	Son.	(1932,	V)		Donnellan	also	cites	in	the	same	breath	German	Romantics	Novalis	 and	 Schlegel,	 as	 well	 as	 Friedrich	 Rückert.	 The	latter	 is	a	minor	mid-nineteenth-century	German	poet	and	professor	 of	 oriental	 languages.	 Nietzsche	 never	mentions	him,	at	least	as	far	as	I	am	aware.	And	there	is	no	doubt	that	German	Romanticism	–	Schiller,	Lessing,	Schlegel,	Novalis	–	largely	 influenced	 Nietsche,	 in	 particular	 Novalis,	 but	 this	does	not	have	much	to	do	with	the	aphoristic	form.	So	that	the	German	aphoristic	 tradition	really	comes	down	to	 two	names:	 Lichtenberg	 and	 Goethe.	 And,	 unfortunately,	Westerdale	 fails	 to	 recall	 the	 context	 of	 this	 "German	aphoristic	 tradition",	 which	 is	 not	 just	 the	 Aufklärung	 in	Germany	 but	 also	 the	Encyclopédie	 in	 France.	 Now,	 in	 the	literature	 of	 the	 Encyclopédie	 there	 is	 a	 certain	 Denis	Diderot	 –	 who	 rarely	 makes	 it,	 if	 ever,	 into	 the	 club	 of	French	 moralists	 –	 whose	 aphoristic	 works	 such	 as	 the	
Pensées	philosophiques	 fully	 belong	 to	 the	 type	 of	material	
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under	 consideration	 here.	 This	 is	 not	 just	 because	 of	 the	enduring	influence	of	authors	of	the	previous	century	–	the	break	between	the	seventeenth	and	the	eighteenth	century	is	in	large	part	a	nineteenth	century	invention,	I	come	back	to	 that	 further	 down	 –,	 but	 also	 because	 the	 aphorism,	 as	Westerdale	 rightly	points	out	 in	his	book,	was	 the	natural	form	 for	 scientific	 treatises	 at	 the	 time.	 Which	 does	 not	mean	 that	Diderot's	 aphorisms	only	 share	 formal	 features	with	 Lichtenberg,	 Goethe	 and	 Nietzsche;	 in	 fact,	 quite	 the	contrary:		 One	 day,	 we	 asked	 someone	 whether	 he	thought	 there	 were	 real	 atheists.	 Do	 you	believe,	he	said,	 that	 there	are	real	christians?	(Diderot	2007,	XVI,	my	translation)		If	there	was	an	analogy	to	make,	or	a	tradition	to	fashion	in	relation	 to	German	aphorisms,	 it	 certainly	had	 to	do	with,	not	the	form,	but	the	irreverent	tone	that	pervades	the	late-eighteenth	century	 literature	 in	both	Germany	and	France,	and	 which	 is	 unlike	 the	 veiled	 criticisms	 of	 La	 Fontaine's	fables	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 seventeenth	 century	 in	 France,	 or	the	 anti-bourgeois	 reactionary	 satires	 of	 Augustan	literature	 in	England	–	or	 indeed	the	excessive,	sometimes	vitriolic	 nature	 that	 Nietzsche's	 comments	 share	 with	 a	
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Catholic	apologist	like	Léon	Bloy,	born	only	two	years	after	him.	Here	is	a	fragment	from	Bloy:		 [On	 Protestantism]	 To	 debate,	 one	 must	 go	down	 to	 a	 swamp.	 Speeches	 are	 no	 sooner	spent	 in	 vain	 than	 they	 come	 back	 like	 the	ebbing	of	 fetid	mud	 to	 the	heart	of	whom	has	given	them.	(Bloy	1999,	my	translation)		This	 lack	 of	 sensitivity	 to	 context,	 magnified	 in	 Pippin's	thesis	as	we	will	 see,	means	 that	Westerdale's	 subsequent	argument	–	Nietzsche's	aphorisms,	beyond	the	diversity	of	forms	 and	 themes,	 are	 structurally	 marked	 by	 an	 excess	designed	 to	 overlap	 the	 excess	 of	 reading	 itself,	 and	critically	reflect	the	need	for	making	interpretations	on	the	part	of	 the	reader,	 thereby	 thwarting	 the	dogmatisation	of	thought	–	comes	short	of	substance.	This	argument	does	not	add	 anything	 to	 the	 challenge	 that	 we	 knew	 Nietzsche	 to	harbour	 already,	 and	neither	does	 it	 situate	 this	 challenge	within	 the	much	 larger	 challenge	 that	modern	 philosophy	presented	to...	precisely	dogmatism.			
Nietzsche's	French	readings	If	it	is	fair	game	to	aim	at	Westerdale's	thesis,	it	is	because	the	impact	of	Nietzsche's	French	readings	on	his	work	is	too	
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obvious	 to	 make	 it	 disappear	 and	 achieve	 academic	 hat	tricks	 instead.	 So	 obvious	 in	 fact	 that	 a	 great	many	 books	have	been	written	on	the	subject,	and	each	time	one	comes	out	 it	widens	the	scope	for	comparison	between	Nietzsche	and	 French	 authors.	 We	 have	 already	 mentioned	Donnellan's	book	that	singles	out	Montaigne,	Pascal	and	La	Rochefoucauld	among	other	moralists	(1982).	Many	studies	offered	 a	 differentiation	 between	Nietzsche	 and	 one	 other	author,	 e.g.	 Nietzsche	 and	 Voltaire	 (Métayer,	 2011),	Nietzsche	 and	Rousseau	 (Ansell-Pearson,	 1991),	Nietzsche	and	 Pascal	 (Léveillé-Mourin,	 1978),	 etc.	 Giuliano	Campioni's	 book,	 Les	 lectures	 françaises	 de	 Nietzsche	(2001),	 broadened	 our	 horizon	 by	 including	 not	 only	Descartes	 (that	 link	 had	 been	 established	 before)	 but	Ernest	Renan	 and	 the	Renaissance	writers	 of	 the	 South	of	France.	 As	 for	 William	 D.	 Williams,	 he	 eschewed	 a	 direct	comparison	in	favour	of	a	chronological	approach	(1952).			 It	 indeed	 makes	 more	 sense	 to	 track	 Nietzsche's	interest	 in	 the	 French	 civilisation	 chronologically.	 For	 the	least	one	can	say	about	Nietzsche	 is	 that	 the	man	was	not	particularly	predestined	for	French	studies.	Picture	instead	a	quintessential	German	boy	born	 to	 a	 Lutheran	pastor	 in	Saxony,	 where	 German	 nationalism	 was	 forged	 –	 in	 both	senses	 of	 the	 word,	 Nietzsche	 argued	 (see	 UM,	 I)	 –	 in	opposition	 to	 Napoleonic	 expansionism,	 as	 Lacoste's	
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excellent	 article	 reminds	 us	 (1993).	 Nietzsche's	 initial	interest	in	ancient	Greece	is	typical	too,	as	this	interest	has	been	the	mainstay	of	 the	German	 intellectual	 life	since	 the	revival	of	German	letters	in	the	eighteenth	century.	So	that	the	 young	 Nietzsche's	 appreciative	 words	 for	 French	culture	 in	 the	 Untimely	 Meditations	 should	 not	 fool	 us;	 it	was	then	very	much	part	of	a	German	debate	centred	on	the	writings	 of	 David	 Strauss	 –	 in	 the	 same	 book,	 Nietzsche	praises	the	"superb"	Hölderlin	and	denounces	the	Hegelian	"bog	of	speculation"	in	pure	Schopenhauerian	fashion	(UM,	I).	 Besides,	 Nietzsche's	 early	 French	 readings,	 including	Diderot,	 Rousseau	 and	 Voltaire,	 were	 the	 natural	companions	to	Goethe	and	Lessing	in	the	German	pedagogy.	For	 the	 young	 Nietzsche,	 pre-classical	 Greece	 was	 the	intellectual	north.	Bismarck	and	Prussia?	He	admired	both	(Lacoste	1993).		 A	 series	 of	 fateful	 encounters	 steered	 Nietzsche	towards	 French	 literature. 1 	He	 first	 started	 frequenting	Francophile	circles	in	the	early	1870s.	We	give	a	partial	list:	once	 Paris	 resident	 Richard	 Wagner,	 whose	 wife	 Cosima	was	 French	 through	 her	 mother;	 Nietzsche's	 long-time	friend	 Franz	 Overbeck,	 the	 man	 who	 would	 retrieve	Nietzsche	 in	Turin,	 French	 through	his	mother	 too,	whose	
																																																								1	The	following	reconstruction	is	based	on	Lacoste	(1993),	Williams	(1952)	and	Astor	(2008,	2017)	
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wife	Ida	translated	French	critic	Sainte-Beuve	into	German;	another	 key	 relation	 in	 Nietzsche's	 life,	 Malwida	 von	Meysenbug,	 the	woman	who	 introduced	 Lou	 to	Nietzsche,	she	 befriended	 the	 French	 republicans	 in	 exile	 during	 her	time	in	England.	And	then,	there	is	Paul	Rée.	Nietzsche	met	Rée	 while	 in	 Basel	 and	 the	 attraction	 was	 mutual.	Nietzsche's	 identification	with	Rée	was	made	all	the	easier	as	 Rée	 started	 out	 as	 disciple	 of	 Schopenhauer	 like	Nietzsche,	 but	 he	 was	 a	 flamboyant	 womanizer	 and	gambler	 too,	 unlike	 him.	 It	 is	 Rée	 who	 single-handedly	introduced	 Nietzsche	 to	 La	 Rochefoucauld,	 Chamfort	 and	other	French	moralists.	 It	 is	Rée	again	who	whispered	 the	genealogical	method	to	Nietzsche	through	his	own	Origin	of	
Moral	 Sensations.	 For	 reminder,	 in	 that	 book	 Rée	 argued	that	"just	like	a	geologist,	one	starts	out	by	looking	for	and	describing	the	several	formations,	and	one	proceeds	to	ask	about	the	causes	that	have	given	birth	to	them"	(Rée	1982;	cited	in	Astor	2017;	for	Nietzsche's	debt	to	Rée	in	his	own	words,	see	Nietzsche,	GM,	Preface,	§4;	and	EH,	p.59).	And	it	is	with	Rée	 that	Nietzsche	 shared	Lou	Andrea-Salomé,	 the	young	woman	that	was	to	turn	his	world	upside	down	and	usher	 in	his	 final	phase,	 from	Zarathustra	 to	 the	"madness	letters".	 When	 the	 three	 of	 them	 were	 an	 item,	 around	1882,	they	would	make	a	pastime	of	writing	maxims	in	the	manner	of	La	Rochefoucauld,	and	Nietzsche	and	Lou	would	
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even	correct	each	other's	production.	(This	social	origin	of	maxims	 is	 in	 fact	 the	 most	 powerful,	 yet	 never	 made,	argument	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 Pippin	 equation:	 La	Rochefoucauld's	maxims	were	born	in	the	 literary	salon	of	the	marchioness	 de	 Sablé	 as	 a	 game	 of	 esprit	 with	 fellow	invitees,	 thus	 in	 conditions	 comparable	 to	 some	 of	Nietzsche's.)		 The	 encounter	 with	 Rée	 opens	 up	 what	 is	 usually	known	as	Nietzsche's	middle	period,	from	the	acquaintance	of	 Rée	 in	 1876	 to	 the	 break	 with	 Lou	 in	 1883.	 The	brainchildren	 of	 those	 years	 –	 Human,	 All	 Too	 Human	(1878),	Daybreak	 (1881)	and	The	Gay	Science	 (1882)	–,	 to	use	 maternal	 vocabulary	 on	 purpose,	 all	 detail	 significant	engagement	 with	 the	 thought	 of	 authors	 we	 call	 French	moralists	 for	 expediency,	 as	 shows	 aphorism	 §214	 of	The	
Wanderer	and	his	Shadow,	 the	usual	 starting	point	 for	 any	discussion	of	Nietzsche	and	the	French	moralists:		
European	 Books.	 	 In	 reading	 Montaigne,	 La	Rochefoucauld,	 La	 Bruyère,	 Fontenelle	(especially	 the	 Dialogues	 des	 Morts),	Vauvenargues,	and	Chamfort	we	are	nearer	 to	antiquity	 than	 in	 any	 group	 of	 six	 authors	 of	other	 nations.	 	 Through	 these	 six	 the	 spirit	 of	the	 last	centuries	before	Christ	has	once	more	
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come	into	being,	and	they	collectively	 form	an	important	link	in	the	great	and	still	continuous	chain	 of	 the	 Renaissance.	 	 Their	 books	 are	raised	 above	 all	 changes	 of	 national	 taste	 and	philosophical	 nuances	 from	 which	 as	 a	 rule	every	 book	 takes	 and	 must	 take	 its	 hue	 in	order	 to	 become	 famous.	 	 They	 contain	more	real	 ideas	 than	 all	 the	 books	 of	 German	philosophers	put	together	(...)	(WS,	§214)		Introducing	 Nietzsche's	 final	 shift	 (from	 the	 aphoristic	books	 afore-mentioned	 to	 the	 mock-prophetic	 writings	 of	
Zarathustra	and	the	more	compact	essays	of	the	Genealogy)	does	 not	 change	 that.	 Nietzsche	 still	 praised	 highly	 and	commented	 at	 length	 on	 French	 authors	 and	 French	civilisation,	 even	 deepening	 his	 interest	 to	 include	 such	lesser-known	 figures	 as	 seventeenth	 century	 libertine	Saint-Évremond	(see	BGE,	VII,	§224).	 		 So	 palpable	 is	 the	 influence	 of	 French	 authors	 on	Nietzsche's	work	that	 it	was	quickly	picked	up	by	scholars	too:	 in	his	Nietzsche,	sa	vie	et	sa	pensée	published	 in	1920,	well	 before	 Heidegger's	 lectures,	 French	 philosopher	Charles	 Andler	 wrote	 about	 "the	 cure	 of	 the	 soul	 and	 of	intelligence"	Nietzsche	purportedly	took	in	contact	with	the	French	moralists	 (1979,	 II)	and	devoted	a	 large	portion	of	
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his	discussion	of	Nietzsche's	intellectual	debts	to	the	French	moralists.		 		
The	traps	of	analogy	Against	 this	 background,	 how	 can	 the	 Pippin	 equation	 be	wrong	 when	 the	 Hegel	 scholar	 pulled	 out	 at	 all	 the	Nietzschean	 stops?	 Was	 it	 not	 Nietzsche	 himself	 who	authorised	 the	 view	 that	 there	 is	 a	 tradition	 of	 French	authors	 engaged	 in	 psychological	 analysis,	 crafting	aphorisms,	 and	 that	 he	 fully	 belongs	with	 them?	Does	not	Pippin	 merely	 rephrase	 Nietzsche's	 own	 storyline	 –	 or	should	 we	 say	 monologue?	 This	 is	 exactly	 where	 the	problem	 lies:	 Pippin	 seems	 to	 have	 forgotten	 to	 include	himself	 in	 a	 process	 already	 marked	 by	 an	 absence	(Nietzsche's	own).	Unfortunately,	Pippin	blindly	 follows	 in	the	 footsteps	 of	 Donnellan's	 Nietzsche	 and	 the	 French	
Moralists	 (1982)	and	skips	both	conceptual	and	contextual	(synchronic	 and	 diachronic)	 analysis	 for	 speed.	 Like	Donnellan,	 he	 takes	 for	 granted	 that	 there	 is	 a	 "clearly	identifiable	 tradition	of	French	moralists,	particularly	with	the	 three	 major	 figures,	 Montaigne,	 Pascal,	 La	Rochefoucauld"	 (Donnellan	 1982,	 Preface;	 the	 same	ordering	can	be	found	in	Pippin	2006,	I)	and	runs	with	that	assumption	 without	 reflecting	 on	 the	 historical	 and	epistemological	 conditions	 of	 the	moral	 and	metaphysical	
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discourses	 at	 work	 in	 France	 from	 the	 sixteenth	 century	onward.	 This	 spectacular	 oversight	 is	 the	 doom	 of	 the	argumentative	 effort	 behind	 Nietzsche,	 moraliste	 français,	as	I	would	like	to	show	now.		 By	far	the	most	conspicuous	mistake	is	the	failure	to	problematise	the	notion	of	psychology	in	Montaigne	and	in	the	 post-Cartesian	 moralists.	 Put	 simply,	 Descartes	introduces	 an	 epistemological	 break	 not	 only	 with	scholasticism	but	also	with	the	thought	of	 the	Renaissance	Montaigne	 embodies	 at	 the	 very	 end	 of	 the	 sixteenth	century,	a	break	that	makes	it	impossible	for	us	to	speak	of	the	 same	 "psychology"	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Montaigne	 and	post-Cartesian	writers	such	as	Pascal	or	La	Rochefoucauld.2	It	 is	true	that	the	publication	of	Montaigne's	Essays	(2009)	is	 itself	 an	 important	milestone	 in	 the	 history	 of	Western	thought	when	 it	 comes	 to	psychology,	 or	 so	 argues	Emilio	Ferrari	 in	his	 convincing	Montaigne:	une	anthropologie	des	
passions	 (2014).	 Montaigne	 distanced	 himself	 from	 the	"Hylemorphic	 conception",	 according	 to	which	 the	body	 is	only	understandable	in	relation	to	the	soul	that	invigorates	and	 organises	 it,	 and	 emphasised	 instead	 "the	mechanical	powers	 and	 the	 dynamical	 autonomy	 of	 the	 body	 with	regards	 to	 the	 soul"	 (Ferrari	 2014,	 14),	 speaking	 of	 "the																																																									2	Besides	Ferrari	(2014),	the	following	passage	relies	on	Nisard	(1844),	Azouvi	(2006),	Kintzler	(1991),	Talon-Hugon	(2002),	Rodis-Lewis	(1995)	and	Monnoyer	(1988).	
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wonderfully	corporeal	condition	of	man"	(Montaigne	2009,	III,	8,	my	translation).	To	this	Renaissance	trope	illustrated	by	Petrarch's	ascent	of	Mont	Ventoux	for	the	sake	of	sport,	Montaigne	also	added	 the	medical	 interest	 in	 the	question	of	 "involuntary	 movements"	 (reflex	 action)	 that	 will	 be	front	 and	 centre	 of	 Descartes'	 mechanistic	 account	 of	 the	body	 fifty	 years	 later	 (2009,	 II,	 6).	 Still,	 Ferrari	 makes	 it	clear	that	for	Montaigne	Man	is	an	indivisible	unity	of	body	and	 soul	 (see	 Montaigne	 2009,	 III,	 5).	 For	 instance,	Montaigne	writes	 about	 the	 "two	 associated	 parts"	 or	 the	"tight	 seam"	 of	 body	 and	 soul	 (2009,	 II,	 17;	 I,	 21,	 my	translation).	So	that	when	Montaigne	writes,	"the	soul	that	has	no	established	goal,	gets	lost;	because,	as	we	say,	to	be	everywhere	is	to	be	nowhere"	(2009,	I,	8),	we	are	very	far	indeed	 from	 the	 Cartesian	 dualism	 of	 body	 and	 soul.	 We	recall	 the	 Sixth	 Meditation	 in	 which	 the	 soul	 becomes	 a	"thinking	 thing"	 (res	 cogitans)	 through	 the	 process	 of	Cogito,	 and	 the	 body	 becomes	 an	 "extended	 thing"	 (res	
extensa).	 The	 departure	 from	 Montaigne	 involved	 in	 this	epoch-making	distinction,	crystal-clear	to	Descartes	in	view	of	Gassendi's	 (Fifth)	Objections,	 is	 all	 the	 clearer	 for	 us	 in	light	of	Descartes'	first	reply	to	Elisabeth,	also	known	as	the	Princess	 of	Bohemia	 –	 this	 is	 the	 remarkable	woman	who	changed	 the	 course	 of	 Cartesianism	 through	 her	 intimate	relationship	 with	 Descartes,	 and	 personal	 relationships	
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with	 Malebranche	 and	 Leibniz.	 In	 the	 very	 first	 of	 her	letters	to	the	founder	of	modern	philosophy,	Elisabeth	was	eager	to	know	how	the	soul	of	man	can	determine	the	body	knowing	 that	 thought	 belongs	 to	 a	 separate	 substance	according	 to	 the	 Meditations	 (Descartes	 1989,	16/05/1643).	 In	 his	 answer,	 Descartes	 first	 distinguished	things	 that	 belong	 to	 the	 soul	 and	 the	 soul	 only,	 from	 the	things	 that	 belong	 to	 the	 body	 and	 the	 body	 only	 (1989,	21/05/1643).	 Only	 then	 can	 we	 characterise,	 wrote	Descartes,	 the	 things	 relevant	 to	 the	 union	 of,	 or	 contact	with,	 body	 and	 soul,	 paving	 the	 way	 for	 Descartes'	 final	treatise,	 written	 specifically	 for	 Elisabeth,	 The	 Passions	 of	
the	 Soul.	 While	 the	 Montanian	 moral	 reflection	 (morale)	highlighted	 the	 becoming-conscious	 of	 the	 physicality	 of	our	human	existence	 in	pure	Renaissance	 fashion	 (Ferrari	2014,	 p.306),	 the	 final	 Descartes	 introduced	 on	 the	 one	hand	 an	 ethics	 (knowing	 the	 separation	 as	 well	 as	interlocking	of	body	and	soul,	how	can	we	acquire	a	proper	distance	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 passions,	 this	 very	interlocking?	 this	 is	 Elisabeth's	 question,	 to	 which	Descartes	provided	a	number	of	answers	in	their	five-years-long	 correspondence)	 and	 on	 the	 other	 a	 "symptomatics"	(what	 are	 the	physiological	 causes	 of	 the	 disturbances	we	experience	as	passions?).	To	wrap	 this	point	up,	 there	are	thus	 two	 negations	 at	work	 from	Montaigne	 to	 Descartes,	
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the	 first	 being	 the	 negation	 of	 the	 contiguity	 of	 soul	 and	body	 (replaced	 by	 the	 Cartesian	 dualism	 of	 pure	 thought	and	pure	extension)	and	the	second	 is	 the	negation	of	 this	strict	dualism	by	opening	up	a	third	set	of	questions	besides	logic	 and	biology,	 that	 of	modern	psychology	proper.	 This	epistemological	 break	 profoundly	 influenced	 the	theological	 and	 metaphysical	 works	 of	 Blaise	 Pascal,	Antoine	 Arnauld	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 Port-Royal,	 in	 turn	spreading	through	the	salon	of	marquise	de	Sablé	to	every	French	 men	 and	 women	 of	 letters	 starting	 with	 La	Rochefoucauld	 himself	 (for	 more	 about	 this,	 see	 Azouvi	2002).	 It	 is	 therefore	 strictly	 impossible	 to	 compare	Montaigne	 and	 La	 Rochefoucauld	 on	 the	 subject	 of	psychology	 as	 if	 they	 were	 on	 the	 same	 plane,	 respective	epistemological	 conditions	 will	 not	 allow	 it.	 The	 most	serious	 evidence	 of	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 Pippin's	 thesis	 is	that	 we	 have	 indications	 that	 Nietzsche	 himself	 well	understood	 at	 the	 end	 of	 his	 life	 the	 points	 we	 have	 just	raised	here:	in	Beyond	Good	&	Evil,	he	writes	that	Descartes	stands	 apart	 in	 the	philosophical	 tradition	with	 respect	 to	what	came	before	AND	after,	proof	are	the	defiant	reactions	to	 the	 Meditations	 (i.e.	 all	 of	 post-Cartesian	 philosophy,	Nietzsche	 implies)(BGE,	§54;	§191).	And	in	Ecce	Homo,	his	philosophical	 testament,	Nietzsche	pairs	La	Rochefoucauld	with...	Descartes:	
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	 They	 [the	 Germans]	 never	 went	 through	 a	seventeenth	century	of	harsh	self-examination	like	 the	 French;	 a	 La	 Rochefoucauld,	 a	Descartes	are	a	hundred	times	superior	to	the	foremost	Germans	in	honesty–to	this	day	they	[the	 Germans]	 have	 never	 had	 a	 psychologist.	(EH,	'WC',	3)		These	are	some	of	Nietzsche's	 final	words.	Beyond	Pippin,	this	 Nietzschean	 rehabilitation	 of	 Descartes	 –	 also	 seen	earlier	 in	 the	 posthumous	 fragments,	 e.g.	 FP	 9	 [178]	autumn	 1887	 –	 puts	 a	 dent	 in	 the	 ruling	 anti-idealist	interpretation	of	Nietzsche,	 from	Sarah	Kofman	(see	1986,	VII)	 to	 Alain	 Badiou	 (see	 2015,	 p.10)	 and	many	American	commentators	in-between	(e.g.	Lampert	1995).		 That	is	not	all.	We	have	mentioned	above	Port-Royal	on	purpose:	it	is	the	forgotten	soil	out	of	which	grew	Pascal	and	La	Rochefoucauld,	 and	a	major	event	 in	 the	European	intellectual	 life	 of	 the	 seventeenth	 century.	 Let	 us	 see	succinctly	what	impact	the	remembrance	of	Port-Royal	has	on	 our	 conversation	 about	 Nietzsche	 and	 the	 French	moralists. 3 	Port-Royal-des-Champs,	 the	 stronghold	 of	Jansenism	in	France,	was	originally	a	convent	in	the	Valley																																																									3	This	reconstruction	is	indebted	to	Génetiot	(2005),	Bénichou	(1988)	and	Rodis-Lewis	(1995).	
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of	 Chevreuse	 twenty-seven	 kilometres	 southwest	 of	 Paris.	Angélique	 Arnauld	 (the	 sister	 of	 philosopher	 Antoine	Arnauld,	known	the	"Great	Arnauld",	 the	only	contradictor	Descartes	 really	 valued)	 ran	 the	 convent,	 until	 the	 Abbé	Saint-Cyran	assumed	its	spiritual	leadership	in	1633.	Saint-Cyran	was	a	close	friend	of	a	well-known	Catholic	priest	in	the	 Spanish	 Flanders,	 Cornelius	 Jansen,	 also	 known	 as	Jansenius	 (1585-1638),	 the	 man	 who	 would	 reintroduce	Augustine	 to	 the	 modern	 era.	 For	 Jansenius	 the	 human	condition	was	tainted	beyond	repair	by	the	original	sin,	and	redemption	could	only	come	in	the	form	of	"efficient	grace"	gratuitously	granted	by	God...	if	only	the	sinner	could	open	up	 to	 Him	 just	 as	 fortuitously.	 This	 is	 known	 as	 Jansenist	predestination.	 If	 Jansenius'	 ideas	 turned	the	tables	on	the	Reformation	 –	 granted	 the	 Church	 is	 corrupted	 past	amendment,	but	what	about	Man?	–,	these	ideas	also	went	against	the	theories	of	grace	being	discussed	at	the	Vatican,	in	particular	Luis	de	Molina's	handy	doctrine	of	 "sufficient	grace",	 and,	 more	 generally	 speaking,	 against	 the	 very	notion	 of	 free	 will,	 or	 so	 would	 the	 powerful	 Jesuits	immediately	have	it,	hence	the	implacable	repression	Port-Royal	 suffered	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 both	 the	 Church	 and	 the	French	 monarchy.	 This	 is	 not	 surprising	 given	 that	 Port-Royal	 elaborated	 one	 of	 the	 most	 radical	 and	 lucid	reflection	on	the	human	condition	until	structuralism	in	the	
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twentieth-century.	 Port-Royal's	 foremost	 thinker,	 Blaise	Pascal	(1623-1662),	wrote	at	length	about	the	decentring	in	our	 view	 constitutive	 of	 the	 symbolic	 nature	 of	 language.	It's	all	over	 the	Pensées,	 the	 fragments	assembled	after	his	death:		 Eternal	 silence	 of	 these	 infinite	 spaces	frightens	me.	(1982,	p.92,	my	translation)		True	 nature	 being	 lost,	 everything	 becomes	nature;	 and,	 the	 true	 Good	 being	 lost,	everything	 becomes	 one's	 true	 Good.	 (1982,	p.162,	my	translation)		At	the	heart	of	Port-Royal's	critique,	developed	in	the	wake	of	 the	disastrous	French	civil	wars	we	know	as	the	Fronde	(1648-53),	 essentially	 led	 by	 greedy	 princes	 against	 the	authority	 of	 Anne	 of	 Austria's	 regency,	 is	 what	 French	scholar	 Paul	 Bénichou	 called	 "the	 demolition	 of	 the	 hero"	(1988),	 by	 which	 he	 meant	 the	 systematic	 destruction	 of	the	 kind	 of	 self-glorifying	 egocentrism	 of	 the	 upper-class	partly	 reflected	 in	 Pierre	 Corneille's	 plays.	 Against	 the	reckless	 behaviours	 of	 these	 big	 egos,	 Pascal	 derided	 the	"hateful	 ego"	 ("le	moi	haïssable",	 1982)	 inherited	 from	 the	old	 aristocratic	 values	 of	 the	 middle	 ages.	 Besides	 giving	
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birth	to	the	first	ever	analysis	of	the	signifier	in	the	shape	of	the	Logic	of	Port-Royal	by	Arnauld	and	Pierre	Nicole	(1662),	the	 Port-Royal	 movement	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 La	Rochefoucauld's	 critique	of	amour-propre	 (self-love)	 in	his	own	maxims:		 Friendship	 is	 only	 a	 reciprocal	 conciliation	 of	interests,	and	an	exchange	of	good	offices;	it	is	a	 species	 of	 commerce	 out	 of	 which	 self-love	always	expects	to	gain	something.	(1976,	§83)		Against	 the	 disappointments	 of	 court	 life,	 Port-Royal	promised	 aristocrats	 the	 satisfactions	 of	 a	 monastic	 life	spent	in	pursuit	of	science.	Against	Pippin's	hasty	charge	of	cynicism	on	the	part	of	La	Rochefoucauld	(2006,	110),	one	should	 thus	 read	 positively	 the	 following	 aphorism,	 as	reflecting	the	love	of	theory	at	the	heart	of	Port-Royal:		 Everyone	 praises	 his	 heart,	 none	 dare	 praise	their	understanding.	(1976,	§98)		This	self-absorption	in	the	world	of	ideas	is	not	far	from	the	kind	 of	 libidinal	 disengagement	 Nietzsche	 attacked	 in	 the	shape	 of	 the	 "Last	 Men",	 however.	 The	 parallel	 did	 not	escape	 Bénichou	 when	 he	 noted	 that	 "under	 the	 reign	 of	
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Louis	XIV,	 the	aristocratic	Overman	was	 in	 terrible	 shape"	(1988,	130).	This	is	because,	against	Nietzsche's	own	vague	beliefs,	 the	 defeat	 of	 the	 princes	 in	 the	 Fronde	 and	 Louis	XIV's	 subsequent	 absolutism	 turned	 the	 dying	 breed	 of	French	 knights	 into	 Versailles-trapped	 courtiers.	 We	 pass	from	 Corneille's	 aristocratic	 triumphs	 to	 Molière's	bourgeois	 comedies	 in	 the	 span	 of	 thirty	 years.	Moreover,	the	 analogical	 fallacy	 leads	 one	 to	 believe	 that	 the	 French	moralists	 shared	 with	 Nietzsche	 the	 diagnosis	 of	 wild	instinctual	 currents	 underneath	 the	 veneer	 of	 respectable	society,	 when	 the	 very	 concept	 Nietzsche	 deploys	 –	 the	German	 Trieb	 Freud	 also	 uses,	 a	 late	 nineteenth	 century	concept	if	there	ever	was	one	–	is	completely	out	of	place	in	the	 moral	 and	 medical	 discourses	 of	 the	 sixteenth,	seventeenth	and	eighteenth	 centuries	 (centred	around	 the	"humors"	and	the	"passions").			 Pippin	 is	 also	 unable	 to	 draw	 the	 line	 between	 the	French	 seventeenth	 century	 and	 the	 misogyny	 that	 is	characteristic	 of	 Nietzsche's	 writings	 (which,	 like	Heidegger,	 Pippin	 mostly	 ignores).	 Yes,	 we	 read	 the	occasional	 sharp	maxim	 on	women	 in	 La	 Rochefoucauld's	oeuvre,	though	never	devoid	of	sophistication,	such	as	this	one:		
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In	 their	 first	 passions,	 women	 love	 the	 lover,	and	 in	 the	 others,	 they	 love	 love	 itself.	 (1976,	§471,	my	translation)		But	we	 find	 in	 La	Rochefoucauld	 nothing	 of	 the	 unrefined	sort	Nietzsche	is	famous	for:		 Everything	 in	 woman	 is	 a	 riddle,	 and	everything	 in	woman	hath	one	solution	—it	 is	called	pregnancy.	Man	 is	 for	woman	a	means:	the	purpose	is	always	the	child.	(Z,	XVIII)		How	could	he?	La	Rochefoucauld	was	surrounded	by	some	of	the	greatest	women	in	French	letters:	Sablé,	Sévigné	and	La	Fayette.	(He	is	often	suspected	of	having	contributed	to	La	 Fayette's	 La	Princesse	 de	 Clèves,	 often	 dubbed	 the	 first	psychological	novel,	another	missed	opportunity	in	Pippin's	discussion	of	Nietzsche,	La	Rochefoucauld	and	psychology.)	La	Bruyère	himself	wrote	that	literary	efforts	by	women	are	"perhaps	 [some	 of]	 the	 best	 written	 we	 possess	 in	 our	language"	(1975,	I,	§37).	These	anecdotes	are	no	accidents:	they	are	part	of	the	first	Feminism	worthy	of	the	name,	that	of	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 seventeenth	 century	 in	 France.	Proof	are	not	only	the	books	published	in	defence	of	women	(Perrault's	 L'apologie	 des	 femmes,	 published	 in	 1694),	 or	
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retracing	 the	 contributions	 of	 great	 women	 in	 history	(Scudéry,	 herself	 a	 famous	 novelist,	 and	 her	 Illustrious	
Women	in	1652;	Ménage's	History	of	Women	Philosophers	in	1690),	 and	 the	 appearance	 of	 the	 first	 erotic	manuals	 for	women.	 These	 works	 pale	 in	 comparison	 to	 François	Poullain	 de	 La	Barre's	On	the	Equality	of	 the	Sexes	(1673),	Feminism's	 first	 theoretical	 work	 and	 a	 milestone	 in	Cartesian	 philosophy.	 The	 threads	 all	 come	 together	 in	Fontenelle's	Conversations	on	the	Plurality	of	Worlds	(1684),	which	set	the	ideal	of	equality	of	the	sexes	in	the	partaking	of	 science	 that	was	 to	 guide	 the	French	 literary	 life	 of	 the	eighteenth	 century.	 And	 yes,	 the	 mood	 soured	 with	Chamfort	on	 the	eve	of	 the	French	Revolution,	but	 insofar	as	 Nietzsche	 clearly	 prioritises	 the	 seventeenth	 century	over	the	eighteenth	century,	caveats	in	Pippin's	thesis	were	needed.	 		 	
A	brief	history	of	French	moralists	This	difficulty	would	have	been	evaded	had	Pippin	devoted	some	time	to	the	notion	of	"French	moralists".	We	proceed	to	do	just	that	here,	before	concluding.	The	invention	of	the	tradition	 of	 French	 moralists	 is	 in	 fact	 more	 or	 less	contemporary	 of	 Nietzsche,	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 solid	secondary	 literature	 on	 this	 subject	 is	 even	 more	 recent.	Louis	 Van	 Delft,	 a	 well-known	 specialist	 of	 the	 French	
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moralists,	 someone	 who	 made	 a	 career	 in	 both	 the	European	 and	 North	 American	 academia	 of	 defining	 the	French	moralists,	notes	in	the	preliminary	remarks	to	his	Le	
moraliste	 classique	 that	 almost	 all	 French	 authors,	 as	different	as	Descartes,	Rousseau	or	La	Fayette,	have	at	one	point	or	another	been	called	"moralist,"	be	it	in	the	French-speaking	 literature	or	 the	English-speaking	 (1982).	This	 is	true	 to	 this	 day:	 an	 anthology	 of	 French	moralists	 on	 the	shelves	 of	 a	 Fnac	 bookstore	 in	 Paris	 reveals	 a	 telling	heterogeneity:	the	list	includes	Christina	Queen	of	Sweden,	Port-Royal	 jurist	 Jean	 Domat,	 Enlightenment	 philosopher	Montesquieu,	the	French	Romantics	Barbey	d'Aurevilly	and	Baudelaire,	 and	 anti-Semitic	 twentieth	 century	 writer	Jouhandeau	(Dufay	2016).	This	lack	of	consistency	deserves	a	definitional	effort.		 So	 what	 is	 a	 French	 moralist?	 Van	 Delft	 proceeds	very	 carefully.	 He	 first	 notes	 that	 the	 word	 moraliste	 in	French	 makes	 its	 appearance	 in	 the	 1690	 dictionary	 of	Antoine	 Furetière	 –	 France's	 early	 version	 of	 Samuel	Johnson.	 According	 to	 Furetière,	 a	 moralist	 is	 "an	 author	who	writes	about	morals	(la	morale)".	And	la	morale	is	"the	doctrine	 of	 mores,	 a	 science	 that	 teaches	 how	 to	 conduct	oneself	and	one's	actions	 in	 life."	 Interestingly	enough,	 the	word	morale	 is	rather	new	too.	Van	Delft	writes	that	it	can	be	 traced	 to	 as	 late	 as	 1661	 in	 an	 author	 named	 Somaize	
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who	 describes	 it	 as	 science	whose	 natural	 presentation	 is	the	 maxim.	 The	 word	moraliste	 later	 takes	 on	 a	 negative	connotation	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 eighteenth	 century:	Van	 Delft	 records	 its	 pejorative	 use	 in	 Rousseau's	 Emile	("always	scolding,	always	moralist,	always	pedantic").	In	his	article	 'Moraliste'	 for	 the	 Encyclopédie,	 Louis	 de	 Jaucourt	makes	a	big	step	towards	defining	the	French	moralist	–	we	quote	the	full	article:		 MORALIST,	author	whose	subject	 is	 the	moral	science	 (la	morale).	Among	 the	moderns,	 only	Grotius,	 Puffendorf,	 Barbeyiac,	 Tillolton,	Wolaston,	Cumberland,	Nicole	 and	La	Placette	treated	 this	 science	 following	 sensible	principles.	Most	of	the	other	moralists	look	like	a	 writing	 tutor	 (un	 maître	 d'écriture)	 who	would	 give	 beautiful	 templates	 without	teaching	how	to	hold	and	use	the	pen	to	write	letters.	Other	moralists	have	found	their	moral	ideas	 either	 in	 the	delirium	of	 imagination,	 or	in	 maxims	 contrary	 to	 the	 state	 of	 human	nature.	Lastly,	many	have	only	chosen	to	draw	fine	portraits,	leaving	aside	the	method	and	the	principles	that	constitute	the	critical	part	of	the	moral	 science.	 That	 is	 because	writers	 of	 this	type	 (de	 ce	 caractère)	 only	 want	 to	 be	 witty	
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people	(gens	d'esprit)	and	are	less	interested	in	shining	 a	 light	 than	 in	 dazzling	 (moins	 à	
éclairer	 qu'à	 éblouir).	 Vain	 pursuit	 of	 a	 futile	glory!	that	makes	the	author	lose	the	only	goal	he	should	set	for	himself,	which	is	to	be	useful.	But	 better	 doing	 the	 job	 of	 manoeuvres	 well,	rather	 than	 badly	 playing	 the	 part	 of	 the	architect.	(Jaucourt	1751,	my	translation)		Jaucourt's	use	of	the	word	'caractère'	 in	relation	to	stylists	leaves	little	doubt	as	to	whom	he	has	in	mind	(La	Bruyère's	only	book	is	titled	Les	caractères	and	it	 is	 full	of	portraits).	By	 distinguishing	 serious	 moral	 science	 from	 fanciful	literary	 efforts,	 Jaucourt	 and	 the	 Encyclopédie	 effectively	paves	 the	 way	 for	 the	 contemporary	 definition	 of	 French	moralists	as	possibly	short	on	substance	but	 long	on	style.	In	 the	wake	 of	 Jaucourt,	Nicolas	 de	 Chamfort	 –	 one	 of	 the	usual	suspects	in	the	field	of	French	moralists	–	does	warn	against	 the	 "charlatanerie"	 of	 the	 moralists	 (and	 clearly	excludes	 himself	 from	 them).	 But	 there	 is	 a	 twist!	 Let	 us	look	at	the	passage	in	question:		 Moralists,	 like	 the	 philosophers	 who	 have	designed	 systems	 in	physics	 and	metaphysics,	have	 over-generalised	 and	multiplied	maxims	beyond	reason.	What	comes	of	Tatice's	[made-
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up	 name]	 maxim	 for	 example:	 Neque	 mulier,	
amissa	 pudicitia,	 alia	 abnerit,	 [Latin	 for	 "a	woman	not	only	 loses	her	 (sexual)	purity,	 she	also	 gets	 rid	 of	 it"]	 after	 the	 examples	 of	 so	many	women	that	a	weakness	did	not	prevent	from	 practicing	 several	 virtues?	 I	 saw	 Mrs	 L,	after	 a	 youth	 not	 so	 different	 from	 Manon	Lescaut's,	[the	heroine	of	Abbé	Prevost's	1731	novel]	experience	later	in	life	a	passion	worthy	of	 Heloise.	 But	 these	 examples	 are	 too	dangerous	a	moral	conduct	to	lay	out	in	books.	One	 must	 simply	 observe	 them,	 and	 not	 be	duped	 by	 the	 charlatanerie	 of	 moralists.	(Chamfort	1982,	CCXCIII,	my	translation)		The	moralists	Chamfort	takes	a	shot	at	are	exactly	the	ones	Jaucourt	praises,	 those	who	want	 to	 lay	out	scientific	 laws	about	how	people	conduct	themselves.	This	passage	makes	it	clear	that	Jaucourt's	views	were	far	from	widely-accepted	in	his	own	time.	In	fact,	Diderot	himself	considered	Jaucourt	an	 unreliable	 collaborator	 (Van	 Delft	 1982).	 With	 good	reason:	 La	 Bruyère	 disarmed	 this	 critique	 before	 it	 was	even	there:		 Anyway,	I	did	not	want	to	write	maxims,	they	are	like	laws	in	morals,	and	I	confess	I	have	
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neither	enough	authority	nor	enough	genius	to	act	legislator.	(1975,	Preface)		That	 is	 not	 all:	 if	 Jaucourt's	 assault	 is	 isolated	 in	 the	eighteenth	 century,	 that	 is	 because	 in	 the	 Ancien	 Régime,	moralist	 thinkers	 still	 are	 the	 natural	 allies	 of	 modern	science	 against	 the	 dying	 scholasticism	 of	 the	 old	ecclesiastical	 networks	 of	 knowledge,	 as	 Parmentier	reminds	 us	 (2000).	 And	 if	 both	 La	 Bruyère	 and	 Chamfort	describe	 themselves	 as	 philosophers,	 it	 is	 because	 la	
morale,	along	with	logics,	physics	and	metaphysics,	is	one	of	the	subspecies	of	philosophy	at	the	time.			 Yet	 Jaucourt's	 article	 left	 a	 trace.	 The	 concept	 of	'French	moralist'	 as	we	 know	 it	 really	 gained	 currency	 in	the	 mid-nineteenth	 century,	 around	 the	 same	 time	 as	Stendhal	polemically	fixes	the	notion	of	 'French	classicism'	(the	 literature	 of	 the	 seventeenth	 century)	 as	 a	 strictly	formalised	 form	 of	 literature	 in	 opposition	 to	 his	 own	generation	–	the	French	Romantics,	from	Chateaubriand	to	Hugo	 to	Dumas	and	Musset	–	 characterised	by	a	 return	 to	artistic	freedom	best	embodied	in	Shakespeare,	to	whom	all	the	 aforementioned	 Romantics	 devote	 an	 essay	 (see	Stendhal	 1970).	We	 remark	 in	passing	 that	 it	 is	 absurd	 to	lump	Stendhal	together	with	the	French	moralists,	as	some	commentators	 do	 (e.g.	 Williams	 1952),	 sometimes	
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following	Nietzsche,	when	Stendhal	–	and	French	literature	of	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 at	 large	 –	 defined	 himself	 in	
opposition	 to	 classical	 literature...	 associated	 with	 the	Ancien	 Régime.	 As	 Sainte-Beuve	 began	 his	 monumental	study	 of	 Port-Royal,	 Swiss	 critic	 Alexandre	 Vinet	 gave	lectures	 on	 "the	French	moralists	 of	 the	 sixteenth	 and	 the	seventeenth	 centuries";	 and	 French	 journalist	 Lucien-Anatole	 Prévost-Paradol	 published	 his	 Études	 sur	 les	
moralistes	français	(1864).	But	at	the	end	of	the	century,	the	elasticity	of	the	concept	remained	intact,	with	French	critic	Emile	 Faguet	 publishing	 his	Political	Writers	and	Moralists	
of	the	Nineteenth	Century	about	authors	widely	outside	the	trio	 of	 Montaigne,	 Pascal	 and	 La	 Rochefoucauld	 we	 have	grown	accustomed	to.	The	same	goes	for	Jules	Barni's	1873	
Les	 moralistes	 français	 du	 XVIIIe	 siècle,	 which	 include	Vauvenargues	 along	 with	 Enlightenment	 philosopher	Helvétius	 and	 little-known	 authors	 of	 the	 eighteenth	century	such	as	Saint-Lambert;	or	Albert	Desjardins,	whose	own	 opus	Les	moralistes	 français	du	seizième	siècle	 (1870)	focuses	 on	 pre-Cartesian	 authors	 of	 the	 sixteenth	 century.	At	the	turn	of	the	twentieth	century,	after	Nietzsche's	own	time,	 Louis	 Van	 delft	 also	 reports	 that	 a	moralist	 is	 "for	 a	Valéry	or	Lévy-Bruhl	[French	writers],	essentially	an	artist"	(1982).	 In	 the	 interwar	 period,	 English	 poet	 Edmund	 W.	Gosse	 published	 his	 Three	 French	 Moralists	 and	 the	
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Gallantry	 of	 France	 on	 La	 Rochefoucauld,	 La	 Bruyère	 and	Vauvenargues,	 finally	 cementing	 the	 concept.	 English-speaking	 libraries	 also	 keep	 the	 record	 of	 an	 article	 by	Henri	Chamard	(of	the	Académie	Française)	dating	back	to	this	 era:	 "Three	 French	 Moralists	 of	 the	 Seventeenth	Century"	 (1931)	 on	 Pascal,	 La	 Rochefoucauld	 and	 La	Bruyère.	After	the	Second	World	War	and	before	Louis	Van	Delft's	 book,	 we	 can	 cite	 two	 works	 in	 particular	 that	illustrates	 the	 interest	 for	 the	 moralists	 beyond	 French	borders	 as	 well	 as	 the	 enduring	 heterogeneity	 of	 the	concept	of	moralists:	Louise	Horowitz's	Love	and	Language:	
a	Study	of	the	Classical	French	Moralist	Writers	(1977)	offers	a	 panorama	 of	 aristocratic	 letters	 of	 the	 late	 seventeenth	century,	 from	 Sévigné	 to	 La	 Fayette	 to	 La	 Bruyère	 and	Saint-Évremond.	And	Anthony	Levi	covers	the	period	from	Montaigne	 to	 Descartes	 in	 his	 1964	 French	Moralists:	 the	
Theory	of	the	Passions,	1585	to	1649.	This	enduring	porosity	of	 the	 notion	 –	 the	 term	 being	 applied	 to	 every	 single	French	 author	 in	 turn,	 as	 it	 should	 be	 clear	 by	 now	 –	explains	the	defiance	against	it	in	the	essays	of	the	late	Jean	d'Ormesson	 characterising	 La	 Rochefoucauld	 as	 "perhaps	the	greatest	of	those	much-touted	French	moralists	people	keep	harping	on	about"	(2015),	before	reminding	us	that	La	Rochefoucauld	 wrote	 memoirs	 and	 mainly	 composed	maxims	 in	 and	 for	 the	 salon	of	marchioness	de	Sablé.	The	
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marchioness	 herself	 wrote	 some	 good	 ones	 we	 scholars	never	pick	up,	including	some	critiquing	La	Rochefoucauld's	attacks	on	amour-propre:		 When	High	and	Mighty	people	want	to	make	us	believe	 that	 they	 possess	 some	 good	 quality	which	they	in	fact	do	not	have,	 it	 is	dangerous	to	 show	 that	 you	 doubt	 them;	 because,	 by	removing	 their	 hope	 of	 deceiving	 the	 world,	you	 also	 remove	 their	 desire	 to	 perform	 the	good	 acts	 that	 might	 have	 arisen	 from	 their	very	 pretensions.	 (included	 in	 La	Rochefoucauld	1976)		So	what	 is	 a	 French	moralist?	 Here	 is	 the	 embarrassingly	vague	definition	Van	Delft	painstakingly	constructs	halfway	through	his	book:		 A	 moralist	 is	 a	 writer	 that	 deals	 with	 morals	and	 (or)	 devotes	 himself	 to	 analysis,	 not	forbidding	 himself	 to	 bring	 up	 norms;	 who	very	 generally	 chooses	 either	 the	 treatise	 or	the	fragment	as	a	form;	whose	attitude	consists	in	 staying	 at	 the	 level	 of	 man	 (se	 maintenir	
avant	tout	à	hauteur	d'homme),	because	of	 the	
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lively	 interest	 he	 has	 in	 experience	 (le	 vécu).	(1982,	my	translation)	
	Concise	 or	 wordy;	 sometimes	 analytic,	 sometimes	normative;	 and	 generally	 interested	 in	 the	 experience	 of	man:	 this	 is	 the	most	precise	definition	the	French	scholar	could	provide	us	with.	Our	conclusion?	Either	the	notion	of	French	moralist	 is	 theoretical	 fake	 news,	 or	 what	 the	 Van	Delft's	 argument	 strongly	 represses	 and	 painfully	 works	out	 is...	 the	master,	who	 chooses	what	 to	write	 about	 and	how	to	write	it.	And	there	is	no	greater	master	than	he	who	forbade	the	poetic	 license	of	 the	moralists	at	university	by	standardizing	educational	practices	and	codifying	academic	discourse	across	disciplines,	Prussian	philosopher	Wilhelm	von	 Humboldt.	 Given	 Nietzsche's	 early	 exit	 from	 the	university	 and	 subsequent	hysterical	material,	 it	 is	 critical	that	 we	 bring	 Humboldt	 to	 bear	 on	 the	 analysis	 of	Nietzsche's	 philosophy,	 and	 not	 resort	 to	 the	 in	 fine	unfounded	 analogy	with	 the	 French	moralists,	which	 only	makes	 sense	 against	 the	 background	 of	 the	 Humboldtian	reform	of	higher	education	that	gave	birth	to	the	university	as	we	know	it	today.	
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PART	 2.	 The	 Woman	 That	 Therefore	 I	
Am:	Nietzsche,	Derrida,	Hegel	
		 The	 divine	 law	 has	 its	 individualisation	 –	 or	 the	
unconscious	Spirit	of	the	individual	its	real	existence	–	in	the	woman,	through	whom,	as	the	middle	term,	the	unconscious	Spirit	rises	out	of	its	unreality	into	actual	 existence,	 out	 of	 a	 state	 in	 which	 it	 is	unknowing	 and	 unconscious	 into	 the	 realm	 of	conscious	Spirit.			 –Hegel,	Phenomenology	of	Spirit,	§463			OUT	 of	 the	 barrage	 of	 interpretations	 that	 Nietzsche	 has	inspired	 in	 the	 philosophical	 conversation	 of	 the	 past	hundred	 years,	 French	 philosopher	 Jacques	 Derrida's	 two	short	 interventions	 in	 the	 70s	 –	 Éperons:	 les	 styles	 de	
Nietzsche	 and	 Otobiographies	 –	 are	 undoubtedly	 some	 of	the	strangest	and	most	captivating	yet.	If	they	have	not	left	the	 kind	 of	 mark	 on	 Nietzschean	 studies	 that	 Deleuze's	books	have	 for	example,	 that	may	be	changing,	as	Éperons	in	 particular	 has	 been	 enjoying	 a	 resurgence	 of	 interest	since	 the	2010s.	Éperons	(Spurs	 in	 the	English	 translation,	the	 title	 I	will	 use	 from	now	 on)	was	 originally	 the	 paper	Derrida	 gave	 at	 the	 landmark	 Nietzsche	 conference	 that	
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took	 place	 at	 Château	 Cérisy	 in	 France	 in	 1972.	 With	respect	 to	 the	 ontological	 interpretation	 sanctified	 at	 the	Royaumont	 conference	 eight	 years	 prior,	 Derrida's	 paper	operated	a	displacement	through	the	questions	of	style	and	the	woman	in	Nietzsche's	writings.	While	style	had	already	found	 its	 way	 in	 the	 works	 of	 a	 number	 of	 scholars	accompanying	 him	 in	 Cérisy,	 Derrida's	 decision	 to	 put	Nietzsche's	 writings	 on	 women	 –	 virtually	 every	 book	 of	Nietzsche	 comes	 with	 a	 number	 of	 aphorisms	 concerning	women	 –	 front	 and	 centre	 of	 his	 intervention	 was	unprecedented.	 Bruno	 Bosteels	 recently	 reminded	 us	 that	Derrida's	text	had	an	"explosive	effect"	(2017)	on	the	male-centred	academia	of	the	post-war	era:	for	the	first	time,	the	question	of	sexual	difference,	and	what	women	have	to	say	about	 it,	was	raised	in	connection	to	a	major	author	of	the	philosophical	 canon.	 Derrida	 argued	 at	 one	 point	 in	 Spurs	that	 "if	 style	was	 the	man,	writing	would	 be	 the	woman",	thus	inspiring	the	well-known	analyses	of	feminine	writing	that	Hélène	Cixous	or	Luce	Irigaray	came	to	be	synonymous	with.	 Now	 we	 understand	 why,	 after	 typically	 serving	 as	fodder	 for	attacks	against	Deconstruction	coming	from	the	Left	 (see	Waite	 1983)	 or	 inspiring	 the	 infrequent	 friendly	commentary	(see	Shapiro	1981),	Spurs	finds	new	relevance	in	 the	 contemporary	 feminist	 (see	 Frantz	 2011)	 and	transgender	 conversations	 (see	 Philips	 2014).	 Sometimes	
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translated	as	The	Ear	of	the	Other	in	English,	Otobiographies	too	was	originally	a	paper	Derrida	delivered	at	a	conference	–	two	papers	in	fact,	the	first	at	the	University	of	Virginia	in	Charlottesville	in	1976,	and	the	second	in	Montreal	in	1979.	In	 this	work,	Derrida	 picked	 up	 on	 unfinished	 business	 in	
Spurs	and	gave	a	more	political	–	and	markedly	less	friendly	–	reading	of	Nietzsche	centred	on	the	questions	of	the	state	and	symbolic	debt	as	much	as	style	and	the	woman.			 In	 this	essay,	 I	argue	 that	 the	 two	 texts	go	 together	and	 represent	 a	 radical	 departure	 from	 the	 notions	 about	Nietzsche	 that	 continue	 to	 be	 common	 currency	 today	 –	Nietzsche	the	thinker	of	Difference,	of	perspective,	of	irony,	of	rebellion,	etc.	–,	as	well	as	provide	a	fascinating	blueprint	for	 a	 broad	 reflection	 about	 philosophy	 and	 style,	 and	philosophy	and	sexual	difference.	What	does	the	woman	at	the	heart	of	Nietzsche's	prose	stand	for,	what	impact	does	it	have	on	our	interpretations	of	Nietzsche,	what	does	it	mean	for	 philosophy	 at	 large,	what	 part	 does	 style	 play	 in	 such	developments	 –	 these	 are	 some	 of	 the	 questions	 that	Derrida	addresses	in	these	two	papers.	To	cut	a	 long	story	short,	far	from	concluding	that	philosophy	becomes	female,	Derrida	 ends	 up	 accusing	 Nietzsche	 of	 fetishizing	femininity,	 thus	 opening	 what	 I'm	 tempted	 to	 call	 the	feminine	–	not	 feminist	 –	 front	we	 saw	earlier	 in	 the	 fight	for	 Difference.	 It	 is	 just	 this	 position	 that	 recently	 came	
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under	attack	from	none	other	than	Catherine	Malabou,	once	Derrida's	 protégée,	 whose	 Changing	 Difference	 (2011)	charges	 Deconstruction	 of	 hypostatising	 difference	 to	 the	detriment	 of	 actual	women	when	 it	 seeks	 to	protect	 them	from	essentialism	and	other	-isms.	While	I	am	sympathetic	to	 this	 concern,	 I	 would	 like	 to	 argue	 here	 that	 Derrida's	intellectual	 journey	 from	 Spurs	 to	 Otobiographies	 already	includes	a	secret	weapon	that	thwarts	such	hypostatisation:	Hegel.	If	the	title	of	this	essay	thus	borrows	from	Derrida's	
The	Animal	That	Therefore	I	Am,	 it	 is	not	(only)	with	intent	to	 provoke	 but	 because	 the	 pun	 contained	 in	 the	 original	French	 (the	 dependent	 clause	 que	 donc	 je	 suis	 can	 both	mean	 'that	 therefore	 I	 follow'	 and	 'that	 therefore	 I	 am')	perfectly	 illustrates	 the	underlying	 logic	 that	 I	derive	 from	Derrida's	papers:	from	the	woman	that	I	follow	(Nietzsche),	we	must	pass	to	the	woman	that,	 in	fact,	I	am	(Hegel).	Our	philosophical	 resolve	 is	 clear:	 one	 cannot	 criticise	 the	hegemony	of	Difference	in	today's	academia	without	being	ready	 to	 return	 Difference	 back	 to	 the	 fold	 of	 the	 Same.	Uncovering	 that	 Hegelian	 cache,	 and	 more	 generally	restoring	 the	 edge	 of	 Derrida's	 thought	 with	 regards	 to	Nietzsche	as	well	as	the	cause	of	women	implies	taking	the	now-familiar	 hard	 road	 into	 the	 content.	 This	 road	 starts	with	 the	 context	 of	 Derrida's	 enunciation,	 i.e.	 the	 shift	 in	Nietzschean	studies	in	the	late	60s	and	early	70s	in	France.	
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Nietzsche's	Anti-Text	In	 the	 words	 of	 Derrida	 himself,	 authors	 Sarah	 Kofman,	Bernard	 Pautrat,	 Jean-Michel	 Rey	 and	 Philippe	 Lacoue-Labarthe	 started	 "a	 new	 phase	 in	 a	 deconstructing	interpretative	 process,	 that	 is	 to	 say	 an	 affirmative	 one"	(Derrida	2010).	If	Derrida	was	keen	to	pay	tribute	to	these	authors,	it	is	because	their	interpretations	take	place	within	the	new	general	orientation	Deconstruction	was	 the	name	of	–	"without	Nietzsche	the	question	of	the	text	would	never	have	 burst	 in	 on	 us,"	writes	 for	 instance	 Lacoue-Labarthe	(1979,	80),	"at	least	not	in	the	precise	shape	it	has	taken	to	day".			 The	 first	 change	 this	 new	 generation	 of	 scholars	introduced	 was	 shifting	 the	 emphasis	 temporarily	 away	from	Nietzsche's	 final	works	 (Beyond	Good	&	Evil,	The	Gay	
Science,	 The	 Will	 to	 Power...)	 and	 back	 to	 his	 initial	theoretical	 guts.	 This	 ground-breaking	 manoeuvre	 led	 to	the	 positive	 reappraisal	 of	 early	 texts,	 in	 particular	 The	
Birth	of	Tragedy	and	the	lesser-known	"Truth	and	Lie	in	an	Extra-moral	Sense"	article.	The	goal	was	to	show	that	there	is	 a	 theory	 of	 signs	 in	 Nietzsche	 that	 seeks	 to	 exist	 on	 its	own,	 without	 implying	 an	 intervention	 inside	 the	metaphysical	tradition	(along	the	line	of	the	'eternal	return'	or	 the	 'will	 to	 power').	 As	 Lacoue-Labarthe	 was	 quick	 to	
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point	 out	 in	 a	 clear	 shot	 at	 the	 Heideggerian	 legacy,	 "the	question	 of	 overcoming	 philosophy	 is	 in	 itself	 a	 very	philosophical	 question"	 (1979,	 78).	 In	 his	 Le	 sujet	 de	 la	
philosophie,	Lacoue-Labarthe	dismisses	any	easy	attempt	to	bypass	the	Heideggerian	commentary	(1979,	79)	but	notes	that	there	is	a	clear	refusal	on	the	part	of	Heidegger	to	start	a	 literary	 investigation	of	 the	Nietzschean	text,	which	 is	 in	fact	a	refusal	to	cement	the	opposition	between	the	poetical	and	 the	 theoretical.	 For	 Heidegger,	 the	 poetic	 form	 of	
Zarathustra	 goes	 hand	 in	 hand	 with	 the	 teaching	 of	 the	doctrine	 of	 the	 eternal	 return	 (82).	 Lacoue-Labarthe	 goes	on	 to	 quote	 Heidegger:	 "every	 real	 philosophy,	 that	 is	 to	say,	 every	 great	 philosophy,	 is	 in	 itself	 denkerisch–
dichterisch	 (intellectual/poetic)".	 We	 know	 what	 potent	influence	 the	 Heideggerian	 interpretation	 will	 have	 on	Deleuze,	 and	 beyond	 Deleuze,	 on	 a	 sizable	 portion	 of	twentieth	 century	 continental	 philosophy	 for	 which	 the	'aesthetic	 turn'	–	 in	Lacoue-Labarthe's	very	precise	words,	"the	 implementation	 of	 truth	 that	 art	 is"	 (87)	 –	 is	 the	panacea	 for	 philosophy's	 metaphysical	 ills.	 Against	 this	theoretical	 background,	 the	 then-young	 guns	 of	Nietzschean	 studies	 wanted	 to	 "return	 to	 Nietzsche	 his	systematic	 dimension"	 (Pautrat	 1971)	 and	 uncover	 a	critique	 (in	 the	 Kantian	 sense)	 of	 language	 right	 from	 the	beginning	 of	 Nietzsche's	 career.	 If	 The	 Birth	 of	 Tragedy	
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literally	 set	 the	 scene	with	 its	defence	of	 the	pre-Socratics	against	the	Socratic	dialectic,	or	of	the	performative	shows	of	 Aeschylus	 against	 the	 cerebral	 Euripides,	 the	 most	obvious	 of	 their	 starting	 points	 remains	 the	 short	 "Truth	and	Lie	in	an	Extra-moral	Sense"	written	in	1873.			 Nietzsche	 begins	 the	 1873	 article	 by	 arguing	 that	man	 can	 never	 know	 himself	 or	 even	 perceive	 himself	completely	–	in	specular	terms	such	as	"laid	out	as	if	 in	an	illuminated	glass	case"	–,	but	is	instead	always	"hanging	in	dreams,	 as	 it	were,	 upon	 the	 back	 of	 a	 tiger"	 (TALIES).	 In	the	 paragraphs	 that	 follow,	Nietzsche	 goes	 on	 to	 summon	every	 single	 major	 philosopher	 (Plato,	 Hegel,	 Descartes,	Locke,	Hobbes,	etc.)	to	appear	to	the	trial	of	truth,	which	he	immediately	 equates	 to	 style.	 A	 full	 flavour	 of	 the	 text	 in	question	 is	 needed	 to	 understand	 where	 the	 Cérisy	generation	comes	from:		 We	 still	 do	 not	 yet	 know	where	 the	 drive	 for	truth	 comes	 from.	 For	 so	 far	 we	 have	 heard	only	 of	 the	 duty	 which	 society	 imposes	 in	order	 to	exist:	 to	be	 truthful	means	 to	employ	the	 usual	 metaphors.	 Thus,	 to	 express	 it	morally,	 this	 is	 the	 duty	 to	 lie	 according	 to	 a	fixed	convention,	 to	 lie	with	 the	herd	and	 in	a	manner	 binding	 upon	 everyone.	 Now	 man	 of	course	forgets	that	this	is	the	way	things	stand	
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for	him.	Thus	he	 lies	 in	 the	manner	 indicated,	unconsciously	 and	 in	 accordance	 with	 habits	which	 are	 centuries’	 old	 (...)	 As	 a	 ”rational”	being,	 he	 now	places	 his	 behaviour	 under	 the	control	 of	 abstractions.	 He	 will	 no	 longer	tolerate	 being	 carried	 away	 by	 sudden	impressions,	 by	 intuitions.	 First	 he	universalizes	 all	 these	 impressions	 into	 less	colourful,	 cooler	 concepts,	 so	 that	 he	 can	entrust	 the	guidance	of	his	 life	and	conduct	 to	them.	 Everything	 which	 distinguishes	 man	from	 the	animals	depends	upon	 this	 ability	 to	volatilize	 perceptual	 metaphors	 in	 a	 schema,	and	 thus	 to	 dissolve	 an	 image	 into	 a	 concept.	For	something	is	possible	in	the	realm	of	these	schemata	which	could	never	be	achieved	with	the	vivid	first	 impressions:	the	construction	of	a	 pyramidal	 order	 according	 to	 castes	 and	degrees,	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 new	world	 of	 laws,	privileges,	 subordinations,	and	clearly	marked	boundaries	 –	 a	 new	 world,	 one	 which	 now	confronts	 that	 other	 vivid	 world	 of	 first	impressions	 as	 more	 solid,	 more	 universal,	better	 known,	 and	 more	 human	 than	 the	immediately	 perceived	world,	 and	 thus	 as	 the	regulative	 and	 imperative	 world.	 Whereas	each	 perceptual	 metaphor	 is	 individual	 and	
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without	 equals,	 and	 is	 therefore	 able	 to	 elude	all	 classification,	 the	 great	 edifice	 of	 concepts	displays	 the	 rigid	 regularity	 of	 a	 Roman	columbarium	and	exhales	in	logic	that	strength	and	 coolness	 which	 is	 characteristic	 of	mathematics	 (...)	 In	 this	conceptual	crap	game	”truth”	 means	 using	 every	 die	 in	 the	designated	 manner,	 counting	 its	 spots	accurately,	fashioning	the	right	categories,	and	never	 violating	 the	 order	 of	 caste	 and	 class	rank.	(TALIES)		This	 passage	 basically	 functions	 as	 a	 manifesto	 for	Nietzsche's	philosophy:	not	only	does	Nietzsche	here	repeat	all	 the	 Hegelian	 steps	 of	 Consciousness	 (see	 Hegel	 1977,	§90-165	–	 from	vivid	 sensations	 to	 abstract	universals)	 to	exactly	 reversed	 conclusions	 (thus	 erasing	 the	emancipatory	 dimension	 of	 the	 Phenomenology),	 but	 he	also	goes	against	 the	argumentative	 journey	of	Rousseau's	
Social	Contract.	While	for	Rousseau	the	obstacle	of	language	and	culture	necessitated	a	political	uprising	to	 free	man	of	such	 bounds,	 Nietzsche	 seems	 to	 argue	 here	 that	 any	contract	 is	 a	 herd-binding	 lie	 spreading	 through	 artificial	political	 constructions:	 "to	 lie	 with	 the	 herd	 and	 in	 a	manner	 binding	 upon	 everyone".	 Truth,	 the	 truth	 of	political	 emancipation	 (Contrat	Social)	 and	new	sensibility	
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(The	 New	 Héloïse),	 is	 reduced	 to	 a	 "crap	 game";	 there	 is	simply	no	exit	out	of	 the	darkness	of	social	existence.	This	evidences	 a	 systematic	 and	 deep-rooted	 mistrust	 of	language	 and	 its	 operations	 that	 is	 characteristic	 of	Nietzsche's	philosophy.	 "Truth	and	Lie"	 is	 indeed	 far	 from	isolated	 within	 the	 Nietzschean	 corpus,	 it	 reverberates	throughout	 Nietzsche's	 career:	 "speech,	 it	 seems,	 was	devised	 only	 for	 the	 average,	 medium,	 communicable,"	writes	 Nietzsche	 as	 late	 as	 in	 1888,	 "the	 speaker	 has	already	vulgarized	himself	by	 speaking"	 (TI,	Expeditions	of	
an	 Untimely	 Man,	 §26)(for	 other	 typical	 examples	 of	Nietzsche's	 blazing	 critique	of	 language	 at	 different	 stages	of	his	career,	see	also	HTH,	§11;	GS,	§58).	In	his	Versions	du	
Soleil	 (1971,	 so	 far	 untranslated	 in	 English),	 Bernard	Pautrat	 argues	 that	 Nietzsche's	 strategy	 to	 overturn	 the	moralism	that	is	behind	the	metaphysical	tradition	includes	doing	 an	 exact	 inventory	 of	 the	 limits	 imposed	 by	metaphysical	 binaries	 and	 boundaries,	marking	 the	 entire	metaphoricity	 of	 language,	 and	 critically	 deploying	 the	rhetoric	 of	 it.	 Pautrat	 directly	 deals	 with	 the	 question	 of	style,	 "that	 is	 styles,	 of	 the	 plurality	 of	 forms	 having	 a	content"	 (1971,	 36):	 the	 variety	 of	 styles	 in	 Nietzsche	signals	 for	 him	 the	 refusal	 to	 reduce	 style	 to	 the	philosophical	signified	beyond	form.	"To	correct	style	 is	 to	correct	 thought	 and	 nothing	more,"	 exclaims	 Nietzsche	 in	
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Human,	 All	 Too	 Human	 (HTH,	 §131).	 And	 Pautrat	 to	conclude	 that	 "to	 argue	 that	 speech	 is	 that	 dance	 on	 the	back	of	the	world	through	which	a	certain	strength	asserts	itself,	one	must	first	show	that	language	is	never	fixed	and	sticky,	that	it	is	"above",	that	is	to	say	that	it	is	proper	at	no	point	of	 its	 curve:	 from	one	end	 to	 the	other	and	 in	all	 its	determinations,	 of	 metaphorical	 essence"	 (1971,	 195).	Style,	 or,	 to	 be	 precise,	 styles,	 are	what	 is	 needed	 to	 undo	the	transcendental	effects	of	language.	To	put	it	differently,	Nietzsche's	 philosophy	 always	 implies	 creating	 a	 distance	between	 any	 enunciated	 content	 and	 the	 subject,	 and	 this	distance	 is	 styles.	 Moreover,	 picking	 up	 on	 the	 specular	metaphor	 of	 "Truth	 and	 Lie"	 Pautrat	 argues	 that	 the	Nietzschean	 aphorism	 has	 a	 therapeutic	 intention	 in	 the	Hippocratic	 mode	 as	 it	 introduces	 fragmentation	 where	there	was	a	bloc(k).	We	could	say	 in	 typically	postmodern	fashion	 that	 the	 aphorism's	 brevity	 is	 a	 thought	 of	 the	disintegration	of	 the	body	 against	 the	metaphor's	work	of	integration.		 Sarah	 Kofman's	 1972	 Nietzsche	 et	 la	 métaphore	(translated	into	English	as	Nietzsche	and	Metaphor	in	1994)	is	 I	believe	 the	most	precise	version	of	 this	 interpretation.	In	 her	 book,	 Kofman	 first	 reminds	 us	 that	 Nietzsche	multiplied	attacks	against	the	Logos	already	in	The	Birth	of	
Tragedy,	 speaking	 of	 speech	 as	 defective	 signs,	 and	
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conceptual	philosophical	language	as	the	most	improper	to	express	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 world.	 Instead,	 Dionysian	 music	was	for	Nietzsche	the	primal	language	of	the	world,	against	(Apollinian)	lyrical	poetry.	In	Kofman's	words:		 Lyrical	 genius	 expresses	 in	 its	 way	 what	 the	Dionysian	 musician,	 without	 resorting	 to	 an	image,	 is	able	 to	make	resonate	by	 identifying	to	the	original	echo	of	the	world.	(1983,	19-20,	my	translation)		The	melody	of	the	world	is	always	ahead	of	the	Word.	This	idea	 is	 not	 restricted	 to	 Nietzsche's	 early	writings:	 in	The	
Wagner	 Case,	 Nietzsche	 still	 reproaches	 Wagner	 with	subjecting	 music	 to	 text.	 Kofman	 adds	 that	 "opera,	deciphered	 by	 a	 reading	 one	 can	 already	 qualify	 as	genealogical,	marks	 the	 triumph	of	Socrates	or	Christ	over	Dionysus,	of	nihilism	over	life	affirmation,	of	the	slave	over	the	 master"	 (1983,	 23).	 For	 the	 artist	 to	 symbolise	Dionysus,	Nietzsche	explained	that	he	or	she	must	 literally	undergo	metamorphosis,	i.e.	become	metaphor	of	the	world	(TI,	 Expeditions	 of	 an	 Untimely	 Man,	 §10).	 What	 does	 it	mean?	 It	 means	 that	 there	 is	 no	 metaphor	 without	depersonalisation	and	without	mascarade,	that	is	to	say	no	metaphor	 without	 the	 Dionysian	 procession	 of	 revellers.	
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Metaphor	 is	 also	 related	 to	 the	 loss	 of	 what	 is	 "proper"	understood	 as	 "essence"	 of	 the	 world:	 essence	 being	undecipherable,	 we	 can	 only	 have	 improper	representations	 of	 it.	 Following	 Schopenhauer,	 Nietzsche	inverts	 Aristotle,	 for	 whom	 the	 metaphor	 is	 the	transposition	 of	 the	 concept	 from	 its	 proper	 place	 to	 a	figurative	place.	For	Nietzsche,	the	least	metaphoric	level	is	that	of	 the	metaphor	 itself,	 and	concepts	are	 further	away	from	 the	 real.	Kofman	 shows	 that	 the	 same	 rationale	 is	 at	work	 in	 Nietzsche's	 Philosophy	 in	 the	 Tragic	 Age	 of	 the	
Greeks	written	around	the	same	period	as	"Truth	and	Lie":	a	metaphoric	style	is	the	sign	of	a	philosophical	system's	full	life	 just	 as	 a	 demonstrative	 style	 is	 the	 sign	 of	 complete	philosophical	 poverty.	 If	 Kofman	 knows	 just	 where	 to	 lay	the	blame	 (on	 the	 "moral	 and	 religious	 forces";	1983,	74),	she	 does	 show	 convincingly	 that	 Nietzsche	 substitutes	'metaphor'	 for	 'perspective'	 in	 his	 later	 works,	 further	transforming	 the	metaphor	 into	 individual	 wills	 to	 power	(and	annihilating	symbolic	potency):		 The	hypothesis	of	the	will	to	power,	an	artistic	force	that	reassesses	and	poses	forms	but	also	tends	 to	 dominate	 through	 them,	 explains	 the	generalisation	 of	 the	metaphor,	 of	 the	 text,	 as	
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well	 as	 the	 illusion	 which	 makes	 these	 two	pass	for	"proper".	(1983,	122)		In	other	words,	in	"metaphor"	Nietzsche	no	longer	stresses	the	 unity	 of	 assembled	 blocks,	 against	which	 he	 rails,	 but	the	 determination	 (and	 violence)	 through	 which	 it	 is	achieved	–	the	"will	to	power".			 We	 finally	 get	 to	 the	 anti-dialectical	 core	 of	Nietzsche's	 thought.	 For	 the	 German	 philosopher,	 true	originality	derives	from	seeing	something	that	has	no	name	yet,	and	to	suggest	a	name	for	it,	as	arbitrarily	as	language	itself	 does	 (Kofman	 1983,	 124).	 Kofman	 grounds	 this	interpretation	 on	 this	 straightforward	 passage	 of	The	Gay	
Science:		
Originality.	 –What	 is	 originality?	 To	 see	something	that	does	not	yet	bear	a	name,	that	cannot	 yet	 be	 named,	 although	 it	 is	 before	everybody's	 eyes.	 As	 people	 are	 usually	constituted,	 it	 is	the	name	that	first	makes	the	thing	 generally	 visible	 to	 them.–	 Original	persons	 have	 also	 for	 the	most	 part	 been	 the	namers	of	things.	(GS,	§261)		It	therefore	makes	no	sense	from	Nietzsche's	perspective	to	interpret	 history	 dialectically,	 since	 history	 is	 nothing	 but	
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the	 accumulation	 of	 unrelated	 enunciations.	 Signifiers	 do	not	bear	on	other	signifiers,	they	do	not	form	a	larger	chain	that	 moves	 on	 its	 own.	 One	 must	 look	 at	 the	 enunciated	content	 genealogically	 instead,	 so	 that	 "each	 metaphor,	each	'proper'	is	the	symptom	of	a	type	of	will,	noble	or	vile"	(Kofman	 1983,	 127).	 As	 Kofman	 points	 out,	 Nietzsche's	writing	 logically	 suppresses	 the	 exclusivity	 of	 some	metaphors:			 To	 prefer	 one	 metaphor	 over	 another	 would	imply	 a	 reference	 to	 a	 "proper"	 that	 that	metaphor	 would	 embody	 more	 than	 another.	Varying	metaphors	on	the	other	hand	suggests	none	 is	 proper	 or	more	 proper	 than	 another,	that	what	is	proper	only	is	the	appropriation	of	the	 "world"	 by	 a	 certain	 perspective	 that	imposes	its	law.	(Kofman	1983,	149)		In	 this	 context,	 the	 Nietzschean	 strategy	 of	 systematic	misunderstanding	 claimed	 by	 the	 philosopher	 is	 an	honorific	title	as	to	write	metaphorically	is	not	to	mix	with	the	 herd	 (see	 BGE,	 §271).	 Kofman	 does	 consider	 the	consequences:		 To	 be	 fully	 metaphoric,	 or	 "proper",	 one's	writings	should	thus	invent	a	singular	code,	an	
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original	 idiom,	 enclosing,	 however	 impossible	that	is,	valuations	that	would	never	have	taken	place.	 To	 write,	 to	 speak,	 and	 to	 be	 at	 least	minimally	 understood,	 despite	misunderstandings,	 to	vulgarise	one's	 thought	even	 a	 little	 is	 an	 inevitable	 fate,	 unless	 one	goes	silent	or	mad.	(1983,	171)		Kofman	here	describes	a	 case	of	Hegelian	 "bad	 infinity"	at	work	–	to	truly	dodge	the	traps	of	language,	one	would	have	to	 go	 farther	 and	 farther	 away	 from	 common	 sense,	 long-held	 values	 and	 social	 links,	 deeper	 and	 deeper	 into	isolation	 and	madness	 searching	 for	 what	 I'm	 tempted	 to	call	the	ultimate	anti-text.	With	the	Nietzschean	disjunction	between	 the	 original	 metaphor	 of	 the	 world	 and	 the	metonymy	of	desire	in	the	shape	of	History,	or	between	the	image	and	sound	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	concept	on	 the	other,	 the	scene	seems	set	 for	 the	discussion	of	nihilism	(I	pick	 up	 this	 thread	 in	my	Part	3).	 As	 Alain	 Badiou	 puts	 it	(2015),	 there	 is	 a	 gap	 (un	 décrochage,	 a	 discrepancy,	 but	also	evocative	of	 the	airplane	 that	 is	 stalling)	between	 the	destructive	 character	 of	 Nietzsche's	 philosophy	 and	 its	affirmative	 part.	 Unless	 one	 concludes	 that	 Nietzsche's	affirmative	 ethics	 consists	 in	 self-destruction,	 as	 Kofman	
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very	 logically	 does	 in	 her	 monumental	 page-by-page	analysis	of	Ecce	Homo	in	Explosions	(1992).			
Kant	with	Sade	Nietzsche	While	Kofman's	reconstruction	truly	 is	 illuminating,	 it	also	makes	light	of	too	much	material	and	Derrida	makes	it	clear	with	 his	 discussion	 of	 the	woman	 in	 Nietzsche's	 writings.	Let	 us	 get	 to	 Spurs.	 Explicitly	 leaving	 Heidegger	 behind,	Derrida	 introduces	 the	 link	 between	 the	 ever-changing	styles	of	Nietzsche	and	the	question	of	the	woman	with	two	symptomatic	 extracts	 from	 Nietzsche's	 works.	 The	 first	 is	from	Beyond	Good	&	Evil:			 Supposing	 that	Truth	 is	 a	woman--what	 then?	Is	 there	 not	 ground	 for	 suspecting	 that	 all	philosophers,	 in	 so	 far	 as	 they	 have	 been	dogmatists,	have	failed	to	understand	women--that	 the	 terrible	 seriousness	 and	 clumsy	importunity	with	which	they	have	usually	paid	their	 addresses	 to	 Truth,	 have	 been	 unskilled	and	unseemly	methods	 for	winning	a	woman?	Certainly	 she	 has	 never	 allowed	 herself	 to	 be	won;	 and	 at	 present	 every	 kind	 of	 dogma	stands	 with	 sad	 and	 discouraged	 mien--If,	indeed,	it	stands	at	all!	(...)(BGE,	Preface)			
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And	the	second	is	from	The	Gay	Science:		
Vita	 femina.	 To	 see	 the	 ultimate	 beauties	 in	 a	work	 -	 all	 knowledge	 and	 good-will	 is	 not	enough;	it	requires	the	rarest,	good	chance	for	the	 veil	 of	 clouds	 to	 move	 for	 once	 from	 the	summits,	and	for	the	sun	to	shine	on	them.	We	must	not	only	stand	at	precisely	the	right	place	to	 see	 this,	 our	 very	 soul	 itself	 must	 have	pulled	away	the	veil	from	its	heights,	and	must	be	in	need	of	an	external	expression	and	simile,	so	 as	 to	 have	 a	 hold	 and	 remain	 master	 of	itself.	 All	 these,	 however,	 are	 so	 rarely	 united	at	 the	 same	 time	 that	 I	 am	 inclined	 to	believe	that	the	highest	summit	of	all	that	is	good,	be	it	work,	 deed,	 man,	 or	 nature,	 has	 hitherto	remained	 for	 most	 people,	 and	 even	 for	 the	best,	 as	 something	 concealed	 and	 shrouded:	 -	that,	 however,	 which	 unveils	 itself	 to	 us,	unveils	 itself	 to	 us	 but	 once.	 (...)	 But	 perhaps	this	is	the	greatest	charm	of	life:	it	puts	a	gold-embroidered	 veil	 of	 lovely	 potentialities	 over	itself,	 promising,	 resisting,	 modest,	 mocking,	sympathetic,	 seductive.	 Yes,	 life	 is	 a	 woman!	(GS,	§339)		
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In	 these	 two	 extracts,	 Nietzsche	 associates	 the	 woman	 to	truth	 dissolving	 the	 dogmatic	 rigidity	 of	 philosophy,	 and	beyond	 truth,	 to	 the	 veil	 of	 phenomena	 supposedly	covering	the	world.	Derrida	puts	it	best:		 She	 [the	 woman]	 engulfs	 and	 melts	 (envoile	
par	le	fond,	both	veiling	and	subjecting	 iron	to	puddling)	 endlessly,	 bottomlessly,	 every	essentiality,	 every	 identity,	 every	 property.	Thus	blinded,	the	philosophical	discourse	sinks	–	 leading	 itself	 to	 its	 doom.	 (...)	 There	 is	 no	truth	of	woman,	but	that's	because	this	abyssal	gap	of	truth,	this	untruth	(non-vérité)	is	"truth".	Woman	 is	 one	 name	 of	 this	 untruth	 of	 truth.	(2010,	39,	my	translation)		With	 regards	 to	 the	mystery	 that	 the	Real	 (capitalised	 for	Lacanian	 Real	 qua	 discrepancy	 or	 lack)	 also	 known	 as	woman	 is,	 Derrida	 argues	 that	 style	 would	 thus	 seem	 to	advance	in	the	manner	of	a	spur	(éperon)	of	sorts.	Derrida	evokes	 the	 rostrum	 of	 a	 ship	 (the	 form	 of	 bow	 on	 ships),	and	 the	 rocky	 outcrop	 of	 coastlines	 that	 the	 French	word	
éperon	 also	means.	 Derrida	 also	 plays	 on	 the	 homophony	between	 the	 English	 'spur'	 and	 'spurn'	 to	 express	 the	defensive	quality	 style	has	against	what	 is	 foreign.	 "Style,"	he	writes,	 "can	 therefore	 protect	with	 its	 spur	 against	 the	
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terrifying,	blinding,	fatal	threat	of	what	shows	up,	again	and	again"	 (2010,	 30).	 Following	 Derrida's	 interpretation,	Nietzsche's	 style	 thus	 seeks	 to	 establish	 a	 distance	 from	which	 the	 charm	 of	 women	 –	 itself	 actio	 in	 distans,	 says	Nietzsche	 (see	 GS,	 §60)	 –	 can	 be	 best	 observed.	 Derrida	suggests	 reading	 the	 dialectics	 of	 fetishism	 and	 castration	into	 this	 entire	 constellation.	 As	 Catherine	Kellogg	 puts	 it,	'woman'	 here	 is	 the	 term	 "associated	 simultaneously	with	the	 veil	 covering	 the	 truth,	 and	 the	 truth	 that	 unveils	 an	absence"	 (2010).	 We	 touch	 upon	 a	 major	 difference	between	 Derrida	 and	 Kofman.	 While	 for	 Kofman,	Nietzsche's	philosophy	is	an	attempt	to	lift	the	forgetfulness	of	repression	–	"the	concept	plays	the	part	of	anticathectic	force	 which	 maintains	 repression,"	 writes	 Kofman,	 "it	allows	 the	 edification	 of	 a	 system	 of	 secondary	rationalisations	 after	 the	 fact,	 erasing	 the	 metaphoric	activity	 as	 being	 original,	 as	 being	 the	 origin	 of	 all	knowledge	 and	 all	 activity"	 (1983,	 55)	 –,	 for	 Derrida	Nietzsche's	 fascination	 for	 the	 ambivalence	 of	 the	woman	allows	 him	 to	 disavow	 castration	 (especially	 the	woman's	castration,	the	fact	that	she	too	comes	under	the	regime	of	sexual	 difference)	 along	 with	 the	 very	 mechanism	 of	repression.	 Far	 from	 being	 a	 beautiful	 appearance	 on	 the	site	 of	 a	 void,	 a	 gap	 set	 in	 motion	 in	 the	 shape	 of	 the	Lacanian	 object	 a	 on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 drive,	 Derrida	
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argues	 that	 the	 woman-mistress	 of	 Nietzsche	 looks	 more	like	Heinrich	von	Kleist's	Penthesilea	besieging	 the	Greeks,	that	is	to	say	the	libidinal	transformation	of	anxiety	into	the	figure	of	 a	dangerous	presence	 that	 characterises	 the	 turn	from	phobia	to	perversion	(see	for	example	GS,	§69-70).	(I	come	back	to	this	transformation	of	 Idea	 into	object	 in	my	
Part	 3.)	 Derrida	 then	 opens	 the	 trial	 of	 fetishism	 proper	when	 the	 dialectics	 of	 having	 and	 giving	 replaces	 that	 of	veiling	and	unveiling.	A	fetish	here	comes	in	the	place	of	the	metonymy	 of	 desire	 that	 never	 settles	 on	 one	 object	 in	particular,	 and	 this	 fetish	 is	 "feminine	 pudendum",	"feminine	 scepticism",	 or,	 in	 a	 single	word,	 femininity.	We	quote	Nietzsche:			 [Women]	 believe	 in	 the	 superficiality	 of	existence	 as	 in	 its	 essence,	 and	 all	 virtue	 and	profundity	is	to	them	only	the	disguising	of	this	"truth,"	 the	 very	 desirable	 disguising	 of	 a	pudendum,	 –	 an	 affair,	 therefore,	 of	 decency	and	modesty,	and	nothing	more!	(GS,	§64)		Note	 the	slide	 from	the	 "superficiality"	of	existence	 (and	a	certain	authenticity	means	daring	to	meet	this	challenge)	to	elevating	 the	 "pudendum"	 of	 women	 in	 the	 place	 of	 it.	
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Derrida	 is	 here	 refreshingly	 blunt	 and	 unreflective	 in	 his	assessment.	In	his	own	words:		 The	 femininity	 of	 woman,	 feminine	 sexuality	and	 other	 essentialist	 fetishes	 which	 are	precisely	what	we	 think	we	 can	 take	 out	 of	 it	all	when	we	are	stuck	with	the	pabulum	of	the	dogmatic	 philosopher,	 the	 impotent	 artist	 or	the	 inexperienced	 charmer.	 (2010,	 43,	 my	translation)1		It	 is	men	who	 typically	believe	 in	 the	 truth	of	 the	woman.	Men	 and	 feminists,	 warns	 a	 decidedly	 edgy	 Derrida	 –	feminism,	he	writes,	"is	the	operation	by	which	the	woman	wants	 to	 emulate	 man	 and	 the	 dogmatic	 philosopher	vindicating	 truth,	 science,	objectivity,	which	 is	 to	say,	with	all	the	virile	 illusion,	the	effect	of	castration	that	goes	with	it"	(2010,	50).	While	this	is	the	kind	of	remark	that	is	likely	to	come	under	fire	today,	we	argue	that	Derrida	makes	here	a	 specific	 point	 about	 the	 mechanism	 of	 disavowal	according	 to	 Freudian	 theory.	 Insofar	 as	 one	 takes	 a	 lack	upon	 oneself	 and	 acts	 as	 the	 agent	 of	 (symbolic)	 division,	one	props	up	a	symbolic	realm	that	 is	devoid	of	such	 lack,																																																									1 	Derrida	 wrote	 these	 lines	 around	 the	 time	 Lacan	 explored	 the	feminine	modalities	of	sexuality	in	his	seminars	of	the	early	70s.	Spurs	is	thus	filled	with	discreet	jabs	at	the	Rue	de	Lille	psychoanalyst,	to	the	point	that	it	looks	like	a	response	to	Encore,	and	this	is	one	of	them.	
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thereby	producing	a	 fetish	–	the	ultimate	fetish	 in	 fact,	 the	letter.	With	the	separate	dimensions	of	the	veil	and	the	gift	collapsed	 upon	 herself,	 Nietzsche's	 woman	 is	 now	 in	 a	position	 to	 give	 him	 the	 truth	 about	 life	 that	 she	 refused	giving	 to	 dogmatic	 philosophers	 before	 (recall	 the	 quotes	we	 opened	 our	 discussion	 of	 Spurs	 with).	 In	 exchange	 of	which,	 she	 may	 make	 demands	 of	 her	 own...	 Perhaps	 the	potentially	 frightening	pregnancy	Nietzsche	 rants	about	 in	the	 Zarathustra	 (Z,	 XVIII).	We	 see	 here	why	 Derrida	 feels	justified	to	say	that	the	Nietzschean	trial	of	femininity	ends	up	 as	 a	 transcendental	 blind	 of	 giving	 and	 taking.	 "This	process	of	appropriation	escapes	every	dialectics	and	every	ontological	 decidability,"	 he	 writes	 towards	 the	 end	 of	
Spurs,	adding	that	"the	property	of	the	abyss	is	necessarily	the	 abyss	 of	 property".	 To	 elaborate	 on	 this	 chiasmus,	we	could	 say	 that	 Nietzsche	 fails	 to	 recognise	 the	 logic	 of	property	at	 the	heart	of	European	philosophy	(from	Locke	to	Hegel)	 beyond	 the	 eternal	 search	 for	 the	 truth	 and	 the	show	of	the	woman.		 If	 Nietzsche	 certainly	 fits	 the	 bill	 of	 the	 impotent	artist	(and	dogmatic	philosopher?),	Derrida	is	still	intent	on	treating	the	diversity	of	styles	in	Nietzsche	positively	at	this	stage,	as	precisely	Nietzsche's	attempt	to	do	away	with	the	dialectics	of	the	veil,	to	perforate	the	veil	as	it	were:			
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The	styled	spur	goes	through	the	veil,	does	not	tear	 it	up	only	to	see	or	create	the	thing	itself,	but	 undoes	 the	 self-opposition	 (l'opposition	 à	
soi),	 the	 opposition	 folded	 upon	 itself	 of	 the	veiled	 and	 the	 unveiled,	 truth	 as	 production,	unveiling/dissimulation	of	the	product	thereof.	It	raises	the	curtain	no	more	than	it	lets	it	fall;	it	 delineates	 its	 abeyance	 –	 its	 epoch.	Delineating,	 undoing,	 unburdening	 oneself	when	it	comes	to	the	veil,	does	it	not	boil	down	to	 unveiling?	 Or	 even	 destroying	 a	 fetish?	(2010,	86)		Derrida	 is	 in	 agreement	 with	 Kofman,	 for	 whom	 the	 self-destruction	we	witness	in	Ecce	Homo	is	not	an	accident	but	the	result	of	Nietzsche's	own	philosophical	path.	Ecce	Homo	thus	 appears	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 break	 through	 the	 wall	 of	words	 that	 disavowal	 has	 erected	 in	 the	 place	 of	 an	absence.	Disavowal	seeks	to	cancel	 itself...	 Is	Nietzsche	not	THE	philosopher	of	différance	in	Derrida's	1972	conference	on	the	subject	(included	in	Margins	of	Philosophy)?	Derrida	implies	 it	again	when	he	closes	Spurs	on	the	abundance	of	styles	that	goes	against	the	logic	of	essence	characteristic	of	traditional	metaphysics:			
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For	simulacrum	to	come	to	life,	one	must	write	in	 the	 gap	 between	 several	 styles.	 If	 there	 is	style,	here	is	what	Nietzsche's	woman	implies,	there	must	be	more	than	one.	(...)	The	anchor	is	lowered,	 risked,	 lost	 maybe	 in	 the	 abyss	between	them."	(2010,	118)		Such	 a	 position	 is	 echoed	 in	 the	 figure	 of	 the	"antiphilosopher"	 Badiou	 recognises	 in	 Nietzsche	 (2015).	Yet,	this	conclusion	is	strikingly	reversed	barely	four	years	later	 in	 the	 conclusion	 of	 Otobiographies.	 Insofar	 as	throughout	 his	 writings	 the	 woman	 remained	 this	fascinating	 presence	 that	 hides	 and	 reveals,	 and	 not	 the	vanishing	mediator	of	 the	 Idea,	Nietzsche	does	not	breach	the	 transcendental	 constraints	 of	 Kantian	 philosophy:	 the	noumenal	Real	remains	forbidden.	Sounds	familiar?	That	is	because	 Lacan	 drew	 the	 same	 conclusion	with	 regards	 to	Sade	 and	 Kant	 in	 the	 early	 60s.	 The	 similarities	 are	 too	obvious	 not	 to	 show	 side	 by	 side,	 starting	 with	 the	 final	words	of	"Kant	with	Sade":		 Be	 that	 as	 it	 may,	 it	 appears	 that	 there	 is	nothing	to	be	gained	by	replacing	Diotima	with	Dolmance,	 someone	 whom	 the	 ordinary	 path	seems	to	frighten	more	than	is	fitting,	and	who	–	did	Sade	see	it?	–closes	the	affair	with	a	Noli	
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tangere	 matrem.	 V	 .	 .	 .	 ed	 and	 sewn	 up,	 the	mother	 remains	 forbidden.	 Our	 verdict	 upon	the	 submission	 of	 Sade	 to	 the	 Law	 is	confirmed.	(...)	Of	a	treatise	truly	about	desire,	there	 is	 thus	 little	here,	even	nothing.	What	of	it	 is	announced	 in	 this	crossing	 taken	 from	an	encounter,	 is	 at	most	 a	 tone	of	 reason.	 (Lacan	2014,	Swenson	Junior's	translation)		And	now,	the	ending	of	Otobiographies:		No	 woman	 or	 trace	 of	 woman,	 if	 I	 have	 read	correctly	–	save	the	mother,	that's	understood.	But	this	is	part	of	the	system.	The	mother	is	the	faceless	figure	of	a	figurant,	an	extra.	She	gives	rise	 to	 all	 the	 figures	 by	 losing	 herself	 in	 the	background	 of	 the	 scene	 like	 an	 anonymous	persona.	 Everything	 comes	 back	 to	 her,	beginning	with	 life;	 everything	 addresses	 and	destines	 itself	 to	 her.	 She	 survives	 on	 the	condition	of	remaining	at	the	bottom.	(Derrida	1984,	Avital	Ronell's	translation)		It	 is	 thus	 worth	 remembering	 the	 gist	 of	 Lacan's	 famous	essay.	For	Sade	and	for	the	Kant	of	the	Critique	of	Practical	
Reason,	 pleasure	 and	 pain	 tend	 to	 only	 one	 goal,	which	 is	the	vanishing	of	 the	subject.	And	existential	pain	 is	 fended	
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off	 in	 the	 fantasy	 of	 presence,	 ultimately	 the	 immediate	presence	 of	 an	 all-powerful	 God.	 Beauty	 –	 and	 there	 is	beauty	in	Nietzsche's	woman	too	–	here	serves	the	purpose	of	 forbidding	 access	 to	 the	 absolute	horror	of	 subjectivity.	Because	 Sade	 does	 not	 concede	 anything	 to	 the	Other	 but	pursues	enjoyment	in	and	through	the	Other,	he	obeys	the	(maternal)	law	whose	command	is:	enjoy!	Derrida	does	not	say	anything	different	apropos	Nietzsche	in	Otobiographies.		
Tarry	with	the	negative	or	die	trying	Jacques	 Derrida,	 follower	 of	 Lacan	 and	 anti-Nietzschean	philosopher?	 It	 is	 a	 possible	 reading,	 against	 all	expectations,	but	it	is	not	ours.	We	invite	the	reader	back	to	
Otobiographies.	 Originally	 scheduled	 to	 speak	 about	America's	Declaration	 of	 Independence	 on	 the	 occasion	 of	its	bicentenary,	Derrida	fittingly	opens	Otobiographies	with	the	 question	 of	 the	 performativity	 of	 the	 act:	 "who	 signs,	and	what	 so-called	proper	names	 [behind]	 the	declarative	act	that	founds	an	institution?"	We	quote	Derrida	in	full:				 There	was	no	signatory,	within	the	law,	before	the	 text	 of	 the	 Declaration,	 which	 is	 itself	 the	manufacturer	 and	 the	 guarantor	 of	 its	 own	signature.	 Through	 this	 fabulous	 event,	through	 this	 fable	 implying	 a	 trace	 and	which	
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is	 in	 truth	 only	 possible	 through	 the	 self-inadequation	of	a	present	(l'inadéquation	à	soi-
même	 d'un	 présent),	 a	 signature	 gives	 itself	 a	name.	It	issues	itself	credit,	its	own	credit,	from	itself	 to	 itself.	 Here,	 the	 self	 arises	 in	 all	 cases	(nominative,	 dative,	 accusative)	 as	 soon	 as	 a	signature	 opens	 credit,	 at	 a	 stroke	 of	 a	 pen,	literally,	 which	 is	 also	 right	 to	 writing.	 This	stroke	 makes	 right,	 establishes	 rights,	 gives	rights,	 gives	 birth	 to	 Right.	 (1984,	 23,	 my	translation)			Derrida	pursues	 this	analysis	of	 the	proper	name	with	 the	mention	in	the	Declaration	that	"[colonies]	are	and	ought	to	be	 free"	 joining	 fact	 and	 right	 thanks	 to	 the	 guarantee	 of	God,	 a	 case	 of	 pure	 Malebranchian	 occasionalism,	 says	Derrida.	 He	 also	 recalls	 the	 famous	 story	 that	 Benjamin	Franklin	told	Thomas	Jefferson	about	Thompson	the	hatter.	A	hatter	named	Thompson	sets	up	shop	and	thinks	of	a	long	sentence	 to	 put	 on	 the	 storefront	 –	 something	 like	 'John	Thompson,	 Hatmaker	 Fashionable	 Hats	 Sold	 Inside	 for	Ready	Money'	 –	 until	 he	 strips	 it	 all	 down	 to	his	 surname	with	the	shape	of	a	hat	below.	Now,	if	the	reader	is	unable	to	 find	 these	 pages	 in	 the	 English	 translation,	 that	 is	because	 it	 is	based	on	 the	1979	Montreal	paper	published	in	Québec	in	1982	under	the	title	L'oreille	de	l'autre,	and	not	
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the	 1976	 Charlottesville	 paper.	 The	 integrity	 of	 Derrida's	demonstration	was	restored	in	France	as	soon	as	1984	with	the	 publication	 of	 Otobiographies	 that	 combined	 both	papers.	As	I	will	show	below,	the	exclusion	of	 this	passage	in	the	English	edition	has,	I	believe,	dramatic	consequences	when	 it	 comes	 to	 understanding	 Derrida's	 argument.	 We	proceed	 with	 our	 reading.	 Coming	 on	 the	 heels	 of	 his	discussion	 of	 Thompson	 the	 hatter,	 Derrida	 remarks	 that	Nietzsche	is	the	only	author,	with	the	possible	exception	of	Freud	and	Kierkegaard,	to	treat	philosophy	and	life	with	his	own	 name,	 in	 his	 own	 name,	 in	 the	name	of	his	name	 one	could	say.	In	Ecce	Homo	Nietzsche	declares	that	he	is	"living	on	his	own	credit".	Commenting	upon	that,	Derrida	writes:		 He	 has	 taken	 out	 a	 loan	with	 himself	 and	 has	implicated	us	in	this	transaction	through	what,	on	the	force	of	a	signature,	remains	of	his	text.	(Derrida	1984,	Ronell's	translation)		A	 boundless	 credit	 that	 one's	 name	 opens	 indeed!	 Death,	argues	Derrida,	 is	 the	only	 logical	payback:	 "to	 establish	 a	name	is	to	be	ready	to	pay	off	a	debt	of	flesh".	Recalling	his	own	Speech	and	Phenomena,	Derrida	pays	special	attention	to	the	auditory	dimension	of	the	name	at	work	in	Nietzsche	
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in	 general	 and	 in	 the	 Zarathustra	 in	 particular,	 citing	 this	passage:		 And	when	 I	 came	 out	 of	my	 solitude,	 and	 for	the	 first	 time	 passed	 over	 this	 bridge,	 then	 I	could	not	trust	mine	eyes,	but	looked	again	and	again,	 and	said	at	 last:	 "That	 is	 an	ear!	An	ear	as	 big	 as	 a	 man!"	 I	 looked	 still	 more	attentively—and	 actually	 there	 did	 move	under	 the	 ear	 something	 that	 was	 pitiably	small	 and	 poor	 and	 slim.	 And	 in	 truth	 this	immense	 ear	 was	 perched	 on	 a	 small	 thin	stalk—the	stalk,	however,	was	a	man!	A	person	putting	 a	 glass	 to	 his	 eyes,	 could	 even	recognise	further	a	small	envious	countenance,	and	also	that	a	bloated	little	soul	dangled	at	the	stalk.	The	people	told	me,	however,	that	the	big	ear	 was	 not	 only	 a	 man,	 but	 a	 great	 man,	 a	genius.	But	I	never	believed	in	the	people	when	they	 spake	 of	 great	 men—and	 I	 hold	 to	 my	belief	 that	 it	was	 a	 reversed	 cripple,	who	 had	too	 little	 of	 everything,	 and	 too	 much	 of	 one	thing.	(Z,	Part	II,	XLII)		This	passage	is	symptomatic	of	Nietzschean	nihilism	in	the	way	 it	 reduces	 the	 social	 sphere	 politically	 and	
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economically	 articulated	 around	 the	 proper	 name	 and	 the	rights	 it	 gives,	 to	 an	 auditory	 phenomenon	 deprived	 of	meaning,	an	order	"poor	in	worlds",	which	has	too	much	of	itself	(proper	names,	brand	names,	names	everywhere)	and	"too	 little	 of	 everything	 [else]".	 Derrida	 then	 goes	 on	 to	show	 that	 this	 loss	 of	 the	 symbolic	 dimension	 –	 the	structuring	 function	of	 the	name	being	rejected	as	a	result	of	the	anti-dialectical	option	we	examined	in	detail	earlier	–	has	 direct	 consequences	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 state	understood	 in	 both	 the	 metaphysical	 and	 political	 sense	(Otobiographies,	 III)	 and	 the	 question	 of	 the	 woman	 (IV).	Another	passage	of	Zarathustra	is	eloquent	on	this	subject:		 A	 state?	 What	 is	 that?	 Well!	 open	 now	 your	ears	 unto	me,	 for	 now	 I	will	 say	 unto	 you	my	word	concerning	the	death	of	peoples.	A	state,	is	 called	 the	 coldest	 of	 all	 cold	 monsters	 (...)	There,	 where	 the	 state	 ceaseth—there	 only	commenceth	 the	man	who	 is	 not	 superfluous:	there	 commenceth	 the	 song	 of	 the	 necessary	ones,	 the	 single	 and	 irreplaceable	melody.	 (Z,	Part	X,	XI)		This	passage	 echoes	 the	 argument	Nietzsche	 already	 spelt	out	 in	 his	 early	 "Truth	 and	 Lie".	 Working	 through	 the	conferences	Nietzsche	gave	 in	1872	 in	Basel	on	 the	 theme	
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of	education	(On	the	Future	of	our	Educational	Institutions),	Derrida	 is	not	afraid	 to	evoke	 the	similarities	between	 the	students’	need	 for	a	guide	 (Führer)	Nietzsche	wrote	about	in	 those	 conferences,	 and	Hitler's	wish	 to	be	 an	 authority,	also	 in	 the	 intellectual	 sense:	 "something	 here	 takes	 place	that	 belongs	 to	 the	 same"	 (1984,	 III).	 "Even	 if	 we	 allow	objections,	 we	 still	 need	 to	 account	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	inversion	 and	 mimetic	 perversion,"	 Derrida	 courageously	insists.	 In	the	following	and	last	part	of	his	demonstration,	Derrida	 completely	 overturns	 his	 own	 Spurs	 by	 tracking	down	the	"disappearance	of	the	woman"	to	the	fifth	lecture	of	On	the	Future	of	our	Educational	Institutions,	concluding	over	 the	 forbidden	 mother	 that	 remains	 "outside	 the	dialectic	 of	 accessible	 and	 non-accessible".	 I	 quoted	 that	conclusion	above	in	full.	
	 If	 this	 convergence	 of	 the	 name,	 the	 state	 and	 the	woman	 strikes	 us	 as	 vaguely	 familiar	 as	 we	 take	 a	 step	back,	 that	 is	 perhaps	 because	 it	 is	 the	 crux	 of	 Hegel's	argument	on	Spirit	and	the	ethical	order	(die	Sittlichkeit)	in	the	Phenomenology,	a	passage	at	the	heart	of	Derrida's	own	
Glas,	 a	book	strictly	contemporary	with	 the	 two	articles	at	hand	 since	 it	was	 published	 in	 1974,	 right	 between	 Spurs	presented	 in	 1972,	 and	 the	 paper	 that	 gave	 birth	 to	
Otobiographies	 in	 1976.	 To	 a	 certain	 extent,	we	 could	 say	that	Otobiographies	 is	Spurs	mediated	by	the	work	Derrida	
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produced	 in	 Glas.	 (It	 would	 not	 be	 the	 first	 time	 that	Derrida	approached	Nietzsche	with	Hegel	by	 the	way:	 this	happened	in	1971	with	the	article	"La	mythologie	blanche"	published	 in	Margins	 of	 Philosophy.)	 Hence	 our	 question:	What	 did	Derrida	 find	 in	Hegel's	 discussion	 of	 the	 'ethical	order'	that	would	account	for	the	displacement	we	witness	from	one	paper	to	the	other?	In	the	course	of	Spurs,	Derrida	notes	 that	 if	women	do	not	believe	 in	 castration,	 they	 live	off	 it	 and	 play	 with	 it.	 They	 present	 the	 two	 faces	 of	castration	 qua	 lack	 in	 the	 Other	 that	 ultimately	 sunk	Nietzsche	 (Derrida	 2010,	 79),	 namely	 that	 there	 is	 such	 a	thing	as	truth,	and	at	the	same	time	this	means	that	there	is	not.	Simply	put,	if	the	symbolic	chain	of	words	can	break	off	at	 random	points,	 for	 example	 in	 the	 face	of	 the	Real,	 this	existential	truth	implies	that	the	means	of	the	expression	of	truth	 –	 this	 very	 symbolic	 chain	 –	 are	 compromised.	 In	Lacanian	terms:	if	there	is	the	Other,	there	is	no	Other	of	the	Other.	 Whatever	 there	 is	 behind	 the	 feminine	 scepticism	Nietzsche	 focuses	 on	 instead,	 for	 example	 the	 fetishism	covering	(up)	a	 lack	Derrida	diagnoses	 in	Spurs,	 it	 is	a	 fact	that	this	feminine	scepticism	goes	some	way	in	the	history	of	 Western	 thought	 and	 finds	 perhaps	 its	 definitive	statement	in	Hegel's	Phenomenology:		
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Womankind	–	the	everlasting	irony	[in	the	life]	of	 the	 community	 –	 changes	 by	 intrigue	 the	universal	end	of	the	government	into	a	private	end,	 transforms	 its	 universal	 activity	 into	 a	work	 of	 some	 particular	 individual,	 and	perverts	 the	 universal	 property	 of	 the	 state	into	a	possession	and	ornament	for	the	Family.	Woman	 in	 this	 way	 turns	 to	 ridicule	 the	earnest	 wisdom	 of	 mature	 age,	 which,	indifferent	 to	 purely	 private	 pleasures	 and	enjoyments,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 playing	 an	 active	part,	 only	 thinks	 of,	 and	 cares	 for,	 the	universal.	She	makes	this	wisdom	an	object	of	derision	 for	 raw	 and	 irresponsible	 youth	 and	unworthy	 of	 their	 enthusiasm.	 (Hegel	 1977,	§475)		Are	 women	 really	 to	 blame	 for	 the	 bankruptcy	 of	 the	(German)	 state?	 Does	 Derrida	 target	 Nietzsche	 to	 shield	Hegel	 from	 the	 same	 charge	 of	 fetishism	 and,	 yes,	theoretical	 feminicide?	 Was	 not	 Nietzsche	 right	 to	 attack	this	kind	of	metaphysical	violence	contained	in	speculative	philosophy?	Not	so	fast:	Hegel's	harsh	remarks	take	place	in	the	 context	 of	 a	 long	 discussion	 on	 the	 ethical	 order	 in	chapter	 VI	 on	 Spirit,	 roughly	 two-thirds	 into	 the	
Phenomenology.	 In	 the	 section	 aforementioned,	 Hegel	
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describes	the	necessary	abandonment	of	the	ethical	life	and	its	 beauties	 –	 the	 efforts	 one	 enjoys	 making	 in	 order	 to	submit	 unconditionally	 to	 the	 law,	 the	 false	dilemmas	one	likes	to	pause	over	and	over	again	(Hegel	has	Kant	in	mind,	e.g.	the	"gallows	man"	in	the	second	Critique)	–	to	pass	from	this	 antithesis	 of	 individuality	 and	 universality,	 to	 a	substance	 that	 includes	 and	 overcomes	 this	 opposition.	 In	Hegel's	words:		 It	is	Spirit	which	is	for	itself	in	that	it	preserves	itself	 in	 its	 reflection	 in	 individuals;	 and	 it	 is	implicitly	 Spirit,	 or	 substance,	 in	 that	 it	preserves	them	within	itself.	(1977,	§447)		Hegel	adds	that	as	actual	substance,	it	is	a	nation;	as	actual	consciousness,	 it	 is	 the	 citizens	 of	 that	 nation,	 especially	when	 they	 form	 a	 government	 (§448).	 For	 Hegel,	 the	journey	 to	maturity	 passes	 through	 the	 transformation	 of	the	ethical	 life	 into	a	duty	towards	the	state	consciousness	belongs	to,	which	Hegel	calls	the	human	law,	as	opposed	to	the	 divine	 law.	 The	 divine	 law	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 is	characterised	 by	 the	 primacy	 of	 the	 duty	 towards	 the	family.	 Hegel	 expressly	 maintains	 that	 it	 bypasses	 the	Notion	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 "natural	 relationship"	 or	 an	"immediate	connection"	(Hegel's	own	italics,	§451).	And	the	
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divine	 law	 is	 the	 prerogative	 of	 the	 woman	 (§463),	 best	embodied	 in	 the	 figure	 of	 Antigone,	 as	 she	 chooses	 her	brother	over	reason	of	State.		 It	 would	 be	 wrong	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	 Hegelian	matrix	simply	confines	feminine	subjectivity	to	the	duties	of	the	 family,	 however.	 Insofar	 as	 the	 divine	 law	 reproduces	the	antithesis	seen	above	in	the	duty	of	one	family	member	towards	 the	whole	 family	 (individuality/universality),	 it	 is	an	 ethical	 relation.	 The	 difference	 with	 the	 human	 law	 is	that	 the	 latter	 prioritises	 the	whole	 (the	 state,	 the	nation)	over	 individuality	 (the	 single	 citizen	 ready	 to	 die	 for	 it),	while	the	divine	law	prioritises	the	individual	(the	brother,	the	sister,	the	son,	the	daughter)	over	the	whole	(the	family	ready	 to	die	 to	 save	 its	 young).	But	 that	 is	because,	 in	 the	divine	law,	the	individual	is	the	universal	(and	the	group	is	conversely	 the	 "pathological"	 link;	 in	 the	 human	 law,	 it	 is	the	 national	 community	 that	 stands	 for	 the	 universal).	 It	seems	 that,	 if	we	 (ethical)	men	are	 ready	 to	die	 to	defend	our	nations,	women	are	ready	to	die	with	the	same	bravery	in	 defence	 of	 the	 individual	 as	 such.	 For	 reminder,	 if	 this	law	 is	 divine,	 it	 is	 because	 it	 recalls	 the	 individual	 par	
excellence,	 Jesus	 Christ.	 Death	 is	 not	 accidental	 in	 this	configuration:	as	Hegel's	reference	to	Antigone	shows,	it	is	a	necessary	point	through	which	passes	the	ethical	order	–	it	functions	 as	 the	 middle	 term	 between	 individuality	 and	
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universality.	We	 have	 here	 the	 essential	 node	 of	 Hegelian	thought	linking	sexual	difference	to	death,	and	the	structure	of	this	dialectics	leads	Hegel	to	derive	the	necessity	of	war.	I	quote	Hegel:		 In	 order	 not	 to	 let	 them	 [individuals]	 become	rooted	 and	 set	 in	 this	 isolation	 [personal	independence	and	property],	thereby	breaking	up	 the	whole	 and	 letting	 the	 communal	 spirit	evaporate,	 government	 has	 from	 time	 to	 time	to	 shake	 them	 to	 their	 core	 by	 war.	 By	 this	means	 the	 government	 upsets	 their	established	 order,	 and	 violates	 their	 right	 to	independence,	 while	 the	 individuals	 who,	absorbed	 in	 their	own	way	of	 life,	break	 loose	from	 the	whole	 and	 strive	 after	 the	 inviolable	independence	 and	 security	 of	 the	 person,	 are	made	to	feel	in	the	task	laid	on	them	their	lord	and	master,	death.	(1977,	§455)		We	cannot	stress	enough	that	in	the	Hegelian	dialectics,	the	human	 law	 does	 not	 go	 against	 the	 divine	 law	 and	 vice	versa,	both	options	(defend	the	state,	defend	the	family)	are	not	mutually	exclusive.	Hegel	is	far	from	envisaging	a	crude	war	of	the	sexes	of	the	kind	the	ancient	world	periodically	experienced.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 if	 the	 human	 law	 pushes	
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individuality	 to	 rise	 to	 the	 challenge	 of	 mediated	universality	 in	 the	 shape	 of	 the	 state,	 and	 stakes	 it	 to	 the	trials	of	death,	our	"lord	and	master,"	the	divine	law	pushes	universality	 to	 rise	 to	 the	 challenge	 of	 immediacy	 in	 the	shape	of	 the	single	 living	body	 (remember	 that	 chapter	VI	comes	 on	 the	 heels	 of	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 organic	 living	being	 in	 chapter	V).	 The	 bonds	 of	 family	 do	 not	 endanger	the	state,	they	are	its	very	lifeline.	(This	is	by	the	way	one	of	several	 Hegelian	 points	 that	 are	 the	 doom	 of	 Marxist-Leninist	 constructions:	 insofar	 as	 twentieth	 century	communism	fetishized	the	state	and	deprived	the	family	of	its	ontological	and	economic	dignity,	it	remained	stuck	at	a	primitive	 level	 of	 this	 dialectics	 in	 the	 Hegelian	perspective.)	Hegel's	analysis	goes	deeper	still:		 Nature,	 not	 the	 accidents	 of	 circumstances	 or	choice,	assigns	one	sex	to	one	law,	the	other	to	the	 other	 law;	 or	 conversely,	 the	 two	 ethical	powers	 themselves	 give	 themselves	 an	individual	 existence,	 and	 actualise	 themselves	in	the	two	sexes.	(1977,	§465)		How	 far	 we	 have	 gone	 from	 the	 scepticism	 Nietzsche	attributes	to	women!	For	Hegel,	 the	"irony	of	womankind"	is	only	a	sign	–	perhaps	a	"trace"	in	Derridean	parlance	–	of	
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the	 complex	 structure	 of	 the	 dialectics	 animating	 human	relations.	 Far	 from	 being	 the	 height	 of	 speculative	philosophy,	Hegel's	argument	in	fact	cuts	moral	discussions	short	 by	 taking	 the	 world	 as	 it	 is	 –	 marred	 by	 sexual	difference,	 the	 embarrassing	nudity	 of	Adam	and	Eve	 cast	out	 of	 paradise	 –	 and	 not	 as	 the	 individual	 consciousness	rationalises	 it.	 Hegel,	 like	 Nietzsche,	 uses	 the	 German	neutral	das	Weib	for	woman,	and	not	the	feminine	die	Frau,	not	 with	 the	 intent	 to	 deny	 the	 ontological	 charge	femininity	 carries,	as	 Anaïs	 Frantz	 would	 have	 it	 apropos	Nietzsche	 (2011),	 but	 on	 the	 contrary	 to	 emphasise	 the	rawness	 of	 sexual	 difference.	 Das	Weib,	 now	 a	 pejorative	word	 similar	 to	 'chick',	 'broad'	 or	 even	 'wench'	 in	 the	English	 language,	 shares	 an	 etymological	 origin	 with	 the	English	'wife'	and	designates	in	the	nineteenth	century	the	everyday	woman,	 often	 of	 low	 social	 origins.	Whereas	die	
Frau,	 now	 standard	 German	 for	 'woman'	 and	 also	 a	 title	equivalent	 to	 'Mrs',	designates	 in	 the	nineteenth	century	a	woman	of	 aristocratic	origin.	Both	Hegel's	 and	Nietzsche's	use	of	the	word	Weib	can	thus	be	construed	as	the	sign	that	femininity	 is	 no	 longer	 re-marked	 within	 the	 aristocratic	order	 of	 the	 Ancien	 Régime,	 but	 comes	 out	 on	 its	 own.	Woman	 at	 the	 biological,	 yes,	 animal	 level:	Weiblich	 still	means	 female	 in	 German.	 (This	 also	 vindicates	 Derrida's	approach	linking	Nietzsche's	despicable	woman	to	his	anti-
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democratic	 politics.)	 The	 double	 "downward	 synthesis"	(Slavoj	 Žižek)	 of	 individuality	 and	 universality,	 and	 the	spiritual	 and	 the	material,	 at	 work	 in	 the	 passage	 quoted	above	 also	 paves	 the	 way	 for	 the	 regime	 of	 particularity	that	 characterises	 legality	 in	 the	 following	 chapter	 of	 the	
Phenomenology.	 This	 is	 one	 of	 Hegel's	 clean	 breaks	 with	Kant:	the	horizon	of	the	Good	is	no	longer	ethical,	it	is	legal.	There	is	no	moral	treatise	in	the	Hegelian	corpus,	there	is	a	major	 opus	 on	 the	philosophy	of	 right	 instead.	This	 is	 not	just	 a	 theoretical	 point:	 recognition	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 law	still	 characterises	 the	 life	 of	modern	 democratic	 societies,	from	minorities'	rights	to	marriage	equality	and	abortion.			
The	woman	that	therefore	we	are	The	dangers	and	allure	of	feminine	scepticism	that	come	up	in	 Nietzsche	 are	 anachronistic	 in	 the	 age	 of	 the	 modern	state	 characterised	 by	 extensive	 legality,	 this	 is	 what	Derrida	must	have	found	in	Hegel's	discussion	of	Sittlichkeit	in	the	wake	of	the	French	Revolution.	It	 is	here	impossible	to	 play	 down	 the	 impact	 of	 a	 number	 of	 works	 on	 our	reading,	 starting	 with	 Canadian	 scholar	 Rebecca	 Comay's	
Mourning	Sickness:	Hegel	and	the	French	Revolution.	 In	 this	classic,	 Comay	 emphasises	 "Germany's	 historical	 non-historicity"	and	characterised	German	Idealism	as	"nothing	but	 the	staging	of	a	 chronically	missed	encounter"	 (2010).	
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In	 his	 own	 Le	 sujet	 de	 la	 philosophie,	 Lacoue-Labarthe	pointed	 out	 that	 Heidegger's	 aesthetic	 programme	 goes	right	back	to	German	Idealism,	with	its	attempt	to	precisely	stage	and	mythologise	this	 traumatic	encounter	with	post-revolutionary	Reason,	 from	 the	Phenomenology	of	Spirit	 to	Schelling's	The	Ages	of	 the	World,	 through	Hölderlin's	 and	Schlegel's	 works.	 But	 one	 of	 the	 first	 to	 read	 Hegel's	realisation	 of	 Germany's	 notional	 lateness	 into	 the	
Phenomenology	was	French	 scholar	Gérard	Lebrun,	whose	
L'envers	 de	 la	 dialectique:	 Hegel	 à	 la	 lumière	 de	 Nietzsche	(unfortunately	 untranslated	 in	 English)	 compares	 and	contrasts	 Hegel	 and	 Nietzsche	 on	 the	 subjects	 of	 history,	politics	 and	 ontology.	 To	 give	 but	 two	 examples,	 Lebrun	showed	 that	 Hegel	 and	 Nietzsche	 shared	 the	 same	 initial	interest	 in	 classical	 Athens	 in	 their	 youth,	 until	 Hegel	moved	on	 to	 the	notional	 superiority	 of	 Christianity	while	Nietzsche	 went	 the	 opposite	 way	 to	 defend	 the	 pre-Socratics	 against	 the	 age	 of	 Pericles	 (2004,	 part	 3).	Channelling	Hegel's	 remarks	on	natural	 law	 from	 the	 Jena	period,	 Lebrun	 also	 explicitly	 addressed	 "the	 Rousseauist	impasse	of	Germany",	that	is	to	say	the	inability	to	translate	a	 Subject	 from	 the	 singular	 to	 the	universal	 –	 if	 there	 is	 a	Subject,	it	has	to	go	against	the	State	(part	2).		 So	who	is	the	woman	of	Nietzsche's	prose?	Certainly	not	Lou	Andreas-Salomé,	the	foreign	negation	in	the	shape	
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of	 a	 woman	 Nietzsche	 ultimately	 could	 not	 reckon	 with.	Neither	is	 it	the	mother,	who	remains	at	the	bottom	of	the	glass	 for	 as	 long	 as	 Nietzsche	 fills	 it	 with	words.	 Is	 it	 the	
Lorelei	Clemens	Brentano	and	Heinrich	Heine	re-actualised	in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 French	 Revolution,	 the	 figure	 of	 the	temptress	that	brought	the	crown	of	Bavaria	to	its	knees	in	1848?	But	 is	 that	woman	not	Liberty	herself,	 of	Tea	Party	and	 Bastille	 fame,	 leaping	 out	 of	 a	 Delacroix	 painting,	raising	 her	 torch	 over	 Lower	 Manhattan,	 always	 and	everywhere	leading	the	people	from	their	atomistic	lives	to	the	greater	whole	of	republics?	In	other	words,	is	it	not	the	unchartered	metonymy	of	Democracy	dislocating	–	literally,	putting	out	of	its	proper	place	–	the	old	aristocratic	habits	of	the	 Holy	 Roman	 Empire	 without	 rhyme	 or	 reason?	 If	 the	absolute	positivity	of	Liberty	signals	for	us	the	return	of	the	repressed	(qua	the	entire	process	of	the	ethical	order	which	saw	 the	 disclosure	 of	 sexual	 difference	 within	consciousness)	 in	 the	 shape	 of	 the	 woman,	 the	 negativity	contained	 in	Nietzsche's	woman	 is	by	 contrast	a	 symptom	of	 his	 philosophy's	 own	 notional	 lateness	 with	 respect	 to	the	 Hegelian	 experience.	 Against	 Badiou's	 interpretation	("Nietzsche	 is	 the	 prince	 of	 Antiphilosophy",	 2015),	Nietzsche	 is	 for	 us	 the	 standard-bearer	 of	 postmodern	metaphysics	that	stretches	from	Schopenhauer	(himself	the	author	of	 full-length	misogynistic	pamphlets)	 to	Heidegger	
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and	 Deleuze,	 insofar	 as	 he	 so	 spectacularly	 recoils	 from	Hegel's	 Sittlichkeit	 jump.	 At	 least	 this	 is	 what	 we	 could	deduce	 from	 Derrida's	 Hegelian	 travels	 (in	 its	 old	etymological	 sense,	 work,	 work	 through)	 from	 Spurs	 to	
Otobiographies,	 and	 within	 Otobiographies	 from	 the	Declaration	 of	 Independence	 to	 Nietzsche's	 reactive	politics.	
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PART	 3.	 Reading	 Two	 Negations:	
Melancholia	 and	 the	 Rise	 of	 the	
Democratic	Master	
		 Death	laughs	at	those	who	call	for	it	and	confuse	it	with	Nothingness.		 –Chateaubriand,	Mémoires	d'outre-tombe		FORGET	 critically	 reflecting	 upon	Two	Negations:	 creation	is	 always	 its	 own	 answer,	 and	 interpretation	 must	surrender	in	the	face	of	it.	At	least	this	is	the	conclusion	of	a	lifetime	spent	in	thought	for	psychoanalyst	Sigmund	Freud.	Indeed,	Freud	wrote	about	literature	on	only	four	occasions	and	 very	 briefly	 each	 time:	 the	 first	 time	 in	 his	 paper	 on	“Creative	Writers	and	Day-Dreaming”	(1908),	to	claim	that	literature	 is	phantasy	written	down;	 then	 in	his	postscript	to	 his	 Jensen’s	 Gradiva	 (1912)	 to	 take	 back	 the	 previous	claim;	in	the	final	pages	of	“The	‘Uncanny’”	(1919a)	to	paint	literature	 as	 a	masterful	 art	 able	 to	 create	more	 uncanny	effects	 than	 reality	 itself;	 and	 finally	 in	 a	 well-known	formula	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 his	 Dostoevsky	 paper	 (1928),	“before	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 creative	 artist,	 analysis	 must,	alas,	 lay	 down	 its	 arms”.	 So	 if	 we	 are	 to	 interpret	 Two	
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Negations	 after	 all	 (rather	 than	 politely	 decline	 to	 include	ourselves	 in	a	 foreign	content),	 and	still	 remain	 faithful	 to	the	master	of	Vienna,	then	we	must	do	it	 in	the	manner	of	Shoshana	 Felman's	 theoretical	 turn	 of	 the	 screw	 (1977),	mindful	of	 the	 fact	 that	 fiction	is	not	theory,	 fiction	 implies	and	 includes	 an	 obstacle	 that	 does	 not	 lend	 itself	 to	 the	clarity	of	the	legal	argument	that	underpins	the	best	of	our	academic	 efforts.	This	obstacle	 is	 of	 course	 the	 (Freudian)	unconscious.	To	quote	Felman's	classic	essay,					 It	is	precisely	because	the	letters	fail	to	narrate,	to	construct	a	coherent,	transparent	story,	that	there	 is	 a	 story	at	 all:	 there	 is	 a	 story	because	there	is	an	unreadable,	an	unconscious.	(1977,	143)		Insofar	 as	 Two	 Negations	 fictionalises	 its	 own	 content	starting	with	the	Second	Negation,	insofar	as	it	sets	a	stage	(a	 City,	 an	 Old	 Town,	 etc.)	 and	 makes	 up	 returning	characters	 (The	 Archer,	 The	 Dreamer,	 The	 Mayer,	 Holly,	etc.),	we	have	 to	 take	 into	account	 this	narrative	structure	in	 our	 interpretation.	 As	 Felman	 has	 shown	 in	 her	milestone	essay,	this	structure	precludes	simple	answers.			 The	other	trap	we	must	absolutely	escape	is	the	one	outlined	 by	 Alenka	 Zupančič	 in	 her	 The	 Shortest	 Shadow:	
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Nietzsche's	Philosophy	of	the	Two	(2003),	namely	sweeping	under	 the	 carpet	 the	 bizarrerie	 and	 poetic	 license	 that	makes	 Two	 Negations	 a	 text	 that	 arouses	 curiosity	 or	amazement.	Theory	sets	up	its	own	irrelevance	when	it	fails	to	 reflect	 on	 its	 position	 of	 enunciation,	 i.e.	 its	 own	amazement,	 for	 instance	 when	 it	 talks	 of	 "action,	 agency	and	 responsibility"	 (Pippin	 2006,	 44)	 apropos	 an	 author	such	 as	 Nietzsche	 that	 would	 have	 ridiculed	 this	 kind	 of	language.	 It	 is	 impossible	 to	 take	 seriously	 a	 number	 of	claims	 and	 references	 in	 Two	 Negations,	 just	 as	 it	 is	impossible	 to	 take	 some	 of	 Nietzsche's	 comments	 at	 face	value,	yet	it	would	be	a	grave	mistake	to	simply	ignore	them	and	pretend	they	are	just	not	there.	Something	will	have	to	be	 said	 about	 such	 provocations,	 about	 their	 function	 and	their	 addressee.	 This	 is	 not	 impossible	 in	 an	 academic	context:	Zupančič	 changed	 the	 field	of	Nietzschean	studies	precisely	 by	 being	 able	 to	 recognise	 "hysterical"	 material	and	address	it	as	such.	So	add	this	trap	on	top	of	the	other	and	 we	 scholars	 find	 ourselves	 in	 a	 double	 bind:	 how	 to	respond	to	this	text	without	reducing	the	manifest	content	to	 the	 latent,	 for	 example	 treating	 femininity	 and	 pop	culture	 in	 Two	 Negations	 as	 cause	 rather	 than	 symptom;	AND	without	reducing	the	latent	content	to	the	manifest,	i.e.	giving	 up	 intellectual	 effort	 for	 impotent	 paraphrasing	 in	the	face	of	complexity.	What	is	perhaps	needed	is	a	certain	
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methodological	 obliqueness:	 sometimes	 the	 only	 way	 to	find	the	key	is	to	act	as	if	there	was	no	safe	to	crack	at	all.			 But	before	we	step	 forward,	or	aside	as	philosophy	does,	we	also	need	to	know	where	our	critical	effort	comes	from	–	where	does	 the	upcoming	 interpretation	originate?	Is	 it	 in	 the	 field	 of	 literary	 criticism,	 or	 comparative	literature	perhaps,	 or	 contemporary	English	 literature?	Or	does	it	reflect	a	knowledge	of,	and	interest	in,	the	history	of	philosophy,	 and	 is	 therefore	more	philosophical	 in	nature,	or	 theoretical	 as	 we	 say	 today?	 It	 is	 not	 the	 same!	 For	instance,	 if	 this	 commentary	 wished	 to	 reflect	 on	 the	literary	 nature	 of	 this	 work,	 as	 would	 a	 piece	 of	 literary	criticism	 do,	 we	 would	 perhaps	 track	 down	 all	 the	references	 to	 contemporary	 culture,	 establish	 parallels	between	 Elizabethan	 theatre	 and	 hip-hop	 poetics	 at	 the	confluence	of	which	we	find	some	of	the	wordplays	of	Two	
Negations.	We	would	obviously	mention	the	rise	of	America	as	 cultural	 superpower	 in	 the	 twentieth	century,	with	pop	music	gaining	mainstream	recognition	(think	of	Bob	Dylan	winning	 the	 Nobel	 prize).	 We	 would	 no	 doubt	 evoke	 the	multiplicity	 of	 literary	 forms	 and	 voices	 within	 a	 single	work.	 The	 references	 to	 psychoanalysis	 fit	 a	 pattern	 too,	and	we	could	 insert	Two	Negations	 in	a	 long	 line	of	works	that	thrive	on	its	signifier.	And,	with	a	bit	of	indulgence,	we	could	also	shine	a	 light	on	the	beauties	of	a	 text	 that	at	 its	
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best	 does	 not	 lack	 for	 any.	 All	 this,	 however,	 is	 not	 our	perspective.	 Since	 this	 essay	 takes	 place	 in	 a	 critical	 and	yes,	 philosophical,	 context,	 our	 objective	 is	 not	 only	 to	 be	able	 to	 raise	 the	difficult	questions	 that	 surround	 the	 text,	but	 to	 also	 provide	 a	 few	 answers	 in	 passing.	 These	answers	take	the	shape	of	three	fundamental	displacements	with	respect	to	contemporary	theory.		
From	nihilism	back	to	melancholia	The	first	displacement	to	operate	is	to	isolate	nihilism	as	a	
moment	 in	 the	 history	 of	 Western	 civilisation	 and	 take	theory	 back	 to	 the	 structural	 question	 of	 melancholia	instead.	 Because	 she	 was	 able	 to	 engage	 with	 Nietzsche's	provocations	 by	 examining	 them	 as	 such	 rather	 than	drawing	 ontological	 conclusions	 à	 la	 Deleuze,	 Alenka	Zupančič's	 The	 Shortest	 Shadow	 is	 the	 best	 port	 of	 entry	into	the	unknown	country	that	Two	Negations	 seems	to	be	at	 first.	 Let	 us	 follow	 in	 her	 footsteps	 and	 see	 how	 her	analysis	 applies	 to	 the	 material	 at	 hand.	 Apropos	 the	"bomb"	 that	 the	 event	 is	 for	 Nietzsche	 ("I	 Am	 Dynamite",	EH;	Sarah	Kofman	also	talks	of	an	"explosion",	see	my	Part	
2)(the	 metaphor	 of	 the	 bomb	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 Two	
Negations,	 see	N2§172),	Zupančič	 evokes	a	 "declaration	of	declaration"	 (2003,	 9-10),	 suggesting	 a	 certain	performative	dimension	 is	 essential	 to	 this	 event.	 For	her,	
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the	author	of	Zarathustra	overcomes	 the	old	philosophical	opposition	 between	 the	 metaphysical	 and	 the	 sophistic	position:	 if	 the	 sophistic	 position	 eluded	 the	 big	metaphysical	 questions	 by	 sticking	 to	 formal	 procedures,	however	 empty,	 it	 seems	 that	 Nietzsche	was	 able	 to	 have	metaphysical	questions	 return	 from	 the	very	emptiness	of	such	formal	procedures.	Zupančič	uses	Hamlet	to	make	her	point:			 A	very	good	example	of	this	kind	of	doubleness	would	 be	 the	 famous	 "play	 scene"	 (or	"mousetrap")	 in	 Shakespeare's	 Hamlet.	 (...)	 In	Hamlet,	 the	 redoubling	 of	 fiction,	 far	 from	avoiding	 or	 lacking	 the	 Real,	 functions	 as	 the	very	"trap"	(the	"mousetrap")	of	the	Real.	One	could	also	say	 that	 the	"mousetrap"	 in	Hamlet	has	 exactly	 the	 status	 of	 the	 "declaration	 of	declaration."	 Through	 the	 staging	 of	 the	"Murder	 of	 Gonzago,"	 Hamlet	 declares	 what	was	 declared	 to	 him	 by	 his	 father's	 Ghost.	 At	the	 same	 time,	 this	 "declaration	 of	declaration",	 taking	 the	 form	 of	 a	 stage	performance,	 succeeds	 precisely	 because	 it	produces	 a	 dimension	 of:	 "I,	 the	 Real,	 am	speaking."	(2003,	13)		
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This	 situation	 –	 of	 the	 Real	 popping	 out	 of	 the	 text	 (Real	capitalised	 as	 it	 is	 not	 physical	 reality,	 but	 discrepancy	 or	impossibility	 within	 and	 beyond	 imaginary	 and	 symbolic	realities)	 –	 is	 definitely	 that	 of	 Two	 Negations':	 not	 only	verbatim	 in	 N2§236,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 passages	 at	 the	beginning	 of	 the	 Second	 Negation	 that	 describe	 an	encounter	 with	 the	 symbolic	 function	 –	 so	 declares	 a	declaration	 –	 as	 traumatising.	 There	 is	 the	 man	 that	"dreams	up	a	city"	(N2§5),	the	abyss	and	the	metaphors	of	the	 lake	and	 the	black	hole	 (N2§11)	 that	 come	back	again	and	 again	 throughout	 the	 text,	 the	 winter	 and	 the	 freeze	that	kill	all	imaginary	objects	(N2§22-4),	the	clear	link	that	is	 immediately	 established	 with	 the	 paternal	 function	(N2§25),	 and,	 more	 generally	 the	 redoubling	 of	 the	symbolic	declaration	–	or	symbolic	discrepancy	–	between	"City"	 and	 "Phallus".	 We	 recall	 Hamlet's	 immortal	 words:	"the	time	is	out	of	joint:	O,	cursed	spite	that	ever	I	was	born	to	set	it	right!"	(Act	1,	Scene	5).	Zupančič	aptly	remarks	that	the	 Nietzschean	 event	 could	 be	 encapsulated	 by	 the	declaration	 "Eins	 wurde	 zu	 Zwei"	 ("One	 became	 Two")	contained	 in	Beyond	Good	&	Evil	(2003,	18).	This	of	course	strikes	a	chord	with	Two	Negations,	from	the	long	passages	on	metaphor	 and	metonymy	 in	 both	 the	 First	 and	 Second	Negation	–	how	"one	breaks	into	two	and	two	falls	back	into	one	 again"	 –	 to	 the	 final	 number	 of	 the	 Second	 Negation	
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initially	 being	 241:	 two-for-one.	 Zupančič's	 find	 places	Nietzsche	 –	 and	 the	 operation	 of	 Two	 Negations	 –	 at	 the	juncture	 of	 the	 Symbolic	 and	 the	 Real.	 This	 perhaps	explains	 the	 particular	 emphasis	 on	 the	 body	 in	 both	Nietzsche	 (see	 for	 example	 the	 obsession	of	 cleanliness	 in	BGE,	 §271)	 and	 Two	 Negations.	 Elaborating	 on	 the	 One-becomes-Two	in	Nietzsche,	and	perhaps	following	Derrida's	
Otobiographies,	 Zupančič	writes	 at	 length	 about	 the	 event	linking	 future	 and	 past,	 the	 hole	 in	 time,	 the	 "well	 of	eternity"	 or	 "timeless	 moment"	 that	 Nietzsche	 seeks	 to	create	 for	 himself	 (2003,	 21).	 This	 space	 of	 writing	experienced	 as	 a	 timeless	 plane,	 one	 where	 time	 can	 be	experienced	 as	 such,	 this	 space	 that	writing	 is,	 is	 the	 very	subject	 of	 Two	 Negations.	 One	 paragraph	 in	 particular	strikes	out:		 Patience	 is	 an	 art.	 Each	 time	 a	 new	 signifier	comes	 up,	 its	 absence	 too	must	 be	 registered.	What	may	 seem	 like	 an	 endless	 process	 –	 the	impossibility	 of	 symbolic	 closure,	 the	 long	process	of	symbolisation,	the	unavoidable	loop	that	 belongs	 to	 the	 symbolic	 order	 itself	 and	must	 be	 gone	 through	 again	 and	 again	 –	 in	sum,	what	Hegel	calls	'bad	infinity'	–	all	of	this	will	 eventually	 turn	 into	 something	 else,	
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though	 not	 what	 you	 expected	 at	 the	beginning.	(N2§44)		If	the	beginning	the	Second	Negation	describes	the	process	of	 symbolisation,	 this	 timeless	 plane	 also	 returns	 in	 the	"meadows"	mentioned	in	the	conclusion	(N2§241).		 Zupančič	links	these	initial	remarks	about	the	event	of	writing	with	a	fine	analysis	of	fin-de-siècle	nihilism	(first	part	 of	The	 Shortest	 Shadow).	So	what	 is	 nihilism?	 Simply	put,	 nihilism	 is	 a	 social	 and	 cultural	 condition	 where	everything	that	has	the	structure	of	a	fiction	is	experienced	as	 a	 lie	 –	 "untruth	 is	 a	 condition	 of	 life,"	 writes	 Zupančič	(2003,	 92).	 She	 distinguishes	 between	 active	 and	 passive	nihilism:	 passive	 nihilism	wills	 Nothing	 –	 one	 of	 the	most	frequent	words	of	Two	Negations	–	and	represents	the	last	stage	 of	 scepticism,	 whereas	 active	 nihilism	 wills	 some	destructive	passage-à-l'acte.	Far	from	being	foreign	to	each	other,	they	are	two	sides	of	the	same	coin:	"passive	nihilism	needs	active	nihilism's	passion	of	the	Real	as	its	other"	(67).	Nietzsche	 occupies	 here	 a	 unique	 position	 in	 the	 nihilistic	constellation	of	"late	modernity"	–	 if	symbolic	 frameworks	are	 readily	 experienced	 as	 false	 comforts	 by	 a	 certain	intellectual	 elite,	 from	 Marx	 to	 sociologists	 such	 as	Durkheim	and	Weber,	Nietzsche	adds	an	additional	turn	of	the	nihilistic	screw	by	condemning	the	socialist	movement	
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as	 "collective	 degeneration	 of	 man"	 (BGE,	 §203).	Nietzsche's	 point	 is	 both	 simple	 and	 indisputable:	 Marx's	critique	of	bourgeois	culture	does	not	go	far	enough	since	it	conveniently	retains	its	teleology	(History	is	on	the	side	of	the	 workers,	 etc.).	 By	 virtue	 of	 being	 its	 fiercest	 critic,	Nietzsche	 becomes	 the	 most	 consistent	 ideologue	 of	nihilism	–	it	is	not	religion	or	the	politics	of	Marx	that	are	a	false	 shelter	 of	 life,	 for	 Nietzsche	 it	 is	 the	 symbolic	framework	itself.	Whereas	the	Real,	nestled	in	the	distance	from	 the	 symbolic	 to	 itself,	 shows	 exposure	 and	vulnerability.	Above	all,	Nietzsche	seeks	the	authenticity	of	the	 Real	 as	 we	 have	 just	 defined	 it:	 "to	 perish	 as	 a	proclaimer,	to	break	at	one's	word,	to	become	the	thing	one	proclaims"	 (Zupančič	 2003,	 16),	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	Nietzsche's	 gist	 (and	Two	Negations).	This	 signature	move	of	 post-Hegelian	 philosophy	 (uniting	 in	 a	 single	 front	figures	as	diverse	as	Schopenhauer,	Nietzsche,	Kierkegaard	and	 Wittgenstein)	 is	 an	 interesting	 and	 far-reaching	reversal	from	the	early	stages	of	European	modernity	when	it	 was	 the	 symbolic	 journey,	 not	 this	 passion	 of	 the	 Real,	that	 was	 the	 perilous	 and	 authentic	 one,	 from	 Dante's	banishment	 from	 Florence	 to	 Rousseau's	 and	 Voltaire's	late-night	 escapes	 to	 the	 Swiss	 border.	 For	 Zupančič,	nihilism	thus	appears	when	the	only	possible	object	 left	to	desire	 is	 its	 transcendental	 condition	 itself	 (2003,	 127)	 –	
	 303	
nihilism	is	desire	that	collapses	upon	itself.	If	this	feature	is	prominent	 in	 Two	 Negations,	 there	 is	 one	 passage	 that	epitomises	the	remarks	we	have	just	made:		 When	 we	 were	 left	 for	 dead	 and	 the	 wolves	dragged	 our	 decaying	 body	 into	 the	 night,	we	could	only	desire	our	own	signifier.	(N2§130)		The	 desire	 for	 the	 transcendental	 condition	 of	 desire	necessarily	 comes	with	 the	decaying	body,	 that	 is	 to	 say	a	body	 outside	 the	 regulative	 horizon	 of	 the	 symbolic,	 so	always	already	coming	apart.	It	is	as	if	what	really	appears	instead	of	symbolic	entities	in	the	guise	of	the	truth	is	death	itself,	in	its	material,	concrete	appearance	–	death	deprived	of	 its	 symbolic	 clothes.	 Both	 Nietzsche	 and	 the	 author	 of	
Two	Negations	write	in	the	shadow	of	Charles	Baudelaire's	poem	 "A	 Carcass",	 whose	 influence	 stretches	 from	 Robert	Graves'	 "A	 Dead	 Boche"	 (1918)	 to	 Yves	 Bonnefoy's	 1953	poetry	 collection	On	the	Motion	and	Immobility	of	Douve,	 a	variation	 on	 Baudelaire's	 poem.	 Zupančič	 evokes	 the	Hegelian	 "bad	 infinity"	 apropos	 this	 concrete	 death:	 in	nihilism,	 the	 semblances	 are	 caught	 in	 a	 never-ending	regression,	including	the	specular	relation.		 This	 lack	 in	 appearances,	 which	 is	 a	 lack	 of	appearances,	 is	 directly	 related	 to	 the	 Kantian	 trap	 of	
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aesthetisation	that	Zupančič	is	keen	to	read	into	Nietzsche's	philosophical	trajectory	(This	is	the	second	and	last	part	of	
The	 Shortest	 Shadow):	 aesthetics	 take	 centre	 stage	 when	appearances	can	no	 longer	be	taken	for	granted.	We	recall	Kant's	journey	in	the	Critique	of	Judgement:	imagination	is	a	success	 when	 it	 fails	 to	 comprehend	 the	magnitude	 of	 its	object	and	turns	to	reason	by	recognising	that.	The	sublime	arises	 from	 this	 discrepancy	 between	 imagination	 and	reason,	 it	 is	 the	 "conversion	 of	 respect	 for	 the	 Idea	 of	humanity	 in	 our	 own	 subject	 into	 respect	 for	 the	 Object"	(Kant	2009,	§27),	or	simply:	conversion	of	the	Idea	into	the	Object.	 Insofar	as	the	moral	 law	is	conceived	 in	relation	to	the	imaginary	(the	sublime	being	its	product)	rather	than	as	an	 independent	 power,	 the	 law	 just	 found	 cannot	 be	overpowered,	but	 it	also	means	that	the	law	has	no	power	in	 itself.	 With	 the	 third	 Critique	 the	 law	 becomes	 an	aesthetic	 phenomenon.	 This	 is	 key	 to	 understanding	 the	relentless	 scorn	 Hegel	 pours	 over	 Kant	 in	 his	writing:	 for	Hegel,	 Kant	 fails	 to	 perceive	 the	 law	 in	 its	 particular,	concrete	shape,	i.e.	the	law	as	always	laid	out	by	someone	in	particular	 (the	Master	 Hegel	 is	 eager	 to	 reintroduce),	 and	harbouring	the	potential	for	violence.	Kant	does	see	that	the	law	is	not	dialecticisable,	and	this	is	what	makes	it	sublime;	but	 he	 does	 not	 get	 past	 it.	 It	 is	 the	 exact	 reverse	 of	contemporary	philosophy's	monolingual	insistence	that	the	
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law	 is	 only	 violence,	without	 emancipatory	 power.	 This	 is	the	bread	and	butter	of	Michel	Foucault	and	followers	such	as	 Italian	 philosopher	 Giorgio	 Agamben.	 If	 the	aesthetisation	of	life	becomes	prominent	in	the	Zarathustra,	then	 the	 law	 is	 forever	 postponed	 by	 its	 own	 aesthetic	staging,	or	so	goes	Zupančič's	argument.		 This	 Kantian-Nietzschean	 aestheticism	 explains	Zupančič's	 introductory	 assertion	 regarding	 Nietzsche's	writings	 that	 "the	 subject	 is....	 that	which	makes	a	place	&	time	 for	 the	 event,	 as	well	 as	 only	 arises	 from	 the	 event"	(24)...	and	puts	a	dent	in	it	at	the	same	time,	insofar	as	there	cannot	be	a	subject	that	remains	at	the	threshold	of	the	law	(to	 put	 it	 differently,	 a	 subject	 only	 arises	 from	 its	encounter	 with	 the	 law).	 This	 question	 is	 crucial	 for	 this	commentary	 because	 Two	 Negations	 exactly	 displays	 the	kind	of	self-referentiality	Zupančič	alludes	to,	it	too	"makes	a	place	and	time	for	the	event"	when	the	text	begins	to	refer	to	 earlier	 passages	 (starting	 with	 N2§190	 referring	 to	N2§129).	 With	 regards	 to	 the	 status	 of	 this	 self-referentiality,	 I	 believe	 the	 analogy	 with	 Hamlet	 is	 here	potentially	 misleading:	 if	 Hamlet	 stumbles	 upon	 the	 Real	while	 attempting	 to	 frame	 it,	 the	 nihilistic	 framing	 of	 the	frame	is	not	the	wild	adventure	of	the	Real	it	often	purports	to	 be,	 it	 is	 in	 fact	 the	 symbolic	 articulation	 of	 Western	
civilisation	at	 the	end	of	 the	nineteenth	century.	 Nihilism	 is	
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the	very	substance	of	those	troubled	years	when	the	Master	was	 a	 rapacious	 capitalist	 and	 the	 king	 an	 absurdly	autocratic	remnant	of	a	 feudal,	outdated	past.	 In	our	view,	Zupančič	 misses	 this	 angle	 and	 falls	 into	 the	 trap	 of	aesthetisation	she	set	herself	when	she	sought	to	positively	reappraise	 the	 Nietzsche	 of	 the	 Zarathustra	 in	 her	conclusion.	I	quote	the	full	passage:		 This	 argument	 leads	 us	 back	 to	 the	 theme	 of	double	 affirmation.	 When	 Nietzsche	 keeps	repeating	 that	 man	 still	 has	 to	 "learn	 how	 to	will"	("to	reject	all	half-hearted	willing"	and	"to	be	 able	 to	will"),	 this	 is	 what	 he	 is	 getting	 at:	man	has	 to	 comprehend	 the	will	 (or	wanting)	as	 something	 that	 is	 always	 doubled	 or	redoubled.	If	one	really	wants	a	thing,	one	also	wants	the	chance	that	brought	this	thing	about;	and	 vice	 versa:	 if	 one	wants	 contingency,	 one	also	wants	 the	 thing	 that	 this	 contingency	has	brought	about	(as	necessary).	If	not,	the	willing	itself	 is	 crippled,	 plunged	 into	 the	 "spirit	 of	revenge	and	gnashing	of	teeth."	In	Zarathustra,	Nietzsche	formulates	this	double	dimension	of	willing	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 will	 being	 able	 also	 to	
will	 backwards.	 "All	 'it	 was'	 is	 a	 fragment,	 a	riddle,	a	dreadful	accident	 	–	until	the	creative	
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will	says	to	it,	'But	this	I	willed	it.'"	(...)	Will	can	dominate	 or	 "disarm"	 chance	 precisely	 and	simply	 by	wanting	 is	 as	 chance.	 In	 this	 sense,	"willing	 backward"	 is	 nothing	 but	 affirming	(saying	 "Yes"	 to)	 what	 one	 might	 call	"contingent	 necessity"	 (or,	 alternatively,	 the	unavoidable	 necessity	 of	 contingency	 itself).	(2003,	162)		Let	me	be	 clear:	 Zupančič	 is	 right	 at	 a	 certain	 level.	 Faced	with	an	impossible	predicament,	over-identification	with	it	re-establishes	 the	 necessary	 distance	 for	 its	 positive	 re-appropriation.	 I	 made	 this	 point	 in	 Two	 Negations	 (see	N2§185).	But	we	could	also	see	the	glass	half	empty	rather	than	half	full:	this	Nietzschean	"Yes"	Zupančič	praises	is	for	us	 the	 sign	 that	 subjectivity	 caves	 in	 to	 superego:	 since	 I	
have	not	found	a	way	out	of	my	predicament,	all	that	is	left	to	
do	is	for	me	to	convince	myself	that	I	willed	it	thus.	Far	from	the	powerful	 assertion	 of	 the	 ego	 in	 the	place	 of	 the	Real,	this	 move	 signals	 the	 withdrawal	 of	 the	 ego.	 Any	reappraisal	of	Nietzsche	has	 to	account	 for	 the	depression	that	 engulfed	 the	 last	 decade	 of	 his	 life,	 and	 Zupančič's	turnaround	conclusion	about	the	Nietzschean	Yes	is	hardly	consistent	with	her	own	mention	of	 the	withdrawal	of	 the	ego	in	Nietzsche	earlier	in	her	argument	(2003,	11).	Would	this	 withdrawal	 not	 be	 a	 better	 way	 to	 account	 for	 the	
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megalomania	 that	Nietzsche's	writings	 typically	 display	 in	the	final	Ecce	Homo,	where	sentences	such	as	"why	I	am	the	greatest"	 abound?	That	 the	ego	 is	 expelled	 from	 itself	 and	resurfaces	outside,	in	speech?	Incidentally,	this	withdrawal	is	a	key	feature	of	Two	Negations	(N2§161	provides	a	great	example)	that	begs	for	an	explanation.		
From	the	withdrawal	of	ego	back	to	that	of	the	Other	Should	we	then	characterise	melancholia	as	a	withdrawal	of	the	 ego	 akin	 to	 psychosis?	 In	 remarks	 delivered	 at	 the	University	 of	 Kingston	 (London)	 and	 elsewhere,	 and	gathered	 in	 a	 paper	 ("Remembering	&	 Forgetting",	 2016),	Russell	 Grigg	 recently	 sought	 to	 show	 that	 Freud's	approach	 in	 his	 seminal	 "Mourning	 and	 Melancholia"	(1917)	was	wrong	because	it	compared	processes	that	are	radically	 different.	 In	 his	 "Remembering	 &	 Forgetting"	Grigg	 argues	 instead	 that	 in	 melancholia,	 the	 subject	structurally	fails	to	separate	from	the	object,	thus	tying	the	condition	 to	 psychosis.	 Melancholia	 does	 not	 display	 the	loss	of	an	object	according	to	the	Australian	psychoanalyst,	but	the	emergence	of	an	invasive	object	that	persecutes	the	patient	 as	 in	 paranoia:	 "the	 melancholic	 suffers	 not	 from	eternal	mourning	but	from	an	inescapable	proximity	to	the	
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object	 in	 the	 Real"	 (Grigg	 2016,	 penultimate	 paragraph1).	Grigg	 explicitly	 compares	 melancholia	 to	 Daniel	 Paul	Schreber's	 invasive	 femininity	 Freud	 addressed	 in	 his	Schreber	case.	For	Grigg,	the	collapse	of	semblances	at	work	in	melancholia	reveals	an	excess	of	unregulated	jouissance.	Recalling	 that	 the	 symbolic	 order's	 purpose	 is	 to	 regulate	
jouissance,	 writing	 therefore	 cannot	 but	 appear	 as	 a	desperate	attempt	to	fend	it	off.	This	is	an	intriguing	line	of	thought	 for	us	as	we	ponder	 the	 role	of	 femininity	 in	Two	
Negations.	Does	not	the	Second	Negation	stage	the	irruption	of	 an	 object	mostly	 absent	 from	 the	 First,	 femininity,	 and	the	desperate	attempt	to	keep	it	at	bay?	When	Grigg	notes	that	 in	 melancholia	 every	 semblance	 collapses	 into	 a	grimace	 of	 the	 invasive	 object,	 it	 is	 difficult	 not	 to	 reread	some	 passages	 in	 the	 light	 of	 those	 remarks.	 N2§211	 for	example	takes	the	opportunity	of	a	discussion	about	science	to	 pile	 up	more	 elaborations	 on	 the	 enigmatic	 object	 that	femininity	is.		 There	 is	 just	 one	 problem	 with	 applying	 Grigg's	points	 to	 Two	 Negations.	 While	 Two	 Negations	 typically	displays	 all	 the	 colours	 of	 melancholia	 –	 and	 we	 should	make	no	mistake,	that	is	because	it	IS	a	work	of	melancholia	–	it	still	comes	to	a	conclusion	that	powers	past	femininity:	
																																																								1	The	online	version	of	Grigg's	article	does	not	provide	pagination.	
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	 We	parted.	I	turned	around	and	retreated	into	the	empty	woods.	I	found	an	old	timber	library	to	finish	my	book,	but	fire	was	already	tearing	through	the	pages	of	the	Word.	Love	is	only	its	failure,	 symbolisation	 only	 its	 loss.	 Final	world?	There	is	––	(Poem)(N2§241)		This	 break	 away	 from	 the	 abyssal	 femininity	 is	 echoed	 in	the	 following	 and	 final	 entry	N2§242,	 in	 the	passage	 from	the	 first	 to	 the	 second	 paragraph:	 "philosophy	 comes	 to	 a	different	 conclusion..."	 If	 melancholia	 is	 able	 to	 step	 back	from	the	abyss	of	the	Other	where	both	subject	and	object	dissolve,	 then	 Grigg's	 reading	 of	 "Mourning	 and	Melancholia"	could	be	misguided	–	I	suggest	we	go	back	to	Freud's	 original	 article.	 Freud	 begins	 by	 offering	 a	 clear	distinction	between	mourning,	which	is	normal	he	says,	and	melancholia,	which	is	pathological.	Freud	immediately	adds	that	melancholia	could	 lead	to	very	different	 things,	which	means	 that	 he	 considers	 melancholia	 possibly	 as	 a	symptom	 and	 not	 necessarily	 as	 a	 condition	 (Freud	 also	says	 that	 symptoms	 of	 melancholia	 also	 fit	 those	 of	mourning).	 He	 then	 describes	 mourning	 as	 a	 temporary	withdrawal	of	 libido	that	can	be	so	 intense	 that	"a	 turning	away	 from	 reality	 takes	 place	 and	 a	 clinging	 to	 the	 object	
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through	 the	medium	of	 a	 hallucinatory	wishful	 psychosis"	(1917,	245).	 In	contrast	 to	mourning	where	 it	 is	vivid,	 the	loss	 of	 the	 object	 in	 melancholia	 is	 withdrawn	 from	consciousness.	 The	 result	 is	 that	 "in	 mourning	 it	 is	 the	world	which	has	become	poor	and	empty;	in	melancholia	it	is	 the	 ego	 itself"	 (246).	At	 this	point,	 Freud	offers	his	 first	therapeutic	clue:	 the	analyst	should	confirm	to	 the	patient	that	he	or	she	"really	 is	out	there",	 that	he	or	she	exists	 in	the	eyes	of	the	Other.	Against	Grigg's	rash	claim	that	Freud	had	 a	 "limited	 understanding	 of	 psychosis"	 (2014),	 this	kind	of	 intervention	actually	comes	close	to	what	modern-day	 psychoanalysts	 do	 with	 psychotics	 in	 the	 consulting	room:	 they	 refrain	 from	 interpretations	and	 instead	 try	 to	highlight	 to	 the	 patient	 the	 key	 signifiers	 of	 his	 or	 her	delirium	he	 or	 she	 could	 readily	 identify	with.	Moving	 on,	Freud	detects	at	the	heart	of	melancholia	a	constellation	of	revolt	that	simply	gets	buried	under	conflicts	too	numerous	to	mount	an	orderly	fight	back.	This	is	why,	says	Freud,	the	relentless	 self-reproaches	 of	 the	 melancholic	 are	 in	 fact	reproaches	against	a	loved	object	"which	have	been	shifted	away	 from	 it	 onto	 the	 patient's	 own	 ego"	 (248).	 The	crushed	 state	 one	 witnesses	 in	 melancholia	 might	 not	 be	due	 to	 the	 complete	 collapse	 of	 symbolic	 faculties	 as	 in	psychosis,	 but	 could	 come	down	 to	what	 I	 am	 tempted	 to	call	an	overload	of	information,	in	the	same	way	a	computer	
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crashes	while	 opening	 too	many	programmes	 at	 the	 same	time.	This	may	be	because	the	computer	was	faulty	to	begin	with:	the	subject's	identification	to	the	abandoned	object	in	melancholia	shows	that	the	object-cathexis	–	meaning	that	the	subject's	engagement	with	external	reality	always	takes	the	 shape	 of	 an	 object	 –	 of	 the	 patient	 is	weak	 enough	 to	revert	to	narcissism	the	moment	an	obstacle	emerges,	and	the	 love	 relation	 with	 the	 object	 is	 preserved	 in	 the	continuing	 love	 for	 the	narcissistic	object	 to	 the	detriment	of	 eroticism.	 This	 is	 one	 way	 of	 reading	 Two	 Negations	critically:	discourses	about	femininity	effectively	shut	down	any	 access	 to	 the	 thing-itself.	 That	 was	 indeed	 Derrida's	point	against	Nietzsche	in	Otobiographies.	But	Freud	argues	here	that	this	reversion	to	narcissism	is	the	only	way	for	the	subject	not	to	 see	 love	 turn	 to	hate	and	erase	all	 symbolic	substance.	 Whereas	 Grigg	 is	 keen	 to	 see	 "ambivalence"	contained	 in	 the	 (foreclosed)	 "aggressive"	 object,	 Freud	insists	 ambivalence	 is	 on	 the	 side	 of	 the	 melancholic	subject:			 The	 loss	 of	 a	 love	 object	 is	 an	 excellent	opportunity	 for	 the	 ambivalence	 in	 love-relationshsips	 to	 make	 itself	 effective	 and	come	into	the	open.	(1917,	250)		
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This	 ambivalence	 is	 why	 Freud	 is	 careful	 not	 to	systematically	 place	 melancholia	 within	 the	 category	 of	
dementia	 praecox	 (psychosis),	 although,	 again,	 he	 never	excludes	 this	 possibility	 either.	 Indeed,	 identification	with	the	object	 of	 the	 type	we	 see	 in	melancholia	 is	 consistent,	Freud	 writes,	 with	 the	 transference	 neuroses,	 especially	hysteria	(1917,	250).	He	then	depicts	melancholia	as	a	sort	of	composite	monster	made	up	of	several	things.	I	quote	the	founder	of	psychoanalysis:		 Melancholia,	 therefore,	 borrows	 some	 of	 its	feature	 from	 mourning,	 and	 the	 others	 from	the	 process	 of	 regression	 from	 narcissistic	object	choice	to	narcissism.	(1917,	251)		A	conflict	rages	between	a	hysterical	identification	with	the	object,	 in	 which	 the	 object-cathexis	 is	 retained,	 and	 a	narcissistic	 identification	 with	 the	 object,	 in	 which	 the	object-cathexis	is	in	fact	lost	(or,	to	put	it	differently,	 if	the	object	of	hysteria	is	other,	the	object	of	narcissism	is	itself;	this	 tautological	 feature	 draws	 the	 line	 between	 the	 two).	This	mixture	of	factors	is	echoed	in	Freud's	suggestion	of	a	"double	vicissitude"	for	the	object	in	melancholia:		
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The	melancholic's	 erotic	 cathexis	 in	 regard	 to	his	 object	 has	 thus	 undergone	 a	 double	vicissitude:	 part	 of	 it	 has	 regressed	 to	[narcissistic]	 identification,	 but	 the	 other	part,	
under	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 conflict	 due	 to	
ambivalence,	has	been	carried	back	to	the	stage	
of	sadism,	which	is	nearer	to	that	conflict.	 (251,	italics	and	bracket	mine)		Now,	 while	 sadism	 is	 of	 course	 a	 fixture	 in	 perversion,	 it	does	 not	 prevent	 analysts	 from	 regularly	 witnessing	sadistic	 behaviours	 in	 neurotic	 patients	 precisely	 because	of	that	ambivalence,	the	conflict	between	love	and	hate	that	is	 part	 and	 parcel	 of	 the	 human	 fabric.	 Freud	 wrote	 the	seminal	 "A	 Child	 Is	 Being	 Beaten"	 paper	 (1919b)	 on	 the	subject,	describing	neurosis	as	an	 illness	that	gets	stuck	to	sadism	 on	 the	 road	 to	 oedipal	 identification.	 This	 "double	vicissitude"	 is	 different	 from	 the	 single	 vicissitude	 the	object	suffers	in	paranoia	(its	foreclusion	and	return	in	the	real)	 and	 implies	 a	 more	 balanced	 and	 protracted	 battle	than	 the	 Blitzkrieg	 triggered	 psychosis	 wages	 against	 the	ego	(possibly	in	the	form	of	invasive	voices,	disturbance	of	phenomenological	 reality,	 etc.).	 Freud's	 conclusion	 is	illuminating:		
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For	 this	 reason	 the	 exciting	 causes	 of	melancholia	 have	 a	 much	 wider	 range	 than	those	of	mourning,	which	 is	 for	 the	most	part	occasioned	only	by	a	real	loss	of	the	object,	by	its	 death.	 In	 melancholia,	 accordingly,	countless	 separate	 struggles	 are	 carried	 on	over	the	object,	in	which	hate	and	love	contend	with	 each	 other;	 the	 one	 seeks	 to	 detach	 the	libido	 from	 the	 object,	 the	 other	 to	 maintain	this	 position	 of	 the	 libido	 against	 the	 assault.	The	location	of	these	separate	struggles	cannot	be	 assigned	 to	 any	 system	 but	 the	 Ucs.,	 the	region	 of	 the	memory-traces	 of	 things.	 (1917,	256)		The	 last	 sentence	 again	 seems	 to	 indicate	 that	 one	 deals	with	signifying	material	in	melancholia,	i.e.	material	subject	to	 the	 dialecticising	 work	 of	 the	 analytic	 interpretation.	According	 to	 Freud,	 the	 irremediable	 sadness	 of	 the	melancholic	 thus	 reads	 as	 a	 double	 displacement	 of	 the	subject:	 first	 a	 displacement	 of	 the	 struggle	 over	 positing	and	maintaining	 the	 object,	 to	 the	 conflict	within	 the	 ego;	and	 then	 from	 this	 conflict	 to	 an	 absence	 of	 conflict,	 the	"extraordinarily	 high	 anti–cathexis"	 (1917,	 258)	 that	 can	manifest	 itself	 in	 the	 subject's	 refusal	 to	 get	 up,	 take	nourishment,	and	pursue	his	or	her	goals	in	life.		
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	 The	 fact	 that	Freud	points	equally	 to	psychosis	and	neurosis	 in	 "Mourning	 and	 Melancholia"	 –	 Freud's	 final	remark	 about	 the	 ego	 satisfied	 to	 have	 proved	 stronger	than	the	object	at	the	end	of	the	illness	suggests	a	psychotic	configuration	 rather	 than	 the	 subject-object	 neurotic	binding	 (1917,	 257)	 –,	 the	 overdetermination	 of	 factors	("the	 exciting	 causes	 of	 melancholia	 have	 a	 much	 wider	range"),	the	double	vicissitude	of	the	object	and	the	double	displacement	 of	 the	 subject	 I	 have	 just	 described,	 are	 all	reasons	why	I	believe	Grigg	is	twice	mistaken:	1)	of	reading	Freudian	 melancholia	 as	 necessarily	 neurotic,	 and	 2)	 of	conflating	 the	 structural	 difference	 between	 neurosis	(defined	 by	 the	 psychic	 mechanism	 of	 repression)	 and	psychosis	 (defined	 by	 the	 psychic	 mechanism	 of	foreclusion)	 with	 the	 contingent	 disjunction	 between	mourning	 and	 melancholia.	 Psychoanalyst	 Darian	 Leader	often	 cautions	 against	 making	 a	 rapid	 diagnosis	 in	 the	presence	 of	 a	 magnified	 feminine	 Other	 in	 the	 clinical	picture.	 In	 his	 article	 entitled	 "Hysteria	 Today"	 (2016),	Leader	argues	that	 the	 identification	with	 femininity	could	be,	 as	 in	 psychosis,	 the	 desperate	 attempt	 to	 keep	 at	 a	distance	 the	 invasive	Other,	 but	 it	 could	 also	 be,	 as	 in	 the	case	 of	 hysteria	 –	 psychoanalytically-understood,	 'clinical'	hysteria,	 not	 the	 "hysterics"	 of	 Charcot	 –,	 the	 dialectical	reflection	 of	 a	 paternal	 identification,	 that	 is	 to	 say	
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identification	with	the	father's	object	of	desire...	 the	woman.	Leader	 laments	 that	when	an	 interest	 in	 femininity	 shows	up	 in	 the	clinical	 setting,	 the	 label	of	hysteria	 immediately	follows.	With	Grigg,	we	could	inversely	lament	the	fact	that	whenever	we	are	 faced	with	an	apparently	 invasive	object	or	 unregulated	 jouissance,	 a	 diagnostic	 of	 psychosis	immediately	 applies.	 But	 Leader	 emphasises	 in	 his	 paper	that	the	jouissance	of	the	Other	is	as	daunting	for	hysteria	as	it	 is	 for	 psychosis,	 albeit	 in	 a	 different	 way.	 Taking	 an	example	from	Two	Negations,	we	could	for	example	wonder	whether	the	most	explicit	passages	such	as	N2§153	betray	the	 jouissance	 of	 the	 unregulated	 subject	 or	 of	 the	unmediated	 Other.	 Leader	 actually	 offers	 clues	 to	distinguishing	 psychosis	 from	 hysteria	 in	 the	 question	 of	the	 function	 of	 a	 delirium	 –	 does	 it	 serve	 to	 limit	 the	proximity	of	the	Other	(as	in	the	case	of	Schreber),	or	is	it	a	way	to	ask	a	question	about	the	value	of	one	for	the	Other,	as	in	hysteria?	Here	again,	while	there	are	instances	where	
Two	Negations	 indeed	seems	 to	elude	a	 threat	bigger	 than	itself,	 there	 are	 also	 moments	 when	 the	 value	 of	 the	narrator	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	 Other	 is	 in	 doubt,	 such	 as	N2§177	 or	 N2§238,	 and	 this	 further	 complicates	 any	simple,	 textbook	 characterisations	 of	 melancholia	 in	 Two	
Negations	(and	elsewhere).	One	lesson	to	draw	from	all	this	is	 that,	with	psychoanalysis,	 a	 solid	 theory	never	 replaces,	
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and	 always	 comes	 after,	 a	 devoted	 attention	 to	 the	discourse	of	the	patient,	the	rigidities	as	well	as	the	cracks	in	it.	This	in	turn	raises	another	problem,	which	is	the	place	of	 psychoanalysis	 at	 university.	 The	 psychoanalytic	discourse	 and	 the	 academic	 discourse	 have	 diametrically	opposed	aims:	the	former	has	a	specifically	therapeutic	aim	while	the	latter	has	an	encyclopaedic	one;	one	will	be	open	to	 the	 Real	 and	 the	 symptom,	 whereas	 the	 other	 will	 be	busy	 plugging	 the	 gaps	 the	 Real	 leaves	 in	 the	 texture	 of	reality	by	labelling	them.	If	one	reads	Lacan's	theory	of	the	four	 discourses	 correctly	 (see	 Seminar	 XVII),	 the	psychoanalytic	discourse	can	only	function	if	it	puts	on	hold	the	 signifying	 effects	 of	 knowledge	 (S2	 is	 in	 the	 lower-left	position	 of	 truth).	 The	 psychoanalytic	 discourse	may	 thus	quite	 simply	 lose	 all	 efficiency	 in	 the	 analytic	 room	 if	 it	seeks	explanations	(putting	S2	in	the	upper	right	position	of	addressee	 and	 the	 barred	 subject	 $	 in	 the	 lower-right	position	 of	 product)	 rather	 than	 the	 improvement	 of	 the	patient's	health	($	in	the	upper	right	position	and	S1	in	the	lower-right	 position,	 the	 assumption	 of	 a	 new	 master-signifier	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 symptom).	 Insofar	 as	explanations	 must	 be	 sanctified	 by	 the	 big	 Other	 of	knowledge,	the	interpretations	of	the	analyst	could	well	slip	into	more	authorised	interventions	as	he	or	she	courts	the	University	as	institution,	and	therefore	lose	the	edge	that	is	
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necessary	to	force	the	patient	to	produce	more	material	 in	the	 analytic	 setting.	 To	 put	 it	 bluntly	 now,	 if	 political	correctness	 definitely	 helps	 score	 in	 the	 academic	 world,	especially	 exposing	 masters	 such	 as	 Freud,	 it	 harbours	disastrous	consequences	for	both	hysteria	and	obsession	in	the	 clinic,	 insofar	 as	 it	 fails	 to	 engage	 the	 former	 (the	hysteric	 is	 likely	 to	 remain	 aloof	 from	 this	 social	 link,	 and	the	 transference	 will	 stall)	 and	 makes	 things	 too	comfortable	 for	 the	 latter	 (the	 obsessional	 loves	explanations	and	will	be	allowed	to	duck	analytic	work	by	discussing	 them).	This	question	of	 the	use	and	excesses	of	psychoanalytic	 tools	 in	 academia	 for	 the	 sake	 of	encyclopaedism	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 Two	 Negations	 –	 I	 will	have	more	to	say	about	that	in	the	final	part	of	this	essay.		 Back	to	melancholia.	Building	on	Lacan's	Seminar	VI,	Grigg	 reminds	 us	 that	 the	 ghost	 of	 old	 Hamlet	 appears	because,	 like	Polynices	 in	 Sophocles'	Antigone,	 he	was	not	given	 proper	 burial	 rites.	 The	 death	 of	 an	 essential	 being	opens,	Lacan	suggests,	 "a	hole	 in	 the	real"	 that	produces	a	signifier	 that	 is	nothing	other	 than	the	signifier	of	 the	 lack	in	the	Other.	"This	is	a	signifier",	Lacan	adds,	"whose	accent	makes	the	Other	powerless	to	give	you	your	response	…	it	is	because	this	signifier	finds	its	place	there,	and	at	the	same	time	 cannot	 find	 it,	 because	 this	 signifier	 cannot	 be	articulated	at	 the	 level	of	 the	Other,	 that	 there	come,	as	 in	
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psychosis	 –	 and	 this	 is	 the	way	 in	which	mourning	 is	 like	psychosis	 –	 to	 proliferate	 all	 the	 images	 that	 the	phenomena	 of	 mourning	 give	 rise	 to"	 (2013,	 22.04.59).	Grigg	 then	 argues	 that	 the	 subject	 in	 mourning	 invents	 a	symbolic	 solution	 to	 this	 breach	 in	 the	 Real	 by	 creating	 a	space	 for	 this	 event	 in	 the	 symbolic	 through	 the	 work	 of	memorialisation.	 While	 Freud	 thought	 of	 mourning	 as	 a	necessary	phase	to	grieve	the	lost	object	and	move	on	to	a	new	one,	 forgetting	 the	old,	Grigg	believes	Lacan	regarded	the	process	of	mourning	as	"the	preservation	of	 the	object	by	 constructing	 a	memorial	 to	 it	 in	 the	 symbolic"	 (2016).	Grigg	proceeds	to	draw	conclusions	of	his	own:		 The	 work	 of	 mourning	 consists	 of	 codifying	imaginary	 features	 of	 the	 object,	 i(a),	 into	signifiers	 lodged	 in	 the	 Other.	 The	 painful	process	of	mourning	stems	from	the	fall	of	the	semblants	that	love	and	desire	attach	us	to,	as	Freud	 taught	us;	 but	 –	 and	 this	 is	what	Freud	did	not	capture	–	 the	work	of	mourning	 is	 the	transformation	 of	 these	 semblants	 into	signifiers	 registered	 in	 and	 endorsed	 by	 the	Other.	(2016)		Grigg	touches	here	upon	something	fundamental.	We	recall	the	 L	 scheme	 Lacan	 introduced	 in	 Seminar	 II:	 for	 the	
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imaginary	relation	between	the	ego	and	the	small	other	to	hold,	there	must	be	a	relation	from	the	big	Other	to	the	Id,	which	 is	 the	 unconscious	 relation	 regulating	 jouissance.	What	 Grigg	 points	 out	 is	 that,	 in	mourning,	 the	 imaginary	relation	remains	preserved	as	it	is	thanks	to	the	work	at	the	level	of	the	symbolic	that	memorialisation	does.	This	is	NOT	the	 case	 in	 melancholia;	 on	 the	 contrary,	 there	 is	 a	 rare	threat	to	the	imaginary	relation	in	the	clinical	picture.	This	is	 something	 Two	 Negations	 is	 very	 eloquent	 about;	 not	only	 does	 it	 testify	 to	 that	 imaginary	 link	 (with	 the	 small	other	of	the	mirror)	under	attack	in	N2§18,		 The	next	morning,	 the	witness	was	absolutely	broken.	 "Once	 the	 lights	 had	 gone	 down,	 the	lake	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 nothing	 but	 my	 own	tears,"	 the	 person	 sputtered.	 "Beyond	 the	reflection,	 there	was	 only	 the	 pavement.	 I	 fell	hard."	(N2§18)		with	 the	 specular	 relation	 literally	 crashing,	 but	 Two	
Negations	 also	 reflects	 on	 this	 much	 later	 in	 the	 text;	N2§235	provides	the	most	concise	formula:		 And	when	this	very	distance	resurfaces,	either	melancholia	qua	 the	collapse	of	 the	 imaginary	
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axis,	or	physical	symptoms	qua	the	collapse	of	the	symbolic	axis,	threatens.	(N2§235)		Grigg	should	absolutely	get	the	credit	for	reminding	us	that	in	melancholia,	 it	 is	 the	 imaginary	 axis	 that	 is	 at	 risk.	 The	problem	 is	 that	 he	 is	 adamant	 that	 the	 collapse	 of	"semblants"	reveals	the	absence	of	the	Name-of-the-Father,	so	that	he	either	admits	an	Other	that	automatically	repairs	itself,	 as	 in	 mourning,	 or	 one	 that	 self-destructs	 within	minutes,	 as	 in	 paranoia	 –	 in	 other	 words,	 always	 a	complete,	completed	Other,	one	that	is	or	is	not.	It	is	a	neat,	almost	 classy	 explanation,	 but	 the	 Freudian	 solution	 of	overdetermination	 (again,	 "some	 of	 its	 feature	 from	mourning,	 others	 from...")	 simply	 squares	 better	 with	 the	facts.	Yes,	"to	be	or	not	to	be"	is	Hamlet's	question,	but	does	not	 the	King	of	Denmark	 also	 remark	 that	 "when	 sorrows	come,	 they	come	not	single	spies	but	 in	battalions"	 (Act	4,	Scene	4),	which	we	could	read	as	a	pointing	to	a	diversity	of	factors	and	conflicts?	Grigg	does	not	raise	the	possibility	of	an	incomplete	Other	being	the	cause	of	melancholia,	that	is	to	 say	 an	 Other	 that	 has	withdrawn	 from	 itself,	 an	 Other	that	 "is	 suddenly	 not	 itself"	 (N2§235).	 And	 yet,	 this	discrepancy	within	 the	Other	 is	 clearly	 articulated	by	Two	
Negations:		
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I	live	in	a	rather	small	place	to	speak	the	truth...	There	 is	 only	 space	 for	 one...	 Although	 God	knows	 the	 many	 I	 welcome."	Much	 later,	 the	
author	 of	 these	 lines	 was	 to	 learn	 that	 God	
radically	didn't	know.	(...)(N2§62,	my	italics)		The	 place	 of	 the	 Other	 has	 shifted,	 and	 this	 gives	 new	impetus	to	the	Second	Negation,	as	this	discrepancy	returns	again	 and	 again	 in	 the	 opposition	 City/Phallus	 that	structures	it	from	beginning	to	end.	Blame	the	melancholic	if	 you	 must,	 but	 something	 is	 rotten	 in	 the	 state	 of	Denmark...			 To	 conclude,	 melancholia	 is	 clinically	 a	 secondary	
disease,	a	serious	complication	of	mourning	that	cancels	the	symbolic	 frame	 of	 the	 subject	 and	 puts	 into	 doubt	 the	imaginary	 relation	of	 self	 to	 self.	Whether	 such	a	 threat	 is	met	 by	 a	 symbolic	 journey	 able	 to	 restore	 the	 imaginary	axis,	 or	 produces	 a	 withdrawal	 of	 the	 ego	 to	 match	 the	original	 withdrawal	 of	 the	 Other,	 that	 all	 depends	 on	 the	resources	 at	 the	 disposition	 of	 the	 patient.	 In	 the	 case	 of	
Hamlet,	 the	 withdrawal	 of	 the	 ego	 should	 be	 strictly	restricted	to	Gertrude's	urge	to	forget	and	move	on:			 GERTRUDE	 –	 Do	 not	 forever	 with	 thy	 veiled	lids	seek	for	thy	noble	father	 in	the	dust:	 thou	
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know'st	 'tis	 common,	 all	 that	 lives	 must	 die,	passing	 through	 nature	 to	 eternity.	 (Act	 1,	Scene	2)		Gertrude	here	completely	misses	subjectivity	–	she	acts	as	if	death	 was	 perfectly	 normal.	 This	 is	 the	 kind	 of	 psychotic	melancholia	Grigg	aims	at,	i.e.	the	voice	of	Nature	that	urges	the	patient	to	commit	suicide	and	return	to	the	(delusional)	pre-symbolic	 world.	 And	 yes,	 Lacan	 does	 competently	suggest	 that	 femininity	 is	 the	 invasive	 cause	 of	 Hamlet's	depression,	 insofar	 as	 depression	 is	 triggered	 by	 a	 failure	with	 regard	 to	 one’s	 desire,	 with	 Ophelia’s	 femininity	 as	"the	 very	 symbol	 of	 the	 rejection	 as	 such	 of	 his	 desire"	(Seminar	VI,	22.04.59).	But	given	Gertrude's	(and	Claudius')	stance,	 it	 is	 perhaps	 better	 to	 fail	 with	 regards	 to	 one's	desire	 than	 to	 completely	 fail	 to	 acknowledge	 (the	transcendental	structure	of)	desire	at	all.	Does	not	Hamlet's	melancholia	 in	 fact	activate	 the	Name-of-the-Father	 rather	than	bury	 it?	With	 the	onset	of	mourning	 in	connection	 to	Ophelia's	 death	 and	 the	 imaginary	 identification	 to	 the	small	other	in	the	shape	of	Laertes,	Oedipal	indicators	have	all	turned	green.	Lacan	himself	stresses	that	Hamlet	gets	it	at	 the	end	with	his	 famous	 "the	body	 is	with	 the	king,	but	the	 king	 is	 not	with	 the	 body;	 the	 king	 is	 a	 thing"	 (Act	 4,	Scene	 1).	 Interestingly	 enough,	 this	 line	 finds	 an	 echo	 in	
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Two	Negations:	"once	you	know	the	throne	and	the	king	are	two	different	things,	the	throne	is	all	for	the	taking"	(N2§3).	Hamlet's	journey	from	object-cathexis	back	to	narcissism	is	not	 the	 only	 one	 to	 include	 a	 return	 ticket	 in	 the	Shakespearean	corpus	by	the	way,	so	does	King	Leontes'	in	
The	Winter's	Tale;	he	too	atones	for	his	sins	at	the	end.	And	
King	Lear's	conclusion	speaks	volumes:		 	 EDGAR	–	The	weight	of	this	sad	time	we	must	obey:	Speak	what	we	feel,	not	what	we	ought	to	say,	The	oldest	hath	borne	most,	we	that	are	young	Shall	never	see	so	much	nor	live	so	long	(Act	5,	Scene	3)		Like	Hamlet,	King	Lear	 sees	a	symbolic	movement	at	work	that	reaches	its	term	with	the	instatement	of	symbolic	debt	between	generations	("the	oldest	hath	borne	most"),	as	well	as	the	restoration	of	the	immediacy	between	one	and	self	at	the	 imaginary	 level	 ("speak	 what	 we	 feel,	 not	 what	 we	ought	 to	 say").	 If	 melancholia	 is	 clinically	 secondary,	Shakespeare's	 plays	 make	 it	 obvious	 that	 it	 is	 culturally	primary	–	this	is	our	next	and	last	displacement.	
	
From	"mourning	sickness"	back	to	Romanticism	
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I	 believe	 the	 question	 of	 the	 withdrawal	 of	 the	 Other	explains	why	German	philosopher	Hegel	is	the	object	of	the	First	 Negation	 and	 forcefully	 returns	 at	 various	 points	 in	the	 Second	 Negation,	 including	 at	 the	 very	 end.	 In	 her	
Mourning	Sickness:	Hegel	and	the	French	Revolution	(2011),	Canadian	 scholar	 Rebecca	 Comay	 offers	 a	 profound	meditation	on	 the	subject	of	mourning	and	melancholia	 in	connection	to	Hegel.	Instead	of	reading	Hegel	in	isolation	–	or	 "analytically"	as	Robert	Pippin's	Hegel's	Idealism	does	–	or	in	dialogue	with	the	philosophical	tradition	–	the	method	of	choice	for	"continental	philosophy",	from	Gérard	Lebrun	to	 Slavoj	 Žižek	 –	 Comay	 chose	 to	 read	 Hegel	 against	 the	background	 of	 his	 enunciation,	 i.e.	 the	 upheavals	 of	 the	French	 Revolution	 and	 the	 Empire,	 and	 Germany's	disarrayed	response	to	these	changes.	Her	thesis	 is	1)	that	the	 conceptual	 movement	 of	 the	 French	 Revolution	completely	 destroys	 Germany's	 means	 to	 mourn	 its	 own	past	by	relegating	to	the	shadows	of	newly-instated	History	the	medieval	culture	of	the	Holy	Roman	Empire,	rendering	impossible	the	kind	of	repairing	Grigg	described	as	at	work	in	mourning,	 and	 2)	 that	 the	 task	 of	 philosophy	 for	Hegel	(and	those	of	us	who	identify	as	Hegelians)	is	to	"explicate	the	 untimeliness"	 of	 historical	 experience.	 In	 her	introduction,	 Comay	 reminds	 us	 that	 translation	 normally	provides	"a	transitional	space	in	which	the	displacements	of	
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empire	can	be	endured	at	a	 figural	 level	 [allowing]	 loss	 to	become	 virtual	 or	 metaphorical"	 (2011,	 16),	 and	 is	 thus	essential	to	the	work	of	mourning	as	we	have	uncovered	it.	You	 basically	 translate	 what	 is	 not	 yours	 until	 you	 can	produce	 the	 hard	 kernel	 that	 escapes	 translation	 and	 is	your	 loss.	However,	 translation	can	be	 thwarted	when	 the	original	 document	 suddenly	 disappears.	 This	 is	 exactly	what	 happens	 with	 the	 French	 Revolution,	 or	 so	 Comay	argues:	"the	Revolution	functions,	psychoanalytically,	as	the	inaccessible,	impossible	Real,	and	the	"German	Ideology"	as	the	 fantasy	 that	keeps	 forever	 circling	around	 it"	 (23).	Let	us	unpack	this	quote:	by	translating	into	its	own	idiom	the	Caesarean	conquests	of	Louis	XIV's	France,	Germany	could	figure	 out	 its	 place	 in	 the	 old	 European	 order	 of	 power,	despite	 its	 own	 lack	 of	 centralization	 (Germany	 is	 not	 a	centralised	state	the	way	England,	France	and	Spain	are	in	the	 seventeenth	 and	 eighteenth	 centuries).	 But	 this	 lack	transforms	 into	 an	 anachronism	 (which	 is	 "trauma	 itself",	writes	Comay)	when	the	Ancien	Régime	gives	way	to	a	new	world	 order.	 Germany's	 situation	 becomes	 twice	 removed	from	 that	 of	 France,	 and	 the	 necessary	 delay	 that	 it	introduces	to	translation	produces	the	noncoincidence	with	itself	 that	 Comay	 derives	 from	 the	 "consciousness"	 of	German	Idealism	(the	question	of	 the	autonomy	of	Reason	for	 Kant,	 all	 the	 elaborations	 around	 the	 'I'	 in	 Fichte,	 the	
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trials	 of	 consciousness	 in	Hegel,	 etc.).	 This	 anachronism	 is	the	very	withdrawal	of	the	Other	we	have	pointed	to	in	the	previous	 stage	 of	 this	 essay,	 and	 one	 of	 the	 merits	 of	Comay's	 book	 is	 to	 have	 put	 it	 forward	 as	 the	 impetus	 of	Hegel's	dialectics.		 It	is	impossible	to	do	justice	to	the	wealth	of	Comay's	argument	here,	so	I	will	only	raise	 issues	that	are	relevant	to	 our	 discussion	 of	 melancholia	 in	 Two	 Negations.	According	 to	 Comay,	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 French	 Revolution	impact	 the	 imaginary	 relation	 from	 one	 to	 self	 just	 as	 in	melancholia.	I	quote	the	author	of	Mourning	Sickness:		 The	 French	 Revolution	 ruins	 the	 genealogical	drama	 of	 legitimation	 in	 which	 the	 spectator	might	 see	 his	 own	 image	 reflected	 in	 the	ongoing	destiny	of	the	collective.	It	blocks	that	
self-image.	 The	 law	 no	 longer	 has	 its	foundation	 in	 some	 higher	 principles	 from	which	 it	would	derive	 its	authority	but	 is	self-grounded	and	valid	solely	by	virtue	of	 its	own	form.	(2011,	42,	my	italics)		The	result	of	the	crisis	of	legitimation	Comay	points	out,	in	combination	 with	 the	 Enlightenment's	 assault	 on	 "Faith"	(superstition,	 religion)	Hegel	 recalls	 in	 the	Phenomenology	(see	1977,	§561;	Comay	emphasises	the	disavowal	at	work	
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in	 this	 move,	 2011,	 67),	 means	 that	 reason	 acquires	 a	negative	dimension	 (Reason)	and	becomes	 "set	 to	 embark	on	 an	 annihilating	mission	 that	will	 culminate	 in	 a	 fury	of	destruction"	 (Comay	2011,	67):	Terror...	Comay's	Hegelian	definition	of	Terror	–	one	that	will	not	be	shared	by	all	–	is	worth	quoting:		 It	 is	 the	 infinite	 melancholia	 of	 a	 self	 that	knows	 no	 other.	 It	 can	 recognise	 no	 obstacle,	no	 externality,	 no	 mediating	 agency,	 no	 local	nuance	or	detour	that	might	delay	or	dilute	the	passage	 from	 individuality	 to	 totality,	 from	part	 to	 whole,	 from	 citizen	 to	 state	 and	 back	again.	(2011,	68)		This	 passage	 upends	 Grigg's	 argument	 apropos	melancholia:	the	subject’s	withdrawal	from	objectivity	is	in	fact	 complete	 as	 Terror	 voids	 the	 world	 of	 objects.	 How	does	 this	 point	 bear	 on	Two	Negations?	 I	 suggest	 reading	the	self-referentiality	in	Two	Negations	we	have	mentioned	above	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 literary	 Terror:	 not	 only	 does	 Two	
Negations	destroy	the	imaginary	objects	that	it	creates	(the	sets,	the	characters),	it	also	destroys	the	conceptual	objects	that	were	used	to	destroy	the	 former.	Proof	 is	 the	subpart	Postface	 (N2§213-227)	 that	 translates	 into	 psychoanalytic	
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concepts	 what	 has	 come	 before	 in	 the	 shape	 of	 a	 fiction,	until	 that	 translation	 is	 cancelled	 by	 the	 more	 literal	vocabulary	of	the	Conclusion	(N2§239-241).	 It	 is	therefore	no	 accident	 that	 N2§242	 reintroduces	 psychoanalytic	concepts	 ("anxiety	 hysteria"	 and	 "conversion	 hysteria")	 in	the	 first	 paragraph,	 only	 to	 brush	 them	 aside	 again	 in	 the	second	and	final	paragraph	of	the	entire	work	–	the	essence	of	the	Second	Negation	is	rehearsed	in	the	span	of	a	single	entry.	For	Comay,	Terror	–	the	"Golgotha	of	Spirit"	as	Hegel	calls	it	–	is	the	only	way	for	melancholia	to	supersede	itself	in	 mourning	 (2011,	 81).	 In	 this	 process,	 Reason	 seeks	 to	abolish	all	determinations,	and	 this	 is	what	Two	Negations	arguably	 does	 to	 the	 substance	 of	 the	 subject	 undergoing	psychoanalysis:	 the	 first	 determination	 to	 go	 is	 the	 self	 as	defined	by	 the	Other	 –	 the	 student	 researching	Hegel	 at	 a	British	university	 (First	Negation).	Then	come	 the	Oedipal	drama	 of	 the	 subject's	 personal	 story	 (Second	 Negation,	"Main	 Body",	 "Epilogue",	 "Post-Scriptum"),	 the	psychoanalytic	 language	 of	 the	 Other	 in	 transference	("Postface",	 "Afterward"),	 and	 the	 reflection	 of	 these	experiences	("Conclusion",	"Bonus").	Last	but	not	least,	also	goes	writing	itself,	with	the	dismantling	of	Two	Negations	in	this	 essay.	 Only	 then	 can	 mourning	 (the	 actual	 loss	 of	 a	close	relative)	take	place.	
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	 There	is	one	aspect	of	Comay's	formidable	book	that	remains	 indebted	 to	 the	mise	 en	 abîme	 that	 characterises	"late	 modern"	 or	 "postmodern"	 philosophy	 (from	Nietzsche's	 "declaration	 of	 declaration"	 to	 Foucault's	fascination	 with	 Las	Meninas	 in	 The	Order	 of	 Things).	 Her	approximation	concerning	French	author	François-René	de	Chateaubriand	(carelessly	cast	aside	as	"a	royalist	detractor	of	 the	 Revolution",	 2011,	 57)	 offers	 a	 clue	 as	 to	 what	 is	missing	in	Mourning	Sickness,	and	why	we	have	to	take	our	investigation	 further	 still	 if	 we	 want	 to	 cover	 the	 whole	conceptual	 journey	 of	 Two	 Negations.	 Chateaubriand,	 the	founder	 of	 French	 Romanticism,	 the	 man	 Victor	 Hugo	wanted	so	badly	 to	be,	 the	hero	of	 such	 twentieth-century	literary	 giants	 as	 Julien	Gracq	 and	 Jean	d'Ormesson,	 spent	years	 in	 exile	 in	 the	 forests	 of	 America	 and	 the	 streets	 of	London	mourning	the	beheading	of	half	of	his	family	during	the	 Revolution,	 contemplating	 all	 the	 while	 "a	 world	 that	was	 fading"	 (1982,	 Part	 I,	 Book	 IX,	 chapter	 10).	Chateaubriand	 can	 boast	 a	 prestigious	 résumé:	 besides	giving	 his	 name	 to	 a	 steak,	 he	 quite	 literally	 resurrected	Christianity	 from	 the	 ashes	 of	 the	 Revolution	 (with	 The	
Genius	of	Christianity),	wrote	popular	novels	that	influenced	Lord	 Byron	 among	 many	 others,	 and	 had	 a	 political	 and	diplomatic	 career	 during	 the	 Empire	 and	 the	 Restoration	(ambassador	 to	 Rome,	 Britain	 and	 Prussia,	 minister	 of	
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foreign	 affairs,	 prominent	 journalist).	 He	 travelled	throughout	 the	 world,	 personally	 met	 Louis	 XVI,	Washington,	Napoléon	and	Nelson,	and	dated	or	befriended	the	 greatest	 women	 of	 his	 time	 (Pauline	 de	 Beaumont,	Juliette	Récamier).	Yet,	all	that	fades	into	the	background	in	comparison	 with	 the	 Mémoires	 d'outre-tombe	 (Memoirs	
from	 Beyond	 the	 Grave)	 written	 at	 the	 end	 of	 his	 life.	Occupying	 a	 central	 place	 in	 the	 literary	 canon	 of	 France,	the	Memoirs	 are	 full	 of	 the	melancholia	 that	 follows	 great	upheavals	 –	 for	 instance,	 Chateaubriand	writes	 about	 "the	groundless	 despair	 (désespoir	 sans	 cause)	 I	 carried	 in	 my	heart’s	 depths"	 (1982,	 Part	 1,	 Book	V,	 Chapter	 15)	 and	 at	one	point	exclaims:	"by	what	miracle	does	man	consent	to	do	what	he	does	on	 this	earth,	he	who	must	die?"	 (Part	2,	Book	I,	Chapter	8).	Death	quite	simply	becomes	the	horizon	of	thought	and	action:	"in	that	labyrinth	of	tombs,	I	thought	of	my	own,	 ready	 to	open"	 (1982,	Part	1,	Book	X,	Chapter	5).	 This	 last	 passage,	 written	 in	 exile	 in	 London,	 reads,	 I	would	argue,	as	the	translation	of	the	trauma	of	Terror,	and	the	failure	of	the	subject	to	catch	up	with	the	abyssal	shift	in	the	Other.	Comay	puts	it	best:			 I	 refashion	 traumatic	 lack	 as	 pre-emptive	negativity:	 a	 conceptual	 guillotine	 intervenes	between	self	and	self.	Having	evacuated	every	
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object,	 I	 evacuate	 myself,	 and	 thereby	rediscover	 myself,	 in	 my	 nullity,	 as	 my	 own	lost	object.	(2011,	92)		Pre-emptive	 negativity	 is	 found	 in	 the	 opening	 chapter	 of	the	Memoirs:	"my	cradle	has	something	of	my	tomb."	At	the	same	 time,	we	recall	Freud's	assertion	 that	 in	melancholia	ambivalence	 towards	 the	 Other	 is	 turned	 inwards	 against	the	ego.	Unable	 to	put	 the	blame	on	an	Other	 that	escapes	definition,	 the	 subject	 of	 melancholia	 must	 discharge	 its	anger	against	 itself	 if	 it	 is	to	preserve	its	object.	And	when	Comay	writes	that	"the	missing	object	is	retained	underlock	and	key	and	undigested	within	the	inner	cavity	of	the	self-sundered	 self"	 (2011,	 111),	 one	 cannot	 but	 think	 of	Chateaubriand's	 sylphide	 ("sylph"),	 the	 woman	 he	assembles	 in	 his	 mind	 and	 regularly	 daydreams	 about	 or	hallucinates	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 his	 adventures.	 I	 quote	 the	chapter	entitled	"Phantom	of	Love"	in	the	Memoirs:			 Thus	I	imagined	a	woman	derived	from	all	the	women	I	had	seen:	she	had	the	figure,	the	hair	and	the	smile	of	the	guest	who	had	pressed	me	against	 her	 breast;	 I	 gave	 her	 the	 eyes	 of	 one	young	 girl	 from	 the	 village,	 the	 complexion	 of	another.	The	portraits	of	great	ladies	of	the	age	of	 François	 I,	 Henri	 IV,	 and	 Louis	 XIV,	 with	
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which	 the	 drawing-room	 was	 decorated,	furnished	me	with	 other	 characteristics,	 and	 I	stole	 certain	 graces	 from	 the	 pictures	 of	 the	Virgin	 hung	 in	 church.	 (...)	 This	 invisible	charmer	 followed	me	 everywhere;	 I	 talked	 to	her	 as	 if	 she	 was	 a	 real	 person;	 she	 varied	according	 to	 my	 mood:	 Aphrodite	 without	 a	veil,	Diana	clothed	 in	dew	and	air,	Thalia	with	her	laughing	mask,	Hebe	with	the	cup	of	youth,	she	often	became	a	fairy	who	subjected	Nature	to	 my	 control.	 I	 retouched	 my	 canvas,	endlessly;	 I	 took	one	grace	 from	my	beauty	 to	replace	 it	 with	 another.	 I	 also	 changed	 her	finery;	 I	 borrowed	 from	 every	 country,	 every	age,	every	art;	every	religion.	Then,	when	I	had	created	a	masterpiece,	I	dispersed	my	lines	and	colours	 once	 more;	 my	 unique	 woman	 was	transformed	 into	 a	 multitude	 of	 women,	 in	whom	 I	 idolised	 separately	 the	 charms	 I	 had	adored	 in	 unison.	 (1982,	 Part	 1,	 Book	 III,	Chapter	11)		This	 is	 not	 the	 Kantian	 sublime	 we	 came	 across	 before	insofar	as	the	object	here	fails	to	fully	articulate	itself	–	 let	alone	 elevate	 itself	 to	 the	 sublime	 –,	 leaving	 the	 subject	painfully	 aware	 of	 it:	 "I	 have	 left	 dreams	 in	 the	 shape	 of	women	 everywhere	 I	 have	 trailed	 my	 life,"	 writes	
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Chateaubriand	 further	down	(Part	1,	Book	VII,	Chapter	8).	This	 phenomenological	 coming-together	 and	 coming-apart	of	 the	 Woman	 instead	 recalls	 the	 long	 passages	 on	 the	Thing	in	Hegel's	Phenomenology	(1977,	"Perception"	§111-31,	echoed	in	the	First	Negation,	N1§8-17).	Here	we	can	put	the	whole	matter	to	rest:	melancholia	does	not	so	much	fail	to	separate	object	from	subject	(Grigg's	theoretical	option)	as	 confuse	 the	 drive	 with	 the	 void	 around	 which	 it	circulates.	To	put	 it	differently,	 it	 confuses	articulating	 the	object	with	the	object	thereby	articulated:	"I	retouched	my	canvas,	 endlessly..."	 But,	 as	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 Memoirs	 and	Chateaubriand's	extraordinary	life	makes	clear,	subjectivity	
only	 arises	 from	 this	 failure.	 This	 is	 why	 Hegel's	 implicit	critique	of	Kant	in	the	Phenomenology	 is	so	 important:	it	 is	when	imagination	successfully	turns	itself	in/to	the	sublime	that	subjectivity	is	decisively	defeated.			 Mourning	is	therefore	not	absent	from	the	Memoirs,	quite	 the	 contrary.	 What	 the	 Memoirs	 say	 about	Chateaubriand's	 1802	 publication	 of	 The	 Genius	 of	
Christianity	 in	 response	 to	 his	 mother's	 death	 fits	 Grigg's	account	of	mourning	to	the	letter.	I	quote	Chateaubriand:		 I	worked	with	the	zeal	of	a	son	who	is	building	a	 mausoleum	 to	 his	 mother	 (...)	 I	 wanted	 to	make	 a	 lot	 of	 noise	 so	 that	 it	 could	 go	 all	 the	
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way	 to	 the	resting	place	of	my	mother.	 (1982,	Part	1,	Book	XI,	chapter	8)		Now,	 is	not	a	mausoleum	exactly	 the	kind	of	 "memorial	 in	the	 symbolic"	 Grigg	 pointed	 to	with	 respect	 to	mourning?	Interestingly	 enough,	 French	 twentieth-century	 scholar	Albert	Thibaudet	remarked	that	the	Memoirs	become	a	kind	of	monumental	tomb	like	the	Pyramid	of	Cheops	(2016,	67).	Chateaubriand	himself	writes	that	"these	Memoirs	will	be	a	mortuary	 temple	 erected	 by	 the	 light	 of	 my	 memories"	(1982,	 first	 chapter).	 It	 is	 as	 if,	 with	 the	 writers	 that	immediately	follow	the	Revolution	(the	French	Romantics),	starting	 with	 Chateaubriand,	 the	 symbolic	 plane	 itself	experiences	death.	 It	 is	no	longer	a	question	of	staging	the	richness	 of	 symbolic	 life,	 as	 in	 Shakespeare's	 magnificent	plays,	but	a	question	of	recounting	the	unique	experience	of	symbolic	 death	 that	 the	 withdrawal	 of	 the	 Other	 has	brought	 forth.	 The	 evacuation	 of	 all	 contents	 that	 Comay	describes	in	her	book	actually	leaves	a	singular	object	in	its	wake:	 style.	 Thibaudet	 notes	 that	 the	 Memoirs	 find	 Man	stylised,	stylised	by	style	itself	(2016,	69),	to	the	point	that	"Buffon's	mot	["style	is	the	man	himself"]	is	inverted:	Man	is	Style."	Style	presupposes	an	Author,	that	is	to	say	someone	who	 rises	 to	 the	 challenge	 of	 death	 by	 digging	 one's	 own	grave	 to	 be	 able	 to	 write	 the	 epitaph	 (and	 have	 the	 last	
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laugh...).	 This	 definition	 is	 in	 stark	 contrast	 to	 the	aestheticism	 of	 Kant	 and	 Nietzsche	 we	 examined	 earlier:	their	 sublime	 instead	bury	 the	Author	under	 the	Object,	 it	prophesizes	 the	 eternal	 return	 of	 all	 imaginary	 content	under	 the	 sun	 in	 a	 desperate	 attempt	 to	 ward	 off	 the	nightfall	 of	 abstract	 freedom.	By	 contrast,	 this	 question	 of	style	in	relation	to	symbolic	death	is	key	in	Two	Negations.	I	quote	the	Second	Negation:		 Can	 we	 all	 colonise	 our	 own	 deaths?	 That	 is	the	political	question.	(N2§20)		As	Two	Negations	fashions	its	own	symbolic	articulation	(so	its	own	death),	style	gradually	comes	to	consciousness	and	logically	 has	 the	 last	 word,	 literally	 (see	 N2§242)	 and	figuratively.	Colonise	our	own	deaths	–	through	style.	And	it	is	a	political	question	because	it	concerns	the	emancipation	of	 the	 individual	 from	 external	 authority.	 This	 point	 leads	me	 to	 my	 final	 remark.	 What	 the	 conceptual	 journey	 of	Chateaubriand's	 Memoirs	 and	 the	 works	 of	 French	Romanticism	 at	 large	 (Hugo,	 Lamartine,	 Balzac,	 Gautier,	Stendhal,	Musset,	 Sand,	 etc.)	 reveal	 is	 the	 assumption	of	 a	new	 democratic	Master	 (capitalised	 to	 indicate	 a	 function	rather	than	someone	in	particular)	with	whom	sovereignty	now	 rests.	 This	 democratic	 Master	 contrasts	 with	 the	 old	
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aristocratic	 Master	 of	 the	 Ancien	 Régime	 Chateaubriand	readily	 dismisses	 in	 the	 first	 chapter	 of	 the	 Memoirs	("aristocracy	 has	 three	 successive	 ages:	 the	 age	 of	superiority,	 the	 age	 of	 privilege,	 the	 age	 of	 vanity;	 leaving	the	first	behind,	it	degenerates	in	the	second	and	expires	in	the	 last").	 This	 new	 democratic	 Master	 is	 that	 of	 the	individual	who	fashions	himself	or	herself	independently	of	traditional	 authorities	 such	 as	 the	 Church,	 the	 State,	 the	Family,	and	last	but	not	 least,	 the	University.	As	 it	piles	up	references	 to	 the	master-slave	 dialectic	 just	 before	 falling	silent	 (N2§239-242),	 this	 democratic	 Master	 is	 what	 Two	
Negations	 awkwardly,	 painfully,	 unconsciously	 works	 out	and	 sends	 back	 at	 the	 end.	 But	 to	 whom?	 That	 is	 the	question.	
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